Breakdown Of Consensus Research Articles

Modeling multi-opinion propagation in complex systems with heterogeneous relationships via Potts model on signed networks.

This paper investigates how the heterogenous relationships around us affect the spread of diverse opinions in the population. We apply the Potts model, derived from condensed matter physics on signed networks, to multi-opinion propagation in complex systems with logically contradictory interactions. Signed networks have received increasing attention due to their ability to portray both positive and negative associations simultaneously, while the Potts model depicts the coevolution of multiple states affected by interactions. Analyses and experiments on both synthetic and real signed networks reveal the impact of the topology structure on the emergence of consensus and the evolution of balance in a system. We find that, regardless of the initial opinion distribution, the proportion and location of negative edges in the signed network determine whether a consensus can be formed. The effect of topology on the critical ratio of negative edges reflects two distinct phenomena: consensus and the multiparty situation. Surprisingly, adding a small number of negative edges leads to a sharp breakdown in consensus under certain circumstances. The community structure contributes to the common view within camps and the confrontation (or alliance) between camps. The importance of inter- or intra-community negative relationships varies depending on the diversity of opinions. The results also show that the dynamic process causes an increase in network structural balance and the emergence of dominant high-order structures. Our findings demonstrate the strong effects of logically contradictory interactions on collective behaviors, and could help control multi-opinion propagation and enhance the system balance.

O historiador Gonzalo Vial e a construção do Marco Político do Informe Rettig (1991)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar o papel do historiador Gonzalo Vial na construção do Marco Político do Informe da Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación Chilena, conhecido como Informe Rettig. Tal seção do documento foi dedicada a tratar dos eventos anteriores ao golpe de Estado de 1973. A narrativa contida no Marco Político do Informe reforça a ideia de inevitabilidade do golpe, utilizando-se da teoria historiográfica de Gonzalo Vial de que a quebra da democracia no Chile se deu a partir da “quebra de consensos” que já vinha acontecendo desde o início do século, mas que se intensificou com a eleição de Allende em 1970. Buscaremos, portanto, refletir sobre os usos do passado recente chileno e sobre o papel do historiador na construção de uma memória oficial que permitisse a reconciliação entre os chilenos, necessária para a consolidação democrática do governo de Aylwin.

The Irish Constitution, a United Ireland, and the Ship of Theseus: Radical Constitutional Change as Constitutional Replacement

This paper considers the prospect of using the Constitution of Ireland as the basis for a iunited Ireland Constitution. It is perhaps assumed by some political commentators in the South that this approach – similar to the German unification experience – is an obvious starting point. But it is far from clear that this is a workable model. It might have an advantage in giving us a default, a starting point and some sense of continuity that might make agreement on a constitutional arrangement less likely to break down. But at the same time, defaulting to the Irish Constitution’s positions could itself be so divisive as to cause such a breakdown in consensus. If the Irish Constitution could fill this role, it would have to be overhauled in a major way, leaving a document that might look almost unrecognisable. The practicality of this should be carefully considered, but so too should the risk that unwritten or conventional aspects of the original constitutional order might remain in spite of radical change. This raises the philosophical quandary of the ship of Theseus: is a ship, with all its planks gradually replaced, still the same ship? The paper considers whether the protean nature of this radically amended constitution’s identity – simultaneously the same and vastly different – could offer a road to a successful compromise.

Islam. The Meaning of Style

The title of this paper is a reference to Dick Hebdige’s famous book Subculture. The Meaning of Style, which was published in 1979 and became one of the most influential works to emerge from the legendary Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (cccs). Hebdige’s study explores the subversive implications of style in post-war British subcultures. The purpose of the following article is to apply his ideas on subculture and style to the discourse on fashion and Islam, with a particular focus on the debate over “modest fashion” in Turkey. Hebdige’s approach will be utilized here principally in order to explore the representation of Islam in fashion and to critically reflect upon the ideological dimensions of “modest fashion”. The present author argues that “modest fashion”, as represented in everyday dress, fashion and lifestyle magazines, advertisements, and fashion shows, is exemplary of the breakdown of consensus among pious Muslims in present-day Turkish society. Furthermore, this article aims to strengthen and reflect upon the use of semiotics in the field of Islamic studies. It draws on data collected during the first international Istanbul Modest Fashion Week held in Istanbul’s historic Haydarpaşa Train Station on 13 and 14 May 2016, as well as on journal articles, media contributions, fashion advertisements, and interviews conducted by the author with fashion designers, influencers, and the organizers of the Istanbul Modest Fashion Week.

Politics and education policy into practice: conversations with former Secretaries of State

Set against a period of rapid change, education has grown in political importance and policy development has moved from the local authority to central government with a key role being played by the Secretary of State. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews, with 10 politicians who have served as Secretary of State for Education, this paper considers a range of issues related to the development and implementation of education policy in England. This paper focuses on motivation and preparation for the role, the movement of ministers, regional factors, relationship with the Prime Minister and the breakdown of consensus. It illustrates the reality of policy implementation against the political realities of serving as a Government minister and the illusion of being able to develop long-term strategies in a rapidly changing environment.

Revisiting the Roosevelt Court: The Critical Juncture from Consensus to Dissensus

Revisiting the Roosevelt Court: The Critical Juncture from Consensus to Dissensus PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT, AND ARTEMUS WARD Scholars have long debated questions about the decline of consensual norms on the Supreme Court. It is widely understood that ChiefJustice John Marshall is responsible for transforming the institution from one where Justices issued their opinions seriatim—or individually—to a collegial body with a single opinion of the Court. It is also plain that the modem Court is often divided with the Justices only issuing unanimous decisions in about one-third of the cases. What remains unclear, however, is exactly when the norm of consensus ended and what caused its demise. We argue that the institutional transfor­ mation from consensus to dissensus was the result of a series of internal and external changes to the judicial decision-making process during the Roosevelt Court—a period roughly from 1937 to 1947 that was dominat­ ed by Justices appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. These developments—occur­ ring both on the Court and in the broader political environment—fundamentally altered the dynamic among the Justices and forever changed the way they decided cases. The end result was the replacement of collective expression—once the long-standing norm— with individual behavior. We highlight what political scientist Paul Pierson terms a “conjuncture”—a moment in time when “discrete elements or dimensions of politics” collide to produce a new, and often unintended, effect. Specifically, we identify a number of institutional develop­ ments that dramatically altered the extent to which consensus could be achieved in the Court’s decision making.1 We trace these trends by undertaking an extensive examina­ tion ofthe Roosevelt Court—the conjuncture, or moment in time, when its ability to achieve consensus changed. Our investigation is based primarily on the private papers of Justices William O. Douglas and Harlan Fiske Stone, including memos sent between the Justices, draft opinions, and other correspondence, which we use to determine the durable shifts in the Court’s decision-making processes during REVISITING THE ROOSEVELT COURT 21 these years. Our analysis shows that various institutional changes instituted both before and during the Roosevelt Court affected the Court’s decision making and brought about and entrenched a dissensus revolution in which individual expression went from virtual nonexistence to the norm. Most scholars attribute the breakdown in the norm of consensus to internal develop­ ments: specifically, the role of individual Chief Justices. The leadership style of Chief Justice Stone is a common culprit.2 Political scientist Stacie L. Haynie argued that Stone’s predecessor—Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes—was largely responsible.3 Gregory A. Caldeira and Christopher J.W. Zorn, also political scientists, furthered these findings by suggesting that consensual norms ebbed and flowed over time and under different Chief Justices.4 But there is other research that points to external factors such as the rise of organized interests and the change in issues that the Court began to consider—specifically the growth of the civil rights and liberties docket.5 This research suggests that a mixture of both external and internal factors combined to cause the breakdown of consensus. In short, Stone did not operate in a vacuum and his style alone cannot explain the Court’s fundamental transformation that occurred during his tenure. In the following analysis, we identify a number of heretofore-unexplored institutional changes that were imple­ mented during the Roosevelt Court. We suggest that it is these developments that so fundamentally changed the Court’s operation that a return to the norm of consensus was virtually impossible—regardless ofthe Chief Justices or the other Justices that replaced their Roosevelt Court predecessors. Table 1 shows the important institutional developments—internal and external, cause and effect—that occurred during the Roose­ velt Court era. As we detail next, once on the dissensus path, there remained only a “critical juncture” to fundamentally alter the institu­ tion.6 That moment arrived with the conjunc­ ture of the external intellectual force of legal realism, the largely discretionary docket Table 1: Institutional dissensus developments of the Roosevelt Court Causes Effects External developments • Judges’ Bill (1925): increased discretionary docket, growth in civil liberties cases • Influence of legal realism • Rapid...

Doomed to Fail: A Case Study of Change Implementation Collapse In the Norwegian Civil Aviation Industry

Managerial choices for change implementation methods have a direct impact on strategic change outcomes. In a three-year longitudinal case study of the Norwegian airport management and air navigation services provider – Avinor – a fundamental mismatch between organizational culture type and change implementation method contributed to the premature collapse of a deliberate strategic change initiative. The major contribution of this article is to expand our knowledge about identifying and avoiding potential pitfalls resulting from a fundamental mismatch between organizational culture in place and change implementation methods during deliberate organizational change. The findings from this case study will show how managerial choices and actions, such as: consensus building, communication and use of participation during deliberate change processes, can positively influence attitudes towards change. However, it will also show that a sudden reversal from a participatory process to purely top-down implementation can lead to a breakdown in consensus and trust, leading to internal and external resistance, and the premature collapse of a change process.

A New Consensus?

A New Consensus? Daniel Rodgers When people ask me what I do, I sometimes say that I have spent my career looking for America. It is a silly answer, of course. Silly, because America is all around me, inescapably and insistently. But silly, also, because "it" is never to be found. America is an argument: a big, multitudinous, often contradictory amalgam of persons, experiences, aspirations, and dissents. The age of fracture was as full of argument and contradiction as any other era in American history. The power that drained out of the works of social philosophers could be found dramatically reconcentrated in the movies, as Melani McAlister reminds us. The conservative intellectuals who wrote of their deep distrust of the nation-state sat in the same party as the heralds of a new national greatness, as Michael Kimmage writes. Federal Reserve heads paid honor to Milton Friedman, as Donald Critchlow notes, though after Paul Volcker's experiment with the money-growth rule that Friedman had championed all through the 1970s, none of them actually tried it again. Public opinion polls throughout the period show both striking patterns of convergence and striking patterns of division, the difference often triggered by modest shifts in wording. If consensus history means a historical account that homogenizes its subject or bleaches out the constant, deeply serious push and pull of arguments, interests, and conflicts, I hope Age of Fracture will not be taken as heralding a consensus history revival. But even intense arguments operate within frames. Certain parts of reality come into focus and rivet attention; others are edged to the side; some fall out of debate altogether. What I have tried to show in Age of Fracture are the ways in which those frames shifted—not for everyone, of course, but for many and particularly for those who thought of themselves as shaping the national debate. It is not an argument about the homogenization of Left and Right, but about the quickness with which assumptions could move across partisan boundaries and the unexpected commonalities among them. What I have tried to highlight, then, is not the fracturing of society, or a breakdown of consensus, or a growing confusion on either the intellectual Right or Left, but a fracturing of social language and imaginations into smaller and more individualistic units of analysis. There was plenty of nationalism in the air, but a nationalism with no new taxes was hardly what Theodore Roosevelt meant by national greatness. There were structures in the movies, but far less structuralist talk in the social sciences. Libertarian sentiments flourished. Talk of fluid markets and fluid identities filtered into new places. I did not mean Age of Fracture as a lament for the passing of Cold War social thought and culture. Much of that is gone and with good riddance. But neither did Richard Hofstadter mean The American Political Tradition, the most brilliantly written of his "consensus" histories, to be a lament for the past. If stepping back from the noise and furor that is everyday politics and trying to take seriously the shifting frames of argument puts Age of Fracture in the company of 1950s social critics without buying into their assumption of a bleached and homogenized American people, there is, as Bruce Schulman writes, a certain honor in that. In the intellectual history blogs and again in this exchange, questions of the causal assumptions behind Age of Fracture have been pressed forward. Which foot moved first? Did the economic transformations of late capitalism set loose these new debates? Or did ideas move first? My response is neither and both. Ideas shape the very frames by which reality is perceived; and they are, in turn, constantly pushed and molded by the realities they try to grasp. Without the era's massive shifts in the global economy, the intellectual history of our times would have come out differently. Without the work of ideas—the aspirational labor of persons trapped in identities that now seemed too tight, the contagious spread of models and metaphors, the arguments of politics, and the mobilization of issues and beliefs—it would have come out profoundly differently as well. I set out in Age of Fracture in...

Consolidating Democracy without Trust: Bangladesh's Breakdown of Consensus in 2007

This paper makes a departure from the dominant formalistic approach to ‘democratic consolidation’ to explore a range of issues, especially mutual distrust and misperception, to analyse why Bangladesh's quest for democracy remains elusive. By taking a closer look at the events that led to the collapse of democracy in 2007, it provides new insights into the failure of relevant political actors to reconcile their personal and political differences in order to give democracy a chance to take root in the country's seemingly dysfunctional political landscape. It suggests that the emergence of what can be called the politics of distrust was a major factor in the breakdown of democracy in 2007. Moving the debate beyond the practice of holding free and fair elections on a regular basis, it is argued that Bangladesh's prospect for fostering a democratic political culture depends on the ability of rival political actors to make concerted efforts to build credible, well-functioning legal and political institutions that cultivate a culture of trust not only among political parties but also between the democratic state and the ordinary citizens.

The Divided States of the Americas

While economic and technological ties may be bringing the Americas closer, at a national level there has been a marked breakdown of consensus, along with deepening disintegration.

Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism

The American-led Iraq war that began in 2003 has generated intense discussion about when it is legitimate to use force and what force can accomplish. Often this debate is portrayed as a breakdown in consensus, with the US charting a new unilateralist course that undermines existing multilateral understandings of how force should be used. Often, too, the debate is portrayed as a transatlantic one in which Europeans (notably France, supported by Germany) are leading the multilateralist defence against growing US unilateralism.

Contraction and Detraction: Non-Equilibrium Studies of Civil-Military Relations

In theories on civil-military relations a main question has been how to draw a line between technical-neutral issues intended for the military to decide and issues that the politicians should deal with. Samuel Huntington's formula for reaching an equilibrium between military autonomy and political control was `objective civilian control' through maximizing military professionalism. This article suggests that Huntington's ideal-typical concepts are not adequate for empirical research if we are to uncover the changing borderline between administrative and political spheres. This is at least true when we focus on society characterized by non-intervention from the armed forces and relatively stable political conditions in a historical period of deterrence. The author introduces the concepts `contraction' and `detraction', which have been useful in studies of administration and professional autonomy in civilian sectors. These concepts are used to describe changing civil-military relations in Norway since 1952. The article puts forward some proposals for conditions internal to the political-administrative system necessary for detraction and contraction processes. For detraction processes, some degree of consensus is needed at the political level. A second condition for detraction processes might be hegemony of one profession in the administrative structures. A third condition might be a degree of homogeneity in normative belief and knowledge structure among members of the dominant profession. Internal conditions for contraction processes might be the other way around, i.e. breakdown of consensus in political institutions, alternative expertise in the administration and split in the dominant profession.

Transfer pricing: The break-down of consensus

Transfer pricing: The break-down of consensus

CHINA'S RESISTANCE TO ECONOMIC REFORMS

After 10 years of institutional and structural change, expanded economic activity, and subsequent economic difficulties, China adopted an austerity program in 1988. Underlying the ostensible economic reasons for the austerity program, however, was growing political resistance to economic reforms among Communist party members.This paper puts forth two explanations. One is that the leadership misunderstands the market system, and this leads to errors in economic policy. The second explanation is that rent seeking by strategically situated groups is responsible for much of the resistance.Because market‐oriented reform makes redundant both bureaucrats and job slots for apparatchik appointments, strong resistance to reform exists at the micro level.Two scenarios could lead to real economic reform: (i) gradual self‐limitation by the Communist party as economic decline continues and as the costs of maintaining the existing system increase, or (ii) a breakdown of consensus within the ruling stratum. In this paper, the dual thesis for resistance to reform serves to reinforce the latter scenario.

An introduction to the experimental versus the pragmatic paradigm in evaluation

This article provides a historical and conceptual framework for the six case studies that follow in this Special Feature section. About 100 years ago, psychology led the social sciences in a “Declaration of Independence” from philosophy. This declaration was supported by the development of Comte's philosophy of positivism, which argued for the superiority of knowledge derived from experimental science over that which came from scholarly interpretation and theory that was not empirically based. The theoretical and technological success of the physical sciences during the first half of the 20th century fueled psychology's commitment to the hypothesis-testing, laboratory-based experimental paradigm. However, for a variety of reasons (e.g., the lack of substantive accomplishments of the experimental paradigm in the social sciences and growing criticism of positivism in the philosophy community), over the past 30 years there has been a breakdown of consensus on the use of the experimental paradigm in psychology, and two alternative models have been developed: a pragmatic paradigm and a hermeneutic paradigm, both based on an epistemology of social constructionism. Although the field of program evaluation has attempted from its beginning to maintain a strong link to the experimental paradigm, in recent years it has been forced by its commitment to real-world program impact to adopt in a more systematic manner aspects of the pragmatic and hermeneutic paradigms. This Special Feature section examines the practical implications of adopting aspects of both the experimental and the pragmatic paradigms in a particular evaluation study. Specifically, the authors of the six case studies were asked to describe and analyze their experiences in terms of whether the two paradigms functioned in their study in a contrasting, conflicting, or complementary manner. The authors were asked to consider a variety of areas of impact, such as research design, data collection methodology, the response of peers, and communication of results.

British defence policy: the breakdown of inter-party consensus

In 1983, for almost the first time since the end of the Second World War, defence became a major party political issue at a general election. In that year it was one of the major campaign issues between the political parties and, according to one poll, ranked second only to unemployment as an issue influencing voter behaviour. Indeed, poll evidence indicated that the Conservatives held an unprecedented and overwhelming 54 per cent lead over Labour on the question of British retention of nuclear arms. Furthermore, of those who thought of defecting from the Labour Party, 42 per cent gave defence as the main reason. Such figures as these suggest strongly that by 1983 the inter-party consensus which had governed defence issues since 1945 had broken down, particularly in view of the fact that the question of defence had not been raised as an issue affecting voting intentions in the 1979 election. The breakdown of consensus may thus be judged by the emergence of defence as a party political issue. It might even be said that in 1983 it was an electiondeciding issue, especially when one set of policies could be represented by opponents as being contrary to the continuation of British membership of NATO, the one issue on which all parties were agreed. Defence thus moved from being a peripheral issue to one at the centre stage of the election campaign and it had a major impact on the outcome of the election. However, the.demise of inter-party consensus was not reflected in the electorate as a whole, which chose to continue to support the tried, and trusted policies of the past rather than adopt the radical alternative presented by the Labour Party, If a new consensus is to emerge—and it is beyond the limits of this particular paper to consider whether a consensus in defence policy is desirable—then all parties will have to review their present policies. However, before turning to the reasons for the breakdown, it is instructive to consider the nature of the post-1945 consensus and the origins of its apparent demise.

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus, by James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus, <i>by James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti</i>

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus. By Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen &amp; Unwin, 1984. Pp. xvi + 301. $28.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus. By Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen &amp; Unwin, 1984. Pp. xvi + 301. $28.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

American diplomacy in the twentieth century and American leadership in world affairs: Vietnam and the breakdown of consensus

American diplomacy in the twentieth century and American leadership in world affairs: Vietnam and the breakdown of consensus