Canadian National Interests Research Articles

Environmental nationalist: Andrew McNaughton and Canada–US relations in the Cold War

Prior to 1945, General Andrew George Latta McNaughton had already made a name for himself as an army general, engineer, inventor, and cabinet minister. After 1945, McNaughton occupied a number of key international roles for Canada: at the United Nations, on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and on the International Joint Commission. Even though he became one of Canada’s most important diplomatic actors during the early Cold War period, this aspect of his career has been mostly ignored by international historians. This article examines McNaughton’s key involvement in the evolution of a number of Canada–US water megaprojects, arguing that his nationalism underpinned his approach to bilateral relations, which combined deep technical expertise with a willingness to publicly assert the Canadian national interest. McNaughton’s approach should be studied not only to better understand North American environmental diplomacy in the Cold War but also to draw from it several lessons for contemporary times.

Роль «североатлантического треугольника» в становлении канадской внешней политики: к вопросу о трактовках концепта

An analysis of various interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” in the context of the development of Canadian foreign policy in the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries is presented. The relevance of the work is due to the need to study the interaction of the Atlantic powers in historical dynamics, with an emphasis on the origins of the development of the “North Atlantic triangle”. Based on the classic works of Canadian historians and the works of modern researchers, the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” is analyzed through three main ideas: the “bookkeeper’s puzzle”, the idea of “counterweight” and the idea of a “bridge” or “linchpin”. It is concluded that the development of Canadian national interests began long before Canadians recognized themselves as a nation and gained the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. This process was largely determined by a specific relationship between two centers of gravity: Great Britain and the United States. Canada was the weakest side of this construct, therefore, for reasons of security and the preservation of its own interests, it developed certain scenarios of relations with the Atlantic partners. Depending on historical circumstances, the emphasis in these scenarios was different. That is why interpretations of the concept of the “North Atlantic Triangle” often differ depending on the subject content and chronological boundaries of a particular study. However, it has been proven that the main goal setting of Canadian foreign policy priorities – to ensure their own security and derive maximum benefit from relations within the “North Atlantic Triangle”, skillfully smoothing out contradictions and maneuvering between Great Britain and the United States – remained unchanged.

Relations between Canada and the European Union as the Subject of Political Research

The given article is dedicated to peculiarities of studying foreign policy of Canada, in particular their relations with the European Union. Regardless of their distant geographic location, Canada has a long history of relations with the countries of the European continent. In particular, in the 20th century Canada played the role of the security donor for Europe and paid a substantial contribution into the victory in both world wars and its active participation in suppression to the Soviet threats during the Cold war. These circumstanced influenced the formation of Canadian foreign policy towards European countries. New division of the world powers as a result of the process of democratization of the Eastern part of the European continent resulted in widening and deepening European integrational processes, thus opening new perspectives and restrictions on the way of implementing Canadian national interests. These peculiarities are also caused by the unique character of the Canadian state-building policy, the fact of their bilingual society, geographic location, direct neighboring with the United States of America. However, common values and social-political orientations encouraged maintaining transatlanting ties and common positions in dealing with problems of global development both in Europe and Canada. It is stated that in the sphere of political research the Canadian scholars are given the biggest dominance. Moreover, there hasn’t been enough strictly conceptual or valid theoretical material among the articles published until recently. Changed became noticeable at the edge of the 80s-90s in the last century. However, articles didn’t signify the formation of the powerful, self-confident academic sphere in studying Canadian foreign policy. It is explained by the low interest towards foreign policy of this North-American State by overseas scholars. It is also analyzed that the Ukrainian researchers didn’t make thorough investigation in this sphere, although they have constantly demonstrated their interest in political aspects of Canada’s development as well as their Euro-integration issue. Key words: political science; foreign policy; Canada; the European Union.

Securitizing Development Assistance: India’s Nuclear Program and Canadian Societal Views on Nuclear Reactor Exports, 1974–1978

ABSTRACTThis article examines an often overlooked but nevertheless important element of Canada’s Cold War-era development assistance policies—the export of nuclear reactors to the developing world. In particular, the focus is on societal responses to India’s explosion of an underground nuclear device in May 1974, an accomplishment made possible in part through the export of Canada’s nuclear expertise, technology, and material. India’s entrance into the nuclear club sparked an intense and wide-ranging debate in Canadian society concerning the nature of Canada’s development and foreign policies, and more specifically, the types of policies that would enable the country to fulfill its main international purpose as a middle power—contributing to conditions of international peace and security. The protracted debate which involved not only politicians but many civil society actors revealed stark divisions among Canadians centered on the extent to which nuclear reactor exports served Canadian national interests.

The key to the Canada–United States relationship: homeland and continental defence in American strategic culture

Since the Second World War, Canada and the United States have worked together to defend North America. However, notwithstanding Canadian concerns about this military cooperation, the United States' main effort has been overseas because American strategic culture is offensively oriented. Thus, American air and missile programs have received little attention, as American policy makers have chosen to deal with security threats such as the Soviet Union by supporting overseas alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and by developing strong strategic nuclear forces. This strategy has been continued after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and will not likely change in the future. By understanding the influence that this offensively oriented strategic culture has on American policy makers, Canadian ministers, civilian officials, military officers and academics can develop foreign and defence policies that can better serve the Canadian national interest.

Review: In the National Interest

IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009 Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, eds. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011. 264PP, $34.95 (paper)Books on Canadian foreign relations history cari t avoid the touchstone figure of Lester B. Pearson. But where many books assail or endorse Pearsonian idealism, In the National Interest makes no bones about it: Pearson was a realist. The point comes through, for instance, in Heather Metcalfe's fascinating essay on Canadian national identity and the Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs and International Trade, or DFAIT). I carfthelp feeling, she quotes Pearson as writing during the fervent welcome given to King George VI as he toured Canada in 1939, all the outburst of Royal and Imperial sentiment which the tour has evoked ... will make it even more difficult for this country to understand the unsentimentally nationalist basis of Canada's external (63-4). Pearson's was hardheaded realism couched in the Canadian national interest. With a few changes, the lament over the pernicious effect of sentimental public opinion on foreign policymaking could have come from George Kennaris classic American Diplomacy or the more recent works of Henry Kissinger. If only public opinion would keep silent and leave foreign policy to the experts, Pearson implied, the tough calls about putting Canada's interests first could be made more easily.This conception of the national interest stands squarely at the centre of this twelve-essay collection. Unlike many edited collections, this one has coherence and a clear argument: Canadian foreign policy has by and large aimed at promoting what were seen as Canada's national interests by political leaders and department officials. There was no golden age of idealistic mediation in Canadian foreign policy, indeed, the golden age giants were cautious pragmatists working to advance Canada's interests incrementally, judicially, and - by and large - effectively.The volume stems from a conference linked to the 100th anniversary of DFAIT It is part of a welcome development in the writing of Canadian international history, spearheaded by DFAIT historian Greg Donaghy, in which historians and political scientists come together to offer chapters in solidly-edited collections. In the National Interest showcases established and new voices in the field, symbolized by the editorial partnership of Donaghy and Michael Carroll. Although space does not permit a discussion of each essay, all are provocative and well worth a read.Several themes run through the book. DFAIT as carrier of the national interest is one. Norman Hillmer examines the Department of External Affairs' first mandarin, O.D. Skelton, and Galen Perras discusses Skeltoris unsentimental anti-imperialism and the role of the department in moving Canada into the embrace of a continental destiny. Heather Metcalfe demonstrates the limits of efforts by foreign policy intellectuals, some of them linked to the department, to mould public opinion. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert note that the department' s prudent and practical on Arctic sovereignty avoided a confrontation with the United States and argue that this course won long-term benefits in defending Canadian sovereignty. Adam Chapnick shows Canadian diplomats working effectively but quietly to advance Canadian interests in the United Nations - itself an organization whose strength was seen as important to the Canadian interest for many years. Tammy Nemeth points out the importance of diplomats in preparing American counterparts for Canadian policies they would not like. Even when relations were chilly, as under the Chretien government, diplomats kept working relations ticking along, as Stephen Randall describes. Officials might have been most effective on soft topics, as outlined by Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon in her essay on the Beijing conference on women. …

A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution

In a July 2011 wide-ranging interview with Madean's magazine, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, still glowing from his majority election victory, offered a stark confession. Since becoming prime minister [in 2006], he said, thing that's probably struck me most in terms of my previous expectations - I don't even know what my expectations were - is not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it's become almost everything.1 Six weeks later, a report in the National Post revealed that the government planned act on Harper's new understanding of the significance of world affairs: Once considered an afterthought by a prime minister preoccupied with winning a majority, wrote Tobi Cohen, relations have moved centre for the Conservatives, who have undertaken a quiet but sweeping re-examination of federal foreign policy.2This essay addresses two questions that should be central Ottawa's review: first, what might have motivated the government's actions on the international stage between 2006 and2on? And, second, was this motivation consistent with Canadian national interests? To date, analysts have offered three answers question one. The first two are consistent with the content of a debate over the possibility of a distinct Conservative foreign policy that was published in a volume of Canada Among Nations shortly after Harper's first election victory in 2006. Conservative partisans argued that there was indeed a distinctly Conservative approach international relations - characterized by a combination of compassion, realism, engagement, focus, and global leadership. Opposing them were those who maintained that the strategic constraints imposed upon Ottawa both domestically and internationally limited the flexibility of any ruling party effect significant change in foreign policy, no matter its partisan leanings. The only real difference that a new government could make was at the rhetorical level.3Both suggestions are profoundly conservative: neither anticipates, nor allows for, broad divergences from the authors' general understandings of Canada's foreign policy history. And while analysts from both camps might point specific rhetoric and decisions from the last five years that support their interpretations, considering the activist nature of the Harper regime (not mention the prime minister's comments in Maclean's), neither theory is ultimately satisfying. Kim Richard Nossal, a professor of political studies at Queen's University, has offered a more plausible assessment. To him, Canadian foreign policy between 2006 and 2011 was driven more by a partisan desire to make the Conservatives the dominant political party in Canada, than it was by dear thinking about world affairs.11 But if the government of Stephen Harper's approach international relations was designed primarily erase any memory of Canada's allegedly Liberal (internationalist) past, why did Ottawa not reject the national security policy of 2004? Why did it not distance itself from the never-popular Afghanistan mission, or Paul Martin's efforts increase the focus of Canada's development assistance program? Further examination will demonstrate that Nossal's explanation is yet more compelling if one defines Liberal foreign policy as the practices manifested most clearly during an exceptional period of Canadian conduct in world affairs, when the national diplomatic personality was shaped primarily by a single Liberal member of parliament - Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Conservative foreign policy between 2006 and 2OII might therefore be most effectively characterized as an effort eradicate one individual's, as opposed one party's, legacy.To determine whether such an approach world affairs was consistent with Canada's national interests, an issue that has yet be dealt with by scholarly analysts in significant detail, one must take into consideration what the Harper government's global outlook attempted replace. …

Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability

Canada has contributed to North American strategic defence, and been an ar- dent proponent of strategic stability, since the early Cold War. Though seem- ingly compatible, Canada's involvement in continental strategic defence and advocacy of strategic stability has been nagged by an underlying contradiction. As part of its contribution to the strategic defence of the continent, Canada has tacitly endorsed and facilitated the United States' offensively oriented nuclear strategies. Canada's support of strategic stability, however, has aimed to dis- courage offensive nuclear doctrines and the arms races they have tended to fuel. Given this contradiction, Ottawa might have decided to harmonize its policies, either by abandoning strategic defence roles that have supported of- fensive American nuclear doctrines, or by ceasing to be an advocate of strate- gic stability and strategie arms control. But this has not been the path chosen by successive Canadian government since the mid-1960s. Instead, Canadian governments have opted to accept the contradiction and pursue a two-track approach: for more than four decades, Canada has contributed to continental strategic defences that have aided offensively oriented nuclear strategies, while simultaneously vaunting the value of strategic stability and strategic arms control.Following this two-track approach has served Canadian governments well. It allowed Ottawa to protect Canada and Canadians by emphasizing the futility of nuclear war and arms races. Yet it further permitted the Canadian military to assist the United States in defending North America and in maintaining a credible nuclear weapons posture, one capable of prevailing over common adversaries during a conflict. Since each of these policies and outcomes served the Canadian national interest, Ottawa was determined to avoid developments that exposed the contradictory nature of the two tracks, or that pushed Canada to choose between its commitment to strategic defence and its advocacy of strategic stability. Canadian governments have managed to conceal this contradiction and avoid making such a choice for most of the past four decades. However, there has been one technological development, ballistic missile defence, that has routinely threatened to expose the contradiction and force Ottawa to give precedence to strategic defence over strategic stability, or vice versa. Nonetheless, in spite of the pressure exerted by BMD, Canadian governments preserved the two- track approach; the missile defence issue has not compelled Ottawa to downgrade either its existing commitments to strategic defence or its support of strategic stability and arms control. A question that remains is whether future Canadian governments will be able to preserve this dual approach when the missile defence issue arises again, which is likely to happen within the next few years.This article examines the history and future of Canada's involvement in the strategic defence of North America and advocacy of strategic stability. It begins with an overview of Canada's strategic defence and stability policies during the Cold War and post- Cold War eras, with a particular focus on the politics surrounding Canadian participation in BMD. Next, it analyzes how the government's decision to decline a formal role in BMD in 2005 represented a reapplication of the two-track approach. It concludes with a discussion of the strategic defence and stability options a future Canadian government is likely to face.BALANCING STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY, 1945-2000Canada's involvement with the strategic defence of North America began in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Convinced that the Soviet Union would soon develop atomic weapons and long-range bombers capable of striking North America, Canada and the United States began planning a joint air defence of the continent in 1946. This planning accelerated in 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device and fielded its first intercontinental bomber. …

Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward

At the Cold War's close, Canada was NATO's ‘odd man out’, contributing relatively little to western defence. Today, Canada is the third-largest contributor of combat forces to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. Canada got into Afghanistan partly as an alternative to getting into Iraq. But fighting the Taliban also serves the Canadian national interest in combating terrorism and has dovetailed well with recent efforts to ‘transform’ the Canadian military and use it more effectively in overseas development efforts. However, the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan beyond the current February 2009 deadline is in doubt. Public support for the combat dimension of the Afghanistan operations remains weak.

The Role of Canadian Aid in Bangladesh

The central argument of this paper is that Canada has played an instrumental role in the development process of Bangladesh since independence in 1971. Even though Canadian aid is not as political as that of other donors, it originated from Canadian national interest, in order to gain influence over Bangladesh and access to its market for Canadian products. Apart from this, although Canadian aid is directed towards poverty reduction, in Bangladesh it has not made any significant breakthroughs in this regard.

Le destin n'est pas inéluctable : évaluation des effets probables du libre-échange nord-américain sur la politique étrangère du Canada

This article with minor revisions, was originally presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Victoria, B.C., May 27, 1990. Since then, Canada has been accused of simply following Washington's lead in sending troops to the Gulfand in seeking to join United States-Mexico free trade negotiations. These developments do not alter the paper's challenging conclusion : namely, that the current bilateral free-trade regime neither obliges nor justifies a subordinate Canadian foreign policy — however much the terms of the Free Trade Agreement may impinge on the international dimensions of some Canadian policies (e.g., on energy and investment), and notwithstanding the potential momentum (but uncertain prospects) of North American integration. Free trade, in fact seems to have increased, not reduced, the salience of the national question in Canada. As well, the Gulf crisis is a test more of United Nations resolve than bilateral solidarity. And on the trade front, Canada has been reminded of the extent to which it remains on its own. U.S. negotiators were angered by Canada's middle-ground position on agricultural subsidies - the issue over which GATT talks collapsed, increasing Canadian vulnerability. Moreover, Canadian participation in U.S.Mexico trade negotiations has been privately less welcome than the official public rhetoric suggests. More than ever perhaps, Canadian national interests depend on strong international diplomacy mode no less necessary, if arguably encumbered, by the evolving context of continental free trade.

A Not So Benign New Century

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES in September 2001 led the Canadian government to pay renewed attention to the security of the country and its citizens. Whether to provide enhanced protection to Canadians or to assuage concerns in Washington, the government moved rapidly to improve security at airports and border crossings, to broaden the powers of police and intelligence agencies, to tighten laws governing immigration and refugee flows, and to stockpile antidotes to a variety of biological warfare agents. All of these measures were aimed at combating what were traditionally referred to as 'unconventional' security threats but are now often called 'asymmetrical' threats. They do not, however, significantly improve Canada's ability to confront enduring or emerging 'conventional' security challenges to its interests, rooted in political instability or interstate conflicts in many areas of the world.Throughout the years of the cold war, Canada's international security policy was reasonably well focused and had a fair degree of coherence, largely because there was an identified adversary, the Soviet Union, and a well understood threat, a global nuclear war resulting from a military confrontation between the two superpowers. With the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union, the adversary and the quasi-existential threat both disappeared.Like most Western countries, Canada experienced considerable difficulties in adjusting its international security policy to the new realities of the 1990s. By the middle of that decade, the government decided to adopt a security policy that gave pride of place to the so-called human security agenda on the grounds that 'serious long term challenges are posed by environmental, demographic, health and development issues around the globe' and that the best response to those challenges was to be found in 'the promotion of democracy and good governance, of human rights and the rule of law, and of prosperity through sustainable development.'(1) In pursuit of this new policy orientation, the Canadian government launched a variety of initiatives, which generally garnered strong domestic support and widespread international attention, positive and negative.Whatever the merits of the new emphasis in Canadian security policy, and they are debatable,(2) one of its by-products is a steadily diminishing attention by policy-makers to more traditional security challenges to Canada's political, security, economic, and social interests worldwide. This is not to suggest a lack of awareness of these issues within the Canadian government system (as the Department of National Defence's excellent annual Strategic Overview makes clear(3)), but rather that they have not been given the attention they deserve by Canada's political leadership. A good part of the evidence for this is to be found not only in the statements and actions of Canadian political leaders, but also in the steady erosion throughout the 1990s of the diplomatic, military, and financial resources Canada would need to address these issues seriously.(4)This article attempts to identify and examine a few of the major long-term international security challenges to Canadian national interests and suggests in general terms some of the capabilities Canada will need to address these challenges in co-operation with its allies and other like-minded countries.RUSSIA AND IS NEIGHBOURHOODIn the cold war era, Soviet strength was the primary concern of the West; in the post-cold war era, it should be Russia's weakness. The collapse of the Soviet system left in its wake a Russia beset with formidable problems, most of which have grown worse in the intervening years. The central government is corroded by cronyism, corruption, and organized crime and is daily faced with challenges to its authority from a variety of centrifugal forces. The economy is in a lamentable state: Russia's gross domestic product is smaller than that of Sweden, a country of only nine million people, and its per capita GDP is less than half that of Malaysia. …

Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy

THE POST-COLD WAR DEBATES over whether and how Canada should be involved in overseas conflicts are coming to a close. Canada will both fight and keep the peace, due in large part to Lloyd Axworthy, who stepped down after four years as minister of foreign affairs to take a position at the University of British Columbia. Henceforth, when the Canadian Forces go abroad, they will do so, as they did in Kosovo, explicitly or implicitly in support of 'human security.' Axworthy, the author of the Canadian human security agenda, has thus won an important political victory and a long-lasting ministerial legacy extending beyond the Department of Foreign Affairs to its sometime arch-rival, the Department of National Defence. For with his human security concept he has paved the way for nothing short of rescuing Canadian defence policy from military irrelevance and strategic sterility.Although Axworthy placed human security at the heart of Canadian foreign policy, he did not coin the term. It came into international parlance largely as a result of a 1994 report by the United Nations Development Programme. Axworthy's own approach to the concept has been broad. As the Department of Foreign Affairs put it in a 1999 'concept paper' issued with his imprimatur: 'In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives.From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing on the security of territory or governments. Like other security concepts - national security, economic security, food security it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk and taking remedial action where prevention fails.'(f.1)THE END OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTThe human security concept will endure as the justification for Canadian military intervention overseas, especially because it has opened the door to abandoning the Canadian national interest as the touchstone for decision-making. As foreign minister, Axworthy never quite gave up on the national interest when he talked about the role of the Canadian military in human security. For example, in justifying Canadian participation in the Kosovo War, he took recourse to the old and creaky argument that the Canadian national interest can be found just about anywhere in the world: 'in an increasingly interconnected world, where we are travelers, exporters and importers, investors and donors, we cannot afford to ignore the problems of others - even if we wanted to.'(f.2) Therefore, he went on, the pursuit of human security overseas, as in Kosovo, serves Canadian interests.This approach is neither convincing nor necessary to justify human security interventions. Take Kosovo. Few Canadians travel there, export to or from there, or invest money there. The same can be said of virtually all the other places where the Canadian Forces recently have been deployed on peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Where is the Canadian national interest in East Timor or, for that matter, on the Ethiopian-Eritrean frontier where Canada recently dispatched a very small peacekeeping contingent to join the United Nations effort?During the cold war, the dispatch of Canadian troops on peacekeeping missions to distant places outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was much more clearly in the national interest. Had a nuclear war ever occurred, the effects on Canada would have been calamitous. Canadian peacekeeping in locations such as the Middle East thus helped to dampen the possibility of a direct clash between the superpowers, reducing the chances of nuclear war. This link between Canadian security and Canadian military intervention disappeared along with the Soviet Union. …

Canada and Italy

IN CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, the multilateral dimensions usually attract the headlines, whether it is summits of the G-7 or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Organization of American States (OAS), or international conferences on climate change or on the banning of anti-personnel landmines. With the exception of the Canada-United States relationship, which is the object of almost constant scrutiny, Canada's bilateral relationships attract relatively little attention, except in times of crisis - France over interventions in Canada's internal affairs, India following nuclear weapons tests, or Spain over the turbot. And yet bilateral relationships constitute the foundation stones or building blocks of Canada's ongoing interactions with the rest of the world. Based on historico-cultural and geopolitical variables, the more important of these relationships usually have one thing in common - they are the focus and end product of quiet, incrementalist diplomacy over a period of years or decades. Their nurturing and development is a steady, unspectacular process in which Canadian national interests are pursued without much hype and without much attention being paid to the fleetingly fashionable ideas of the hour. The relationship that exists between Canada and Italy is illustrative of this reality.Although clearly fostered by governmental policies and initiatives, the relationship between Canada and Italy is in the first instance the product of a shared Western civilization. Whether in the fields of art or literature, philosophy or religion, science or political thought, the two countries are heirs to a common cultural tradition. This in itself is sufficient to create certain natural affinities and to make the relationship an 'obvious' one. It also accounts in part for Canada's attraction as a destination for Italian emigrants, giving the relationship a strong social basis, and for the identification of common political, economic, and security interests, giving the relationship broad institutional foundations (NATO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and so on).The relationship with Italy is one to which the Canadian government has paid a 'normal' amount of attention, given the level of the interests at stake. Diplomatic contacts have been continuous and substantive, as would be expected with a country that is a NATO ally, a G-7 partner, and a leading member of the European Union. A long list of bilateral agreements has been negotiated with Italian governments in response to evolving circumstances and interests. Italy has not, however, been accorded a particularly high priority in the formulation of Canadian government policies and programmes and has rarely been the target of any unique or high profile initiatives. Although substantial, and likely to continue its steady growth, the relationship does not seem destined to know any spectacular developments or break-throughs in the near future.THE FOUNDATIONSA shared civilization and a common cultural heritage do not guarantee close or friendly relationships between nation states - a point eloquently demonstrated by two World Wars in the past century. However, in the absence of any major clashes of interests or policies, they do constitute an important basis for understanding between states, for mutual appreciation, and for the development of solid bilateral relationships, especially when, as in the case of Canada and Italy, they are buttressed by social ties and contacts resulting from immigration and the presence of significant Italian communities in Canada.While the existence of a shared 'civilizational space' may not always be a leading consideration in the process of foreign policy development, it does constitute a sub-text that occasionally finds overt expression. As early as 1927, Prime Minister Mackenzie King wrote in a public message that Italians 'have always stood at the forefront in all spheres of human activity, in that of the intellect, of the imagination, of science and of art. …

Moving Alaskan Oil to Market: Canadian National Interests and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 1968–73

On 18 July 1968, Robert Anderson, chairman of Atlantic Richfield Company, announced that one of largest petroleum accumulations known world today had been discovered on north slope of (1) Estimated contain between five and ten billion barrels of oil, Prudhoe Bay location would, according Mr. Anderson, soon undergo commercial development, and and transportation studies would begin immediately. (2) Within two weeks, Atlantic Richfield and Humble Oil and Refining Company had awarded a contract Houston's Pipeline Technologies, Inc., to study feasibility of transporting... recently discovered Arctic oil market by a pipeline a port in southern Alaska. (3) By mid-February 1969, Atlantic Richfield, Humble, and British Petroleum Oil Corporation jointly declared that it was their intention proceed with construction of a $900 million dollar pipeline that would run about 800 miles in a generally southern direction from Prudhoe Bay area on Arctic Ocean across Alaska's Brooks [Mountain] Range Gulf of Alaska on state's southern coastline. (4) The oil would then be transported by tanker select refinery and distribution sites along U.S. west coast, particularly in state of Washington. (5) The trio of oil corporations, while strongly indicating a preference for a trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker transportation scheme, nonetheless noted that planning studies on alternate routes are continuing. (6) The possibility that large quantities of Prudhoe Bay oil would soon be transported on an ongoing basis by tanker along Canadian west coast was not received enthusiastically by Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau. Canadian authorities were particularly concerned over passage of tankers through environmentally delicate and economically important Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia en route refineries in northwestern Washington State. According Donald Macdonald, minister responsible, proposed transit through Straits involved the consequent risk of disastrous oil spills Vancouver Island and British Columbia mainland. (7) This possibility was compounded by two disconcerting realities then confronting Trudeau government. First, routing of tankers from Alaska Washington State would be exclusively within American territorial and international waters. As such, not only would Ottawa be unable subject these ships Canadian maritime laws and regulations, but it would also have no legal leverage with which challenge proposed routing. Second, there was no jointly coordinated vessel management regulatory arrangement between Canada and United States oversee safe passage of ships through Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia. Fearful of environmental and economic risks posed coastal waters and lands of British Columbia by a tanker accident and oil spill, Ottawa moved dissuade United States from pursuing this option. This article reviews strategy and position taken by Ottawa prevent American oil tanker traffic along Canada's west coast and, in particular, it closely examines Ottawa's attempts from 1971 1973 convince American government and business officials that an alternate transportation route, namely an overland pipeline through Canada's Mackenzie Valley region, was a more attractive choice. (8) Finally, reasons behind Nixon administration's decision reject routing scheme touted by Trudeau government--and by definition authorize trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker route--will be detailed and considered. Canadian and American National Interests In order convince Washington that industry-favored trans-Alaska plan should not be given regulatory approval (by Department of Interior) or political authorization (by Congress and White House), Canada decided pursue two courses of action simultaneously: first, diplomatically protest, publicly and privately, use of very large crude carriers (VLCC) for shipment of Prudhoe Bay oil from Valdez American west-coast terminals; and, second, promote vigorously an alternative route for transportation of Alaskan oil--a Mackenzie Valley pipeline. …

Canadian Security In the High Arctic: a Strategic Analysis In Three Parts- Part 1 - Fourth Boundary Problem

Dr. Critchley's paper will appear in three parts, the first: the "Fourth Boundary Problem" in this issue. Two succeeding issues will deal withthe"Energy Shortage" and"Military Considerations". Dr. Critchley is highlyqualified to deal with this subject, given her wide background in studiesrelated to this potentially important, but little understood, part of ourcountry. Introduction(1) A discussion of security policy with reference to any region of theworld is based on a strategic analysis of the region. Although strategicanalysis is often thought to deal solely with military doctrines, forces andequipment, it actually incorporates a wide range of factors. The range isindicated by the following general categories: geographical characteristics;human, material and financial resources; social and economic trends; scientificand technological developments; transportation and communications links;considerations of domestic politics; and such features of internationalrelations as trade, international law, military affairs, and foreign relationswith allies and adversaries. Depending on the region in question, thesignificance of some categories will be greater than others, and the specificmix of relevant factors will vary considerably. Strategic analysis which concerns the future must, of necessity use a largeproportion of data of uncertain validity. Generally, when the focus of analysisis on human activities in political and economic affairs our judgments of whatwill be significant or relevant five years from now are often faulty. If thetime frame is ten or fifteen years in the future, the probability of errorincreases all the more. Economic trends, for example can be questioned byusing different indices, or reversed by unexpected developments. Thecapabilities of military forces can be affected by faulty planning and use, variations in terrain or weather conditions. The intentions of politicalleaders to act or react in specific ways to events in domestic andinternational politics are perhaps the most uncertain of data. The objectiveconfirmation of such trends, intentions and capabilities can only beaccomplished after they have become historical events-even then, the causes, meaning and ramifications of such events are matters of dispute amongspecialists. Although we all have a distaste for basing analysis on imperfect and incompleteinformation, yielding to the natural tendency to wait for better information isa luxury not available to the strategic analyst. Even if we assume the presenceof sufficient political will and resources to carry out a specific defencepolicy-and these are major assumptions- there is an eight- to ten-year lagbetween the time when the policy decision is made and the time by which it isfully implemented(2). Therefore, if we wish to have a suitable rangeof capabilities and options for the pursuit of defence of Canadian nationalinterests at a given time in the future, the strategic analysis on which thepolicy decision is based must anticipate the domestic and internationalpolitical environment by some ten to fifteen years. There is always thepossibility of making some adjustments in the analysis and the policy over theintervening years as better information becomes available; but failure toinitiate an analysis which in- corporates a variety of possible developments.due to the uncertainty of the data at hand, often leaves the political leaderswith inappropriate options and inadequate capabilities to meet futurerequirements.

Canada, The Commonwealth, and the United States

twenty-second annual study conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs was held at the University of Toronto on June 4 and 5. A common agenda under the general theme Canada, the Commonwealth and the United was discussed by three round tables. The main divisions in the agenda were (1) the Commonwealth Canada's relations with the United Kingdom, with the Dominions; (2) the United States economic relations, political relations; (3) the mutual interests security, stability.1 Discussion in general was dominated by the conviction that the distribution of weight and power in the North Atlantic triangle has shifted radically in the past fifteen years and that a situation of serious imbalance has resulted, posing serious if not entirely novel problems for Canadian policy. The relative importance of Britain in the pattern has diminished with the loss of her position of world leadership, the decline of her market as a factor in Canada's export trade and the weakening of the old imperial ties of sentiment and tradition. On the other hand the United States has gained steadily in stature in all respects. Canada's perennial problem of trying to maintain a balance between her historic partners has, therefore, taken on a new urgency and there was a general feeling in the conference that the preponderant weight of the United States in Canadian affairs might be offset by Canadian efforts to make more of the connection with her transatlantic partner. This utilitarian approach to the Commonwealth connection from the point of view of Canadian national interests turned up more difficulties than constructive proposals. Much attention was given to developing the role of the Crown and extending its Commonwealth functions in order to make it more positive rather than purely symbolic and sentimental; consideration was given to developing Canada's economic relationships with the United Kingdom