The relationship between executive compensation and bank risk-taking is one of the core topics of corporate governance theory. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, due to the characteristics of banks, such as systemic risk, this relationship has become more important. However, though usually calculated on the basis of cash salary and inside equity, which can promote risk incentives, inside debt was considered a tool for risk reduction in prior empirical analyses. Based on actual bank situations, we had doubts about this relationship and wanted to verify the specific relationship between inside debt and risk. We initiated this research by setting up a theoretical model between inside debt and bank default risk and by simulating the result using data from Wells Fargo & Co. to draw the function image. We are the first to define the three kinds of compensation in three dimensions. Then, considering bankruptcy, we found the black box effect exists. Therefore, different from prior views, pay me later not only reduces but also increases risk. We expect our findings to offer help to the formulation of policies for pay contracts.