Beliefs Of Players Research Articles

Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of the game, each player's belief about the minimum-effort of other players in the group is elicited, in addition to the player's chosen effort level. We find that many agents choose effort levels systematically exceeding their beliefs of others' effort levels. We explain this in terms of such subjects taking the role of “leader” in an attempt to pull the group towards more efficient outcomes. We find that the propensity for leaders to emerge depends on individual traits such as trustfulness and cognitive ability. Furthermore, moving to a superior equilibrium is more likely under certain design features such as conditions relating to the cost of effort and the amount of information available to players.

Open-World Narrative Generation to Answer Players’ Questions

Planning-based narrative generation is effective at producing stories with a logically-sound flow of events, but it can be limiting due to the rigidity of its constraints and the high burden on the domain author to define story-world objects, initial states, and author and character goals. Giving the system the freedom to add objects and events to the story-world history arbitrarily can improve variety and reduce authorial burden, but risks leading to stories that seem jarringly contrived to the audience. I propose to use question-answering as the antidote to contrivance in a highly-generative interactive narrative system: By modeling the player's beliefs about the story world, inferring the implicit questions the player may be asking through their interactions, and answering those questions in a way consistent with the player's prior knowledge, a system could focus on creating cohesion in the ways that matter most to the player while accepting a degree of contrivance in the details that the player is likely to overlook.

An experimental investigation on the dark side of emotions and its aftereffects.

The economic literature is so far overwhelmingly dedicated to the effect of incidental emotions on virtuous behavior. However, it is not so explicit for destructive behavior and the way it evolves with emotional states. To fill this gap, we explore how incidental emotions impact antisocial behavior in a laboratory experiment. As our vehicle of research, we used the open treatment of the joy-of-destruction mini-game. In addition to that, we elicited players' first and second-order beliefs via an incentivized questionnaire. We find that destructive behavior is driven by two motives: spite (Machiavellian traits) and preemptive retaliation (Expected destruction by partners). Emotional states do not impact destructive behavior directly. However, positive emotions brighten the expectations of other player beliefs on his partner's destruction, and indirectly reduces the willingness to destroy partner's money.

Research on the use of videogames: effects on students of secondary upper schools of Udine territory

From the researches carried out in literature it appears how gaming is a behaviour in continuous evolution andexpansion (Mauceri & Di Censi, 2020) and is widespread in the entire population, particularly among teenagers.The present paper is the result of a multi-professional and inter-sectorial research carried out and shared with operators of the health service Azienda Sanitaria Universitaria Friuli Centrale (ASUFC), teachers of the Regional SchoolOffice (Uff. VI), the Provincial Student Council (CPS) of Udine and with a professional educator.One of the targets of this research was to analyse the feelings and beliefs of players regarding the use of videogamesand this was done in March 2021 through a questionnaire. 596 students of upper secondary schools of Udine territoryjoined this survey and to reach the target four videoplayer profiles have been outlined taking into account the playtime: the occasional player (N = 61; 10.2%) who uses the videogames for maximum 30 minutes per day, the habitualplayer – mild (N=57; 9.6%) between 30 minutes and 1 hour, the habitual player – moderate (N=250, 41.9%) between1 and 4 hours and the severe player (N=71, 11.9%) between 4 and more than 6 hours. The analysis of the repliesdemonstrates how all statements (21), following the chi-squared test, have a statistically important difference with respect to the profiles, except for two. It appears how the severe players run more often into potential experiences of riskof addiction or trouble, and they prefer to play instead of going out with friends, sometime also stopping friendshiprelations and feeling a higher desire to going on playing at the end of the session, also forgoing some hours of sleep.The research group, taking into consideration the spreading of the behaviour of severe players (11.9%), would deemuseful to plan and carry out future interventions aimed at encouraging the technological health since the first classesof upper secondary schools, in order to allow the students the acquainted use of technologies and gaming activitiesand to prevent the relative risks coming from the massive and improper use of these tools and actions.

Measuring Belief-dependent Preferences without Data on Beliefs

Abstract We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in sequential two-player games without data on the (higher-order) beliefs of players. We show how informative bounds can be derived by exploiting a specific invariance property common to those preferences. We illustrate our approach by analysing data from an experiment conducted in Denmark. Our approach produces tight bounds on the causal effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population—a result also substantiated by the participants’ answers to a post-experimental questionnaire. On the other hand, our approach yields high implausible estimates of guilt aversion—participants would be willing, in some games, to pay at least three Danish crowns (DKK) to avoid letting others down by one DKK. We contrast our estimated bounds with point estimates obtained using data on stated higher-order beliefs, keeping all other aspects of the model unchanged. We find that point estimates fall within our estimated bounds, suggesting that elicited higher-order belief data in our experiment is weakly (if at all) affected by various reporting biases.

축구선수의 비합리적 신념 도출

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore the irrational beliefs of football players. Methods: In this study, 152 football players were selected as research participants, and football players’ irrational beliefs were derived by open-ended questionnaire and judging whether to adopt irrational beliefs based on previous studies. As a result of the study, 1,064 raw data were collected as the beliefs of football players, and 100 football player beliefs were derived by accumulating frequencies according to the commonality and similarity of meanings. 100 football player beliefs, only beliefs that satisfy all of the criteria, such as whether it is goal-setting rigidity, illogicality and unreality, and the catastrophizing were derived as irrational beliefs. Results: The irrational beliefs of football players are ‘never get injured’, ‘never make a mistake’, ‘never be red carded’, ‘never lose, ‘never lose goal’ ‘must make a goal’, ‘never lose even one goal’, ‘never be meltdown’. Conclusion: It is expected that this study will be used to expand the understanding of beliefs as affect the performance of football players and hope actively discuss the correction of beliefs.

Chapter 1: “I piss a lot of people off when I play dwarves like dwarves”: Race, Gender, and Critical Systems in Tabletop Role-Playing Games

Background This chapter explores player interactions and engagement in tabletop role-playing game settings. Objective Particularly focusing on the intersection of gaming systems, virtual settings, and player interactions, this chapter seeks to explore how implicit systems shape individuals’ experiences and behaviors. Through this focus, the chapter intentionally draws parallels between informal gaming settings and classroom-based interactions. Setting Though this study makes specific connections to classroom pedagogies, data were collected from a multiyear ethnographic study of playing tabletop role-playing games with adult participants in informal learning environments. Data were collected from within public gaming cafes and shops. Research Design Participant observation within a role-playing game community served as the primary approach to this ethnographic study. In addition to fieldnote-based observation, interviews with players and archival analysis of gaming artifacts helped triangulate meaning-making at the gaming table. Analysis was conducted through an inductive coding approach that focused on player interactions, systems, and settings. Findings Cultural values, including racism and sexism, shaped player experiences at the table, based on systemic designs and textual guidance from game-related fiction. While games speak to broad possibilities for exploring race and gender, these constructs become limited through the layers of player beliefs, designed rule sets, and depictions within narratives. The emancipatory possibilities of ludic imagination are flattened by cultural norms that may oppress. Conclusions Broadening the findings from this study, this chapter concludes with classroom-based recommendations. If a contemporary approach to critical pedagogy depends on dialogue and cultural understanding, this chapter points to the limitations of confining such work to traditional classroom settings. Instead, it suggests that an interrogation of these systems, alongside youth, is a necessary step in critically oriented classrooms.

Real‐time waiting‐price trading interval in a heterogeneous options market: a Bernoulli distribution

AbstractOptions pricing remains an open research question that is challenging for both theoreticians and practitioners. Unlike many classical binomial models that assume a “representative agent,” the model suggested herein considers two players who are heterogeneous with respect to their estimations of the distribution of the underlying asset price on expiration day, and with respect to their levels of willingness to make a transaction (eagerness level). A two‐player binomial model is developed to find the real‐time optimal option price in two stages. First, we determine a primary feasible pricing domain. We then find a narrower feasible domain, termed the “waiting‐price trading interval,” meaning the region within which the players may either wait for better offers (due to a change in market conditions or player beliefs), or make an immediate transaction. The suggested model is formulated by a nonlinear optimization problem and the optimal price is shown to be unique. We demonstrate that the counter player's eagerness level has a significant effect on the proposed optimal option price. Using empirical analysis, several known lattice‐based models for option pricing, such as CRR and Tian, are compared with the current model (herein, S‐H) in which the price offered by the model player takes into account the subjective beliefs of the opposing market player. The comparison shows significant advantages to the S‐H model in terms of the expected profit on expiration day.

Signaling with Private Monitoring

We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic player transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the long-run player's second-order belief. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the long-run player's past play. A novel separation effect then emerges through this second-order belief channel, altering the traditional signaling that arises when beliefs are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined.

Examination of Self-efficacy Beliefs of on performance (An empirical study on National level Players of team sports in Sri Lanka)

The main goal of this study was identify the impact of Self-Efficacy on the performance of team sports players in Sri Lanka. Mainly it was focused to measure self-efficacy belief of team players and the experimental variable of the study was perceived performance. The study utilized a likert scale questionnaire which had been adopted from literature to obtain data for the study. The research model was tested using 308 subjects comprised of national level team players. Data were analyzed using SPSS and structural equation modeling with AMOS. Self-efficacy has proven to have a noticeable impact on subjective performance of the players. The recommendations included the strategies which can be utilized to enhance the self-efficacy belief of the players.

Analytical games for knowledge engineering of expert systems in support to Situational Awareness: The Reliability Game case study

Knowledge Acquisition (KA) methods are of paramount importance in the design of intelligent systems. Research is ongoing to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. Analytical games appear to be a promising tool to support KA. In fact, in this paper we describe how analytical games could be used for Knowledge Engineering of Bayesian networks, through the presentation of the case study of the Reliability Game. This game has been developed with the aim of collecting data on the impact of meta-knowledge about sources of information upon human Situational Assessment in a maritime context. In this paper we describe the computational model obtained from the dataset and how the card positions, which reflect a player belief, can be easily converted in subjective probabilities and used to learn latent constructs, such as the source reliability, by applying the Expectation-Maximisation algorithm.

Measuring Belief-Dependent Preferences Without Information About Beliefs

We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in sequential two-player games without exploiting information or data on the (higher-order) beliefs of players. We show how informative bounds can be derived by exploiting a specific invariance property common to those preferences. We illustrate our approach by analyzing data from an experiment conducted in Denmark. Our approach produces tight bounds on the causal effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population – a result also substantiated by the participants' answers to a post-experimental questionnaire.On the other hand, our approach yields high implausible estimates of guilt aversion. We contrast our estimated bounds with point estimates obtained using data on self-declared higher-order beliefs, keeping all other aspects of the model unchanged. We find that point estimates fall within our estimated bounds suggesting that elicited higher-order belief data in our experiment is weakly (if at all) affected by a potential endogeneity problem due to e.g. false consensus effects.

The complex mechanism of belief control for cost reduction under stability restriction. Cournout competition example.

Papers suggests the mechanism for the cost reduction by the belief control. It suggested the mechanism that could be usefull to reduve costs and satisfy all these requirements just by belief control, though belief control is a hard problem itself. Authors consider market of manufactures with utlity function as in Cournout competion with quadratic costs. Authors make suggestions on beliefs and knowledge of agents weaker in terms of common knowledge and found domains of parameters where utility increases and where it decreases when we change the beliefs of players. These results provide important insights into the properties of information control for the chosen games. The stability restrictions are restrictions on the utility functions by obervability and exceeding minimal value.

The Optimal Strategy in the Minimum Effort Game

A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from player beliefs to an optimal effort level. From this expression the set of Nash equilibria in the game is fully characterized. All Nash equilibria are symmetric and involve at most two actions being played with positive probability. We discuss how our expression for the optimal strategy can help inform on the comparative statics of a change in the number of players and effort cost benefit ratio.

Instability of Equilibrium Price

We develop a theory of market instability caused by strategic trade with complete information and without outside shocks. We focus on general equilibrium duopoly as a strategic market game with infinite strategies, and a pricing mechanism. First order conditions of the game are the 1-st kind integral equations of Fredholm, which have many solutions. A solution is a probability distribution and can be approximated only. We suggest a modification of Tikhonov regularization for their numerical approximation. Impossibility to construct a unique and exact solution imposes a restriction on existence of converging common beliefs of players about actions of each other, on existence of rational expectations, and on price discovery property of the market, although the market is informationally efficient. Approximated price has unremovable instabilities, 'natural instabilities', specific to parameters of a chosen approximation. Our result is also related to existence of sun-spot equilibrium, and noise trade.

Natural Instability of Equilibrium Prices

We develop a theory of market fluctuations caused by strategic trade with complete information and without outside shocks. The constructed general equilibrium duopoly is a strategic market game with infinite strategies and multiple mixed strategies equilibria. First order conditions (FOC) of the game are the ill-posed problems (Hadamard, 1909), but every equilibrium mixed strategy can be only approximated. This imposes restrictions on convergence of common beliefs of players about actions of each other, existence of rational expectations and a price discovery property of the market, although the market is informationally efficient (Fama, 1970). We suggest a modification of Tikhonov regularization to construct pseudo-solutions. All endogenous variables of the model are exposed to unremovable instabilities, ‘natural instabilities’, specific to parameters of a chosen approximation. Our result is also related to existence of common knowledge, sun-spot equilibrium, and noise trade.

Perceptions of football players regarding injury risk factors and prevention strategies.

Current approaches regarding injury prevention focus on the transfer of evidence into daily practice. One promising approach is to influence attitudes and beliefs of players. The objective of this study was to record player’s perceptions on injury prevention. A survey was performed among players of one German high-level football (soccer) club. 139 professional and youth players between age 13 and 35 years completed a standardized questionnaire (response rate = 98%). It included categories with (1) history of lower extremity injuries, (2) perceptions regarding risk factors and (3) regularly used prevention strategies.The majority of players (84.2%) had a previous injury. 47.5% of respondents believe that contact with other players is a risk factor, followed by fatigue (38.1%) and environmental factors (25.9%). The relevance of previous injuries as a risk factor is differently perceived between injured (25%) and uninjured players (0.0%). Nearly all players (91.5%) perform stretching to prevent injuries, followed by neuromuscular warm up exercises (54.0%). Taping is used by 40.2% of previously injured players and 13.6% of players without a history of injuries. In conclusion, the perception of risk factors and performed preventive strategies are inconsistent with scientific evidence. Future transfer strategies should incorporate the players beliefs and attitudes.

A Non-Self-Referential Paradox in Epistemic Game Theory

In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely modeling players' epistemic beliefs and assumptions is impossible. Furthermore, we introduce an interactive temporal assumption logic to give an appropriate formalization of the new paradox. Formalizing the new paradox in this logic shows that there is no complete interactive temporal assumption model.

Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

This paper studies sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring. We recover a recursive structure by means of stochastic filtering. The set of complete, infinite-length outcome paths forms a filtered space, over which the filtrations represent the players' information sets. Finite-period histories are setwise identical to the filtered space, so that players face continuation games strategically identical to the original game. A player's first-order beliefs of her opponents' private histories along with her finite-period histories are sufficient statistics for continuation of play, and the value of continuation is a function of the two. In a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium profile, each player has a partition of her belief manifold. Over each submanifold, value functions, which indicate continuation values, are maximized when the histories and beliefs are consistent, that is, when the beliefs are reachable from initial beliefs through the histories. The mixed-strategy equilibria are the belief-free equilibria in the literature. Private beliefs are irrelevant in action choices and state transitions as all value functions are identical. However, beliefs affect the continuation values. We are able to characterize the pure-strategy equilibrium sets when the actions and signals are finite.

“Isn’t everyone like me?”: On the presence of self-similarity in strategic interactions

AbstractWe propose that in strategic interactions a player is influenced by self-similarity. Self-similarity means that a player who chooses some action X tends to believe, to a greater extent than a player who chooses a different action, that other players will also choose action X. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we analyze the actions and the reported beliefs of players in a two-player two-action symmetric game. The game has the feature that for “materialistic” players, who wish to maximize their own payoff, there should be negative correlation between players’ actions and the beliefs that they assign to their opponent choosing the same action. We first elicit participants’ preferences over the outcomes of the game, and identify a large group of materialistic players. We then ask participants to choose an action in the game and report their beliefs. The reported beliefs of materialistic players are positively correlated with their actions, i.e., they are more likely to choose an action the stronger is their belief that their opponent will also choose the same action. We view this pattern as evidence for the presence of self-similarity.