Body Ownership Research Articles

The bodily self from psychosis to psychedelics

The sense of self is a foundational element of neurotypical human consciousness. We normally experience the world as embodied agents, with the unified sensation of our selfhood being nested in our body. Critically, the sense of self can be altered in psychiatric conditions such as psychosis and altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelic compounds. The similarity of phenomenological effects across psychosis and psychedelic experiences has given rise to the “psychotomimetic” theory suggesting that psychedelics simulate psychosis-like states. Moreover, psychedelic-induced changes in the sense of self have been related to reported improvements in mental health. Here we investigated the bodily self in psychedelic, psychiatric, and control populations. Using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion, we tested (N = 75) patients with psychosis, participants with a history of substantial psychedelic experiences, and control participants to see how psychedelic and psychiatric experience impacts the bodily self. Results revealed that psychosis patients had reduced Body Ownership and Sense of Agency during volitional action. The psychedelic group reported subjective long-lasting changes to the sense of self, but no differences between control and psychedelic participants were found. Our results suggest that while psychedelics induce both acute and enduring subjective changes in the sense of self, these are not manifested at the level of the bodily self. Furthermore, our data show that bodily self-processing, related to volitional action, is disrupted in psychosis patients. We discuss these findings in relation to anomalous self-processing across psychedelic and psychotic experiences.

Sense of own body shapes neural processes of memory encoding and reinstatement.

How is the fundamental sense of one's body, a basic aspect of selfhood, incorporated into memories for events? Disrupting bodily self-awareness during encoding impairs functioning of the left posterior hippocampus during retrieval, which implies weakened encoding. However, how changes in bodily self-awareness influence neural encoding is unknown. We investigated how the sense of body ownership, a core aspect of the bodily self, impacts encoding in the left posterior hippocampus and additional core memory regions including the angular gyrus. Furthermore, we assessed the degree to which memories are reinstated according to body ownership during encoding and vividness during retrieval as a measure of memory strength. We immersed participants in naturalistic scenes where events unfolded while we manipulated feelings of body ownership with a full-body-illusion during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. One week later, participants retrieved memories for the videos during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. A whole brain analysis revealed that patterns of activity in regions including the right hippocampus and angular gyrus distinguished between events encoded with strong versus weak body ownership. A planned region-of-interest analysis showed that patterns of activity in the left posterior hippocampus specifically could predict body ownership during memory encoding. Using the wider network of regions sensitive to body ownership during encoding and the left posterior hippocampus as separate regions-of-interest, we observed that patterns of activity present at encoding were reinstated more during the retrieval of events encoded with strong body ownership and high memory vividness. Our results demonstrate how the sense of physical self is bound within an event during encoding, which facilitates reactivation of a memory trace during retrieval.

Temporal visuomotor synchrony induces embodiment towards an avatar with biomechanically impossible arm movements

Visuomotor synchrony in time and space induces a sense of embodiment towards virtual bodies experienced in first-person view using Virtual Reality (VR). Here, we investigated whether temporal visuomotor synchrony affects avatar embodiment even when the movements of the virtual arms are spatially altered from those of the user in a non-human-like manner. In a within-subjects design VR experiment, participants performed a reaching task controlling an avatar whose lower arms bent in inversed and biomechanically impossible directions from the elbow joints. They performed the reaching task using this “unnatural avatar” as well as a “natural avatar,” whose arm movements and positions spatially matched the user. The reaching tasks were performed with and without a one second delay between the real and virtual movements. While the senses of body ownership and agency towards the unnatural avatar were significantly lower compared to those towards the natural avatar, temporal visuomotor synchrony did significantly increase the sense of embodiment towards the unnatural avatar as well as the natural avatar. These results suggest that temporal visuomotor synchrony is crucial for inducing embodiment even when the spatial match between the real and virtual limbs is disrupted with movements outside the pre-existing cognitive representations of the human body.

Subcortical contributions to the sense of body ownership.

The sense of body ownership (i.e. the feeling that our body or its parts belong to us) plays a key role in bodily self-consciousness and is believed to stem from multisensory integration. Experimental paradigms such as the rubber hand illusion have been developed to allow the controlled manipulation of body ownership in laboratory settings, providing effective tools for investigating malleability in the sense of body ownership and the boundaries that distinguish self from other. Neuroimaging studies of body ownership converge on the involvement of several cortical regions, including the premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex. However, relatively less attention has been paid to subcortical structures that may also contribute to body ownership perception, such as the cerebellum and putamen. Here, on the basis of neuroimaging and neuropsychological observations, we provide an overview of relevant subcortical regions and consider their potential role in generating and maintaining a sense of ownership over the body. We also suggest novel avenues for future research targeting the role of subcortical regions in making sense of the body as our own.

Facilitation of imitative movement in patients with chronic hemiplegia triggered by illusory ownership

The sense of body ownership, the feeling that one’s body belongs to oneself, is a crucial subjective conscious experience of one’s body. Recent methodological advances regarding crossmodal illusions have provided novel insights into how multisensory interactions shape human perception and cognition, underpinning conscious experience, particularly alteration of body ownership. Moreover, in post-stroke rehabilitation, encouraging the use of the paretic limb in daily life is considered vital, as a settled sense of ownership and attentional engagement toward the paralyzed body part may promote increased frequency of its use and prevent learned nonuse. Therefore, in addition to traditional methods, novel interventions using neurorehabilitation techniques that induce self-body recognition are needed. This study investigated whether the illusory experience of a patient’s ownership alterations of their paretic hand facilitates the enhancement in the range of motion of succeeding imitation movements. An experiment combining a modified version of the rubber hand illusion with imitation training was conducted with chronic hemiplegia. A larger imitation movement of the paretic hand was observed in the illusion-induced condition, indicating that the feeling of ownership toward the observed limb promotes the induction of intrinsic potential for motor performance. This training, using subjective experience, may help develop new post-stroke rehabilitation interventions.

A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of the Effectiveness of Body Ownership Illusions in Virtual Reality

Body ownership illusions (BOIs) occur when participants experience that their actual body is replaced by a body shown in virtual reality (VR). Based on a systematic review of the cumulative evidence on BOIs from 111 research articles published in 2010 to 2021, this article summarizes the findings of empirical studies of BOIs. Following the PRISMA guidelines, the review points to diverse experimental practices for inducing and measuring body ownership. The two major components of embodiment measurement, body ownership and agency, are examined. The embodiment of virtual avatars generally leads to modest body ownership and slightly higher agency. We also find that BOI research lacks statistical power and standardization across tasks, measurement instruments, and analysis approaches. Furthermore, the reviewed studies showed a lack of clarity in fundamental terminology, constructs, and theoretical underpinnings. These issues restrict scientific advances on the major components of BOIs, and together impede scientific rigor and theory-building.

Effect of a Body Part Action on Body Perception of the Other Inactive Body Part

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an illusory experience in which a fake rubber hand is felt as if it were one’s own hand when the visible fake and invisible real hands are stimulated synchronously. Although several studies have suggested contributions of action to body ownership using the RHI paradigm, the relationship between body ownership and agency has not yet been fully revealed. To better understand this relationship, the present study investigated the transfer of body ownership between body parts induced by a body part action. Using an RHI paradigm involving virtual reality, we tested whether a simple finger action of the dominant (active) hand can induce the embodiment of a virtual hand corresponding to the non-dominant (inactive) hand. We evaluated the illusory experience, perceptual changes, and physiological changes during the experiment with a subjective questionnaire, crossmodal congruency effect measurement, and skin temperature measurement, respectively. The results demonstrated that the finger action induced the embodiment of both virtual hands, causing a significant increase in agency of the inactive hand. This suggests that the illusory experience induced by an active body part contributes to an increase in agency as well as body ownership over the virtual body of the other inactive body part.

NeuroDog

Virtual reality (VR) allows us to immerse ourselves in alternative worlds in which we can embody avatars to take on new identities. Usually, these avatars are humanoid or possess very strong anthropomorphic qualities. Allowing users of VR to embody non-humanoid virtual characters or animals presents additional challenges. Extreme morphological differences and the complexities of different characters' motions can make the construction of a real-time mapping between input human motion and target character motion a difficult challenge. Previous animal embodiment work has focused on direct mapping of human motion to the target animal via inverse kinematics. This can lead to the target animal moving in a way which is inappropriate or unnatural for the animal type. We present a novel real-time method, incorporating two neural networks, for mapping human motion to realistic quadruped motion. Crucially, the output quadruped motions are realistic, while also being faithful to the input user motions. We incorporate our mapping into a VR embodiment system in which users can embody a virtual quadruped from a first person perspective. Further, we evaluate our system via a perceptual experiment in which we investigate the quality of the synthesised motion, the system's response to user input and the sense of embodiment experienced by users. The main findings of the study are that the system responds as well as traditional embodiment systems to user input, produces higher quality motion and users experience a higher sense of body ownership when compared to a baseline method in which the human to quadruped motion mapping relies solely on inverse kinematics. Finally, our embodiment system relies solely on consumer-grade hardware, thus making it appropriate for use in applications such as VR gaming or VR social platforms.

No reduction in motor-evoked potential amplitude during the rubber hand illusion.

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), touches are applied to a fake hand at the same time as touches are applied to a participant's real hand that is hidden in a congruent position. Synchronous (but not asynchronous) tactile stimulation of the two hands may induce the sensation that the fake hand is the participant's own. As such, the illusion is commonly used to examine the sense of body ownership. Some studies indicate that in addition to the subjective experience of limb ownership reported by participants, the RHI can also reduce corticospinal excitability (e.g., as reflected in motor-evoked potential [MEP] amplitude) and alter parietal-motor cortical connectivity in passive participants. These findings have been taken to support a link between motor cortical processing and the subjective experience of body ownership. In this study, we tried to replicate the reduction in MEP amplitude associated with the RHI and uncover the components of the illusion that might explain these changes. As such, we used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation to probe the excitability of the corticospinal motor system as participants experienced the RHI. Despite participants reporting the presence of the illusion and showing shifts in perceived real hand position towards the fake limb supporting its elicitation, we did not observe any associated reduction in MEP amplitude. We conclude that a reduction in MEP amplitude is not a reliable outcome of the RHI and argue that if such effects do occur, they are unlikely to be large or functionally relevant.

Ownership of the affected leg is further reduced following deceptive behaviors in body integrity dysphoria

Although predicted by the notion of embodied morality, it remains unknown whether a reduced sense of body ownership (SoO) is associated with increased or decreased dishonesty. To clarify this issue, we tested patients with body integrity dysphoria (BID), a clinical condition characterized by chronic reductions of SoO toward one leg that patients persistently desire to have amputated. Participants with BID played a card game in which they could voluntarily tell the truth or cheat an opponent, and thus either steal or give them money. To assess whether SoO toward the effector limb influences (im)moral decisions, responses were communicated with the affected or the unaffected leg. We found that a higher number of self-gain lies was followed by further reductions of SoO toward the affected leg. Our result supports the idea that reductions of SoO may follow immoral behaviors to distance from unwanted characteristics of the self, like one's own dishonesty.

Altered functional connectivity of the hippocampus with the sensorimotor cortex induced by long-term experience of virtual hand illusion

Synchronizing the movement of a virtual hand with an unseen real hand in a virtual environment is an effective method to induce a sense of ownership of the virtual hand. Although several neuroimaging studies have revealed neural mechanisms related to the ongoing process of ownership illusion, the effect of the long-term experience of ownership illusion on brain activity remains to be investigated. Here, we developed an apparatus based on real-time image matting and virtual reality technology which allowed us to use the image of participants’ real hands as their virtual hands and synchronize the movement of the virtual hands with the unseen real hands in a virtual scene. Resting-state functional imaging data were acquired immediately after participants completed several light office tasks with the virtual hands in either the virtual environment (virtual hand condition) or real environment (real hand condition). Significant positive functional connectivity of the hippocampus with the primary somatosensory and motor cortex was only observed in the virtual hand condition. The results provided novel evidence for the involvement of hippocampal-sensorimotor connection in the long-term experience of virtual hand ownership. The functional connection reorganization of the hippocampus might promote multi-sensory information integration into memory and updated the sense of body ownership, which offered important insights into the neural network underlying the availability of long-term use of VR technology in healthcare and rehabilitation.

The self and the Bayesian brain: Testing probabilistic models of body ownership through a self-localization task

Simple multisensory manipulations can induce the illusory misattribution of external objects to one's own body, allowing to experimentally investigate body ownership. In this context, body ownership has been conceptualized as the result of the online Bayesian optimal estimation of the probability that one object belongs to the body from the congruence of multisensory inputs. This idea has been highly influential, as it provided a quantitative basis to bottom-up accounts of self-consciousness. However, empirical evidence fully supporting this view is scarce, as the optimality of the putative inference process has not been assessed rigorously. This pre-registered study aimed at filling this gap by testing a Bayesian model of hand ownership based on spatial and temporal visuo-proprioceptive congruences. Model predictions were compared to data from a virtual-reality reaching task, whereby reaching errors induced by a spatio-temporally mismatching virtual hand have been used as an implicit proxy of hand ownership. To rigorously test optimality, we compared the Bayesian model versus alternative non-Bayesian models of multisensory integration, and independently assess unisensory components and compare them to model estimates. We found that individually measured values of proprioceptive precision correlated with those fitted from our reaching task, providing compelling evidence that the underlying visuo-proprioceptive integration process approximates Bayesian optimality. Furthermore, reaching errors correlated with explicit ownership ratings at the single individual and trial level. Taken together, these results provide novel evidence that body ownership, a key component of self-consciousness, can be truly described as the bottom-up, behaviourally optimal processing of multisensory inputs.

360-degree video-based body-ownership illusion for inducing embodiment: development and feasibility results

Illusions that create a sense of ownership over a virtual body have been widely used to investigate the characteristics of our bodily experience. Despite the great potential of 360-degree videos to implement full-body ownership illusion, research is in its early stages, and no validated tools—neither commercial nor free—are available for the scientific and clinical community. In the current study, we present and discuss the development and feasibility results of a free 360-degree video-based body ownership illusion that researchers and scholars can experience using a cardboard headset with their smartphones. Forty-six participants underwent the 360-degree video-based full-body ownership illusion, visualizing in a first-person perspective (1PP) or in a mirror view the pre-recorded body of a young female performer. All participants were exposed to a congruent visuo-tactile condition (embodiment condition) and to an incongruent visuo-tactile condition (control condition). Participants completed the Embodiment Questionnaire and the Objectified Body Consciousness (OBC) scale. Results revealed that in the congruent visuo-tactile condition (compared to the control one), participants experienced a strong illusion in terms of body ownership, self-location, and agency. In terms of visual perspective, there was no difference in embodiment feelings between participants who experienced the illusion in 1PP and those who underwent a mirror perspective. Lastly, the control beliefs subscale (i.e., OBC scale) displayed a positive correlation with the self-location illusion susceptibility. Overall, these results point to the feasibility of this novel tool as immersive 360-degree video-based scenarios to deliver bodily illusions, and they open new avenues for future clinical interventions.

Is the rubber hand illusion associated with somatic symptom reporting?

Current approaches to somatic symptom perception conceptualize somatic symptoms partly as somato-visceral or body illusions evoked by an interaction between bottom-up (sensory) and top-down (expectations, attention) processes. Similar processes of multisensory integration are assumed to contribute to the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Findings concerning the strength and direction of associations between these two phenomena, symptom perception and the RHI, are equivocal. Individuals of a non-clinical sample (N = 63; 56% females; Mage = 20.4; SD = 1.6) completed the Patient Health Questionnaire Somatic Symptom Scale (PHQ-15) and participated in an experiment that evoked the RHI. In repeated measures analyses of variance with the PHQ-15 score as covariate, no significant interaction effects between the PHQ-15 score and indicators of the RHI, i.e., proprioceptive drift (F(1,61) < 0.001 p = 0.993, partial η2 < 0.001; BF10 = 0.307), felt body ownership(F(1,59) = 0.043, p = 0.836, partial η2 = 0,001; BF10 = 0.501), and felt body disownership (F(1,59) = 0.148, p = 0.702, partial η2 = 0.002; BF10 = 1.972) were found. Overall, frequentist and Bayesian analysis indicated that the support for a possible association between the PHQ-15 and indicators of the RHI remains inconclusive, i.e., neither the null nor the alternative hypotheses were sufficiently supported. At least in this non-clinical sample, the association between somatic symptom distress and the strength of the RHI appears so weak (perhaps non-existing), that both phenomena (somatic symptom distress and the RHI) appear distinct and largely unrelated.

Feeling of hand deformation as a monkey's hand: an experiment on a visual body with discomfort and its algebraic analysis.

While there are many studies in which body ownership can be transferred to a virtual body, there are few experimental studies of how subjects feel about their own bodies being deformed since a real body cannot be deformed. Here, we propose such an experimental setup, in which a twisted hand is diagonally viewed from behind, which is called a "monkey's hand." Although the subject cannot see the thumb hidden behind his or her arm, he or she feels that the monkey's hand has an ambiguous thumb that functionally never exists but structurally exists. This ambiguity is consistent with experimental results on proprioceptive drift, by which the deformation of the hand is measured. The ambiguity of the presence and absence of the thumb is finally analyzed with a specific algebraic structure called a lattice. This can help us understand disownership as being different from the absence of ownership.

Disentangling the neural correlates of agency, ownership and multisensory processing

The experience of the self as an embodied agent in the world is an essential aspect of human consciousness. This experience arises from the feeling of control over one's bodily actions, termed the Sense of Agency, and the feeling that the body belongs to the self, Body Ownership. Despite longstanding philosophical and scientific interest in the relationship between the body and brain, the neural systems involved in Body Ownership and Sense of Agency, and especially their interactions, are not yet understood. In this preregistered study using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion inside an MR-scanner, we aimed to uncover the relationship between Body Ownership and Sense of Agency in the human brain. Importantly, by using both visuomotor and visuotactile stimulations and measuring online trial-by-trial fluctuations in the illusion magnitude, we were able to disentangle brain systems related to objective sensory stimulation and subjective judgments of the bodily-self. Our results indicate that at both the behavioral and neural levels, Body Ownership and Sense of Agency are strongly interrelated. Multisensory regions in the occipital and fronto-parietal regions encoded convergence of sensory stimulation conditions. The subjective judgments of the bodily-self were related to BOLD fluctuations in the Somatosensory cortex and in regions not activated by the sensory conditions, such as the insular cortex and precuneus. Our results highlight the convergence of multisensory processing in specific neural systems for both Body Ownership and Sense of Agency with partially dissociable regions for subjective judgments in regions of the Default Mode Network.

Body ownership illusion through virtual reality as modulator variable for limbs rehabilitation after stroke: a systematic review

Stroke is the leading cause of motor impairments and generates distortion of body representation. Hence, stroke can modulate the sense of embodiment, namely the feeling of being inside the body (ownership), in the place where the body is located (location), and moving the body according to its own intentions (agency). A growing number of studies have adopted virtual reality (VR) to train motor abilities. However, the impact of the body illusion on the rehabilitation outcome is not fully understood. The present systematic review investigates the modulating role of the body illusion elicited by VR on motor rehabilitation in post-stroke patients after embodying a virtual avatar. The research was led in the main databases—PubMed, Scopus, PsychINFO, and Web of Science—and four studies matched the inclusion criteria (e.g., to have a sample of adult post-stroke patients, to use VR as an instrument for motor rehabilitation, to adopt the paradigm of the body illusion as a modulator for motor rehabilitation, to test the sense of body illusion outcome). Research outcomes demonstrated that two studies adopted the immersive and two the non-immersive embodied VR; three studies focused on the upper limb, and one on lower limb rehabilitation. Two studies compare VR training with traditional therapy, and two are pilot studies with only one experimental group. The studies demonstrated the feasibility of the body illusion as an accelerator for motor rehabilitation compared to the non-embodied condition, and as a positive correlator of the rehabilitation outcome. The finding should be taken with caution due to the limited studies included; however, they are encouraging to justify further research efforts in this area.

Visuo-Tactile Congruence Leads to Stronger Illusion Than Visuo-Proprioceptive Congruence: a Quantitative and Qualitative Approach to Explore the Rubber Hand Illusion.

The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) arises through multisensory congruence and informative cues from the most relevant sensory channels. Some studies have explored the RHI phenomenon on the fingers, but none of them modulated the congruence of visuo-tactile and visuo-proprioceptive information by changing the posture of the fingers. This study hypothesizes that RHI induction is possible despite a partial visuo-proprioceptive or visuo-tactile incongruence. With quantitative and qualitative measures, we observed that gradual induction of the sense of body ownership depends on the congruence of multisensory information, with an emphasis on visuo-tactile information rather than visuo-proprioceptive signals. Based on the overall measures, the RHI observed went from stronger to weaker with full congruence; visuo-proprioceptive incongruence and visuo-tactile congruence; visuo-proprioceptive congruence and visuo-tactile incongruence; full incongruence. Our results confirm that congruent visual and tactile mapping is important, though not mandatory, to induce a strong sense of ownership. By changing index finger and thumb postures rather than the rotation of the whole hand, our study investigates the contribution of visuo-proprioception and postural congruence in the field of RHI research. The results are in favor of a probabilistic multisensory integration theory and do not resonate with rules and constraints found in internal body models. The RHI could be illustrated as a continuum: the more multisensory information is congruent, the stronger the RHI.

Understanding the neural bases of bodily self-consciousness: recent achievements and main challenges.

The last two decades have seen a surge of interest in the mechanisms underpinning bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Studies showed that BSC relies on several bodily experiences (i.e., self-location, body ownership, agency, first-person perspective) and multisensory integration. The aim of this literature review is to summarize new insights and novel developments into the understanding of the neural bases of BSC, such as the contribution of the interoceptive signals to the neural mechanisms of BSC, and the overlap with the neural bases of conscious experience in general and of higher-level forms of self (i.e., the cognitive self). We also identify the main challenges and propose future perspectives that need to be conducted to progress into the understanding of the neural mechanisms of BSC. In particular, we point the lack of crosstalk and cross-fertilization between subdisciplines of integrative neuroscience to better understand BSC, especially the lack of research in animal models to decipher the neural networks and systems of neurotransmitters underpinning BSC. We highlight the need for more causal evidence that specific brain areas are instrumental in generating BSC and the need for studies tapping into interindividual differences in the phenomenal experience of BSC and their underlying mechanisms.

Multiple embodiment relations: sense-making in dissociative experiences

ABSTRACT In response to a call for new conceptualizations of the self that avoid mind/body dualisms, recent research has introduced more flexible and fluid theorizations of personhood. This paper takes a phenomenological approach to examine the perceived shifts in body ownership and distribution of agency which underpin such theorizations. We focus on two dissociative experiences, namely, spirit possession and virtual reality, explicating how consumers can experience changes of perspective by disconnecting from the mainstream of their conscious awareness, allowing for a controlled “letting go,” resulting in therapeutic gains. We highlight how consumers create a larger assemblage of the self beyond single viewpoints for a new kind of experiencing. We argue that existing work has treated embodiment in a fairly symmetrical manner, insufficiently considering the inherently somatic characteristics of consumer experiences as an articulation of a multiplicity and distribution of embodiment and agentic relations, both human and non-human.