Cable Television Operators Research Articles

Rent-seeking in the telco/ cable cross-ownership controversy

Probable effects of policy reform are thought to be observable through critical evaluation of interest group positioning in the competition to gain favourable public policies. In the current debate in the USA regarding possible elimination of the cable/telco cross-ownership restrictions, strong positions have been taken by several interested parties. By examining the economic interests implied by the official policy endorsements of the telcos, cable firms, broadcasters and municipalities, it is concluded that telco entry into video markets offers the possibility of significantly enhanced efficiency and consumer choice in local cable television markets. Such access will not be achieved, however, without significant rent-defending measures by incumbent cable television operators, prompted by the dilution of industry profits protected by current entry barriers in the cable television marketplace.

City objectives in monopoly franchising: the case of cable television

This paper employs an approach from the labour literature to determine relative weights which cities place on alternate service proposals when selecting cable television operators. Using contract proposals for 27 franchise auctions which took place across the US between 1979 and 1981, a probit model is estimated which corrects for firm self-selection into the auctions. Cities are found to select firms with local or regional advantages, and to prefer relatively fewer unprofitable services and relatively higher basic tier prices. The results suggest that monopoly franchising may serve private interests at the average consumer's expense.

Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises: Evidence from the Effects of Deregulation

The 1989 Cable Act eliminated most price regulation of cable television operators, including the right of municipalities to enforce price terms in franchise agreements. Deregulation was justified, at least partially, by the contention that competition from other entertainment media eliminated any market power of cable franchises. We examine the value at sale of existing cable systems before and after deregulation. Assuming that this value represents the expected present value of future profits, deregulation had the predicted negligible effect on profits in cities with significant broadcast competition. However, profits appear to have increased in areas where the competition from broadcast television was less severe. We explore several explanations for this increase and conclude that significant market power is the most plausible explanation.

Report: AT&T's Pay-Per-View Television Trial

Pay-per-view service is a television entertainment service wherein consumers can watch a scheduled movie or live event on their home television sets and be charged specifically for the viewing. It is a usage-sensitive pricing system for television entertainment similar to the movie services found in some hotels in which viewers pay only for those programs they watch. The prospect of multimillion-dollar revenues from the sale of first-run movies, live sporting events, and other premium television entertainment on a pay-per-view basis has continued to entice movie studios, event producers, cable and network television operators, and other purveyors of home video entertainment. For pay-per-view to be a viable business, an efficient system for ordering, distributing, and billing of the pay-per-view programs is necessary.

Simultaneous Rediffusion by Cable Television Operators in Canada and the Problem Of Nonpayment of Copyright Royalties

Simultaneous Rediffusion by Cable Television Operators in Canada and the Problem Of Nonpayment of Copyright Royalties