U.S. Military Hegemony in the Arabian/Persian Gulf: How Long Can It Last?

Abstract

Throughout the autumn and into the winter of 2002–2003 the world watched as the United States prepared to wage war against Iraq. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon had added two battalions of troops to the single battalion of 2,500 troops already on station in Kuwait, establishing a mechanized brigade of more than 6,000-strong.1 By the end of August 2002 the United States had added two brigade-sets of materiel, each consisting of equipment for two armored battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion, to the one brigade-set already prepositioned in Kuwait—enough firepower to support 15–25,000 troops.2 In the few days it would take to airlift these soldiers to the region, the United States could quickly add three brigades of soldiers armed with 200-plus tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers to the forward deployed troops and firepower already stationed in northern Kuwait near Iraq’s border. While U.N. weapons inspectors were allowed back in Iraq in November, Saddam Hussein got a close-up look at U.S. war fighting capabilities in early December when 12,000 U.S. troops participated in a long-planned war game exercise in northern Kuwait. At the same time, in Qatar, a command exercise was held simulating a full-scale regional war. The Bush administration’s ability to flex U.S. military muscle in the Gulf region is facilitated by the extensive strategic infrastructure the United States constructed in the region following the defeat of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait in 1991. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the first Bush administration initially had to rely on the “over-the-horizon” military network created under the aegis of the Carter Doctrine during the 1980s. As the Iran hostage situation dragged on and with the Soviet Union having invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, the United States responded with the Carter Doctrine. …