The informational role of guarantee contracts

Abstract

Guarantee credit financing (GCF), allows banks to offer loans to capital-constrained retailer (he) based on the guarantee contracts offered by the manufacturer (she). Therefore, this study investigates the signaling role of guarantee contracts when the retailer is less informed about its product's market potential. In particular, we explore a joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity to deliver the manufacturer's demand information. We add a framework to the capital-constrained supply chain with asymmetric demand information under GCF. Using a signaling game to capture the demand information asymmetry, we identify the strategic interaction between the retailer and the manufacturer under GCF. Also, we investigate the value of GCF when both GCF and trade credit financing (TCF) are viable. We find that the single guarantee contracts cannot signal the manufacturer's demand information when the production cost is less than a threshold, otherwise, only the separating equilibria survive the intuitive criterion. Besides, the findings reveal that the demand information asymmetry can either benefit or harm the retailer or the manufacturer, but cannot benefit both of them. In addition, GCF remains an attractive financing option when both GCF and TCF are viable. A joint contract of guarantee credit and production quantity can be used to deliver the demand information if the guarantee contracts are invalid. Our paper helps to explain the impact of asymmetric demand information on supply chain partners’ decisions under GCF and sheds light on the design and use of guarantee contracts.