Campaign Finance Disclosure Research Articles

When Do Voters Respond to Campaign Finance Disclosure? Evidence from Multiple Election Types

AbstractIn recent American elections political candidates have actively emphasized features of their fundraising profiles when campaigning. Yet, surprisingly, we know comparatively little about how financial information affects vote choice specifically, whether effects differ across types of election, and how robust any effects are to other relevant political signals. Using a series of conjoint experiment designs, I compare the effects of campaigns’ financial profiles on vote choice across direct democratic and representative elections, randomizing subjects’ exposure to additional political cues. I find that while the financial profile of candidates can affect vote choice, these effects are drowned out by non-financial signals. In ballot initiative races, the explicit policy focus of the election appears to swamp any effect of financial information. This paper is the first to explore the comparative effects of financial disclosure across election type, contributing to our understanding of how different heuristics interact across electoral contexts.

Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior

AbstractDo audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The US Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10% of US House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a US agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive reelections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.

Explaining digital campaign expenses: The case of the 2018 legislative elections in Colombia

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the investment in digital tools and the allocation of communication expenses in a Global South country with an uneven digital penetration rate. Data were collected for 2,563 candidates in the 2018 legislative election in Colombia, based on the official campaign finance disclosure documents. A multivariate analysis shows that particularly challengers invest in social media tools, which is a strong indication in favor of the equalization model. That such an effect is not found for radio and television expenses confirms this interpretation. Candidates on open lists are more inclined to spend on both digital and radio and television tools than candidates on closed lists. At the district level, the odds of spending on digital media increase with the digital media use, but so does the odds of spending on radio and television ads.

Reading the Fine Print: Issue Advertisements and the Persuasive Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosures

There is an expectation among practitioners that advertising disclosures work to inform voters about who is speaking and whether they should trust the information in the advertisement. However, existing research suggests that current disclosure regulations may not perform as reformers expect. These studies indicate that voters may be deceived by strategically chosen interest group names that falsely project knowledge or trustworthiness. In this study, I measure how actual campaign names and interest groups are perceived by individuals in terms of their knowledge and trustworthiness. I then experimentally vary the campaign finance disclosure within a ballot initiative advertisement to see how these disclosures affect respondents’ issue preferences. This study found that in some cases, there was no difference between an advertisement with no disclosure and one with a veiled disclosure message. In other cases, this level of disclosure reduced support for the issue. In most cases, respondents appear to condition their support on the credibility of the campaign donor disclosed. In some cases, respondents are deceived by the perceived credibility of campaign names when less comprehensive disclosure is used.

Campaign Finance Disclosure

Campaign finance disclosure is the last (somewhat) robust regulation we have in American campaign finance, and it is under threat. We urgently need more research on disclosure. Regulatory complexity makes studying campaign finance disclosure daunting. It also creates so-called dark money and anonymous speech online. Scholars must understand the existing regulatory loopholes as they plan studies to avoid biased estimates and understand the conditions in which their results generalize to a broader population. The court's disclosure jurisprudence is thin and based on largely unproven assumptions. As the research on campaign finance disclosure matures, scholars should take a broad view of the costs and benefits of disclosure, rather than the narrow, court-led focus many studies have had until now. We must also take seriously the ways in which cognitive limitations can limit the benefits of disclosure. I explain the doctrine and review existing studies, highlighting opportunities to expand the literature.

Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior

Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The U.S. Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10 percent of U.S. House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a U.S. agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive re-elections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval; and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.

Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the 'Informational Interest' Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure

Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the 'Informational Interest' Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure

Show Me the Money: 'Dark Money' and the Informational Benefit of Campaign Finance Disclosure

Campaign finance compliance and transparency reveal important non-policy attributes that voters care about. They may signal how the candidate would govern if elected. Using vignette and conjoint survey experiments, I show that voters in primary elections base their candidate selection on transparency considerations, even where the candidate shares the respondents’ preferred policy positions. The findings bring campaign finance compliance into the scholarly conversation about candidate valence, and they explain why some primary candidates discourage dark money support only to embrace it in the general election.

Do Institutions and Rules Influence Electoral Accessibility and Competitiveness? Considering the 2014 Toronto Ward Elections

Electoral and campaign finance reforms are believed to improve the competitiveness of elections and the accessibility of the electoral process; however, the interaction between electoral institutions and competitiveness and accessibility in nonpartisan municipal elections remains understudied. This article examines the City of Toronto, which exemplifies many of the reforms proposed in the American context, including a strict campaign finance regime and low barriers to candidate entry. Analysis of campaign finance disclosure data and candidate characteristics for Toronto’s 2014 ward elections reveals that electoral and campaign finance rules increase electoral accessibility while doing little to limit incumbency advantage. We argue that crowded nonpartisan races are low-information environments in which candidates, donors, and voters cannot assess challenger quality, which reinforces incumbent name recognition and access to campaign resources. The Toronto case highlights the limits of institutional and regulatory change as a means of increasing local electoral competitiveness and accessibility.

The Kantian Publicity Principle and the Transparency Presumption in Public Affairs: When Private Citizens’ Participation Becomes Public Knowledge

This article applies Immanuel Kant’s “publicity principle” to several issues that involve citizen participation in public affairs, including open records laws, campaign finance disclosure, and the confidentiality of private organization membership and donor lists. The Kantian principle is premised on the belief that informed people will rise up in opposition to actions incompatible with “the transcendental concept of public right.” However, in many controversies, publicity may serve to threaten—rather than protect—segments of the citizenry who support causes that are not popular with other portions of the populace. The article concludes that the publicity principle applies reasonably well to actions of public officials, but is a less useful guide when applied to the participatory acts of private individuals.

Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Candidate Funding Sources and Voter Evaluations

AbstractMoney comes from a variety of sources in American elections. It is unclear however whether voters’ knowledge about a candidate's funding portfolio influences how that candidate is evaluated. We present the results of two survey experiments in which we randomly assigned the composition of donors from various categories to a hypothetical candidate. We find that on average a candidate described as having received a majority of his contributions from individuals is evaluated more highly than one who received a majority of his contributions from interest groups. We also find that when it comes to self-financing a campaign, using private sector money is more beneficial to candidates than using inherited money, but only when the candidate is a member of the same party as the voter. Our results have implications for campaign strategy, academic debates concerning the effect of money on elections, and policy debates concerning the effects of increased campaign finance disclosure.

State Campaign Finance Laws and the Equality of Political Representation

Abstract Laws that regulate the financing of campaigns are one attempt to attenuate the role of money in politics in hopes that citizens' opinions will receive more equal consideration when elected officials make policy decisions. Do states with stricter campaign finance laws actually display more egalitarian patterns of representation? Using public opinion measures from the National Annenberg Election Surveys and data on state policies, I first demonstrate that state policy decisions are consistently more proximate to the opinions of citizens with higher incomes. I then evaluate the relationship between the strictness of state campaign finance laws and political equality and find evidence that states with more stringent campaign finance disclosure requirements weigh citizens' opinions more equally in the policymaking process. However, I find no statistical relationship between the strictness of contribution limits or the presence of a public financing system and the equality of political representation.

The Effects of Increased Campaign Finance Disclosure: Evaluating Reform Proposals

Campaign disclosure requirements vary considerably across the United States. In some states, it is difficult to learn much about outside group spending in non-federal elections; other states have recently passed disclosure laws that go beyond federal requirements. This study builds upon a growing body of research on the impact of anonymous spending to address two questions about campaign finance disclosure: what types of disclosure information voters pay attention to and whether there are partisan differences in responsiveness to campaign finance data. We address these questions via an experiment in which people are randomly assigned to receive additional information about the donors to an outside group. We find some evidence that campaign finance information affected candidate evaluations and vote choice, but that subjects’ evaluations were particularly sensitive to whether they were told that out-of-state donors were behind the outside group. Further, we find little evidence that partisan identification conditioned these treatment effects; Republicans, Democrats, and Independents responded to our experimental stimuli in much the same way.

Sunshinees Shadow: Overbroad Open Meetings Laws as Content-Based, Distinct from Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, and Constitutionally Suspect

In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses “strict” open meetings laws applicable in many states to local legislators — laws which restrict substantive discussion of government business even among two or three legislators (far short of a quorum) outside a properly noticed public meeting, and/or which contain no exceptions for sensitive, privacy-invasive topics which might legitimately warrant private deliberation at early stages. Such laws are surprisingly common and broad, and stand in stark contrast to the lack of such restrictions applicable to most state legislators and all federal legislators. Drawing on a novel Fifth Circuit case criticizing such laws, Prof. Mulroy’s prior Tennessee Law Review Article had argued that such laws are overbroad speech restrictions. This new Article draws on a new Fifth Circuit case upholding such laws, and analyzes two relatively new arguments in the defense of such laws. First, this Article argues that such strict “sunshine” laws cannot be defended by analogizing them to campaign finance disclosure laws upheld in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United case and its progeny, because the government interests justifying such disclosure laws do not apply with equal force to strict sunshine rules. In so doing, it discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Second, it argues that such laws are properly analyzed as “content-based” speech restrictions triggering “strict scrutiny” constitutional review. In so doing, the Article discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCullen v. Oakley. It synthesizes the surprisingly muddled Supreme Court guidance on when to analyze a speech restriction as content-based, criticizes part of the current doctrine on this question, and argues for a straightforward “purely facial” approach which always treats a law as content-based if the law’s application turns on the content of the speech involved. Along the way, it explains many of the counterintuitive, harmful effects of overbroad sunshine laws, including their tendency to chill discussion, hinder compromise, force inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, breed widespread noncompliance and contempt for the law, and transfer power from legislators to unelected staff and lobbyists.

Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code

In an attempt to avoid the traditional constitutional problems associated with campaign finance disclosure laws, campaign finance reform advocates took an alternative approach. Reformers amended the Internal Revenue Code and used the tax status of political organizations as a mechanism for encouraging campaign disclosure of campaign related spending. The reformers conditioned a political organization's tax-exempt status on the willingness of the organization to disclose its contributors and expenditures. This article deals with the constitutionality and wisdom of the recently enacted legislation and suggests possible alternatives.

A framework for analyzing and comparing privacy states

This article develops a framework for analyzing and comparing privacy and privacy protections across (inter alia) time, place, and polity and for examining factors that affect privacy and privacy protection. This framework provides a method to describe precisely aspects of privacy and context and a flexible vocabulary and notation for such descriptions and comparisons. Moreover, it links philosophical and conceptual work on privacy to social science and policy work and accommodates different conceptions of the nature and value of privacy. The article begins with an outline of the framework. It then refines the view by describing a hypothetical application. Finally, it applies the framework to a real‐world privacy issue—campaign finance disclosure laws in the United States and France. The article concludes with an argument that the framework offers important advantages to privacy scholarship and for privacy policy makers.

Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure

In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court swept away long-standing limits on corporate spending in federal elections, but it also strongly affirmed the constitutionality of robust disclosure and disclaimer requirements. In the wake of that decision, many proponents of campaign finance regulation have turned their attention to disclosure as the best remaining mechanism by which to regulate money in elections. At the same time, opponents of campaign finance regulation — including the legal team behind Citizens United — have trained their sights on disclosure, filing new challenges to existing disclosure require- ments in a number of state or federal courts, although so far with only limited success.Relying on the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD) — an original database developed by one of the authors to track the population of unique individual campaign contributors from 1980 through 2008 — this essay tests the Supreme Court’s rhetoric about disclosure, and some of the premises of our current policy debates about money in politics, against the realities of the FEC’s existing disclosure regime. In particular, we find that compliance with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system. In so doing, the current system fails to provide basic facts about how candidates (and committees) finance their campaigns. We suggest that much of what the Court and reformers assume about disclosure is wrong — that their views are premised on an effective and well-functioning disclosure regime that in fact bears scant resemblance to the system of disclosure maintained by the FEC. Correcting these misunderstandings will be critical to crafting better reform proposals. And the stakes could not be higher: disclosure may well be the only constitutionally viable and politically feasible method of regulating money in elections in a post-Citizens United world.

Publius Was Not a PAC: Reconciling Anonymous Political Speech, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Disclosure

Publius Was Not a PAC: Reconciling Anonymous Political Speech, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Disclosure

Information at the Margin: Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot Issues, and Voter Knowledge

Abstract All 24 states that permit voters to cast ballots directly on policy matters also require that contributions and expenditures on ballot issue campaigns be disclosed publicly. Scholars assert that information about the financial involvement of interest groups in ballot issue campaigns provides voters with valuable cues about how to vote on potentially complex and confusing issues. In this article, I argue that the proper way to assess the informational benefits of disclosure is to assess whether the information gleaned from disclosure reports is beneficial to voters at the margin, once other available information is taken into account. Using a survey experiment, I show that disclosure information provides few marginal benefits for voters, calling into question the informational rationale for disclosure laws.

Anonymous Political Speech and the First Amendment

This article criticizes federal and state campaign finance disclosure laws on First Amendment and political privacy grounds and offers several suggestions for reform respectful of these concerns. Part II of this article offers a history of anonymous speech and suppression of political speech generally. It also illustrates the benefits of anonymous speech to political discourse and participation in the American experiment. Part III is a political speech primer, laying out the basic principles for protecting it constitutionally, and identifying the schism between free speech and campaign finance reform. Part IV discusses the difficulty and expense of complying with campaign finance disclosure. It also discusses efforts to expand campaign finance disclosure laws to reach practically all political speech. Finally, Part V discusses the paradox surrounding legal protection of anonymous speech, and offers various proposals to bolster political privacy.