Bashar al-Asad Research Articles

Reinterpreting Authoritarian power: Syria's Hereditary Succession

When Hafiz al-Asad died in 2000, his son Bashar became Syria's president. By examining an unresolved inconsistency in the leading accounts about Syria's succession, this article reveals the limitations of single-person analysis as the causal explanation for Syria's hereditary leadership selection. I provide an alternative explanation by emphasizing the role of senior elites in forming regime consensus around Bashar al-Asad's candidacy. Hereditary successions, therefore, reveal an instance of authoritarian continuity rather than one likely to end in regime breakdown. Hafiz al-Asad died on June 10, 2000 after nearly 30 years at the helm of one of the Middle East's most volatile regimes. Syria witnessed 15 successful coup d'etats between 1949-1970,1 external wars with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973), vicious Pan-Arab competition with regional states,2 and a near civil war between 1976-1984.3 Al-Asad slowed the raucous domestic political upheavals by stitching together a hard state compared to its regional counterparts.4 Much of the literature on Syria seems to suggest that the country requires a strong, repressive leader to offset the state's early proclivity for regime turnover. As Flynt Leverett argues, al-Asad transformed a coup-ridden semi-state into a veritable model of authoritarian stability.5 The country's politics are often explained through a sectarian lens, since al-Asad hailed from Syria's minority 'Alawi sect.6 Other accounts describe al-Asad's political dominance through the rule framework.7 Using this framework, however, influences how central events - such as presidential succession - are explained. Al-Asad's death in 2000 gripped the region. The leader was widely rumored to be preparing his son, Bashar, for the presidency. Some, however, speculated that his offspring's succession was far from certain.8 Israeli intelligence learned of al-Asad's death five hours before the media reported it but held back public reports so as not to invite a contentious transfer of power on its border.9 Instead of a contested succession process in a potentially unstable environment, Syria seamlessly became the first hereditary in the Arab world. The day that al-Asad's death was announced, Parliament amended the constitution to lower the eligibility age for presidential candidates, while the security forces closed airports and sealed the Syrian and Lebanese borders to prevent outside opposition figures from entering the country to challenge the process. During the next 48 hours, the ruling Ba'th party's leadership inserted al-Asad's son at the top of its command structure as the military promoted and named him the armed forces' commander-inchief. The interim President dutifully oversaw Parliament's unanimous nomination of Bashar as the lone candidate for a national referendum. On the one-month anniversary of his father's passing, Bashar received over 97% of votes cast in the referendum. The inauguration occurred a week later. In order to anoint him, senior elites from across the political establishment proved swift in their decision-making and capable of sustaining the uncontested execution of consensus over a period of five weeks. Rather than focus on the elites' coordinated response across the institutions of Parliament, the ruling party, security services, and the military, scholars emphasize the personalized character of Syria's hereditary succession. Since Hafiz al-Asad presumably designated his son as heir, his incomplete preparation appears irrelevant. The implication is that al-Asad's servants of power unhesitatingly installed his son. The President's dominating political reach appeared as extensive in death as it had been in life. Egyptian intellectual Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim quickly coined the term, Jumalikaya, which combines the Arabic words for republic and monarchy to describe the event.10 The personalized narrative continues to prevail as the literature's explanatory norm over ten years after Syria's succession. …

Privileging the Private: Media and Development in Syria

In 2001 Syria opened its media outlets to private ownership for the first time in over forty years. More than a year after coming to power, President Bashar al-Asad issued Decree 50, which overturned a 1963 revolutionary decree outlawing privately owned publications. While Decree 50 is often rosily credited with reforming the Syrian mediascape, it actually instituted more restrictions on publishers and journalists than ever before. This includes forcing journalists to reveal their sources, as well as imposing fines and jail terms for journalists or publishers who disobey the guidelines or publish without a license. As details of Decree 50 make clear, opening the door for the privately owned press in Syria did not ensure a press free of restrictions. Officials from the public media sector lauded the establishment of the private media as yet another “modernizing” reform enacted by Bashar that would “serve the nation.” Western news reports have focused on the historical momentousness of the emergence of the private press in Syria, remarking that even though the press may not be “independent” by Western standards, it could mark the beginning of a new era of press freedom. Almost a decade later, the same English-language outlets have rejected elements of Syria’s media privatization as a fraud, reporting that the country’s private outlets are owned by wealthy businessmen close to the regime, and while some outlets may be breaking social “taboos”, their inability (or unwillingness) to criticize the regime strips them of credibility in the eyes of Western journalists.

Syria's Diversified Options

US–Syrian relations are still strained, but president Bashar al-Asad has wasted no time in building new alliances with Iran, Iraq, and even Russia, writes Robin Yassin-Kassab. The election of Obama has done little to improve US–Syrian relations. But, as Robin Yassin-Kassab reports, in Damascus president Bashar al-Asad has been busy building new alliances with Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and even Russia.

BOOK REVIEW | Asad in Search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hafiz and Bashar

Kedar’s book seeks to address the relative gap in research on the Syrian media. The format and style of the book is rather standard throughout, offering readers thematically organized chapters that each try and discern and analyze messages, headlines, stories and strategies of the Syrian press. The period focus of the book is on Hafiz al-Asad’s rule, although a lengthy concluding chapter is devoted to the first year and a half of Bashar al-Asad’s presidency. An interesting format used by Kedar is to provide the media content in Arabic followed by English translation. The format is beneficial for readers who wish to juxtapose the original content with the author’s analysis. Kedar’s focus is on news stories written in the three main Syrian newspapers: Tishrin, Al-Ba‘ath and Al-Thawra. Despite proclamations of objectivity (pg. xv), he relies on rather crude generalizations and culturalist arguments about Syrians and Arabs in general that saturate the analysis and deflect from the analytical contribution of the book in explaining the dynamics of the Syrian print media. The first chapter discusses ways in which the media serve the goals of propagating regime ideology and legitimating the rule of Hafiz al-Asad to the Syrian public. While he is successful in distinguishing between propaganda and information and in drawing parallels between media content and the political imperatives of the regime, Kedar’s methodology of content analysis ignores the relationship between media and other institutions that served similar socializing functions within Syrian society. He fails to see the media as an appendage of Syria’s authoritarian political structure, suggesting instead that it is “recruited” (pg. 10) to serve the goals of the regime. The second chapter departs from a focus on Hafiz al-Asad towards analyzing messages about the Syrian state. In this, the lengthiest chapter, he identifies and organizes themes found in the Syrian press, including themes of unity, “Arabness,” and modernism. He also demonstrates consistent patterns in how other national issues such as citizenship, the army and the Ba‘ath Party are treated in the media.

The Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in Syria Under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad

This paper seeks an explanation for the resilience of the Syrian authoritarian regime under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad. It will be argued that this resilience is to a relevant extent caused by the fact that the regime’s “material” as well as “ideational” forms of power share a common element, if not an underlying principle. This generates their compatibility and congruency and thus produces a convergence of forces which manifests in the regime’s ability to exceed the mere sum of its individual forms of power. It will be demonstrated that this common principle can be conceptualized as a “tacit pact” between unequal parties, with the weaker party under constant threat of exclusion and/or coercion in the event of noncompliance. It will be argued that inherent in the pact is a high level of ambiguity; this, paradoxically, renders it more effective but at the same time also more instable as a tool of domination. Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, eine Erklarung fur die Widerstandsfahigkeit des syrischen Regimes unter Hafez und Bashar Al-Asad zu erarbeiten. Die hier vertretene These ist, dass sowohl die materiellen als auch die ideellen Arten von Macht des syrischen Regimes auf einem gemeinsamen Prinzip beruhen. Dieses bewirkt eine Konvergenz von Kraften, die zu der besonderen Widerstandsfahigkeit des syrischen Regimes fuhrt. Dieses gemeinsame Prinzip soll hier als ein tacit pact konzeptionalisiert werden, der aus zwei ungleichen Parteien besteht und in dem die schwachere Partei unter der standigen Androhung von Gewalt und dem Ausschluss aus dem Pakt im Falle seiner Nichteinhaltung steht. Dem tacit pact wohnt ein hohes Mas an Ambiguitat inne, das ihn zu einem effektiveren, aber paradoxerweise auch instabilen Herrschaftinstrument macht.

Defying the hegemon: Syria and the Iraq War

What are the explanations for and consequences of Syria's defiance of the United States over the Iraq war? Although President Bashar al-Asad had sought to realign Syria westward, the failure of the SyriaIsrael peace process and Syria's oil deals with Iraq soured USSyrian relations while Syria's opposition to the invasion of Iraq created a crisis in which US threats and sanctions targeted Damascus. Syria's Arab nationalist identity made regime acquiescence in overt aggression against an Arab state is impossible. The regime adapted to US pressures with a mix of concessions and counter-pressures. It held stubbornly to its regional cards, bending when pressures were maximized, but seemingly outlasting the US campaign against it.

Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad

The conventional wisdom regarding Iran and Syria is that these are belligerent states headed by hostile leaders. Rarely is an effort made to imagine how international politics are perceived from the Iranian or the Syrian perspectives, or consider how these perceptions are part of an interactive crisis in which the USA may be implicated as deeply as the regimes in Tehran and Damascus. In this article, we investigate the United States' ongoing crisis with Iran and Syria from the vantage point of their leadership. Our central research questions are: What kind of leaders are Ahmadinejad of Iran and al-Asad of Syria? More specifically, what are their cognitive diagnostic beliefs of the ensuing conflict and their prescriptive beliefs towards it? What is an appropriate strategy for the USA towards Iran and Syria? The answers to these questions speak to the conventional wisdom of Ahmadinejad and al-Asad as hostile and propose strategies for averting a dangerous escalation of the conflict. Our central goal in this article is to develop towards Iran and Syria `realistic empathy' as we consider it `the great corrective for all forms of war-provoking misperception'.

D4. Former Pres. Jimmy Carter, Notes on Meetings with Hamas Leaders and Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad, and Observations Regarding the Peace Process, Atlanta, GA, 22 April 2008 (excerpts).

D4. Former Pres. Jimmy Carter, Notes on Meetings with Hamas Leaders and Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad, and Observations Regarding the Peace Process, Atlanta, GA, 22 April 2008 (excerpts).

Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the first years in power

When Basher al-Asad became President of Syria in June 2000, he had a tough act to follow. A quiet, unassuming opthalmologist, trained in Britain, young Asad was successor to his dynamic, wily father Hafiz, who had consolidated power in his ethnically diverse and politically restive state through personal charisma, brute force and political balancing acts. Now, some years after Basher's succession and with mounting international pressure for political and economical reform, his handling of the issues facing Syria raises serious questions for the future stability of the Middle East. This is the first major work on Basher al-Asad. It assesses the durability of Hafiz's legacy, including the influence of the old power-brokers, the effectiveness of Basher's attempts to move away from his father's shadow, and prospects for reform. Above all, it evaluates Basher's continuing hold on power following Syria's humiliating retreat from Lebanon in Spring 2005.

The new lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and modern Syria

Is Syria a rogue state? How important is it to the fates of Iraq, Iran, Israel and Lebanon? This is the inside story. David Lesch has had unique and extraordinary access to Syria's President, his circle and his family. At a critical juncture in the history of the Middle East this is the essential account of contemporary Syria and its enigmatic leader. Bashar al Asad succeeded his father, Hafiz al Asad, as Syrian president in 2000. Inheriting a worn-down dictatorship, he soon encountered momentous regional and international issues involving the global war on terror and the growth of democracy in the Middle East. While Bashar seeks a seamless integration into a changing political environment, many in Syria fear the loss of the political and economic power they enjoyed during the reign of Hafiz al Asad. David Lesch's account of contemporary Syria and its leader is vital to an understanding of Syria's current place in the world, its past, present and future. The fate of Syria says much about what type of Middle East will emerge in the near future, and that fate is very much tied to Syria's young ophthalmologist-turned-president, Bashar al Asad.

The Lion in Spring? Three Takes on Syria through the Presidential Lens

Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread Nor Freedom. London and New York:Zed Books, 2003; Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire.Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005; David Lesch, The NewLion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2005.Since Hafez al-Asad’s death in June 2000, Syria has spent more time in theinternational spotlight than perhaps ever before, due primarily to the Bushadministration’s interest in the country’s relations with four of its neighbors:Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon. This interest has spurred the publication ofseveral “contemporary issues” books analyzing the country’s political situationand aimed at English-speaking policymaking, analyst, diplomatic, andjournalistic communities in the United States and elsewhere. Three of themost talked-about analyses are Alan George’s Syria: Neither Bread NorFreedom, Flynt Leverett’s Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire, andDavid Lesch’s The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and ModernSyria. These three books have become well-known “recommended reads”for policymakers working on Syria and have circulated around the Europeanand American diplomatic, non-governmental organization (NGO), and businesscircles in Damascus.Like most of the books published on Syria since the 1970s, these threefocus on the president, and for good reason: the intense presidential personalitycult that characterized Syria under Hafez al-Asad (reigned 1971-2000) has continued into his son Bashar’s presidency, albeit in a softened form(fewer photos in public places and less frenzied “great leader” rhetoric).Those looking to explain current Syrian policies and to forecast future developmentsdo so by concentrating their analyses on the president – in this case,the son of the legendary and much-scrutinized Hafez. The transition from aregime led by a man about whom decades of information and analysis hadbeen collected to one led by his relatively unknown son has produced asense of uncertainty and lack of knowledge among American policymakers,foreign service officials, and journalists. For many seeking to understandSyria’s present and likely future, the primary questions to answer are: Whois Bashar and what has influenced his development as a political leader?What are his objectives as regards ideological, domestic, and foreign relationsconcerns? How strong is he vis-à-vis other regime officials, and whatcapacity does he have to make his objectives prevail? ...

The Missed Opportunity for Economic Reform in Syria

Bashar al-Asad, the incumbent President of Syria, declared in his inauguration speech in 2000 that economic development was his absolute priority. In February 2001 he reiterated in an interview wit...

The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria

The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria

Domestic demands and regional risks

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Economic challenges and policy responses

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Economic challenges and policy responses

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Domestic demands and regional risks

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Coping with external challenges

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Coping with external challenges

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.

Managing modernisation: Domestic politics and the limits of change

In the summer of 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited the presidency of Syria from his father, the long-ruling Hafiz al-Asad. This Paper evaluates the capacity of the new leadership to meet growing societal, economic, political and foreign policy demands. Halfway through Bashar al-Asad's first term, Syria finds itself in a rapidly changing regional environment. The country is undergoing a process of economic change which, in the long run, may add up to a full transformation from étatism to a market economy. Political factors, however, limit the reach and impact of economic reform. The new generation of leaders has a much deeper understanding of the country's reform needs, but they are not willing to risk their own hold on power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Syria's authoritarian structures will be dismantled in the near future. On the foreign-policy front, the first years of Bashar al-Asad's tenure coincided with the breakdown of the Middle East peace process, the Iraq war and that conflict's regional repercussions. The regional geopolitical situation has not made the task of reformers easier - rather, renewed tension in the Middle East has strengthened the hand of conservative elements in the regime.