Canadian Security In the High Arctic: a Strategic Analysis In Three Parts- Part 1 - Fourth Boundary Problem

Abstract

Dr. Critchley's paper will appear in three parts, the first: the "Fourth Boundary Problem" in this issue. Two succeeding issues will deal withthe"Energy Shortage" and"Military Considerations". Dr. Critchley is highlyqualified to deal with this subject, given her wide background in studiesrelated to this potentially important, but little understood, part of ourcountry. Introduction(1) A discussion of security policy with reference to any region of theworld is based on a strategic analysis of the region. Although strategicanalysis is often thought to deal solely with military doctrines, forces andequipment, it actually incorporates a wide range of factors. The range isindicated by the following general categories: geographical characteristics;human, material and financial resources; social and economic trends; scientificand technological developments; transportation and communications links;considerations of domestic politics; and such features of internationalrelations as trade, international law, military affairs, and foreign relationswith allies and adversaries. Depending on the region in question, thesignificance of some categories will be greater than others, and the specificmix of relevant factors will vary considerably. Strategic analysis which concerns the future must, of necessity use a largeproportion of data of uncertain validity. Generally, when the focus of analysisis on human activities in political and economic affairs our judgments of whatwill be significant or relevant five years from now are often faulty. If thetime frame is ten or fifteen years in the future, the probability of errorincreases all the more. Economic trends, for example can be questioned byusing different indices, or reversed by unexpected developments. Thecapabilities of military forces can be affected by faulty planning and use, variations in terrain or weather conditions. The intentions of politicalleaders to act or react in specific ways to events in domestic andinternational politics are perhaps the most uncertain of data. The objectiveconfirmation of such trends, intentions and capabilities can only beaccomplished after they have become historical events-even then, the causes, meaning and ramifications of such events are matters of dispute amongspecialists. Although we all have a distaste for basing analysis on imperfect and incompleteinformation, yielding to the natural tendency to wait for better information isa luxury not available to the strategic analyst. Even if we assume the presenceof sufficient political will and resources to carry out a specific defencepolicy-and these are major assumptions- there is an eight- to ten-year lagbetween the time when the policy decision is made and the time by which it isfully implemented(2). Therefore, if we wish to have a suitable rangeof capabilities and options for the pursuit of defence of Canadian nationalinterests at a given time in the future, the strategic analysis on which thepolicy decision is based must anticipate the domestic and internationalpolitical environment by some ten to fifteen years. There is always thepossibility of making some adjustments in the analysis and the policy over theintervening years as better information becomes available; but failure toinitiate an analysis which in- corporates a variety of possible developments.due to the uncertainty of the data at hand, often leaves the political leaderswith inappropriate options and inadequate capabilities to meet futurerequirements.