Brexit Negotiations Research Articles

Luxembourg’s Position in the Brexit Negotiations

Luxembourg’s Position in the Brexit Negotiations

The Irish Factor in the Brexit Negotiations

The Irish Factor in the Brexit Negotiations

Brexit Negotiations And Its Impact On UK-EU Relations

Brexit Negotiations And Its Impact On UK-EU Relations

Brexit in Air Transport after 2020

Research background:The authors are providing an update to the ongoing process of Brexit and the negotiations between the UK and the EU, following their own previous research in this area.Purpose of the article:In 2019, the aviation sector in the UK ranked as the third largest in the world. London Heathrow, a hub to many UK airlines, ranked as Europe’s busiest airport and seventh busiest in the world. [1] Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU, in the context of globalization and the existing deep ties within the EU institutions, presents a complex task. Following the Brexit referendum in June 2016, where the majority of the electorate decided that Britain should leave the EU, events have progressed significantly by the UK leaving the EU formally at 23:59 on the 31st January 2020. However, negotiations are still ongoing and when it comes to Aviation, the outcome in many key areas is still uncertain.Methods:The article is based on data and information collation as well as the authors’ experience within the industry.Findings & Value added:Once the transition period terminates on the 31st December 2020, Brexit will have a significant influence on trading in the European domestic market and globally on the international market. This paper discusses available options for the UK and the EU that follow from existing decisions in the Brexit bill, as well as outlining possible future developments. Furthermore, in light of the existing threats to the Aviation industry from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the cessation of air travel for many weeks, adjustments to the Brexit plan might be required.

Brexit, Covid-19, and Possible Frameworks for Future UK/EU Financial Governance Cooperation

The EU project is at an inflection point. Intra-EU alliances are altering in light of the UK’s departure, the EU’s financial markets remain segmented, and there is limited appetite for completing the Banking Union. The second stage of the Brexit negotiations also collided with the Covid-19 pandemic, a medical emergency that has placed economies around the world under tremendous strain. This combination of issues amounts to a ‘polycrisis’ for the EU, aspects of which raise existential questions about the future of the EU project. This article focuses on one strand of the debates generated within this polycrisis: future UK/EU policy cooperation with respect to financial governance; or the mechanisms which support financial market regulation and supervision. The article discusses the importance of the financial services sector to the UK and the EU, and examines potential institutional options for future financial governance cooperation. In particular, the article advocates harnessing the dexterous aspects evident within precedents, including in existing EU/third country association agreements, to develop a functional arrangement for future financial governance cooperation. Such a framework could also lead to closer UK/EU cooperation than currently appears likely.

The Role of the European Parliament in the Single Market Programme: The Cost of Non-Europe and the Car Emission Directive (1983-89)

The Single Market has been at the heart of European integration for more than three decades, as the recent Brexit negotiations exemplifies. However, the role of the European Parliament in the origins and the first years of implementation of the Single Market programme has been neglected, whereas it was important in two respects. First, as early as 1983 the European Parliament contributed to intellectual mobilisation efforts in advance of the programme’s adoption by developing the notion of the “cost of non-Europe”, an economic concept which materialized the tangible benefits of the Single Market Programme, instead of framing this endeavour as simply another European policy among others. Michel Albert was instrumental in this debate. Second, the European Parliament was active after the Single Act was signed in 1986 by adopting and influencing legislation to concretely implement this ambitious programme, as the example of the 1989 car emission directive demonstrates. Here the role of Carlo Ripa di Meana was of particular importance.

Bottom-up Geopolitics and Everyday Brexits at the Gibraltar-Spain Border

ABSTRACT Brexit has opened doors for renewed attention to contested, multi-scalar geopolitical forces grounded in everyday life in borderlands. In this paper, we aim to unravel ‘everyday Brexits’ in the Gibraltar–La Línea (Spain) borderlands. By studying the 2019 commemoration of the historic 1969 border closure, we concentrate on how local borderwork by residents is mobilised for bottom-up geopolitics in the context of Brexit negotiations. We use a conceptual approach that focuses on multiple layerings of the border and the selectivity of stakeholders to select among these layers to pursue their interests. Based on on-site observations, in-depth interviews, and informal conversations with residents and key actors of La Línea and Gibraltar, we argue that Brexit has increased the tension of already loaded core-periphery relations in Spain. Brexit does not represent a sudden disruption. Rather, we show how Brexit allowed the bottom-up geopolitical mobilisation of latent, strongly historically embedded and continuous cross-borders sentiments of residents. This mobilisation could potentially challenge local cross-border power relations. In the final analysis, we conclude that the bottom-up geopolitics of ‘ordinary’ residents through everyday bordering processes is central to geopolitics research, including with regard to Brexit and in particular for non-British geographies affected by Brexit.

Using Game Theoretic Modeling to Analyze the United Kingdom's Exit from the European Union

This paper uses modeling techniques from Game theory to analyze Brexit, Britain’s choice to exit the European Union. First, a brief history of the Brexit negotiations over the past 4 years is present. It is followed by a macroeconomic cost-benefit analysis of Brexit to both players (Britain and the European Union) in which food security, trade, and migration rules are considered. Information from this cost-benefit analysis is then used to assign payoffs, create a simple ‘static game’ modeling Brexit as of 2018, and find the mixed Nash Equilibrium that gives us the best strategies that both sides can play. A more complex ‘Bayesian extensive-form’ game (Tree Z) is then built to reflect the real-world Brexit negotiations more accurately. This game shows the European Union to be of two types: i) Humanitarian-goal oriented and ii) Economic-goal oriented. Backward induction techniques are used to derive the optimal strategy that the United Kingdom should play given its beliefs about the European Union’s type.

EU-27 Public Opinion on Brexit.

Although there has been much interest in British public opinion on Brexit, much less is known about how EU‐27 Europeans view the Brexit negotiations. This is surprising, because Brexit confronts the EU‐27 with difficult choices. Whereas accommodating the UK carries the risk of encouraging further countriesto leave the EU, an uncompromising negotiation stance increases the economic and social costs of Brexit. Using original survey data from 39,000 respondents in all EU‐27 countries collected between the start of the Brexit negotiations and December 2018, this article shows that exposure to the economic risks of Brexit makes respondents more willing to accommodate the UK, whereas a positive opinion of the EU decreases their willingness to compromise. Moreover, many Europeans face an accommodation dilemma that moderates these preferences. Overall, the EU‐27 public unsentimentally supports a Brexit negotiation line that safeguards their own interests best.

Brexit and Britain’s Changing Constitution

The Brexit saga which culminated in the sweeping victory of the Conservative Party in the parliamentary elections of December 2019 and the British withdrawal from the European Union the following months caused a major upheaval in the relationship between Britain’s main constitutional actors, especially between the government and the judiciary. In the course of the long-winded and acrimonious Brexit debate, the courts were repeatedly asked to intervene at critical junctures of the withdrawal process, first to secure a central role for Parliament in discussing and approving the terms of withdrawal and then to protect Parliament against attempts by the government to curtail and render ineffective this role through the questionable use of its prerogative powers. This development reached its climax with the UK Supreme Court’s judgment of 24 September 2019 on the unlawfulness of the prorogation of Parliament decided by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister in the run-up to Brexit, an unprecedented interference by the courts with the exercise of prerogative powers in the name of a functioning parliamentary democracy. While the reasoning of the Court does not appear entirely convincing, there can be no doubt that the ruling was crucial in upholding the central role of Parliament in the Brexit negotiations and, by implication, of the authority of the courts which had defined that role at the beginning of the negotiations. That the Supreme Court felt it necessary to take the unprecedented step of confronting the executive over the use of its prerogative powers in a highly polarized political debate also demonstrates the extent to which the political consensus which in former times had underpinned the functioning of Britain’s flexible constitutional democracy has broken down as a result of the Brexit debate, and the divisions it has engendered within Britain’s political class and in the public at large. This gives rise to the concern that the reforms announced by the Conservative government following its sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections of December 2019 will destroy any progress which had been made in the UK prior to the Brexit referendum towards a modern practice of parliamentary majority government based on incomplete but genuine checks and balances.

From Membership to Partnership The EU and Its Relations with the UK After Brexit: The Fisheries Dimension

Fishing in European waters has been a contentious issue since the sixteenth century and was a key factor in the development of the international law of the sea itself. At the time the UK joined the EU and shared its waters with Member State vessels it also lost access to its traditional fishing grounds off Iceland. The Common Fisheries Policy developed a centralized approached based around historic fleet size rather than productivity of Member States’ waters. Controls were centred around technical measures, reduction in capacity and quota. These worked: the collapse of fish stocks was halted and started to recover a little. However many stocks are still potentially illegally allocated beyond scientific levels, and fishing continues unmanaged in the EU’s suite of offshore marine protected areas. The management institutions need greater transparency and stronger adherence to the law. There is scope to build a future relationship between the EU and the UK: the UK and some of its overseas territories need the EU market, many stocks are shared, and the parties will need to agree on scientific approaches. However, It is likely that the UK is due a greater allocation of stocks than the current system. As we approach the endgame of the Brexit negotiations it is important that both sides reflect that fishing represents less that 0.1% of their economies and over-politicization of a small sector will not help either party in the context of the larger negotiations. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which the UK helped to create, has started to rebuild stocks and that upward trajectory needs to continue; it will only do so through collaboration. Brexit, Fisheries, Competence, Environment

Brexit and the discursive construction of the corporation

AbstractThe UK decision to exit the EU in 2016 has led to economic uncertainty. Foreign corporations with UK subsidiaries have sought to mediate these uncertainties while a final agreement is negotiated. Critical to this is the relationship between headquarter-subsidiary relations (HQs) and these subsidiaries. Discourse analysis has increasingly been used to examine corporate relations, with the corporation viewed as socially constructed through discourses and perpetual deliberations. Deploying a discourse approach, and recognising the importance of topological spatial relations, this article examines the relationship between HQs and UK-based subsidiaries during the Brexit negotiation period. In conclusion, HQs have generally devolved responsibility to subsidiaries for responding to Brexit, involving ‘consensual’ relations with subsidiaries and less intrusive ‘stretched’ topological power relations.

Realising supply chain resilience: an exploratory study of Irish firms' priorities in the wake of Brexit

PurposeThe purpose of this research is to validate an industry-wide definition of supply chain resilience (SCRES) within the Irish supply chain sector and measure the key elements of SCRES and their relative importance for Irish firms in light of Brexit.Design/methodology/approachSurvey method is used in this research. Data were collected from supply chain managers in Irish firms. Findings were analysed in accordance with industry sector and exposure to Brexit.FindingsThe results from the respondents confirm a willingness to define and utilise SCRES under a four-phase cycle; ready, respond, recover and grow. Focus on SCRES enablers shifts in accordance with cycle position. Understanding cycle position is paramount for successful execution of a SCRES strategy. Findings can be used as a basis for the development, implementation and management of a SCRES strategy.Research limitations/implicationsResearch was conducted at one specific point during Brexit negotiations. Sector specific and longitudinal studies are required to build upon this exploratory study.Practical implicationsSupply chain managers must ensure that phase position and enabler implementation are aligned to maximise the investment in a SCRES strategy. As a disruption event and its associated response evolve, management must demonstrate an ability to deploy and focus efforts on different SCRES enablers throughout the four-phase cycle.Originality/valueThis is the first research focussing on an industry-wide accepted definition of SCRES and its key enablers within Irish supply chains.

Brexit’s implications for EU-NATO cooperation: Transatlantic bridge no more?

Since its accession to the European Union, the United Kingdom has played an important role in the design and development of the European Union’s foreign, security and defence policy. While it is among the founding members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is also one of the main contributors to European security and played an active part in developing the relationship between both organisations. With the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, questions concerning the implications of Brexit on European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization cooperation arise. As the transatlantic bridge between the two organisations, Britain also faces an uncertain position within the European security architecture. It therefore needs to redefine its relations with the European Union and its own position among other member states. Taking into account the development of national security interests and recent political events, this article develops three possible scenarios that may occur for the European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization relationship depending on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations.

국제협상과 국내정치: 양면게임의 브렉시트 협상 설명력 검토

로버트 퍼트넘이 제시한 양면게임(TLG:Two-Level Game)은 국제정치와 국내정치의 연계를 인정하며 연계 시기와 방식을 탐구하려는 하나의 시론이다. 이 글은 영국의 유럽연합 탈퇴(Brexit, 브렉시트) 협상 가운데 영국과 유럽연합(EU) 간에 가장 큰 쟁점이었던 ‘백스톱’을 TLG의 틀에서 분석한다. 영국이 EU를 탈퇴하면 영국령에 속하는 북아일랜드와 EU회원국 아일랜드 간에 국경통제가 다시 도입되어야 한다. 그러나 국경통제 재도입은 아주 어렵게 쟁취한 북아일랜드 평화협정을 다시 교란시킬 우려가 크기 때문에 국경통제 없음을 유지하기 위한 안전장치가 백스톱이다. 영국과 EU 모두 협상 초기에 이해당사자의 승인을 끌어내기 위해 윈셋의 크기를 의도적으로 축소했다. 이후 양측은 윈셋의 크기를 조금씩 상향조정하여 협상을 타결했다. 영국은 윈셋 크기를 조정할 수 있는 여러전략 가운데 발목잡히기 전략만을 사용했다. 초국가적 로비나 제휴와 같은 다양한 전략을 구사하지 않았기 때문에 조정전략의 적용 조건은 좀 더 세밀하게 분석되어야 한다.

Euro clearing after Brexit: shifting locations and oversight

PurposeThis paper investigates the impact of moving Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs) that clear euro-denominated transactions to the Eurozone after the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. Prior to Brexit, the City of London had a dominant position in euro-clearing, but in the aftermath of Brexit, clearing houses might decide to move to the EU27. This paper aims to investigate the impact of moving euro-clearing to the EU27.Design/methodology/approachThis paper provides an economic, political and legal investigation based on desk research. It studies the relevant materials, as they relate to the functioning of Central Counterparty Clearing in the aftermath of Brexit, with specific attention to the potential shift of locations and oversight.FindingsThe development of a EU27 financial hub and the possibility to increase oversight over euro-denominated financial transactions, which were partly at the roots of the financial and Eurozone crisis, could strengthen the market shaping of European financial markets. However, localizing euro-denominated transactions in Europe could potentially give rise to efficiency losses and a higher risk for companies and investors. Furthermore, the European regulatory framework currently faces certain weaknesses, obstructing the regulatory potential of the EU.Research limitations/implicationsAs the Brexit negotiations are not yet finished, this paper does not intend to set out a definite outcome of the processes currently taking place.Practical implicationsShifting locations and oversight of CCPs as a result of Brexit could lead to the establishment of a large financial centre within the EU-27. At the same time, it is to be expected that such a development will have a significant impact on the financial infrastructure of the City of London.Originality/valueThere exists an important trade-off with regard to shifting locations that need to be at the forefront of the discussions and the negotiations when dealing with Brexit. This seems to be neglected in a lot of the current policy debates. This paper takes stock of the ongoing debate and how it relates to the functioning of CCPs.

Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU

ABSTRACT Research on the Brexit negotiations has linked the problems faced by Britain to flawed assumptions in the UK’s perception of EU interests. These include the idea that the EU would be open to compromise on key principles, that it would offer the UK a bespoke relationship, that national capitals would respond favourably to bilateral initiatives, and that EU unity would not hold. Yet the origins of these assumptions have been subject to little systematic scrutiny. How did such wrong-headed assumptions about the EU’s interests emerge? Drawing on insights from bounded rationality we identify three aspects of the decision-making environment linked with biased thinking: (1) ill-fitting routines and lessons, (2) a lack of decision-making openness, and (3) a lack of EU expertize and contact. We demonstrate our argument using data obtained from interviews in Brussels and London in 2017–18 and accounts of those involved in the decisions.

The European Crowdfunding Service Providers Regulation and the Future of Marketplace Lending and Investing in Europe: the ‘Crowdfunding Nature’ Dilemma (UPDATED JULY 2020)

The European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSPs) for businesses, since its presentation, has faced difficult trilateral negotiations among the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The length of the legislative process can be explained not only by the insurgence of nationalisms, the uncertainty related to Brexit negotiations and the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, but also because of the different views of the three European Institutions about crowdfunding and on how to regulate it. Nonetheless, they eventually reached an agreement in December 2019 and the Regulation is finally close to its formal adoption. The present paper, after briefly describing crowdfunding main features, will critically and analytically analyze the main aspects of the ECSPs Regulation, with respect to the approved text and to the pre-existing versions, evaluating the available alternatives, their pros and cons and proposing adjustments to reach a functional, tiered and proportional regulation and shed light on the nature and future of financial-return crowdfunding in Europe. The present paper is an updated version of my previous one here: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594353.

Policy Preferences and Policy Legitimacy After Referendums: Evidence from the Brexit Negotiations

How do votes in direct democratic ballots translate into policy preferences about future outcomes and affect the perceived legitimacy of those outcomes? This article examines these questions in the context of sovereignty referendums: specifically, the 2016 referendum on British membership of the European Union (EU). While the referendum result gave the British government a mandate for Britain leaving the EU, it did not provide any firm guidance as to the kind of Brexit that voters would prefer and consider legitimate. To examine the perceived desirability and legitimacy of different Brexit outcomes, we conducted a nationally representative conjoint experiment measuring attitudes towards different possible negotiation outcomes. Our findings show that ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ voters were highly divided over what they wanted from Brexit on salient negotiation issues, but also that most voters did not regard any possible outcome as legitimate.

What sort of Brexit do the British people want? A longitudinal study examining the ‘trade-offs’ people would be willing to make in reaching a Brexit deal

In a referendum in March 2016, the British public voted by a margin of 52 per cent to 48 per cent to leave the European Union. Unfortunately, the referendum question provides little information on the sort of relationship Britons desire with the EU. The purpose of this study is to use stated choice experiments (CEs) to understand and quantify what aspects of the relationship between Britain and the EU are important to the public and what trade-offs they would be willing to make. The CEs are undertaken with a random probability sample of the public at two points in time, 2017 and 2018, to allow us to explore how preferences might have changed over time. We developed a series of discrete choice models ranging from Scaled Multinomial Logit models (SMNLs) to Latent Class models (LCMs) to understand and quantify public preferences and to explore how they vary across the population. The results are used to assess how positively or negatively the public value different plausible Brexit negotiation positions.