THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: Finding a Cooperative Solution

Abstract

When will villagers come together to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for themselves individually? Can locally based collective action be a viable way to manage common property resources? Many writers on collective action and common property are pessimisric about the ability of people who face problems with common property resources to organize sustainable patterns of use for themselves. Some writers favor privatization of 1:he commons as the only viable solution; others, the imposition of state regulation. This article shows, with reference 232 Research Observer 2, no. 2 (July 1987) to Mancur Olson's logic of collective action, that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak for the village-based use of common property resources. There can thus be no general presumption that collective action will fail in the management of common property resources, any more than there can be a general presumption that it will work. article suggests that the chances of success through collective action depend on the characteristics of the resources, the user group, and group-state relations. This article is based on a forthcoming book, Village Republics: Conditions Notes for Collective Action in South India, Cambridge University Press. I am grateful to Hans Binswanger, Richard Kimber, Ford Runge, and especially Elinor Ostrom for discussions on various points of the argument. 1. For references, see citations later in text. 2. It is not that Olson says or implies that the size of the collective net benefit is irrelevant; he simply does not give it much attention. 3. For example, McKean (1984) on Japan; Gilles and Jamtgaard (1981) on Peru; Campbell and Godoy (1985) on the Andes; Hitchcock (1980), Peters (1983), and Thomsen (1980) on Africa; and Netting (1978) on Switzerland. See also Runge (1987) and Ostrom (1985b). 4. This argument is in line with some of the early writings in public choice theory, notably Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Ostrom (1968). Later work in the public choice tradition has tended to focus too much on the issue of financial contributions. I have not discussed here the issue of group size. Olson's celebrated theorem, stated without qualification early in his book, is later restricted to large groups in a taxonomy of small, intermediate, and large. He says little about how to distinguish the three types of groups in practice, but he might argue that the groups under discussion here are intermediate groups and therefore outside the scope of his argument. 5. See also Ostrom (1985b), the starting point of my own formulation. Ault, W. 1973. Open-field Farming in Medieval England: A Study of Village By-laws. References London: Allen and Unwin. Blomquist, W., and E. Ostrom. 1985. Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma. Policy Studies Review 5, no. 2: 383-93. Buchanan, J., and G. Tullock. 1962. Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Campbell, Bruce, and R. Godoy. 1985. Common-field Agriculture: Andes and Medieval England Compared. Queens University of Belfast, Geography Department. Carruthers, I., and R. Stoner. 1981. Aspects and Policy Issues in Groundwater Development. World Bank Staff Working Paper 496. Washington, D.C. Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Review 57: 347-59. Dore, R. 1971. Modern Cooperatives in Traditional Communities. In P. Worsley, ed. Two Blades of Grass. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gilles, J. L., and K. Jamtgaard. 1981. Overgrazing in Pastoral Areas: Commons Reconsidered. Sociologia Ruralis 21: 129-41. Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162 (December): 1343-48. Hitchcock, R. K. 1980. Tradition, Social Justice, and Land Reform in Central Botswana. Journal of African Law 24: 1-34. Johnson, 0. 1972. Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems. Journal of Law and Economics 15: 259-76.