Climate Change Beliefs Research Articles

Adopting LEDs changes attitudes towards climate change: experimental evidence from China

The adoption of low carbon technologies needs to go hand in hand with an increased awareness of climate change and its consequences and solutions. Attitudes toward climate change are influenced by a variety of factors, most notably educational attainment and exposure to climatic events attributable to climate change. However, less is known about the effect of technology adoption on climate change beliefs and support for mitigating measures. Through a longitudinal, incentivized field experiment with Chinese households, we assess attitudes toward climate change before and after adopting efficient lighting technology. The results show differential patterns of attitudinal change: while belief in the reality of climate change and willingness to adopt energy-efficient appliances increase, support for energy taxes does not. We attribute the attitudinal change to the adoption of LED light bulbs. Further evidence suggests that experience with efficient technology, rather than knowledge acquisition, drives this change. These results highlight the importance of action-initiating behavioral intervention to complement educational programs aimed at improving knowledge.

A Social Identity Approach to Engaging Christians in the Issue of Climate Change

Using two nationally representative surveys (total N = 2,544) and two experiments (total N = 1,620), we investigate a social identity approach to engaging Christians in the issue of climate change. Results show Christian Americans say “protecting God’s creation” is a top reason for wanting to reduce global warming. An exploratory experiment and a preregistered replication tested a “stewardship frame” message with Christian Americans and found significant increases in pro-environmental and climate change beliefs, which were explained by increases in viewing environmental protection as a moral and religious issue, and perceptions that other Christians care about environmental protection.

Communicating Climate Change: Probabilistic Expressions and Concrete Events

Abstract Despite near unanimous agreement among climate scientists about global warming, a substantial proportion of Americans remain skeptical or unconcerned. The two experiments reported here tested communication strategies designed to increase trust in and concern about climate change. They also measured attitudes toward climate scientists. Climate predictions were systematically manipulated to include either probabilistic (90% predictive interval) or deterministic (mean value) projections that described either concrete (i.e., heat waves and floods) or abstract events (i.e., temperature and precipitation). The results revealed that projections that included the 90% predictive interval were considered more trustworthy than deterministic projections. In addition, in a nationally representative sample, Republicans who were informed of concrete events with predictive intervals reported greater concern and more favorable attitudes toward climate scientists than when deterministic projections were used. Overall, these findings suggest that while climate change beliefs may be rooted in partisan identity, they remain malleable, especially when targeted communication strategies are used.

Cognitive complexity increases climate change belief

The present research bridged the relationship between cognitive complexity and belief in anthropogenic climate change and tested the differential effectiveness of two argument types. In the first two studies (with 817 and 226 participants, respectively) we found that participants with lower levels of cognitive complexity were less likely to believe in anthropogenic climate change than those with higher levels. In Study 3 we used an experimental design with 304 participants to examine the reactions to different types of arguments across people with differing cognitive complexity. We compared the two most common types of arguments in discussions of climate change: 1) Presenting facts about climate change on their own (one-sided); 2) Presenting opposing arguments (i.e., misinformation) together with the correct climate change facts (two-sided). Participants with lower cognitive complexity were more likely to believe in climate change when exposed to facts of climate change on their own compared to the two-sided, refutational combination of misinformation and facts; but those with higher cognitive complexity were more likely to believe in climate change when exposed to the refutational combination rather than facts alone. Media and scientists need to consider the cognitive complexity of their audience when dealing with climate change.

Perceived Social Consensus Can Reduce Ideological Biases on Climate Change

It is well established that conservatives in the United States are substantially less likely than liberals to accept that climate change is happening and is human caused and are less supportive of policies to limit climate change. However, it is likely that ideological differences in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences are smaller when people have close friends and family members who care about climate change. Here, we use nine nationally representative survey samples (total N = 16,168) to evaluate this claim and test if perceived social consensus predicts a smaller difference in climate change beliefs between liberals and conservatives. We find that social consensus plays an important role in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences for people across the ideological spectrum, but especially among conservatives. These findings provide important insights on how to bridge ideological divides in large social dilemmas such as climate change.

Framing climate change in frontline communities: anthropological insights on how mountain dwellers in the USA, Peru, and Italy adapt to glacier retreat

We report on anthropological research conducted in three mountain communities (in the USA, Italy and Peru), which have been directly affected by glacier retreat for over 40 years. Our mixed methods include ethnographic research, analysis of transcripts of interviews, focus groups and community meetings, and case studies of adaptation projects. Our findings indicate that local people are acute observers of change. They draw on two frames (climate change and community) in their discussions and projects but rely much more heavily on the latter frame. This pattern of drawing on the community frame, characteristic of all discussions, is most marked in the community meetings. The effectiveness of the community frame in supporting projects calls into question some widely shared notions about the role of belief in climate change as a crucial precondition for adaptation and challenges the “perceive–predict–act” model of climate change response.

The Effects of Climate Smart Agriculture and Climate Change Adaptation on the Technical Efficiency of Rice Farming—An Empirical Study in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam

This study employed the propensity score matching approach to empirically assess the effects of climate smart agriculture participation and climate change adaptation response on the technical efficiency of rice production. Observational data were collected from in-depth interviews with 352 rice farm households in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam. The findings indicate that 71% of local farmers adapted their rice farming to climate change related to salinity intrusion and drought, while 29% of farmers did not. Additionally, only twenty-two rice farmers were typically chosen as participants in the climate smart agriculture pilot program by local government and institutions. The choices for adaptation response and climate smart agriculture participation are significantly influenced by agricultural extension services, belief in climate change, the area of farming land, as well as geographical locations (e.g., province and access to water sources). The results also reveal that climate change adaptation response, including climate smart agriculture participation, played a crucial role in improving technical efficiency of rice production by 13%–14% compared to no adaptation response. Regarding the individual effect of climate smart agriculture participation, participants could achieve higher technical efficiency by 5%–8% compared to non-participants.

An experimental examination of measurement disparities in public climate change beliefs

The extent to which Americans—especially Republicans—believe in anthropogenic climate change (ACC) has recently been the subject of high profile academic and popular disagreement. We offer a novel framework, and experimental data, for making sense of this debate. Using a large (N = 7,019) and demographically diverse sample of US adults, we compare several widely used methods for measuring belief in ACC. We find that seemingly trivial decisions made when constructing questions can, in some cases, significantly alter the proportion of the American public who appear to believe in human-caused climate change. Critically, we find that some common measurement practices may nearly double estimates of Republicans’ acceptance of human-caused climate change. We conclude by discussing how this work can help improve the consumption of research on climate opinion.

Perception of Climate Change Risk and Adaptation in the Czech Republic

Public perception of climate change is an important element that affects attitudes towards adaptation and mitigation. Understanding the general public’s perception of the issue can assist decision-makers, though the climate change perception is affected by multiple factors. This study examines the main sociodemographic factors, including gender, and the role of previous personal experience with extreme weather events on climate change perception and engagement in individual adaptation and mitigation actions among the general population in the Czech Republic. Based on statistical analysis, gender, age and previous experience with extreme weather events have been found to play a significant role in the climate change beliefs of individuals and in the perception of the cause of the changing climate. The analysis revealed that respondents with previous experience with extreme weather events were significantly more likely to implement adaptation and mitigation actions than respondents with no experience. The survey represents insights into climate change perception and beliefs of the general public at the national level.

Climate change belief, sustainability education, and political values: Assessing the need for higher-education curriculum reform

Educational attainment is generally a strong predictor of belief in climate change, but prior research indicates that for political conservatives a college education is not always associated with increased belief. Conservatives in several countries, especially those in populist parties, have shown skepticism toward climate-mitigation policies and in some cases toward climate science. The study contributes to theories of environmental belief by examining two mechanisms for the low effect of the college education on climate belief for conservatives: selective exposure bias (students avoid courses that challenge their beliefs) and resistance to belief change (students reject or filter information that is incompatible with their political orientation). Using a survey of college-educated adults in the U.S., the study finds strong evidence for selective exposure bias and mixed evidence for resistance to belief change. Importantly, approximately one-third of conservative students who took a college course with climate-change content shifted from initial skepticism or uncertainty to a more confident belief. Moreover, exposure to an education with a core curriculum is associated with stronger belief. The study provides support for the policy goal of a curricular requirement for climate education, which can overcome selective exposure bias and, for some students, resistance to belief change.

Climate change denial and beliefs about science

Social scientists have offered a number of explanations for why Americans commonly deny that human-caused climate change is real. In this paper, I argue that these explanations neglect an important group of climate change deniers: those who say they are on the side of science while also rejecting what they know most climate scientists accept. I then develop a “nature of science” hypothesis that does account for this group of deniers. According to this hypothesis, people have serious misconceptions about what scientific inquiry ought to look like. Their misconceptions interact with partisan biases to produce denial of human-caused climate change. After I develop this hypothesis, I propose ways of confirming that it is true. Then I consider its implications for efforts to combat climate change denial and for other cases of public rejection of science.

Polarization of Climate Change Beliefs: The Role of the Millennial Generation Identity

ObjectiveThis article explores how the Millennial Generation identity—the shared values and experiences of young adults (born between 1980 and 1997)—affects political polarization of climate change belief, specifically how it mediates the relationship between party affiliation and educational attainment.MethodTo test this, an interaction between Millennial*Republican*education is estimated, using data from an original national survey administered in 2015.ResultsMillennials are more likely to believe in the evidence of climate change and its anthropogenic causes than older adults of their same party affiliation. Unlike older adults, the most educated Millennials are not the most likely to adhere to political party stance; rather, it is among the least educated Millennials that party sorting is most evident.ConclusionThe Millennial Generation identity is meaningful for understanding political attitudes. Important distinctions exist between Millennials and older adults in the evaluation of climate change opinion and related policies.

Seeing is not always believing: crop loss and climate change perceptions among farm advisors

As climate change is expected to significantly affect agricultural systems globally, agricultural farm advisors have been increasingly recognized as an important resource in helping farmers address these challenges. While there have been many studies exploring the climate change belief and risk perceptions as well as behaviors of both farmers and agricultural farm advisors, there are very few studies that have explored how these perceptions relate to actual climate impacts in agriculture. Here we couple survey data from United States Department of Agriculture farm service employees (n = 6, 514) with historical crop loss data across the United States to explore the relationship of actual climate-related crop losses on farm to farm advisor perceptions of climate change and future farmer needs. Using structural equation modelling we find that among farm advisors that work directly with farms on disaster and crop loss issues, there is a significant positive relationship between crop loss and perceived weather variability changes, while across all farm advisors crop loss is associated with reduced likelihood to believe in anthropogenic climate change. Further, we find that weather variability perceptions are the most consistently and highly correlated with farm advisors’ perceptions about the need for farm adaptation and future farmer needs. These results suggest that seeing crop loss may not lead to climate change belief, but may drive weather variability perceptions, which in turn affect farm adaptation perceptions. This lends further evidence to the debate over terminology in climate change communication and outreach, suggesting that weather variability may be the most salient among agricultural advisors.

Predictors of visitors’ climate-related coping behaviors in a nature-based tourism destination

Abstract: Climate change affects the supply of nature-based tourism opportunities as well as the demand visitors place on those opportunities. Climate-induced changes in visitor demand, specifically climate-related coping behaviors (e.g., seeking safer recreation sites, changing trip timing, using weather forecasts to plan trips), are influenced by multiple factors such as season of visit, specific visitor attributes, and general climate change beliefs and concern. Understanding the relationships between visitor characteristics and coping behaviors within the context of a changing climate will help recreation managers and tourism providers anticipate shifts in demand and adapt strategically. In this study, we present results from a series of binary logistic regression models of summer and winter visitor survey data to examine climate-related coping behaviors within a regional nature-based tourism area (the North Shore region of Lake Superior in Minnesota). Findings reveal that winter recreationists, younger visitors, and visitors who are concerned about climate change, are most inclined to use behavioral coping in response to changing climate and environmental conditions. Specifically, we found that winter season recreationists are much more likely to report having experienced a past climate-related impact, and that weather information, alternative gear, and flexibility in timing their trips are important in overcoming these constraints. Further, younger visitors were more likely to use informational (weather forecast) coping, site substitution, and activity substitution to respond to climate-related impacts. This study expands upon climate-related recreation and tourism research by documenting how recreationists’ informational, spatial, and temporal coping behaviors vary across visitor characteristics. Further research is needed to determine if the behavioral coping preferences and patterns found in this study emerge across diverse contexts. However, our findings here can help managers begin to strategically plan and collaborate to maintain destination-level attractiveness to visitors despite changing environmental conditions. Management implications: Understanding how visitors respond to environmental changes is important in sustaining ‘weather-resistant’ visitor flows. In anticipation of on-site disruptions and future demand shifts, regional partnerships within nature-based destinations may mitigate reductions in visitor demand and accommodate shifting patterns in visitor flows. For example, recreation managers and tourism providers could identify and jointly market alternative recreation opportunities when conditions are not conducive to participating in desired activities, as well as develop a networked approach for communicating weather and site safety information.

Counteracting Climate Science Politicization With Effective Frames and Imagery

Politicization of science occurs when the inherent uncertainty of science is emphasized to cast doubt on scientific consensus. Climate change has become particularly susceptible to this kind of politicization. In this article, we report the results of a survey experiment in which we manipulated text frames and visual imagery associated with two types of environmental hazards linked to climate change—sea level rise with associated flooding and increased heat levels with associated drought and wildfires. We present evidence that the use of visual imagery can counter the effects that science politicization has on climate change beliefs and behaviors.

Understanding and modifying beliefs about climate change through educational travel

Understanding the factors that shape individuals’ beliefs about climate change is key to the development of effective climate change communication and education strategies. In this study, we test a path model of the social psychological antecedents of beliefs about climate change and evaluate the effectiveness of an educational travel program in changing them. Results show that environmental worldview and affective association with nature are two significant predictors of students’ belief in the occurrence of climate change. Gender was found to influence belief in an anthropogenic causation, while political orientation was a significant predictor of conviction that climate change is occurring. Regression analysis was used to test for changes in climate beliefs before and after participation in an educational travel experience, compared to a control group, using a quasi-experimental design. Results indicate participation strengthened climate change beliefs.

Mitigation system threat partially mediates the effects of right‐wing ideologies on climate change beliefs

AbstractResearch consistently shows that right‐wing ideological adherents are more likely to deny climate change. However, less is known about how right‐wing ideological subtypes are uniquely related to climate change denial, as well as what explains these relationships. This study examines whether threat to the socioeconomic system in the form of climate change mitigation policies, referred to as Climate Change Mitigation Threat (CCMT), mediates the relationships between Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) subtypes and four forms of climate change denial (existence denial, human cause denial, impact denial and climate science denial). U.S. participants (N = 334; Mage = 34.70, SD = 5.98) were recruited via Amazon MTurk. When shared variance in the predictors was accounted for, we found that: (a) Conventionalism (RWA‐C) positively predicted all forms of climate change denial; (b) Dominance (SDO‐D) positively predicted existence denial; (c) Anti‐Egalitarianism (SDO‐E) positively predicted both human cause and impact denial; and (d) Aggression (RWA‐A) negatively predicted existence denial. All significant direct relationships were partially mediated by CCMT, except for the direct paths between SDO‐D and existence denial, and RWA‐A and existence denial. These findings suggest that right‐wing adherents who conform to societal norms and prefer unequal social systems may deny climate change partly due to a perception that mitigation strategies proposed to combat climate change threaten the existing socioeconomic system.

Just don’t call it climate change: climate-skeptic farmer adoption of climate-mitigative practices

Despite low levels of agreement that climate change is caused primarily by humans, respondents to a survey of climate change beliefs and adoption of climate-mitigative practices among beef and grain producers in Alberta, Canada, indicate a high level of adoption of several agricultural practices with climate-mitigative benefits. Respondents’ motivations for adoption of climate-mitigative practices rarely include the belief that climate change is caused by humans, but rather expectations for economic benefits, improvements in soil quality, and biodiversity, among other things. The strongest predictor of mitigative practice adoption is a learning orientation, defined as valuing improvement, research, learning, and innovation, followed by a conservation orientation that values land stewardship. Predictors are not consistent across practices; however, in some but not all cases adoption is predicted by climate change norms, or assumption of personal responsibility to address climate change, and other predictors vary by practice as well.

Housing investment, sea level rise, and climate change beliefs

We investigate the association of new housing construction with sea level rise exposure and climate change beliefs. We combine U.S. Census construction permits data, sea level rise projections, county-level climate change belief estimates (Howe et al., 2015), and standard housing controls. The results suggest that (i) sea level rise vulnerability is associated with significantly reduced construction in areas with high climate change beliefs, but that (ii) this relationship is significantly attenuated in more skeptical areas, suggesting that climate skepticism may be delaying adaptation.

Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: A cross-European analysis

There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. Using data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (n = 44,387), we examine how key socio-political and demographic factors are associated with climate change perception across 22 European countries and Israel. We show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain associations with climate change perceptions, such as the ones for the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement value dimension, political orientation, and education, are more consistent across countries than for gender and age. However, even if the direction of the associations are to a large extent consistent, the sizes of the effects are not. We demonstrate that the sizes of the effects are generally smaller in Central and Eastern European countries, and that some demographic effects are larger in Northern European as compared to Western European countries. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other national contexts.