Televised candidate debates have become a ubiquitous part of contemporary American politics. Uniquely positioned within a dual context of rational, deliberative decision-making and hoopla of televised games and sporting events (Germond & Witcover, 1979; Graber, 1984; Jamieson & Birdsell, 1986; Kraus & Davis, 1981; Vancil & Pendell, 1984), debates create distinctive problems of perspective for critics. Typically, studies of televised debates have examined them as rational political discourse, searching for their impact on voter's knowledge of candidates and issues and/or choices voters make in privacy of voting booth.(1) In this essay I would like to take an alternate perspective. First, I will suggest that all symbolic acts, including televised debates, are both formal and informational texts, and can be understood fully only critics examine both what Kenneth Burke has called of and of Second, I will argue that televisual discourse is defined by narrative which entails a set of audience expectations which can be fulfilled only through development of a particular kind of candidate persona, one which makes traditional forms of argument and evidence use problematic. Finally, I will illustrate this perspective in a reading of series of debates that took place during 1984 North Carolina Senatorial race between Jesse Helms and James Hunt. My objective is to explain outcome of race or impact that debates had on it.(2) Rather, my goal is to use debates to illustrate implications of an alternative critical perspective. PERSPECTIVE The Psychology of Form More than a half-century ago, Kenneth Burke (1931/1968) noted that symbolic acts are defined by their form, processes through which they arouse, fulfill, and gratify audience appetites.(3) Humans develop expectations (the synonym for appetites that Burke used later in his discussion of form) both through their experiences with world--the rhythms of tides, crescendo and climax of sexual experiences, and so on--and through their experiences with symbolic acts (1931/1968, pp. 45-56, 143). Initially, Burke's conception of form focused on former experiences, but as his thought began to embrace humankind's symbolic ontology, cultural and ideational aspect of form became more important (Heath, 1979, p. 394). But throughout his discussion of Burke differentiated psychology of information and psychology of form. Burke complained that scientific had artificially separated form and subject matter, symbol and (1931/1968, pp. 30-32). The obsession with that characterized science in twentieth century had led the artist also to lay his |sic~ emphasis on giving of information (1931/1968, p. 32). The details of artistic works were offered, not for their bearing upon business of molding and meeting reader's expectations, but because these details are interesting in themselves (1931/1968, p. 144). Surprise and suspense, core emotions of a of information, had begun to replace eloquence, defining emotion of of While former depends on fulfilling requirements of logical latter is achieved through association or juxtaposition of ideas which if logical, is nevertheless emotionally natural (1931/1968, p. 39). Scientific standards of truth, appropriate to a of information, had been misapplied to art: Truth in art is discovery of facts, an addition to human knowledge in scientific sense of word. It is, rather, exercise of human propriety, formulation of symbols which rigidify our sense of poise and rhythm. Artistic truth is externalization of taste. (1931/1968, p. 42) In short, hypertrophy of of has led, and inevitably does lead, to atrophy of of form (1931/1968, pp. …