Much of the current research on the constitution of subjectivity has been grounded on attempts to conceptualize the body without collapsing into reductive materialism or, to the contrary, theorizing a completely historical subject in the hope of doing ontological and ethical justice to formative specificity. With the rationalism-empiricism struggle put to bed by Kant’s transcendental turn and tucked in tightly by Hegel’s dialectic, the twentieth century was greeted with a maelstrom of world wars and efficient technology which produced the greatest number of corpses in the shortest time in world history; and still, to use Hegel’s famous saying, thought stood “at the crossroads of materialism and idealism.” Wrestling with articulating the interpenetrating quagmire of consciousness and body marked the beginning of twentieth century thought. For instance, Freud’s science of childhood development aligned emerging aspects of subjectivity with the very development of the body itself. In another effort, Husserl identified eidetic constructs which structured experience and, most importantly for our purposes, he distinguished between the phenomenal lived-body of the Lebenswelt known as Leib, and the anonymous thing-like quality of the body known as Körper. In this context, the corpse is the very opposite of the body insofar as the body is the site of the unfolding of subjectivity whereas the corpse seems to be the limit of subjectivity: a spatial-temporal marker of a subject which was. For instance, although it has been suggested that the corpse has somehow been emptied of subjectivity, is it not just as likely that it is we who are emptied before it? What is it about the corpse that disgusts us, intrigues us, fascinates us and reveals us to ourselves? The notion of the ‘uncanny’ is frequently invoked as a placeholder for the specific and irreducible character of such threshold experiences (such as encountering a corpse). But what is the structure of the uncanny? Moreover, what are the broader considerations regarding limit experiences as integral to the constituting of the subject?