Carter Doctrine Research Articles

President Carter Policy Toward Arabian Gulf Carter Doctrine how it was drawn

The aim of this study is to discuss United States of America foreign policy toward the Arabian Gulf during President Carter Administration. The emphasis of the paper is on mainly in the role of the National Security Adviser namely Zbigniew Brzezinski securing Carter Doctrine as a policy.
 After the Iranian revolution and the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan, US policy toward the Gulf region was rather passing through tremendous changes. To protect the American interests in the area, President Carter had to draw a new policy. In the end he came up with Carter Doctrine. This research is more interested in the decision-making during Carter’s era. Therefore, the process of this policy and how it came about would be discussed in detail. Furthermore, a background of those participants in drawing that policy as well as the struggle among them would be discussed too.

The American role in the Anti-Soviet Afghan War (1977- 1980)

Purpose of the study: This study aims to discuss the American role in the anti-Soviet Afghan war and disclose the reasons for the Soviet worry about the growth of the fundamentalist terrorist groups inside Afghanistan.
 Methodology: This is library-based research work.
 Results: The article has come up with some main points on that severe war. One of these was that the American President Jimmy Carter's Doctrine in 1980. Carter's Doctrine could be considered a sort of policy that allows the use of military force in case American interests are exposed to Soviet threats. As a result, the American administration promised to militarily support the Afghan fighters against the Soviet control in Afghanistan. But, at the same time, the Americans failed to realize the ethnic, ideological, social, lingual, and theological structure of the Afghan society.
 Application: This study could have many applications in the faculties of politics and the contemporary altogether to teach the ways of public and secret or hidden political relationships between the secular states or so-called superpowers that employed the extremist groups to overwhelm the stable states that do not subdue to the western domination.
 Novelty: This study explores the incorrect claim of the superpowers in general and of the United States of America in particular of the theory of separation religion and the state, which is often used in the double standard.

Rethinking the Carter Doctrine and its Geopolitical Implications

This article combines insights from constructivism with historical analysis to argue that the US military engagement in the Gulf, beginning in the 1980s, was primarily driven by the changed roles of two actors: Iran after the Islamic Revolution and the United States attempting to regain its role as a global superpower following the Vietnam War. It argues that the year 1979 constitutes what constructivists deem a “critical juncture,” in which America’s response to three events—the Iranian Revolution/hostage crisis; the siege of Mecca’s Grand Mosque; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—helped to redefine the Gulf’s security architecture and made the region more insecure. It ends with a close examination of US participation in the Iran–Iraq War and the long-term implications of the Carter Doctrine’s changing logic.

Perspectives on The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>

Amerykańska polityka praw człowieka wobec Argentyny w czasie „brudnej wojny” 1976-1983

The U.S. Human Rights Policy Towards Argentina During the “Dirty War” 1976-1983 The paper aims to provide an analysis of the question of violations of human rights during the last military dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983) and the impact of this problem on bilateral relations with the United States. The article will focus mostly on the presidency of James “Jimmy” Earl Carter. The political line adopted by him, known as “the Carter doctrine” or “human rights policy” was the basis of restrictive attitude towards the Argentine dictators. In order to provide a complete analysis, the topic of the paper was treated broadly, covering not only bilateral, American-Argentine issues, but also multilateral forms of exerting pressure on Argentina, mainly at the United Nations and Organization of American States. The article also provides an analysis of the human rights policy itself, as well as of the state terror introduced by the Argentine military, known as the “Dirty War””.

Geopolitical dimensions of US oil security

The United States appears less exposed to geopolitical risks affecting its oil supply than at any time since the relatively stable period preceding the widespread oil sector nationalizations of the 1970s. Energy prosperity in the US contrasts with a more fraught period for traditional energy exporting states where geopolitical challenges have been compounded by fiscal stress and rising domestic energy demand. America's relationship with energy-exporting countries will continue to evolve as the US grows more self-sufficient and as more non-OPEC resources become viable, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Expanded geographic diversification of oil production portends a gradual diminution of the strategic importance of large crude oil exporters. One longer term potential effect of the US shale revolution may be, for example, an unwillingness in Washington to maintain the Carter Doctrine's promise of protection for its interests in the Persian Gulf, although this appears unlikely in the near term. Nevertheless, continued economic growth in developing Asia and the unlocking of new energy resources around the world means the geostrategic relationships that have protected energy supplies over the last 40 years are unlikely to endure over the long run.

Selling the Arc of Crisis: Promoting Foreign Policy Change during the Carter Presidency

AbstractThe Carter Administration came to Office seeking to continue a policy of détente. However, the Administration’s policy vis-à-vis the Soviets became more assertive throughout the Presidency, culminating in the Carter Doctrine. The current paper applies a conceptual framework for “issue selling” to argue that a more assertive foreign policy was being promoted by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his NSC staff since the early days of the Carter Presidency. By applying an assortment of issue selling strategies, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the NSC staff were able to exploit the communicative interactions amongst the political leadership to continuously promote a more forceful US policy towards the Soviets. By being able to interpret and define the problem representation facing the Administration, the APNSA was able initiate and continuously promote a wholesale policy transformation leading to the development of the Carter Doctrine.

Circumventing Hormuz

After 34 years, the Carter Doctrine remains valid. But there are cheaper and more effective ways of keeping the oil flowing than unilateral deployment of military force.

Similarity of Doctrines: American Domestic Politics and the Carter Doctrine

Similarity of Doctrines: American Domestic Politics and the Carter Doctrine

La "doctrina Obana", la teoría de "Guerra Limitada" y la nueva política exterior de EEUU; ¿hacia una nueva política neo-nixoniana?

La Administración Obama, al igual que la Administración Nixon y las subsiguientes administraciones norteamericanas se tuvieron que enfrentar con un cambio profundo en la estructura del sistema internacional y al síndrome Vietnam, creando la política de Detente y aplicando la Doctrina Nixon, la Administración Obama se enfrenta también a un sistema internacional cambiante y al síndrome Irak, que puede ayudar o paralizar a EEUU en situaciones de crisis a la hora del uso de la fuerza. Consistente con su visión del sistema internacional y de su política exterior, ha diseñado una doctrina para el uso de la fuerza militar por parte de EEUU. El problema es que esta etapa de Détente acabó llevando a la Doctrina Carter y una re-edición de la Guerra Fría.

No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since 1776

No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since 1776

Doctrinal Cycles and the Dual-Crisis of 1979

Though presidential doctrines claim to be broad, forward-looking articulations of national security principles, they are in fact reactive and narrow. They emerge following crises and can subsequently constrain security policy, creating ideal conditions for new crises to emerge. This paper thus argues that in the pursuit of security, presidential doctrines can perpetuate a cycle of instability. Using the Nixon Doctrine as the present case study reveals that the strategy first came as a response to the failure in Vietnam, then rendered the US unable to foresee or manage the events of 1979: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These crises subsequently forced a wholesale reassessment of security in the form of the Carter Doctrine. In examining this period of US–Middle East relations, the constricting, reactive nature of doctrines and the concomitant cycles of instability become self-evident.

Amerykańska wizja pokoju na Bliskim Wschodzie. Od „małych kroków” Henry’ego Kissingera do mediacji Jimmy’ego Cartera

An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger’s ‘little steps’ to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington’s influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called ‘J. Carter doctrine’) the US President said that every “attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America” and thus it “will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat’s death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt.

Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy

For years to come, historians are likely to ponder the reasons that led the United States to invade Iraq in March 2003-an invasion that has cost many lives and vast treasure but has yet to result in the establishment of a stable, legitimate regime. Many reasons, official and unofficial, have been advanced to explain the 2003 invasion, but none have proved entirely persuasive. The original explanation given for US military action-to eliminate the threat supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-no longer holds credibility, as it has long since been shown that US officials were aware before the invasion that Iraq possessed few, if WMD munitions. The main explanation provided after the invasion-to foster democracy in Iraq and neighbouring countries-has also lost credibility because of the increasingly violent hostility between Iraq's religious and sectarian factions. Other explanations, drawing on the ideological and personality traits of George W. Bush and other key figures involved, have also been offered. As times goes on, however, analysts are sure to consider the deeper historical forces that gave rise to the 2003 invasion-and this mode of analysis is likely to lead us back to the of 1980.The Carter doctrine was first enunciated in then-President Jimmy Carter's state of the union address of 23 January 1980, in which he informed congress and the American people that access to the Persian Gulf's oilfields was essential to the health of the US economy and so hostile effort to block such access would be considered an assault on America's vital interests and so would be resisted by any means necessary, including military force. To implement this policy, Carter established the rapid deployment joint task force (RDJTF) and deployed a permanent US naval presence in the Gulf. And while they may have employed different language, all the presidents who succeeded Carter have reaffirmed the basic premises of his 1980 doctrine and have taken steps to enhance America's capacity to project military force into the greater Persian Gulf region.Many formative expressions of America's Cold War policy-the Truman doctrine, the Eisenhower doctrine, and the Nixon doctrine, among others-have been rendered moot by the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Carter doctrine, however, continues to govern US foreign policy today. As will be argued below, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq can be viewed as a natural extension of the Carter doctrine, along with other US military moves in the Persian Gulf area. But the logic of the Carter doctrine is no longer being applied to the Gulf alone: increasingly, access to oil in other producing areas is being viewed in Washington as a vital interest, and thus as something that must be protected by military force whenever necessary. Indeed, the globalization of the Carter doctrine may prove to be one of the most significant developments of the post-Cold War era.ORIGINS OF THE CARTER DOCTRINEThe origins of the Carter doctrine can be traced back to February 1945, when the United States first established a protectorate over Saudi Arabia and committed itself to the use of military force in protecting Persian Gulf oil. This move was triggered by Washington's concern over the nation's declining oil output and a desire to ensure the safety of its overseas supplies. Until 1945, the United States was largely self-sufficient in petroleum production and, in most years, produced a large enough surplus to satisfy the needs of many foreign consumers as well. But the requirements of wartime consumption plus intimations of an eventual decline in US output led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to seek control over foreign sources of petroleum. By 1943, he had concluded that Saudi Arabia was likely to assume the role of America's principal foreign supplier after World War II, and, by 1945, had determined that the United States must extend some sort of protective umbrella over Saudi Arabia's prolific oil fields. …

The New US Middle East Policy and Energy Security Challenges

The direct link between United States' energy security policy and its military policy in Persian Gulf can be traced back to formulation of Carter doctrine in late 19705 and subsequent creation of rapid deployment force (RDF)-ancestor to US central command (CENTCOM)-in early igSos.' The threat has evolved with strategic context-from a Soviet incursion into Gulf after invasion of Afghanistan, to an Iranian attack against Gulf monarchies after 1979, to regional security implications of Iraq-1 ran to threat posed by Saddam Hussein after end of with Iran-but objective has remained same: to sanctuarize petro-monarchies of Gulf, and especially Saudi Arabia, against any external threat; in other words, to prevent heart of world oil system from being caught up into regional political instability.FROM POLICEMAN TO POLITICAL ENGINEERTo use a term from political philosophy, US involvement in Persian Gulf under Carter doctrine amounted to applying a negative power: it was meant to prevent people from doing certain things more than it aimed at shaping region. The US has made it impossible for Iran and Iraq, successively, to threaten security of production and export facilities of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, as well as sea-lanes of Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. But from late 1970s until 11 September 2001, US had never seriously tried to change regimes of Iran, Iraq, or Syria, to prevent Iraq and Iran from fighting, or to push for political reforms in monarchies of Gulf. The type of power that United States has applied in Middle East under Carter doctrine is that of a policeman, not that of a planner.After terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Bush administration undertook a complete reorientation of US policy in Middle East. At core of new approach is idea that to win war on terrorism United States must take advantage of its unprecedented power to freedom-promote democracy and market economy-throughout world, and especially across Arab-Muslim world. The second aspect of Bush doctrine-as new policy has come to be called-is concept of preemptive war, which actually means preventive war: nature of threat confronting United States-a combination of transnational terrorist networks, evil regimes, failed states, and proliferation of unconventional weapons-requires that US be ready to act preventively. This second pillar of Bush doctrine contributes to its revolutionary character but is of less importance for purpose of this article than policy of democracy promotion in Middle East.The first comprehensive policy document presenting Bush doctrine was national security strategy of United States of America (NSS) released by White House in September 2002. was also conveyed to American people and to world in a series of speeches by President Bush in 2002 and 2003.2 The latest NSS document, published in March 2006, tones down doctrine of preemption-though it formally maintains it-but strongly reaffirms strategic commitment to advancement of liberty. In his introductory letter, Bush reaffirms that fighting and winning on terror and promoting freedom as alternative to tyranny and despair are two inseparable priorities of US foreign policy, and that the advance of liberty will make America more secure. The first sentence of NSS itself states: It is policy of United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.1 The Bush doctrine has evoked an intense debate among foreign policy experts but, more than three years after launch of in Iraq, promotion of political freedom is still guiding principle of Bush administration's Middle East policy. …

The Road to Baghdad: The United States and the Persian Gulf

The Road to Baghdad: The United States and the Persian Gulf

Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The Continuing Salience of the Carter Doctrine

Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The Continuing Salience of the Carter Doctrine

U.S. Military Hegemony in the Arabian/Persian Gulf: How Long Can It Last?

Throughout the autumn and into the winter of 2002–2003 the world watched as the United States prepared to wage war against Iraq. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon had added two battalions of troops to the single battalion of 2,500 troops already on station in Kuwait, establishing a mechanized brigade of more than 6,000-strong.1 By the end of August 2002 the United States had added two brigade-sets of materiel, each consisting of equipment for two armored battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion, to the one brigade-set already prepositioned in Kuwait—enough firepower to support 15–25,000 troops.2 In the few days it would take to airlift these soldiers to the region, the United States could quickly add three brigades of soldiers armed with 200-plus tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers to the forward deployed troops and firepower already stationed in northern Kuwait near Iraq’s border. While U.N. weapons inspectors were allowed back in Iraq in November, Saddam Hussein got a close-up look at U.S. war fighting capabilities in early December when 12,000 U.S. troops participated in a long-planned war game exercise in northern Kuwait. At the same time, in Qatar, a command exercise was held simulating a full-scale regional war. The Bush administration’s ability to flex U.S. military muscle in the Gulf region is facilitated by the extensive strategic infrastructure the United States constructed in the region following the defeat of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait in 1991. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the first Bush administration initially had to rely on the “over-the-horizon” military network created under the aegis of the Carter Doctrine during the 1980s. As the Iran hostage situation dragged on and with the Soviet Union having invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, the United States responded with the Carter Doctrine. …

The Carter presidency: a re-evaluation

The Carter presidency competence - Washington from the outside human rights in domestic context - the case of women's rights Black civil rights compassion and foreign policy - the case of the Soviet Union and Northern Ireland human rights and revolutions - Nicaragua and Iran from human rights to the Carter doctrine.

The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia

When the Carter Doctrine was enunciated in January 1980, the United States was still reeling from a series of blows to its strategic position in Southwest Asia.1 In February 1979, the shah of Iran had been overthrown; subsequent relations with his successors, troubled by the legacy of United States support for the shah, were increasingly complicated by the ongoing revolution in Iran and, after November 1979, by the frustrating interaction between Iranian politics and the hostage crisis. An attack on Mecca's Grand Mosque in December, moreover, suggested that fundamentalist Islam was not unique to Iran, but was an emerging force on the Arabian Peninsula. The burning of the American embassy in Islamabad (precipitated by the erroneous belief that the United States was responsible for the attack on the Grand Mosque) indicated the extent to which the United States was perceived by Muslims throughout the region as hostile to Islam.