Capital-constrained Supply Chain Research Articles

System dynamics modeling and robustness analysis for capital-constrained supply chain under disruption

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to explore mitigation measures for cash flow interruption during the epidemic and provide decision support to ensure the regular operation and robustness of the supply chain (SC).Design/methodology/approachConsidering the scenarios of production capacity and demand disruption during the epidemic, the authors adopt system dynamics (SD) to construct a three-echelon SC financial system consisting of a core manufacturer, a capital-constrained retailer and the customer. In different interruption scenarios, through the decision adjustments of stakeholders, the differences in performance are compared to explore solutions for SC robust optimization.FindingsThe results show that partial credit guarantee (PCG) could solve cash flow interruption and maintain the regular operation of the SC. During epidemic, with the product price increases, the revenue of stakeholders and the robustness are generally negatively correlated. But when the manufacturer's production capacity is fully interrupted, increasing product price is the right decision for the retailer and could simultaneously promote performance and robustness.Originality/valueThis paper primarily focuses on the PCG under the cash flow interruption caused by epidemics. The authors adopt the supply chain finance (SCF) theory and SD method to supplement and expand existing research on interruption management of SC. It is a pioneering study to explore the robustness of the SC financial system under disruptions.

Financing and information sharing in capital-constrained supply chain

This paper focuses on financing choices and information-sharing strategies in the capital-constrained supply chain. We model four scenarios with the capital constraints of the respective manufacturer and retailer using bank credit financing (BCF) and trade credit financing (TCF) approaches to address financing problems, and investigate the retailer’s willingness to share demand forecasting information. We find that TCF is an equilibrium financing choice for a capital-constrained supply chain. However, when a capital-constrained member chooses TCF, sharing demand information over the supply chain becomes more difficult. The interactions between the choices of financing approach and information sharing based on the game equilibriums, as well as the conditions that encourage the well-funded member to offer TCF in the capital-constrained supply chains, have also been analytically explored and numerically verified. Additional managerial insights are provided for discussions.

The Impact of Trade Credit on Financing Strategy in a Dual Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

This study analyzes the financing strategy of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, both subject to capital constraints. Specifically, the bank provides loans to the manufacturer, who then grants trade credit to the retailer. Based on the three-party game analysis framework of the bank, manufacturer, and retailer, this paper constructs a supply chain financing model under the information symmetry and information asymmetry structures, respectively; measures the maximum financing ability of the manufacturer; and discusses the influence of trade credit, moral hazard, and information structure on the manufacturer’s and bank’s strategies. The results show that under the trade credit situation, it is critical for the bank to provide loan to manufacturer who does not have moral hazard. The maximum financing capacity of the manufacturer is affected by the rate of return on moral hazard and the intensity of trade credit default. The increase of trade credit default intensity and risk exposure will lead to the increase of the interest rate of bank loan, and in the case of information asymmetry, the bank will often ask for a higher interest rate to deal with the information disadvantage. The strategy for the bank to make the credit line is more complex, and the degree of information asymmetry plays a positive moderating effect on the influence of trade credit on the credit line. Our findings provide implications for participants who implement financing actions to improve their financial performance and control the moral hazard and default risk along a supply chain.

Mixed financing modes for capital-constrained supply chain with risk-averse members

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer are risk-averse decision makers. The capital-constrained retailer may adopt two mixed financing modes: (1) bank credit and equity financing (BEF) and (2) trade credit and equity financing (TEF). Using a mean-variance framework, we analyze the supply chain members financing and ordering decisions in two cases: symmetric and asymmetric retailer risk aversion threshold information. In the case of symmetric information, we characterize the conditions under which both the supplier and the retailer prefer BEF or TEF. In the case of asymmetric information, we demonstrate that the retailer has an incentive to pretend to be less risk averse. To prevent this distortion behavior, we design a minimum quantity contract for the supplier. Finally, we extend our model to a bank loan-trade credit-equity mixed financing mode (BTEF) in which the retailer can borrow from the bank and the supplier and seeks financial support from investors. The numerical simulations support our results.

Recovery from demand disruption: Two-stage financing strategy for a capital-constrained supply chain under uncertainty

This paper addresses recovery strategies for supply chain enterprises under uncertain demand. Specifically, a bank or supplier is considered to provide financing for a capital-constrained retailer to reduce or even eliminate the negative impact of disruption. The problem is formulated with a bank-supplier-retailer game model. A robust optimization approach is used to obtain the retailer’s minimax regret order quantity where only the upper and lower bound of demand are known. Four financing strategy combinations for two-stage financing before and after demand disruption are proposed, including bank-bank, supplier-supplier, bank-supplier, and supplier-bank. With respect to supply chain recovery, three strategies of mixed recovery, pure penalty, and pure investment are proposed, and their performances are examined. Furthermore, the impact of each financing combination and recovery strategy on the retailer’s regret, bankruptcy risk, and profit are analyzed, which provides a basis for financing decisions. The relevant results show that the pure investment strategy can not only protect the bank and supplier from losing profit due to disruption, but also bring less bankruptcy risk to the retailer. On the other hand, penalty strategy can also mitigate the negative impact of disruption on the supplier, but it will lead the retailer to facing higher risk of bankruptcy. For the retailer, the bank-bank and bank-supplier financing combination is superior to the others because they are less likely to result in bankruptcy. Finally, as an extension, the proposed models are applied to some other financing schemes which are commonly employed in practice, and some managerial implications are drawn.

Price Timing and Financing Strategies for a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Stochastic Demand

Price Timing and Financing Strategies for a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Stochastic Demand

The Orchestrating Role of Carbon Subsidies in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

In this paper, we investigate the role of carbon subsidies in a capital-constrained supply chain. We analyze two green technology investment structures in such supply chains: one where the manufacturer determines the optimal carbon emission abatement level (MI-structure) and one where the retailer determines the optimal carbon emission abatement level (RI-structure). As the leader (the powerful participant or the first mover in a supply chain), the manufacturer may choose the investment structure that is most favorable to them. Our major findings are as follows: (1) carbon subsidies can improve the performance of a centralized green supply chain; (2) there exists a threshold value of carbon subsidy that determines the manufacturer’s choice of the best carbon emission abatement investment structure, but the retailer always benefits from RI-structure; and (3) the traditional cost-sharing contract fails to achieve green supply chain coordination. However, as an orchestrator, the carbon subsidy plays a crucial role in achieving quantity coordination when implemented alongside traditional cost-sharing contracts. Furthermore, using a parameter of side-payment, we propose a new contract design that facilitates win-win coordination.

Financing equilibrium in a capital constrained supply Chain: The impact of credit rating

In this study, we investigate a supply chain comprising one well-funded supplier and one small-sized retailer with capital constraints. The supplier acts as a leader to distribute one newsvendor-type product via the retailer in the uncertain market demand. In the presence of capital shortages, the retailer has two different financing alternatives: bank financing and trade credit. Moreover, the small-sized retailer has an imperfect credit rating, which reflects the exogenous credit risk beyond the current supply chain transaction. By capturing both the demand risk and credit risk, we model each financing strategy and derive the optimal solutions. When both financing strategies are feasible, we prove that the retailer always benefits from bank financing, while the supplier’s preferences are determined by two critical factors (i.e., the retailer’s credit rating and the production cost). Considering that the supplier’s preferences are not always aligned with the retailer’s, we characterize a wholesale price Pareto zone, in which trade credit is the unique equilibrium. We further generalize our model to consider that the retailer with a positive initial budget, finding that the feasible regions of two financing formats shrink as the initial budget builds up. Interestingly, when the initial capital of the retailer is moderate (still capital shortages), we observe that trade credit is more likely to be the financing equilibrium if the retailer’s credit rating is low. These findings enrich our understanding of the impact of credit rating on financially constrained supply chain operational and financial decisions.

Optimal financing strategies with 3PL customized service in a capital-constrained supply chain

• We adopted game theory and numerical analysis to analyze supply chain finance. • 3PL financing and bank financing modes are studied. 3PL firm undertakes customized service. • The optimal financing strategy depends on the ratio of revenue-sharing. • 3PL financing is the optimal strategy, achieving a win-win outcome. • When the retailer has extremely risk-averse attitude, bank financing might be the optimal financing strategy. Consumers are becoming more customized-conscious and customized service becomes particularly important. We suppose that 3PL firm and the newsvendor-like retailer are risk-neutral profit maximizers, and the retailer is capital-constrained, needing short-term financing. Considering customized service, we mainly discuss two financing sources: bank financing and 3PL financing, where the customized service level is determined by the retailer or 3PL firm. The results show that the optimal financing strategy depends on the ratio of revenue-sharing. When the ratio is within a certain range, 3PL financing is the optimal strategy, achieving a win–win outcome. This paper also discusses a case where the retailer has risk aversion behavior. We reach an interesting conclusion. When the retailer has extremely risk-averse attitude, bank financing might be the optimal financing strategy. When the retailer is relatively optimistic, 3PL financing is a wise choice. These conclusions give us some meaningful management inspirations in light of customized service.

The informational role of guarantee contracts

Guarantee credit financing (GCF), allows banks to offer loans to capital-constrained retailer (he) based on the guarantee contracts offered by the manufacturer (she). Therefore, this study investigates the signaling role of guarantee contracts when the retailer is less informed about its product's market potential. In particular, we explore a joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity to deliver the manufacturer's demand information. We add a framework to the capital-constrained supply chain with asymmetric demand information under GCF. Using a signaling game to capture the demand information asymmetry, we identify the strategic interaction between the retailer and the manufacturer under GCF. Also, we investigate the value of GCF when both GCF and trade credit financing (TCF) are viable. We find that the single guarantee contracts cannot signal the manufacturer's demand information when the production cost is less than a threshold, otherwise, only the separating equilibria survive the intuitive criterion. Besides, the findings reveal that the demand information asymmetry can either benefit or harm the retailer or the manufacturer, but cannot benefit both of them. In addition, GCF remains an attractive financing option when both GCF and TCF are viable. A joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity can be used to deliver the demand information if the guarantee contracts are invalid. Our paper helps to explain the impact of asymmetric demand information on supply chain partners’ decisions under GCF and sheds light on the design and use of guarantee contracts.

Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

Ordering and interest rate strategies in platform finance with an overconfident and commerce retailer

We investigate the effect of overconfidence on a capital-constrained supply chain under platform finance (PF), in which the e-commerce retailer (e-tailer) sells products and pursues a financing strategy through a platform. The e-tailer’s overconfident behavior is gauged by a cognitive bias in the estimation of demand variance. We develop Stackelberg games under two PF schemes: fulfillment by platform (FBP) and by e-commerce retailer (FBR). We find that overconfidence influences participants’ decisions and performance. Slight overconfidence weakens the platform’s bargaining power since the e-tailer will make conservative order decision and the platform will cut the interest rate. Severe overconfidence may be exploited by the platform since the e-tailer performs insensitive to the interest rate. We find there exists a Pareto region that entices both parties to participate in FBP.

Optimal portfolio financing selection in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk-averse members

ABSTRACT We first consider a supplier-retailer supply chain in which only the capital-constrained retailer is risk-averse while the supplier and the bank both are risk-neutral. The newsvendor-like retailer may fund its business by two portfolio financing schemes to satisfy uncertain market demand: (1) bank loans and the supplier’s equity investment (BCF-SI) and (2) bank loans and the supplier’s credit guarantee (BCF-SG). Using CVaR criterion, we model the behaviour of the risk-averse retailer to analytically derive the portfolio financing equilibrium in a Stackelberg supplier-led game separately for two portfolio financing schemes. We characterize the conditions under which the supplier and the retailer reach Pareto improvement under two portfolio financing schemes compared with the non-financing benchmark. Moreover, we extend the model to the case in that the supplier and retailer both are risk-averse while only the bank is risk-neutral to further investigate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal financing scheme selection. The numerical examples verify our theoretical results.

The effects of in-transit inventory financing on the capital-constrained supply chain

In-transit inventory financing is gaining popularity as an alternative way to access financing. However, compared with other financing means such as trade credit and bank loans, the effects on the supply chain of a third-party logistics provider (TPL) providing in-transit inventory financing are seldom investigated. This study adopts a channel competition model to examine the impact of such financing on the supply chain. Through comparative analysis with conventional financing approaches, we find that the availability of in-transit inventory financing allows retailers to take advantage of a lower financing fee for trade credit, even when the demand for trade credit decreases. In addition, the TPL-provided financing service can lead to a reduction in financing fee for both trade credit and in-transit inventory financing when both the supplier and retailers have financing demand or the TPL is subject to a high degree of risk aversion. Finally, when the TPL has the first-mover advantage in setting its financing fee, the supplier with a financing demand pays a lower financing fee to the TPL due to the decreased demand for in-transit inventory financing. In this case, we find that the low logistics cost, the low unit product price without trade credit and a high financing ratio can make in-transit inventory financing more attractive than trade credit. Our results have important implications for the implementation of in-transit inventory financing in supply chains.

Impact of financing models and carbon allowance allocation rules in a supply chain

This paper focuses on a capital-constrained supply chain system under a carbon trading environment. Bank Credit Financing and Trade Credit Financing models are designed under the grandfathering and benchmarking allocation rules. Through constructing a Stackelberg game model consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained manufacturer who is investing in carbon emission reduction, we analyze the optimal decisions and financing selection strategies under different allowance allocation rules. These results show that the manufacturer always invests a higher carbon emission reduction under the benchmarking rule. Meanwhile, he always prefers BCF no matter how the carbon allocation rules change. Whereas, the upstream supplier would like to provide delayed payment under TCF. The government is beneficial to provide the benchmarking rule to the manufacturer when his historical carbon emission is lower, otherwise, the government can implement the grandfathering rule.

Financing strategy selection and coordination considering risk aversion in a capital-constrained supply chain

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>By applying Stackelberg game theory, this paper investigates the supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse supplier, measuring risk-averse behavior by using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The equilibrium solutions of the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's order quantity are obtained under two financing strategies: supplier financing (SF) and supplier investment (SI). It is found that the supplier's risk aversion is a crucial factor affecting both parties' financing decisions, and the supplier should offer different financing strategies to the retailer based on his risk attitude and the profit-sharing coefficient. However, the retailer prefers SF regardless of the supplier's risk aversion. Taking bank credit financing as a basic model, the advantages of SF and SI have been investigated. A Pareto improvement region for the two finance strategies has been identified and some suggestions are provided for the supplier's optimal utility. Then we extend to the situation that both parties are risk-averse and use the financing cost-sharing mechanism to achieve centralized decision-making.</p>

The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer’s possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer’s optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier’s optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher’s price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher’s value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher’s price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher’s price is small, the supplier’s optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms’ decisions. The results show that the voucher’s price should be small so that the large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher’s value is large and the voucher’s price is medium.

The Impact of Equity Financing on the Performance of Capital-Constrained Supply Chain under Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

The reduction in carbon emissions by industrial enterprises is an important means for promoting environmental protection and achieving sustainable development. To determine the impact of carbon emissions reduction on supply chain operation and financing decision-making, in this study we designed three financing strategies, i.e., bank loan financing, equity financing, and hybrid financing (a combination of bank loan financing and equity financing), for a manufacturer (leader) and a low-carbon supply chain composed of a capital-constrained retailer, constructed Stackelberg game models, solved the equilibrium results under each financing strategy using the reverse recursion method, and revealed the financing preference of the supply chain member companies through comparative analysis. The results showed that the increase in the consumers’ low-carbon preference and equity financing ratio have positive impacts on supply chain equilibrium, a result that is opposite that for the impact of the interest rate of bank loan financing; additionally, the abovementioned three factors jointly determine the profit of the manufacturer of the low-carbon supply chain, while the retailer’s profit is affected by the equity dividend ratio. Finally, we present the conditions for the financing preference of the manufacturer and the retailer. The findings of this study can provide references for low-carbon supply chain companies to make appropriate management decisions.

Effects of demand uncertainty reduction on the selection of financing approach in a capital-constrained supply chain

This study investigates how demand uncertainty reduction (DUR) affects the decisional dynamics within a supply chain, which comprises a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer, who chooses between bank credit and trade credit financing. A comprehensive scenario analysis suggests the retailer should accept trade credit when DUR is high, trade credit risk premium is moderate, and wholesale price is exogenous and low. However, the retailer should adopt trade credit only when both DUR and production cost are not high, and wholesale price is set endogenously. We further relax the assumption on the bank’s risk attitude and find most results still hold.

Trade Credit Financing for Two Competitive Retailers in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

This study examines trade credit strategy in a supply chain framework including one manufacturer and two competitive retailers under a Cournot game setting. We consider three supply chain models depending on how many retailers have capital constraints: (i) Model NN (i.e., none of the retailers has capital constraints); (ii) model AN (i.e., a single retailer has capital constraint); and (iii) model AA (i.e., dual retailers have capital constraints). We analyze equilibrium strategies of supply chain under three models, and show that the manufacturer sets a higher price for a capital-constrained retailer than that for a fund-abundant retailer. Notably, the fund-abundant retailer’s wholesale price is not dependent on its rival’s capital status. Certain numerical experiments have been performed to show the impact of retailer’s competition, market disturbance, and production cost on trade credit financing strategy. Findings reveal that by increasing the horizontal competition intensity, the capital-constrained retailer benefits more from trade credit. With a higher market disturbance or a higher production cost, the manufacturer is more willing to offer trade credit to capital-constrained retailers.