In law a constant stream of actual cases, more novel and more tortuous than mere imagination could contrive, are brought up for decision-that is, formulae for docketing them must somehow be found. Hence it is necessary first to be careful with, but also to be brutal with, to torture, to fake and to override ordinary language ....(1) Introduction This essay is about grammatical(2) and, to a lesser extent, moral aspects of law of complicity, which treats someone who helps someone else commit a crime as though helper himself committed crime. The point I hope to make here is similar to one Professor Phillip Johnson made about what he called the unnecessary crime of conspiracy.(3) In its current mode, complicity too is unnecessary, but for better reasons, I think, than Professor Johnson came up with for saying same about conspiracy. Johnson suggested eliminating crime of conspiracy by calling conspiracies attempts,(4) a change of description that is more than semantic. Attempting entails trying. Conspiracies may demonstrate their members' antisocial character, but by agreeing to kill someone tomorrow or next month parties have no more attempted or tried to commit murder than those who engage to marry attempt to marry, or those who register for a Bar Exam prep-course attempt to take Bar Exam. Professor Johnson forces his redescription of conspiracy into Model Penal Code's definition of attempt which, even without his help, already makes a paranoid fantasy out of what it means to attempt a crime. Despite what Code says, searching for a victim,(5) reconnoitering,(6) or possessing materials to be used in crime(7) are not part of grammar of trying to commit a crime; equally ungrammatical is Professor Johnson's claim that agreeing to commit a crime is trying to commit a crime. I am not concerned here with conspiracy, but with complicity. My thesis is that in its current mode, where someone encourages someone else to commit a crime, complicity is unnecessary because it is redundant of laws that criminalize solicitation (a request that someone else commit a crime)(8) or conspiracy (where requested party agrees).(9) Where complicity is not redundant, that is, where criminal idea does not originate with helper, or where there is no agreement to commit a crime, I would redescribe complicity as an inchoate or risk-based, as opposed to consequence- or harm-based, mode of criminality. This is because essence of complicity is not causal as to principal or perpetrator's offense, but relational as to principal offender, or simply expressive of helper's antisocial or dangerous character.(10) A decade ago, Paul Robinson,(11) Sanford Kadish,(12) and Joshua Dressler(13) each wrote excellent pieces on complicity, which before then had received little scholarly attention in America. In 1991, Oxford University Press published Keith Smith's impressive one-volume treatise, which presents Smith's views alongside centuries of English thought on topic.(14) None of these four principal works or work examined therein, including that of criminal-law gurus George Fletcher and Glanville Williams, sees complicity as a form of inchoate liability. In last quarter-century, three short articles recommending such an approach have appeared in English law journals: two by Richard Buxton and one by J.R. Spencer, both of whom focus more on operation than on meaning of complicity.(15) The same can be said of English Law Commission, whose 150-page consultation paper compresses into a few short paragraphs essence and logic of complicity.(16) The Model Penal Code, too, hints at inchoate nature of complicity, but Code's approach fails both grammatically (someone who tries but fails to help robbery has perpetrated robbery),(17) and thematically. By placing complicity provisions remote from inchoate provisions, and by sentencing complicit actors like perpetrators, not like inchoate offenders, Code's drafters demonstrate that they saw complicity as only nominally inchoate or risk-based. …
Read full abstract