The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia

Abstract

When the Carter Doctrine was enunciated in January 1980, the United States was still reeling from a series of blows to its strategic position in Southwest Asia.1 In February 1979, the shah of Iran had been overthrown; subsequent relations with his successors, troubled by the legacy of United States support for the shah, were increasingly complicated by the ongoing revolution in Iran and, after November 1979, by the frustrating interaction between Iranian politics and the hostage crisis. An attack on Mecca's Grand Mosque in December, moreover, suggested that fundamentalist Islam was not unique to Iran, but was an emerging force on the Arabian Peninsula. The burning of the American embassy in Islamabad (precipitated by the erroneous belief that the United States was responsible for the attack on the Grand Mosque) indicated the extent to which the United States was perceived by Muslims throughout the region as hostile to Islam.