Weapons Capability Research Articles

Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation

Russia and the United States have a special responsibility to connect “vertical” nuclear disarmament and “horizontal” nonproliferation. Russian and American behavior will influence the choices made by nonnuclear states about the decision for a nuclear weapons capability or for the acquisition of a complete nuclear fuel cycle with the potential for weaponization. This study uses an analytical model to examine the stability of a possible future world in which nonproliferation efforts “hold the line” against new nuclear states, while the U.S. and Russia maintain stable deterrence at reduced levels of deployed forces.

Review: Canada in Norad 1957–2007

CANADA IN NORAD 1957-2007 A History Joseph T. Jockei Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queerfs University Press, 2007. 225PP, $34.95 paper (ISBN 978-1-55339-134-0)Joseph Jockei, professor of Canadian studies at St Lawrence University, is an authority on post- World War II United States-Canadian defence relations. He has taken a particular interest in North American continental air defence, and this is his second book on the subject His first was No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, Ae United States and the Origins of North American Defense 1945- 1958, published in 1987.Canada in NORAD continues the story from 1957 to 2007 and is focused on the origins and history of the North American air (and now aerospace) defence agreement and the organization created by that agreement known as the North American aerospace or NORAD. The book looks at three aspects of NORAD: the trajectory and growth of United States-Canadian cooperation in North American air defence as the threat changed; NORAD as a United States-Canadian binational command; and the evolution of the agreement itself.The United States and Canada established NORAD to respond to the threat presented to North America by Soviet bombers. They realized that the speed at which those bombers could arrive, plus the lethality of their nuclear cargo, necessitated an immediate, coordinated response. It was clear that there would not be enough time to plan as each incident developed. Jockei convincingly argues that what made NORAD politically possible was the concept of Jockeis description of how the agreement works is excellent he notes that the commander of NORAD (by custom an American officer with a Canadian deputy commander) would the power to direct coordinate and control the operational activities of assigned while would remain in national hands (35). Command here means administration, discipline, training, pay, promotion, and the ability to or remove forces. A key point is that the assign or remove forces responsibility rests with each government and not NORAD.The agreement created NORAD as an integrated (binational) organization of United States and Canadian personnel where operational decision-making and financial responsibilities are shared. For example, the director of operations is usually a Canadian officer, and this was true on n September 200I. The Canadian deputy commander is frequently the acting commander of NORAD, since the United States commander is also the commander of at least one other United States and thus is frequently away. It is interesting to read about the trouble (perhaps exceeding his authority) the US commander took in 1958 to ensure that his Canadian deputy was familiar with the capabilities of NORAD's nuclear weapons in the event that he needed to declare that their use was warranted (27-9, 197).Both governments have strongly supported NORAD. Until very recently, it has usually been the American position that NORAD should be the primary vehicle for North American air defence, supported by other commands. Jockei cites a statement by NORAD's commander in 1967: Air and missile defense must be directed by a single individual and this individual must be CINCNORAD.... NORAD should be the primary command (75).It had been the United States' expectation that NORAD would have operational control of the national missile defence system (149). In 1999 there was discussion of giving it an expanded homeland defence function (161), thinking that continued to hold after 9/n (178). …

Chapter Three: Can Iran's Capability Be Kept Non-Weaponised?

This paper explains how Iran developed its nuclear programme to the point where it threatens to achieve a weapons capability within a short time frame, and analyses Western policy responses aimed at forestalling that capability. Key questions are addressed: will the world have to accept an Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and does having a weapons capability mean having the Bomb? For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue emphasised denial of supply. Since 2002, there has also been a demand-side dimension to the strategy, aimed at changing Iran's cost–benefit calculations through inducements and pressure. But the failure of these policies to prevent Iran from coming close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability has promoted suggestions for fallback strategies that would grant legitimacy to uranium enrichment in Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. The paper assesses these ‘second-best’ options in terms of their feasibility and their impact on the proliferation risks of diversion of nuclear material and knowledge, clandestine development and NPT break-out, and the risk of stimulating a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond. It concludes that the risks are still best minimised by reinforcing the binary choice presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation, and strengthening denial of supply.

Chapter Two: Western Strategy So Far

This paper explains how Iran developed its nuclear programme to the point where it threatens to achieve a weapons capability within a short time frame, and analyses Western policy responses aimed at forestalling that capability. Key questions are addressed: will the world have to accept an Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and does having a weapons capability mean having the Bomb? For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue emphasised denial of supply. Since 2002, there has also been a demand-side dimension to the strategy, aimed at changing Iran's cost–benefit calculations through inducements and pressure. But the failure of these policies to prevent Iran from coming close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability has promoted suggestions for fallback strategies that would grant legitimacy to uranium enrichment in Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. The paper assesses these ‘second-best’ options in terms of their feasibility and their impact on the proliferation risks of diversion of nuclear material and knowledge, clandestine development and NPT break-out, and the risk of stimulating a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond. It concludes that the risks are still best minimised by reinforcing the binary choice presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation, and strengthening denial of supply.

Conclusion

This paper explains how Iran developed its nuclear programme to the point where it threatens to achieve a weapons capability within a short time frame, and analyses Western policy responses aimed at forestalling that capability. Key questions are addressed: will the world have to accept an Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and does having a weapons capability mean having the Bomb? For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue emphasised denial of supply. Since 2002, there has also been a demand-side dimension to the strategy, aimed at changing Iran's cost–benefit calculations through inducements and pressure. But the failure of these policies to prevent Iran from coming close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability has promoted suggestions for fallback strategies that would grant legitimacy to uranium enrichment in Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. The paper assesses these ‘second-best’ options in terms of their feasibility and their impact on the proliferation risks of diversion of nuclear material and knowledge, clandestine development and NPT break-out, and the risk of stimulating a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond. It concludes that the risks are still best minimised by reinforcing the binary choice presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation, and strengthening denial of supply.

Chapter One: Framing the Problem: Iran's Pursuit of Fissile Material

This paper explains how Iran developed its nuclear programme to the point where it threatens to achieve a weapons capability within a short time frame, and analyses Western policy responses aimed at forestalling that capability. Key questions are addressed: will the world have to accept an Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and does having a weapons capability mean having the Bomb? For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue emphasised denial of supply. Since 2002, there has also been a demand-side dimension to the strategy, aimed at changing Iran's cost–benefit calculations through inducements and pressure. But the failure of these policies to prevent Iran from coming close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability has promoted suggestions for fallback strategies that would grant legitimacy to uranium enrichment in Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. The paper assesses these ‘second-best’ options in terms of their feasibility and their impact on the proliferation risks of diversion of nuclear material and knowledge, clandestine development and NPT break-out, and the risk of stimulating a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond. It concludes that the risks are still best minimised by reinforcing the binary choice presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation, and strengthening denial of supply.

Notes

This paper explains how Iran developed its nuclear programme to the point where it threatens to achieve a weapons capability within a short time frame, and analyses Western policy responses aimed at forestalling that capability. Key questions are addressed: will the world have to accept an Iranian uranium enrichment programme, and does having a weapons capability mean having the Bomb? For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue emphasised denial of supply. Since 2002, there has also been a demand-side dimension to the strategy, aimed at changing Iran's cost–benefit calculations through inducements and pressure. But the failure of these policies to prevent Iran from coming close to achieving a nuclear-weapons capability has promoted suggestions for fallback strategies that would grant legitimacy to uranium enrichment in Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. The paper assesses these ‘second-best’ options in terms of their feasibility and their impact on the proliferation risks of diversion of nuclear material and knowledge, clandestine development and NPT break-out, and the risk of stimulating a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond. It concludes that the risks are still best minimised by reinforcing the binary choice presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation, and strengthening denial of supply.

A Detailed Study of the Effectiveness and Capabilities of 18th Century Musketry on the Battlefield

During the mid 18th century, the standard British Army issue weapon was the Brown Bess Musket. There are various accounts of the performance of this early form of firearm and its tactical deployment (e.g. Hanger 1816). Using a technical replica of the Brown Bess, range trials and computer modelling have been used to asses the weapon's capabilities and likely performance. The research found the Brown Bess musket to be a lethal weapon at the ranges at which enemy was commonly engaged, so long as it was accurate enough to hit the target. A single shot fired at 150 yards could penetrate at least two soldiers, even if bone were hit. The armour of the day (shields of wood, leather and sometimes steel, and the layers of woollen clothing) was easily pierced by the shot. The shot was found to readily deform on impact with metal targets. The maximum range could extend to around 1200m, with 202m reached when fired horizontally.

Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli

This article examines Libya's nuclear rollback in light of sources that have emerged since December 2003. These sources offer new perspectives on the Libyan regime's motives for pursuing nuclear weapons, why it concluded that the effort to acquire nuclear weapons was becoming a threat to national security, and how this reflects on Libya's security policy under Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. It will be argued that this particular case illustrates a recent trend towards post-revolutionary realpolitik in Libyan foreign and security policy. Libya's decision to end its long-standing pursuit of nuclear weapons came as a double shock to the international community. Not only was this a surprising move by the eccentric Libyan leader, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, but few had realized how far Libya had progressed in acquiring resources for a nuclear weapons program. Before the announcement of Libya's nuclear rollback in December 2003, the outside world had substantially underestimated Libya's progress in obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities. Since then, more technical information has emerged about Libya's nuclear weapons program but less is known about the regime's reasons for pursuing and then abstaining from these weapons capabilities. Sources that have emerged since 2003 offer more insight into several aspects of the evolution of Libya's nuclear weapons project and why it came to a halt. This article examines these new sources and supplements them with the author's interviews with key Libyan officials. This study examines three main questions. First, what led the Libyan regime to pursue nuclear weapons? Second, why did the Libyan regime come to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent had become a security threat? Third, what does this tell us about Libya's evolving national security policy under Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi? With one notable exception, is no literature on the Libyan regime's decision making in the field of security.1 The literature on policy-making processes in the Libyan regime consists of a few groundbreaking studies that point to the need for further detailed and updated analyses.2 Libyan scholar Amal Obeidi argues that there are problems and obstacles related to the security studies field in Libya in particular. Because of the sensitivity of these topics scholars have been reluctant to deal with or explore such areas.3 What is known, however, is that regime survival remains the Libyan regime's first priority.4 So far, Libya's nuclear policy turnaround has largely been explained in terms of external developments and influences associated with the post-9/11 security agenda. Analysts have pointed to increasingly robust non-proliferation measures since 2001, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and/or the trilateral negotiations between the United States, Libya, and the United Kingdom as the causes of Libya's policy change.5 While American and European governments stressed either punitive measures, increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation, or the facilitating role and incentives associated with international diplomacy, academics have more persuasively pointed to the successful combination of carrots and sticks in the American and British efforts to persuade Libya to discontinue the pursuit of nuclear weapons.6 Others, in turn, have argued that Libya's seeming volte-face was rooted in a reorientation of Libyan foreign and security policy dating back to the mid-1980s.7 What is largely absent from these attempts to explain Libya's nuclear rollback is the perspective from Tripoli on the internal processes and developments that led to this policy change. In particular, the changing relationship between Libyan grand strategy and the objectives driving the pursuit of nuclear weapons has been missing from the academic debate. By incorporating these perspectives into the analysis, a richer explanation of Libya's nuclear rollback can be developed. This article posits that Libya's reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons reflected the regime's changing foreign and security policy priorities. …

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran. 1 1 Many of this article's arguments are based on interviews and meetings with more than 200 individuals between July and December of 2007. These interviews were conducted in the United States, as well Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges and India's Response

India is uniquely placed in the international security and political environment as it neither falls within the NPT ‘definition’ of ‘nuclear weapon states’ nor is it a country that can be ignored in any international arrangement without taking into account the reality of its being a state with nuclear weapons capability. At a time when proliferation challenges are assuming disturbing levels, this article seeks to examine the policy options available for India to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The US-India Nuclear Accord

The US-India nuclear accord of July 2005 and the subsequent Henry Hyde nuclear cooperation act of December 2006 have generated considerable debate among supporters and opponents largely on the basis of its potential implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Critics argue that the agreement undermines confidence in the nonproliferation regime; it enhances the political role of nuclear weapons, but it sets bad precedents for other states seeking nuclear weapons. It increases India's weapons capability and numbers and will result in a two-way nuclear arms race in Asia between India and Pakistan and India and China.1In this article, I contend that the critics are stretching their points and that the accord's implications for the nonproliferation regime are not as negative as they portray. Although the accord may impinge on the regime in terms of legitimacy and fairness, its negatives are more than compensated by the positives, i.e., the integration of a rising major power as a responsible nuclear state with some restraints on its military program. In a political and strategic sense, it is better to have a rising global power inside the regime than of outside it. Bringing in India as a stakeholder of the regime is in the longer term to the benefit of the regime and to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.There are always tradeoffs and unintended consequences in major ground-breaking initiatives such as the US-India accord. For instance, during the 19703, when the US formed an alliance with China, that event pushed India onto the Soviet side, but it could have helped accelerate the Soviet decline later on. More importantly, China's political and economic integration-resulting from the Deng era reforms-would not have taken place without China's political rapprochement with the US. One can only imagine what China would be like today had there been no economic liberalization and political and economic integration of it into the global mainstream.THE US-INDIAACCORDThe process that led to the U S-India nuclear cooperation act began in July 2005, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George Bush signed an agreement to regularize India as a nuclear weapons state without a formal recognition ofthat status. That agreement simultaneously recognized India's energy needs and proliferation concerns. It stated that India would assume the same responsibilities and practices as the recognized nuclear weapons states. The chief components of the agreement, which were finalized at subsequent meetings between the two sides, are as follows: India will place the majority of its existing and under construction nuclear reactors as well as all future thermal and civilian breeder reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; negotiate with the IAEA to put its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity; permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor in Trombay in 2010; identify and declare nine other research facilities civilian; negotiate and sign the additional protocol with the IAEA (which will allow the agency to conduct inspections on civilian facilities without prior notice); create a robust national export control system; refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them; adhere to the missile technology control regime (MTCR) and the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) guidelines; continue its moratorium on nuclear testing; and work with the US to conclude the missile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), currently under negotiation in the Geneva disarmament forum.2 In return, the supplier restrictions and sanctions in the nuclear area that are in existence against India will be lifted. The US would spearhead the NSG (a forum of 45 countries) to lift its ban on nuclear trade with India.After a series of protracted negotiations, as well as a side agreement on civil-military separation plan for its nuclear facilities by India, a joint statement reiterating the agreement was issued in March 2006 during the visit of Bush to India. …

Iran and the West: A Symposium

IRAN increase the prospects of peace between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. In order to succeed, this policy will require the United States to develop robust means of deterrence that carry the threat of unbearable consequences to Iran in the event it succeeds in developing a bomb and attempts to use it. Should Iran reject a U.S. offer made in good faith for improved relations, there would be far greater international support for tough action against the regime in Tehran. The rise of the Shia in the wake of the war in Iraq has coincided with increased violence in the Middle East. Although the war has resulted in unprecedented loss of U.S. credibility in the international arena, the outcome thus far suggests that Iran stands to lose from chaos in Iraq and further conflict in the Middle East. Both countries therefore have an incentive to seek a detente. A deal would help the United States to improve its standing in the world, and reassert its supremacy as a global power, and would allow Iran to assume the role of a power in the Persian Gulf committed to stability in the region. The price of confrontation may be too high for both countries, and the potential dividends of • deal too tempting to ignore. YITZHAK NAKASH is currently a Carnegie Corporation Scholar. He is the author of Reaching for Power: The Shia in the Modern Arab World. Suzanne Nossel T HE PROSPECT of a nuclear-armed Iran— bent on regional domination, aggressive toward Israel, and hostile to the United States—is as serious a threat as the United States has confronted in recent decades. For at least two key reasons, that threat will not be directly confronted with force in the short term. First, there are genuine questions about how close Iran is to nuclear weapons capabilities . Estimates differ and are inconclusive. After the intelligence failure in Iraq, standards of proof are high, and policymakers in Washington and in capitals abroad will demand more certainty before taking aggressive action. Second , U.S. military capabilities, regional influence , and diplomatic leverage are effectively reduced by the grinding conflict in Iraq, making the prospect of a second simultaneous conflagration in the Middle East both politically and militarily untenable. For now, containing the threat posed by Iran will center on diplomatic measures aimed at dissuading the Iranian regime from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, sustaining international unity in opposition to Tehran's weapons program, and preventing escalation of the conflict to a point where force is the sole remaining option. The policy will amount to a carefully calibrated, hands-on holding pattern designed to draw out the problem to a point where it can be solved diplomatically and politically or where circumstances have changed to make the use of force feasible. In this context, questions will arise about whether Washington is right to refuse direct talks with the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Current U.S. policy is that as long as Tehran declines to suspend uranium enrichment, direct talks are off-limits . The reasons for spurning face-to-face negotiations are clear enough. Ahmadinejad is a sworn enemy of Israel and a Holocaust denier. He has thumbed his nose at serious offers by the United States, Europe, China, and Russia to strike a bargain for economic and political rewards in return for nuclear safeguards. In engaging directly with such a leader, the United States risks dignifying and publicizing his cause. Ahmadinejad seems bent on positioning Iran as a power with global stature, and going toe-to-toe with Washington could advance that aspiration. There's also little to suggest that direct talks between countries with competing worldviews and strategic objectives will bear fruit. After all, the United States and Iran do communicate regularly through foreign intermediaries and the media, such that each knows the other's bottom line. Talking to Tehran is neither a solution to the crisis in itself , nor is it particularly likely to lead to one. DISSENT / Winter 2007 n 49 IRAN Although talking to Tehran will not end the brewing nuclear standoff, it could advance Washington's goal of keeping a lid on it long enough for more appealing...

Iran and the West: A Symposium

IRAN Anne-Marie Slaughter A N IRAN WITH A popular, accountable, and rights-regarding (PAR) government would not be a threat, even if it developed a nuclear weapon. But an Iran with a president who denies the Holocaust, who will not deny that he called for the eradication of Israel, and who won popular election through a rhetoric and a radicalism that worry even the mullahs is a grave potential threat. At the same time, Iran is the modern heir to a great Persian culture, one of the cradles of civilization as we know it. It is a legitimate rising power, in the sense that its size, natural and human resources, history, and geography all entitle its people to aspire to be recognized as a major power in its region and the world. Our approach to Iran must acknowledge and proceed on both these realities. The solution is to give Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the bear-hug treatment. We should enfold him in an iron embrace, engaging him in ways that either tame him or expose him as a danger not only to the world but to the Iranian people. Concretely, we should engage Iran on three fronts: Iraq, a broader Middle East peace settlement, and nuclear weapons. On all three fronts, we must pursue diplomacy with Iranian political and religious leaders and dialogue , as much as possible, with the Iranian people. On Iraq, the United States should begin from the premise that the Sunnis and the Shiites are now waging a civil war, leaving only two feasible options for the United States: (1) work with other powers in the region, particularly Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, to reach a political settlement that can be enforced; or (2) withdraw and leave a civil war raging on Iran's borders. Iran has already signaled that it does not want a civil war that could spill over to Sunnis in Iran itself or that draws Iran directly into a much wider regional conflict. A simmering conflict that keeps the United States tied down is one thing. A raging conflict with the United States gone is quite another , creating a major incentive to negotiate, requiring Ahmadinejad and the mullahs at least to explain to the Iranian population why it is sometimes acceptable to sit down with the Great Satan. In a broader Middle East settlement, the United States should embrace the plan put forward by King Abdullah of Jordan in March 2002 as the basis for a regional and international conference aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East as a whole. That plan proposed that the Arab world establish "normal relations" with Israel and recognize the ArabIsraeli conflict to be concluded in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories , Israeli recognition of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution for Palestinian refugees. An additional topic for this peace conference would be the establishment of a Helsinki Process for all Middle Eastern countries , whereby they would agree to a set of political and economic "baskets" of commitments designed to bring all their governments up to PAR and establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East to oversee a process of implementing these commitments . At the same time, we should encourage Israel to do everything possible to make a separate peace with Syria, leaving Iran deprived of its arc of influence and faced with the prospect of rising Saudi influence in the Middle East, unless it is willing to come to the table as well. 0 N NUCLEAR WEAPONS, the United States should be willing to offer Iran assurances that assuage its legitimate fears. These assurances might include a negative security assurance—a promise not to attack Iran except in response to Iranian military action or direct Iranian support of a terrorist attack against the United States, Europe, or Israel. This offer would hinge on an Iranian commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and Iranian willingness to allow that commitment to be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, the five nuclear powers and several leading nonnuclear powers should announce an emergency review conference at which the original barDISSENT...

High Technology Terrorism: A Threat to Global Security

It is to be understood that terrorist violence is neither spontaneous nor random. Terrorists are always aware of the implications of their acts. Evidence supports the contention that terrorists are not able to avail themselves of the present technologies. To manufacture their own nuclear weapons, terrorists would require both strategic, special nuclear materials and the expertise to convert them into a bomb or radiological weapon. Whether terrorists of the future will be able to achieve a nuclear weapons capability depends upon several factors. The paper attempts to deal with those factors in detail.

Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy: A Study in Weberian Activism

It has always been true that foreign policy debates tend to proceed on a weak evidentiary base, with clever quips or stirring oratory regularly trumping sound analysis. According to Thucydides, for example, the Athenian assembly that endorsed the Sicilian expedition during the second Peloponnesian War had only the haziest conception of the adversaries’ capabilities. 1 Contemporary politics is distinctive not in the sloganeering quality of political discourse, but in the divergence between the quality of information available to society as a whole and the quality of information used in making decisions. For example, it was clear to any open-minded observer by the time of the Congressional vote in 2002 that implications of collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda lacked any basis in reliable evidence. By the time the Bush Administration initiated war in 2003, claims about Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities were also partially debunked and increasingly dubious. Still, the war went forward, and many Americans continued to believe the Bush Administration’s false claims even after the Administration itself had abandoned them. Many political scientists—like many Americans—were deeply dismayed by this situation, and in the fall of 2004 a group of us determined to try to do something about it. We saw two obvious options. One was to address the substantive issue directly, participating in the election campaign as citizens according to the logic that a new presidential administration would at least not repeat the policies of the Bush team. But anybody could do that, and our marginal contribution could only be modest. We decided

Pakistan: An Unsettled Nation

Pakistan faces many problems. The struggle over the country's Islamic dimension is undecided. Pakistan continues to be a hotbed of Islamic fervor. As evidenced by the frequent interruptions of civilian rule by military regimes the country is not sure which course to follow. Violence has become Pakistan's trademark. The jihadi culture is frightening. Poverty and underdevelopment are wide spread. The educational system is a mess. Integration of the different ethnicities has not been completed. Enmity characterizes the relationship to India, mistrust that to Afghanistan. Its nuclear weapons capability is looked upon with suspicion by Western countries. Fundamental changes will only be possible if Pakistan finds its way to democracy.

High-Intensity Acoustics for Military Nonlethal Applications: A Lack of Useful Systems

There have been many previous claims of nonlethal acoustic weapon effects, mostly in the popular rather than the scientific literature. Anecdotal reports of extraordinary effects can make meaningful assessment and review of this area very difficult. Acoustics research has shown that the nonlethal weapon capabilities of audible sound generators have been grossly overstated. Although high-intensity infrasound significantly disrupted animal behavior in some experiments, the generation of such energy in a volume large enough to be of practical use is unlikely because of basic physical principles. On the basis of experimentation completed to date at a number of institutions, it seems unlikely that high-intensity acoustic energy in the audible, infrasonic, or low-frequency range can provide a device suitable for use as a nonlethal weapon.

‘Real men want to go to Tehran’: Bush, pre-emption and the Iranian nuclear challenge

The desire for regime change in Iran has coloured the Bush administration's approach to the challenge presented by Tehran's apparent desire to build a nuclear weapons capability. Yet the threat of military force either to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and/or to eff ect regime change has proved counterproductive to the simultaneous eff orts to stop the Iranian programme through diplomacy. Indeed, the entire Bush policy towards Iran of simultaneously wishing to coerce, undermine and replace the regime while also seeking to persuade it to abandon its nuclear programme through diplomacy has proved both strategically inconsistent and consistently counterproductive. In failing to decide whether it prioritizes a change of regime or a change of behaviour it has got neither. This article elucidates the rationale behind the Bush administration's policy approach, demonstrating how in seeking both objectives simultaneously it has achieved neither. It sets out instead a set of policies to regain the initiative in US-Iranian relations and to prioritize and coordinate American policy goals within a broader Middle East policy.

Can the NPT Survive? The Theory and Practice of US Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy after September 11

This article examines the prospects for survival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the post-9/11 world, arguing that American non-proliferation policy and the future of the NPT are inextricably linked. It discusses the shift from the Clinton administration's nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda of the mid-1990s to the Bush administration's preference for informal arms control regimes and the new policy of non-proliferation exceptionalism that distinguishes between good proliferators (India, Pakistan) and bad proliferators (North Korea, Iran). The Bush administration's penchant for unilateral foreign security policies and its double standards in implementing export restrictions on sensitive technologies while disavowing American nuclear disarmament obligations undermine the NPT bargain and endanger the treaty. The Bush administration's security-oriented strategy and acceptance of selective proliferation for balance of power purposes may lead to the emergence of a silent crowd armed with nuclear weapon capabilities. The key to preserving the relevance of the NPT is to reconnect nuclear non-proliferation with nuclear disarmament, while strengthening the treaty's enforcement machinery against non-compliers.