Calculus Of Consent Research Articles

Bibliography of James M. Buchanan's Publications, 1949-1986

1. Prices, Income, and Public Policy (with C. L. Allen and M. R. Colberg) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). Second Edition (1959). 2. Public Principles of Public Debt (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1958). 3. The Public Finances (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1960). Second Edition (1965). Translated into Spanish as Hacienda Publica (1968). Third Edition (1970). Translated into Japanese (1972). Fourth Edition (with Marilyn Flowers, 1975). Fifth Edition (with Marilyn Flowers, 1980). Sixth Edition (with Marilyn Flowers, 1986). 4. Fiscal Theory and Political Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). Translated into Turkish (1965). Translated into Japanese (1972). 5. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (with Gordon Tullock) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Paperback Edition (1965). Translated into Japanese (1979). Translated into Spanish (1980). 6. Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966). Translated into Japanese (1971). Translated into Spanish (1973). 7. Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1968). Translated into Italian (1968). Translated into Japanese (1974). 8. Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., October 1969) (Out of Print). Reprinted by University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint (1979). 9. Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis (with Nicos Devletoglou) (Basic Books, 1970). English Edition (1971). 10. Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, edited with Robert Tollison (University of Michigan Press, 1972). 11. LSE Essays on Cost, edited with G. F. Thirlby (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1973). 12. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Translated into Japanese (1977). Translated into Italian (1979). Translated into German (1984). 13. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (with Richard E. Wagner) (New York: Academic Press, 1978). Translated into Japanese (1979). Translated into Korean (1981). 14. Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspective of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978). 15. WhatShould EconomistsDo? (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Press, 1979).

THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: Finding a Cooperative Solution

When will villagers come together to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for themselves individually? Can locally based collective action be a viable way to manage common property resources? Many writers on collective action and common property are pessimisric about the ability of people who face problems with common property resources to organize sustainable patterns of use for themselves. Some writers favor privatization of 1:he commons as the only viable solution; others, the imposition of state regulation. This article shows, with reference 232 Research Observer 2, no. 2 (July 1987) to Mancur Olson's logic of collective action, that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak for the village-based use of common property resources. There can thus be no general presumption that collective action will fail in the management of common property resources, any more than there can be a general presumption that it will work. article suggests that the chances of success through collective action depend on the characteristics of the resources, the user group, and group-state relations. This article is based on a forthcoming book, Village Republics: Conditions Notes for Collective Action in South India, Cambridge University Press. I am grateful to Hans Binswanger, Richard Kimber, Ford Runge, and especially Elinor Ostrom for discussions on various points of the argument. 1. For references, see citations later in text. 2. It is not that Olson says or implies that the size of the collective net benefit is irrelevant; he simply does not give it much attention. 3. For example, McKean (1984) on Japan; Gilles and Jamtgaard (1981) on Peru; Campbell and Godoy (1985) on the Andes; Hitchcock (1980), Peters (1983), and Thomsen (1980) on Africa; and Netting (1978) on Switzerland. See also Runge (1987) and Ostrom (1985b). 4. This argument is in line with some of the early writings in public choice theory, notably Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Ostrom (1968). Later work in the public choice tradition has tended to focus too much on the issue of financial contributions. I have not discussed here the issue of group size. Olson's celebrated theorem, stated without qualification early in his book, is later restricted to large groups in a taxonomy of small, intermediate, and large. He says little about how to distinguish the three types of groups in practice, but he might argue that the groups under discussion here are intermediate groups and therefore outside the scope of his argument. 5. See also Ostrom (1985b), the starting point of my own formulation. Ault, W. 1973. Open-field Farming in Medieval England: A Study of Village By-laws. References London: Allen and Unwin. Blomquist, W., and E. Ostrom. 1985. Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma. Policy Studies Review 5, no. 2: 383-93. Buchanan, J., and G. Tullock. 1962. Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Campbell, Bruce, and R. Godoy. 1985. Common-field Agriculture: Andes and Medieval England Compared. Queens University of Belfast, Geography Department. Carruthers, I., and R. Stoner. 1981. Aspects and Policy Issues in Groundwater Development. World Bank Staff Working Paper 496. Washington, D.C. Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Review 57: 347-59. Dore, R. 1971. Modern Cooperatives in Traditional Communities. In P. Worsley, ed. Two Blades of Grass. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gilles, J. L., and K. Jamtgaard. 1981. Overgrazing in Pastoral Areas: Commons Reconsidered. Sociologia Ruralis 21: 129-41. Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162 (December): 1343-48. Hitchcock, R. K. 1980. Tradition, Social Justice, and Land Reform in Central Botswana. Journal of African Law 24: 1-34. Johnson, 0. 1972. Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems. Journal of Law and Economics 15: 259-76.

Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat

13 in 1978 set off heated charges that vital services were being cut back instead of looked-for reductions in the size of the state bureaucracy. A bureaucratic response of this type to budget cuts is entirely foreseeable given the conception of bureaucrats as utility-maximizing individuals. Focus on the behavior of individual agents in the governmental process commenced formally in 1962 with Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent. Since then, the ability of legislators and bureaucrats to engage in self-interested (as opposed to public-interest) behavior, has been investigated by numerous scholars. The general concensus which has emerged from these studies, among public choice economists at any rate, is that producers of public goods, acting in their own interest, are not led by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' to act in the more general public interest. This paper provides additional support for the public choice view of public servant behavior. A comparison of proposed budget cuts by federal agency with proposed reductions in agency personnel reveals that, in the face of

The Buchanan-Tullock model: Some extensions

In their seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and Tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relation­ships relevant to institutional choices. However, the Buchanan-Tullock model remains general, thus inviting others to specify details and to develop extensions. The present paper seeks to explicate this important model so as to clarify the framework in certain important ways and then to extend the model by introducing explicit considerations of such dimensions as group size and group preference heterogeneity as explicit variables.

GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY

GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY

Comment on Rae's “The Limits of Consensual Decision”

On the whole, I am very much an admirer of Douglas Rae's article. Indeed, if the editor will not object to my revealing this fact, I was one of the referees who recommended its publication. I do find myself with two objections to it, however, and as I suppose the reader will not be very surprised to learn, these concern its treatment of the general approach to politics which James Buchanan and I put into The Calculus of Consent.' These objections fall into two general fields: first, the intellectual history of the doctrine of consent, and, second, the methodological importance of Pareto optimality. With respect to the intellectual history, Rae, I think, may have been misled by the literature. The origins of the doctrine of consent or consensus, which he traces through political scientists from Locke and Calhoun, were actually quite disparate from those of the doctrine of Pareto optimality, which was drawn from economics, and there is no obvious reason to believe that the earlier political writers influenced the economists particularly. Pareto, for example, was an Italian engineer and Wicksell a Swede. Their educations would have put little emphasis on Locke, and I doubt that either had even heard of Calhoun. The positions they adopted were essentially efforts to deal with technical problems which had arisen in economic analysis in their particular fields. It was only after their positions had been developed that the resemblance between their position and that of certain earlier political philosophers was noticed. Even to this day there is a great difference between the two. I myself, for example, have never read so much as one page of Calhoun and have no desire to do so. Similarly, my knowledge of Locke and John Stuart Mill and even Bentham is largely derived from secondary sources. Buchanan, on the other hand, who is interested in philosophy, has done a good deal of reading in these areas, but I must say even in his case he is totally ignorant of the original text of Calhoun's work. The fact that there is some resemblance between the two points of view has, however, led to a number of recent writers, who are writing in what I might call the economic tradition, to refer to these political philosophers. In fact, what we have are

Demand for education, and its estimation

Since education produces major externalities and has important merit want characteristics, the estimation of a demand schedule is extremely difficult. Demand estimation for higher education is made somewhat easier because of the great importance of the associated costs and the relevant private substitutes, i.e. private colleges and universities. Therefore higher education is a good candidate for the application of the individual (economic) preference approach, which is based on the assumption that individuals are aware of their need for education about as they are aware of their needs for products provided by the open market. The estimation of demand for primary and secondary education can rely only to a minor extent on the individual (economic) preference approach. The voter's behavior approach analysis is likely to be more directly applicable. Study of the behavior of voters and the behavior of legislators and members of school boards can shed light on the demand for education. Analytic insight can be gained also by the “voting with one's feet”, and the “calculus of consent” methods. Finally, benefit-cost analysis can be applied in situations where education gives an extremely weak demand signal. In education we often are less interested in overall benefit-cost estimates than in the benefit-cost positions in which different important interest groups find themselves with regard to education. Such analysis requires the identification of significant interest groups, bargaining strategies, and bargaining patterns, as well as of ways in which education decision makers respond to group pressures.

The Status of Democratic Values and Procedures in a Changing Urban America

THE STUDY of democracy's future in American local government -its procedures and values has particular relevance in light of assertions by some experts, Edward C. Banfield, Scott Greer and James Q. Wilson among others,' that the complicated problems associated with contemporary urban life cannot be solved, and are often aggravated, by the mindless exercise of Jacksonian or local, direct democracy with its insouciant lust meddlesome by a sovereign citizenry. Such a democratic system, when forced to vote bonds or approve governing bodies subjects as technical as metropolitan rapid transit, more likely will bungle than solve the problem. Further, other things being equal, such mass participation tends to encourage common denominator policies: the masses may patronize air-conditioned ballparks but they do not subscribe in great numbers to fine symphonies, masterful ballet companies and urban beautification. In other words, not all values are entirely compatible: presuming one values mass participation, then one must sometimes sacrifice aesthetics, economy, efficiency, expertise and so on. Or at least, if popular government is highly prized, then some calculus of consent must be devised, much as TVA did on a different areal level, which will reduce urban politics from noise to music so that the metropolis will be for itself instead of against itself as it orders civilized life in the mid-twentieth century.2 Some of those doubting the utility of popular government in each and every instance also assert that widespread participation need not be feared. As a matter of simple observation, most persons neither care to have nor actually do have sophisticated political knowledge, and they seldom participate in political affairs, especially in local governmental business.3 Further, that bastion of grass-roots

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. By James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. x, 361. $6.95.)

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. By James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. x, 361. $6.95.) - Volume 58 Issue 4

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

The Calculus of Consent

The Calculus of Consent

The Calculus of Consent.

The Calculus of Consent.

Book Review: The Calculus of Consent, by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. University of Michigan Press, 1962. x + 361 pages. U.S. price $6.95.

Book Review: The Calculus of Consent, by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. University of Michigan Press, 1962. x + 361 pages. U.S. price $6.95.

Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins1

EconomicaVolume 29, Issue 113 p. 17-28 Article Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins1 James M. Buchanan, James M. Buchanan University of Virginia, CharlottesvilleSearch for more papers by this author James M. Buchanan, James M. Buchanan University of Virginia, CharlottesvilleSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 February 1962 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1962.tb00004.x Although independently developed, this note draws upon and extends certain ideas that have been developed in a larger work undertaken in collaboration with Gordon Tullock. See, The Calculus of Consent (forthcoming). I should acknowledge Tullock's indirect as well as his direct influence on the general ideas presented in this paper. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume29, Issue113February 1962Pages 17-28 RelatedInformation