In the last two decades, since the 1990’s, the increased concern about emerging and re-emerging diseases, mostly zoonotic bacteria or viruses (West Nile virus in USA, SARS corona virus and highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in Asia, the new H1N1 influenza worldwide) has fueled the design, construction and operation of a multitude of new biosafety- biocontainment facilities and/or laboratories [1-3] in USA, in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa. Both biosafety level 3 (BSL3) and biosafety level 4 (BSL4) facilities, which study human or animal pathogens, with specific difficulties, levels and labels, [4,5] are highly technical and complex in their construction, commissioning, and management [6]. The building costs for a BSL-3 facility are typically double or quadruple those of a BSL-2, with even greater differences evident when taking into consideration operational costs such as energy, maintenance, and dedicated personnel (from 200800%). Such is the pressure to reduce the area devoted to BSL3-BSL4 activities that, occasionally, the final working spaces are so small as to force the transfer of samples to the outside. This fact could have serious implications for both biosafety and biosecurity issues, two different [7], yet closely related terms, as improperly treated and therefore still infectious materials transferred out of a BSL3/4 facility could lead to potential proliferation of bio-weapons and increase the biohazard to the community. A biological sample can reach the outside of a BSL3 area in two ways: either without inactivation (infectious) if it must be transferred to another BSL3 facility, or after undergoing an inactivation process to render the biological sample non-infectious. Transferring infectious samples Researchers commonly refer to specific guidelines (Laboratory biosafety manual from WHO, PHAC, BMBL or NIH-CDC, [8-10], which distinguish between Category A and B infectious substances [11] and their methods of shipping, but specific regulations within each country should also be considered. In this case the danger exists in the transportation of the biological specimen between facilities (bio security issues may also play an important role), but not necessarily in their further handling as those materials will be used, propagated and tested in an equivalent BSL3 facility. Transferring non-infectious samples