During the 1980s, two government defence policy decisions were subjects of controversy for the Canadian public. The first was the decision of Pierre Trudeau's Liberal government in July 1983 to allow the United States to test its air-launched cruise missile in Canada's north. The second was the decision of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney in September 1985 not to participate in the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on a government-to-government basis. Both decisions were related to the aerospace defence of the continent and made the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD) in 1986 also controversial. Opinion polls demonstrated the extent of public disagreement over the issues. According to a Gallup poll in August 1983, 48 per cent of Canadians opposed cruise testing, 44 per cent supported it, and 8 per cent were undecided.(f.1) In May 1985, Gallup identified 53 per cent in favour of Canadian participation in SDI research, 40 per cent opposed, and 7 per cent undecided. The opposition was reflected in mass public demonstrations across the country. The numbers taking part in Vancouver's annual Walk for Peace, for example, swelled from 1,500 in 1980 to 30,000 in 1982 and 60,000 in 1985.(f.2) By 1983, 500 peace movement groups nation-wide were working against testing cruise missiles.(f.3) In the autumn of that year, a coalition of 26 peace movement and trade union organizations challenged the Trudeau government's decision in the Supreme Court under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 1985, when participation in SDI was also an issue, the Canadian Peace Alliance was formed to co-ordinate activities nation-wide. By May 1983, Trudeau had received 6,570 letters about the cruise issue, of which only 119 supported testing. Similarly, by June 1985, Mulroney had received 5,000 letters about Canada's relationship to s SDI, of which only 6 supported participation.(f.4) This extended period of intense public interest in defence policy-making echoed the years between 1959 and 1963 when Canadians debated the appropriateness of a nuclear weapons role for Canada's air defence forces. Major analysts of Canadian defence policy-making tend to characterize these periods of large-scale organized dissent as 'copycat' phenomena(f.5) or as expressions of 'a latent anti-Americanism and of a self-image of moral rectitude.'(f.6) The nature of public disagreement, however, suggests another reading. At the core of each period were defence programmes which, by actively involving Canadians in Canada in the military relations of the United States and the Soviet Union, demonstrated consent for those relations. That consent, together with a questioning of appropriate roles for Canada in the East-West relations of the Cold War, informed dissent. Thus, public dissent was distinctly Canadian and consistently expressed when challenged. Between 1963 and the early 1980s, no defence programme of a comparable nature was undertaken by Canadian governments. The issues of the 1980s were subjects of high-profile media attention. A comparison of the content of newspaper coverage with information contained in the archives of the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs reveals that the Canadian print media mounted a well-informed debate about the issues -- a debate relatively unconstrained by the kinds of closure which major theoretical perspectives predict for issues of national security. In so doing, the media contributed to the shaping of the public discourse on these issues, as they also reflected it. After exploring the linkages between cruise missile testing, SDI, and the NORAD agreement, this article will review major theoretical understandings of the limitations placed on the media's reportage of security issues. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the coverage of these issues in seven Canadian newspapers will follow, and the article will conclude with some reflections on the relationship between public interest in security issues and government decision-making. …