Behavior In Democracies Research Articles

Countering Authoritarian Behavior in Democracies

Countering Authoritarian Behavior in Democracies

Meet in the Middle: Terrorism and Centrist Party Vote Shares in Legislative Elections

AbstractScholars have found that terrorism can influence political behavior in democracies by affecting citizens’ emotions such as anxiety and fear. However, researchers have yet to examine how terrorism affects vote choice cross‐nationally. The few studies that have investigated terrorism's effect on vote choice have only examined single states through case study analysis. While informative, researchers lack an understanding regarding how terrorism influences vote choice cross‐nationally based on the nature of terrorist attacks and the ideology of political parties. Thus, using a unique dataset that incorporates political party ideology, this study examines the effect the number and severity of terrorist attacks have on vote choice in legislative elections in 56 democracies from multiple regions and levels of development from 1975 to 2014. Preliminary results indicate that terrorist attacks are critical events that significantly affect vote choice in the democratic states included in this analysis.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change: Analyzing Withdrawal from Coalition Operations in Iraq

When do democracies become ‘unreliable’ alliance partners? Existing studies make conflicting claims about the alliance behavior of democracies. Some argue that democratic leaders are hardly constrained by domestic considerations in their decision-making, even when the public is largely opposed to a military commitment. Others contest that domestic politics does matter and, specifically, that election cycles and government turnover influence decisions on whether or not to withdraw from a military operation. This paper puts these arguments to an empirical test, investigating alliance dynamics for 29 democracies that participated in the multinational ad hoc coalition for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) between 2003 and 2010. Employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the paper takes a set-theoretic approach that emphasizes the combination and interaction of the preconditions of coalition withdrawal. This complements and goes beyond existing studies that have been mainly formal and statistical work. The paper specifically focuses on the election cycle, government turnover, casualty levels, terrorist attacks, and deployment size as conditions that potentially cause withdrawal decisions.

Unreliable Allies? Democratic Reliability and Coalition Warfare in Iraq

When do democracies become ‘unreliable’ alliance partners? Existing studies make conflicting claims about the alliance behavior of democracies. Some argue that democratic leaders are hardly constrained by domestic considerations in their decision-making, even when the public is largely opposed to a military commitment. Others contest that domestic politics does matter and, specifically, that election cycles influence decisions on whether to withdraw from an operation or to participate in the first place. This paper puts these arguments to an empirical test, investigating alliance dynamics for 29 democracies that participated in the ad hoc coalition for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) between 2003 and 2010. Employing fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the paper takes a set-theoretic approach that emphasizes the combination and interaction of the preconditions of coalition withdrawal. This complements and goes beyond existing studies that have been mainly formal and statistical work. The paper specifically focuses on the election cycle, government turnover, and partisanship as conditions that potentially cause withdrawal decisions.

Leader Survival, Military Mobilization, and Interstate Conflict in Democracies and Dictatorships.

I argue variation across regime type in the political cost of increasing military spending during an interstate war underlies differences in the crisis bargaining and conflict behavior of democracies and dictatorships. I develop a model in which a war's outcome is influenced by leaders' mobilization efforts and democratic leaders are more likely to be removed from power for increasing military spending than dictators. The model provides an explanation for known empirical regularities and implies previously unidentified relationships between regime type and interstate conflict. Consistent with one of the model's novel predictions, empirical analyses indicate democratic challengers are less likely to make demands that lead to fighting than non-democratic challengers when the distribution of capabilities is roughly equal, but not when one state is substantially stronger than the other state. My findings have implications for our understanding of when and why crisis bargaining and interstate conflict processes differ across regime type.

The Electoral (Dis)Connection in U.S. Foreign Policy

In the last few decades, a significant body of research in international relations has linked the behavior of democracies in the international arena to electoral mechanisms, notably the prospect that democratic leaders face of being voted out of office. Indeed, in the US context, presidents often worry about public opinion when making foreign policy choices. At the same time, however, scholars of American politics emphasize that voters typically do not know much about foreign policy, and tend to take their cues on foreign policy from elites. To reconcile these perspectives, I argue that we can better understand the nature of democratic foreign policymaking by focusing on elite competition. If presidents are able to earn and retain the support of other important elites - such as Congress, key members of the bureaucracy, and high-ranking members of the military - then public opinion can be effectively managed and presidents can try to inoculate themselves against electoral consequences. For practical purposes in many cases, then, the relevant domestic audience for foreign policy choices may be other elites, rather than the mass public. Important implications follow for our understanding of the foreign policies of democracies more generally, as well as international relations theories that rely on regime type as a key variable. If leaders in a democratic state frequently worry most proximately about the political reactions of other elites, then in many cases the relevant domestic audience is likely to be far smaller than theories of democratic foreign policymaking typically assume. Focusing on the use of force, the paper outlines an elite-centered framework for understanding how democratic leaders manage public opinion, and illustrates the theory with two cases of presidential deliberations over whether to escalate an ongoing military intervention.

International Crises and the Capitalist Peace

Recent research suggests that free markets and economic development contribute to a reduction in interstate conflict. This “capitalist peace” has been seen alternately to complement or to supplant the more well-known democratic peace effect. Here, we compare the behavior of democracies and capitalist dyads in the context of the Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. The ICB data offers a number of advantages in assessing the conflict decisions of national leaders, rather than the accidents of subordinates or others. In particular, we explore as yet untested implications of each perspective, examining the effect of regime type and economic and interest variables on escalation and crisis intensity. Our findings provide new evidence that free markets, economic development, and similar interests account for the special peace in liberal dyads.

Do Democracies Breed Rent‐seeking Behavior?

Using objective institutional historical data for the case of Uruguay, we test the link between rent‐seeking behavior in democracies using time‐series and panel data approaches. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent‐seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent‐seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.

Disarmed democracies: domestic institutions and the use of force

In Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, David P. Auerswald examines how the structure of domestic political institutions affects whether democracies use force or make threats during international disputes. Auerswald argues that the behavior of democracies in interstate conflict is shaped as much by domestic political calculations as by geopolitical circumstance. Variations in the structure of a democracy's institutions of governance make some types of democracies more likely to use force than others. To test his theory, Auerswald compares British, French, and U.S. behavior during military conflicts and diplomatic crises from the Cold War era to the present. He discusses how accountability and agenda control vary between parliamentary, presidential, and premier-presidential democracies and shows how this affects the ability of the democracy to signal its intentions, as well as the likelihood that it will engage in military conflict. His findings have implications for the study of domestic politics and the use of force, as well as of U.S. leadership during the next century.This study will interest social scientists interested in the domestic politics of international security, comparative foreign policy, or the study of domestic institutions. It will interest those concerned with the exercise of U.S. leadership in the next century, the use of force by democracies, and the future behavior of democratizing nations.David P. Auerswald is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.