Abstract
AbstractDo audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The US Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10% of US House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a US agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive reelections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.
Highlights
Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior
Hunter’s general election opponent attacked Hunter during the 2018 election by stating the campaign finance scandal “would be funny if it wasn’t so sad and shameful.”2 The information revealed about this scandal affected voters, suggesting greater transparency influences democratic decisions
Do transparency institutions that reveal candidate noncompliance with the law affect election margins? Do audits by executive agencies that provide greater information about elected officials impact the behavior of those audited? We argue that institutions that encourage
Summary
Do Audited Legislators Go Home More? Tables 7 and 8 display the results of the models on legislator travel to their districts. The other is the Number of trips home in the first quarter of 1976 As shown in this additional model, the direct effect of being audited is associated with an increase in travel (about 1.23 more trips for audited nonsouthern members relative to non-audited nonsouthern members), but again, we lack statistical precision. [insert Tables 7 and 8 here] Conclusions and Implications Transparency and campaign finance audits are policies that can increase information to voters. Incumbent legislators whose audits revealed violations were more likely to retire, foregoing facing voters who knew they engaged in campaign finance malfeasance. In terms of our understanding of legislative politics and elections, the theory suggests that information about scandal and valence influences voters. Information – and audits – improve voters’ abilities to evaluate whether candidates are high on character valence, resulting in a more informed, competent electorate
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