Contraction and Detraction: Non-Equilibrium Studies of Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

In theories on civil-military relations a main question has been how to draw a line between technical-neutral issues intended for the military to decide and issues that the politicians should deal with. Samuel Huntington's formula for reaching an equilibrium between military autonomy and political control was `objective civilian control' through maximizing military professionalism. This article suggests that Huntington's ideal-typical concepts are not adequate for empirical research if we are to uncover the changing borderline between administrative and political spheres. This is at least true when we focus on society characterized by non-intervention from the armed forces and relatively stable political conditions in a historical period of deterrence. The author introduces the concepts `contraction' and `detraction', which have been useful in studies of administration and professional autonomy in civilian sectors. These concepts are used to describe changing civil-military relations in Norway since 1952. The article puts forward some proposals for conditions internal to the political-administrative system necessary for detraction and contraction processes. For detraction processes, some degree of consensus is needed at the political level. A second condition for detraction processes might be hegemony of one profession in the administrative structures. A third condition might be a degree of homogeneity in normative belief and knowledge structure among members of the dominant profession. Internal conditions for contraction processes might be the other way around, i.e. breakdown of consensus in political institutions, alternative expertise in the administration and split in the dominant profession.