The language of systematics, and the philosophy of ‘total evidence’

Abstract

This contribution analyses the primacy of classification over generalization, and the philosophy of total evidence that emerges from the relation of homology to character statements. Primary conjectures of homology are basic character statements, i.e. statements that predicate properties of organisms, properties that are instantiated by those organisms and/or their parts. Secondary conjectures of homology are embedded in a second‐level (metalinguistic) discourse that turns on the coherence or incoherence of those basic character statements relative to a hierarchy. The coherence or incoherence of character statements is a logical relation between statements, not a causal (historical) relation between organisms. The choice of the hypothesis of relationships that is supported by the largest set of coherent basic character statements is based on the empirical presupposition that the properties referred to by the set of coherent character statements are grounded in causally efficacious relations of inheritance and ontogeny, and co‐instantiated because they are inherited through common ancestry (Hennig's auxiliary principle). Unless that empirical presupposition is causally grounded, phylogeny reconstruction is of an inherently probabilistic nature, whether under parsimony or other models of analysis. The causal grounding of a coherent set of character statements typically seeks a link between character statements and causally efficacious generative mechanisms for morphological characters (as is defeasibly indicated by topology and connectivity), or secondary structure information for molecular characters.