Campaign Finance Disclosure Research Articles

Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure

Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of disclosure requirements, some donors have been able to remain anonymous through a combination of regulatory gaps, complicated financing schemes, and lags in when information is made public. As a first examination of the potential consequences of increased anonymity in political advertising we designed an experiment that varied the amount and format of information about the interests behind an attack ad sponsored by an “unknown” group. We find that participants were more supportive of the attacked candidate after viewing information disclosing donors, suggesting that voters may discount a group-sponsored ad when they have more information about the financial interests behind the message. We also find some evidence that the effect of disclosure depends on how campaign finance information is presented. Our study has implications for how (to this point, failed) congressional efforts to require greater disclosure of campaign finance donors may affect electoral politics.

Congressional Disclosure of Time Spent Fundraising

This Article advocates passage of a law requiring members of Congress to disclose the amount of time they spend fundraising. In the wake of Citizens United and other court decisions severely limiting lawmakers’ ability to regulate campaign spending, many scholars have turned their focus to campaign finance disclosure laws. According to some, laws requiring campaigns and donors to reveal the source of contributions and expenditures are the last bastion of federal campaign finance law. Yet despite a history of broad acceptance, disclosure laws rest on an increasingly shaky foundation. The most troubling aspect of current disclosure law is that it contains loopholes so obvious and irresistible that many political players choose to spend dark money, the source of which is unidentified. Further, some argue that even when the source of political spending is disclosed, the information provided to the electorate is of questionable usefulness for a host of reasons. Finally, opponents of disclosure laws point to their potential chilling effect and threats of retaliation that can occur when the public learns who supported a certain candidate or ballot measure. Even those who support disclosure laws have recently conceded that perhaps the law should encompass only large spenders rather than those contributing only a few hundred dollars. For these reasons, there have been calls to reform federal disclosure law so it is more properly tailored to serve its goals without chilling speech. Many have proposed effective, intelligent changes that would improve the disclosure regime greatly. However, the current discussion about disclosure largely ignores the fact that there is a gaping hole in disclosure requirements: While the electorate receives some information about a candidate’s financial backers and can learn about a legislator’s votes and other activities, voters cannot discover how much time their representatives spend raising money. Information about legislators’ fundraising time is critically important: the average member of Congress spends between thirty and seventy percent of their time seeking money. The aim of requiring disclosure of fundraising time would be twofold: First, it would supplement current disclosure law by providing new, valuable information about legislators that is less susceptible to avoidance, is more useful to voters, and would not risk chilling speech. Second, it would discourage legislators from spending egregious amounts of time fundraising, thereby encouraging them to devote more time to the jobs they are elected to do. Though this Article focuses on the discrete proposal of requiring disclosure of time spent fundraising, it also advocates further scholarly examination of enhanced disclosure of legislators’ activities. Such requirements, like the one proposed here, provide greater benefits and often lack the drawbacks of disclosure laws that seek information from nongovernment actors.

Following the Money: Campaign Finance Disclosure in India and the United States

Abstract The authors compare the legal and administrative challenges of campaign finance disclosure regimes in the United States and the Republic of India. While the two countries' campaign finance laws differ markedly, they share the goal of timely and accurate disclosure of campaigns' financial activities. However, the two countries have encountered different obstacles to the realization of this goal. The authors discuss the responses to these obstacles, and examine how the different approaches taken by the United States and India reflect each country's distinct legal culture, broader treatment of election issues, and prior experience with campaign finance regulation.

Business in the Bulls-Eye? Target Corp. and the Limits of Campaign Finance Disclosure

Abstract The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United has generated a storm of debate about the role of corporations and unions in American elections. Since organizations may not be barred from participating directly in elections, the political agenda turned to whether disclosure of corporate and union involvement can serve as a check or tool of accountability. In this article we argue that disclosure provides a very limited check, grounding this conclusion on the highest profile case study to emerge in the 2010 midterm election cycle, that of the Target Corporation's contribution supporting a Republican gubernatorial candidate in Minnesota. We argue that this case should have provided extremely fertile ground for opponents of direct corporate political contributions, but that even with disclosure and targeted mobilization, the effect appears to have been sharply limited.

Buying the Electorate: An Empirical Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme Court Erred by Not Revisiting Citizens United

The article discusses how the Supreme Court erred by summarily reversing the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership v. AG and not revisiting their holding in Citizens United v. FEC. The article begins by discussing the holding in the Western Tradition Partnership case and analyzing both the majority and dissenting opinions. The article then analyzes how the Montana Supreme Court distinguished Citizens United, with the Court specifically looking at the “unique” political history in Montana and finding that Montana’s ban on corporate independent political spending served a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to that interest. The article then transitions into an empirical study of the current campaign finance landscape by specifically looking at: states’ unique histories of corruption, the lack of transparency with regard to corporate political expenditures, the public perception of corruption in corporate political spending practices, the independence of super PACs, the influence of political dark money and 501(c)(4) organizations being used to circumvent campaign finance laws, and the use of shell corporations to circumvent campaign finance disclosure rules and Federal tax laws. The article concludes by listing additional arguments in favor of the Supreme Court revisiting Citizens United including: the breadth of the First Amendment, the idea of corporations being “creatures of the state,” the ability of PACs to allow corporate political participation, the issue of a state’s power to exclude foreign corporations from participation in their democratic political institutions, shareholder protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme Court’s history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the doctrine’s factual underpinnings no longer appear to be accurate.

Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age

Everywhere you look, campaign finance disclosure laws are under attack. Disclosure has been opposed by the National Organization for Marriage, Senate and House Republicans (including Senator McConnell, who used to call for no limits and full disclosure), Republican members of the Federal Election Commission, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. But attacks on disclosure have come not only from the right. Members of the academy, including Bill McGeveran, Richard Briffault, Lloyd Mayer, and Bruce Cain. have criticized disclosure laws. In this short Essay, I offer a qualified defense of government-mandated disclosure, one which recognizes the concerns of these prominent academics but also sees much of the anti-disclosure rhetoric of the Chamber and others as overblown and unsupported - offered disingenuously with the intention to create a fully deregulated campaign finance system in which large amounts of secret money flow in an attempt to curry favor with politicians but avoid public scrutiny. To the contrary, disclosure laws remain one of the few remaining constitutional levers to further the public interest through campaign finance law.Even in the Internet age, in which the costs of obtaining campaign finance data about small-scale contributions by individual donors often have fallen to near zero, there is virtually no record of harassment of donors outside the context of the most hot button social issue of gay marriage - and even there, much of the evidence is weak. In the face of evidence of a real threat of serious harassment, courts should freely grant exemptions from campaign finance laws. Even absent proof of harassment, Congress and state legislatures should modify their disclosure laws to protect the informational privacy of those individuals who use modest means to express symbolic support for candidates or ballot measures. But major players in the electoral process generally should not be able to shield their identities under a pretextual appeal to the prevention of “harassment” because of the important government interests in preventing corruption and providing valuable information to voters which are furthered by mandated disclosure. It is no surprise that the Internet has been primarily responsible for the loss of informational privacy in the campaign finance disclosure context. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Internet is at least indirectly responsible for strengthening the two primary government interests supporting mandatory disclosure. The rise of the Internet was a prime force in the unraveling of the older campaign finance regime, and the subsequent emergence of new campaign finance organizations such as “Super PACs” which raise the danger of the corruption of elected officials dramatically. Disclosure laws may not be the best tool to police the potential for corruption from these new or supercharged campaign finance vehicles. Nonetheless, disclosure laws are much better than nothing in ferreting out when an elected official might act to benefit her supporters rather than act in the public interest.As for the information interest, campaign finance data, especially when included on the face of campaign advertising, provides an important heuristic cue helping busy voters decide how to vote. Such data assist voters who face Internet-driven information overload and a variety of potentially misleading campaign ads seeking to mask the identity of those behind campaigns and campaign advertising.

Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0

Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0

Table of Contents

AbstractIRS Reviews, Seeks Comments On New Hospital Exemption RulesHouse Passes Campaign Finance Disclosure LegislationFraternity Chapter Scholarship Foundation Denied ExemptionOrphanage Held Agency of Church for Parsonage Allowance PurposesIRS Rules that Unrelated Businesses Not Regularly Carried OnA Look at the Most Recent Reasonable Compensation CaseIRS Overstates its Cases: A RepriseSweeping Public Charity Legislation IntroducedCharitable Giving Decreased in 2009New Statistics on Noncash Charitable ContributionsOther Developments

The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?

We surveyed independent citizens’ groups who advertised in either of the Canadian federal elections of 2004 and 2006 to see whether financial reporting laws act as barriers to entry in politics. The most conservative estimates suggest that conforming imposes administrative costs of no more than 9% of group budgets. These small reporting costs and our finding that 61% of respondents believed reporting requirements discouraged independent groups from participating in elections suggest that there may be intangible but substantial costs to disclosure. Our survey indicates these costs arise from the fear of prosecution by authorities for alleged violations of reporting requirements.

Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States

This study examines the relationship between the quality of campaign finance disclosure in the American states and print news coverage of campaign finance. Does better disclosure of money in politics have an effect on the quantity, content, and timing of news articles? The implications are important for the effectiveness of disclosure in informing voters about the role of money in politics and holding politicians accountable. In theory, better disclosure should decrease the cost of information, allowing journalists to write more articles in a timely manner and move beyond the typical horserace story about which candidate has more money. The findings provide strong evidence that better disclosure regimes tend to reduce horserace coverage but do not necessarily increase the number of articles that focus on potentially improper political contributions or expenditures. While there is a slight increase in the quantity of news articles about political money, there is no evidence that better disclosure improves timeliness of news reporting. A discussion follows about the implications of these findings for regulating money in politics, and proposes further research to evaluate the link between campaign finance transparency and political accountability.

The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative Campaign Finance Disclosure

This article describes two systems within which campaign finance laws seek to limit corruption. One consists of the legal and ethical rules governing relations between individual politicians and donors. The other is the macro-level regulation of total campaign spending and the acceptable level of private influence over the public sector. Disclosure is integral to both. Looking at four distinct systems, the U. S., the U. K., Germany, and California, I assess the scope of corruption at the micro (legal) and macro (regulatory) levels. To assess micro level evidence of corruption, I focus on the U.S. and California. These two systems have long experience with independent enforcement agencies. Both show evidence of effective and active enforcement of the laws, with violations of campaign finance laws on a very small scale. To assess the macro scale of corruption, I compare the growth of spending in all four systems. All four show an important regularity. Campaign spending is a very small fraction of national income (and of government spending) and it grows at the same rate of income. These facts are consistent with the view that corruption through campaign spending is a small societal problem. I conclude with a comment on why we should have disclosure, even though corruption in this system appears to be on a very small scale.

Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 6, No. 1 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium—Part TwoNot Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory SystemRobert F. BauerRobert F. BauerSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:13 Feb 2007https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6004AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byPolicy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capitalJournal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2Improving Corporate Political Donations Disclosure: Lessons from Australia5 June 2017 | Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3Administering Politics: Rediscovering Campaign Finance and Public Administration28 July 2016 | Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 38, No. 3Managing the Risks of Corporate Political Donations: A Utilitarian Perspective20 December 2012 | Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 2Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on News Reporting in the American States Raymond J. La Raja13 August 2007 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative Campaign Finance Disclosure Stephen Ansolabehere9 May 2007 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 Volume 6Issue 1Mar 2007 InformationCopyright 2007, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Robert F. Bauer.Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Mar 2007.38-55.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.6004Published in Volume: 6 Issue 1: February 13, 2007PDF download

Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States

The decline of political efficacy and trust in the United States is often linked to the rise of money in politics. Both the courts and reform advocates justify restrictions on campaign donations and spending as necessary for the improvement of links between the government and the governed. We conduct the first test of whether campaign finance laws actually influence how citizens view their government by exploiting the variation in campaign finance regulations both across and within states during the last half of the 20th century. Our analysis reveals no large positive effects of campaign finance laws on political efficacy. Public disclosure laws and limits on contributions from organizations are in some cases associated with modest increases in efficacy, but public financing is associated with a similarly modest decrease in efficacy. ∗Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We thank Barry Burden, Dick Niemi, the editors, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Thanks also to Matt Jacobsmeier and Matt Stiffler for research assistance. †Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 146270146; 585-273-4779; david.primo@rochester.edu; Fax: 585-271-1616 ‡Department of Economics and Truman School of Public Affairs, University of Missouri, 118 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211; 573-882-5572; milyoj@missouri.edu; Fax: 573-882-2697

Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 4, No. 4 Campaign Disclosure Project Symposium Part OneDesigning Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign FinanceProfessor Clyde WilcoxProfessor Clyde WilcoxSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:17 Nov 2005https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.371AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byCampaign Finance DisclosureAnnual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 14, No. 1Improving Corporate Political Donations Disclosure: Lessons from Australia5 June 2017 | Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3I Know What You Did Last Cycle: Improving the Detection of State Campaign Finance Violations Ellen C. Seljan, Todd Lochner, Maya Gold, and Walker Davis1 September 2016 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform23 October 2012 | Party Politics, Vol. 20, No. 6Managing the Risks of Corporate Political Donations: A Utilitarian Perspective20 December 2012 | Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 2Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure22 April 2013 | American Politics Research, Vol. 41, No. 6The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?4 February 2010 | Public Choice, Vol. 146, No. 3-4Divergent Disclosure: The Value of Uniformity in State Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Grant Davis-Denny17 November 2005 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4 Volume 4Issue 4Dec 2005 InformationCopyright 2005, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Professor Clyde Wilcox.Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Dec 2005.371-386.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.371Published in Volume: 4 Issue 4: November 17, 2005PDF download

Divergent Disclosure: The Value of Uniformity in State Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws

Divergent Disclosure: The Value of Uniformity in State Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws

The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo

Although scholars have explored innumerable aspects of the Supreme Court's landmark opinion in the 1976 campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), one area left virtually unexplored is the case's drafting history. This article provides a chronology of the internal deliberations of the Court from the time of the post-argument conference to the issuance of the decision on January 30, 1976. It concludes with some thoughts on what the drafting history tells us about the Court's rejection of the equality rationale for campaign finance regulation.The drafting history reveals the following interesting points about the case:(1) Justice Stewart wrote the crucial portion of the opinion upholding campaign contribution limits but striking down limits on campaign expenditures. Justice Powell wrote the section on campaign finance disclosure, Justice Brennan wrote the section on the public financing provisions for presidential elections, and then-Justice Rehnquist wrote the section on the unconstitutionality of the manner in which the Federal Election Commission was constituted. Chief Justice Burger wrote the introduction to the opinion; (2) Initially, Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with Justice White that the provision limiting to $1,000 independent expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for federal office was constitutional. These Justices appeared to change their minds out of concern over the law's vagueness, not because of a belief that the First Amendment prohibited limits on campaign expenditures; (3) Footnote 52 of the opinion, which has provided the basis for the rise of soft money and issue advocacy, came late in the drafting process; and (4) The Court seemed well aware the new law, as it interpreted it, would not be very effective and even used this ineffectiveness as a reason to strike down the expenditure limits. But the Court seemed unaware that the late-added footnote 52 would have such an impact on electoral politics.

A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 1, No. 2 Original PapersA Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election CommissionBradley A. Smith and Stephen M. HoerstingBradley A. SmithSearch for more papers by this author and Stephen M. HoerstingSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:6 Jul 2004https://doi.org/10.1089/153312902753610002AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited ByFederal Election Commission Divided: Measuring Conflict in Commission Votes Since 1990 Michael M. Franz10 June 2021 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2Disclaiming responsibility: How platforms deadlocked the Federal Election Commission's efforts to regulate digital political advertisingTelecommunications Policy, Vol. 43, No. 8Campaign Finance Regulation in North America: An Institutional Perspective Daniel P. Tokaji18 September 2018 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3I Know What You Did Last Cycle: Improving the Detection of State Campaign Finance Violations Ellen C. Seljan, Todd Lochner, Maya Gold, and Walker Davis1 September 2016 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3Public Agency External Analysis Using a Modified “Five Forces” FrameworkInternational Public Management Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?4 February 2010 | Public Choice, Vol. 146, No. 3-4The Devil We Know? Evaluating the Federal Election Commission as Enforcer Michael M. Franz3 August 2009 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 8, No. 3Wheat from chaff: Third-party monitoring and FEC enforcement actionsRegulation & Governance, Vol. 2, No. 2Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis Todd Lochner17 November 2005 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign Finance Violations Todd Lochner6 July 2004 | Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1Beyond Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference Volume 1Issue 2Jun 2002 To cite this article:Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting.A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Jun 2002.145-171.http://doi.org/10.1089/153312902753610002Published in Volume: 1 Issue 2: July 6, 2004PDF download

The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy

251 BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT decided McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,1 the law related to campaign finance disclosure was a mess. As this commentary explains, McConnell resolved a key disclosure question, upholding the constitutionality of new disclosure rules in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) related to contributions and expenditures funding “sham issue advocacy” in candidate elections. McConnell unfortunately left open many other important questions concerning conflicts between two earlier key Supreme Court cases discussing disclosure, Buckley v. Valeo2 and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.3 Even after McConnell, the constitutionality of disclosure rules in three important areas remains unclear: (1) To what extent may the government compel disclosure of a speaker’s identity in face-to-face election-related communications or compel disclosure of the funder of communications on the face of election-related advertisements? (2) To what extent may the government compel disclosure of expenditures by those using modest resources? (3) To what extent may the government compel disclosure of contributions and expenditures in ballot measure campaigns? Answers to these questions will await cases post-McConnell.

The Determinants of Candidates' Vote Share and the Advantages of Incumbency in City Council Elections

Theory: The congressional and state legislative elections literature suggest that candidates' performance in elections is largely a function of incumbency, campaign spending, and party support. Little is known, however, about how these variables affect candidates' vote share in city council elections. Hypotheses: I expect incumbency, campaign spending, and party organization support to be the most important predictors of candidates' vote share. In addition, I expect endorsements from local newspapers and race or ethnicity of the candidates to influence election outcomes. Methods: Multiple regression models are tested on 631 candidates who ran for the Chicago city council between 1979 and 1995. Data are from a variety of local newspapers, official campaign finance disclosure reports, and official election returns. Results: Incumbency, Democratic party support, number of opponents, campaign spending, and newspaper endorsements are all significant predictors of candidates' vote share. Democratic Party organization support is still an important component of ward-level politics in Chicago, despite a weakening of the machine at the county level. Findings also indicate that campaign spending is an increasingly important component of these contests.

The limitations of campaign finance disclosure

National Civic ReviewVolume 67, Issue 5 p. 223-227 Article The limitations of campaign finance disclosure Lynn Hellebust, Lynn Hellebust Lynn Hellebust was executive director of the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission. This is his address at the National Municipal League's National Conference on Government, November 15, 1977.Search for more papers by this author Lynn Hellebust, Lynn Hellebust Lynn Hellebust was executive director of the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission. This is his address at the National Municipal League's National Conference on Government, November 15, 1977.Search for more papers by this author First published: May 1978 https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4100670505Citations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume67, Issue5May 1978Pages 223-227 RelatedInformation