Bank Capital Requirements Research Articles

Do Bank Capital Requirements Make Resource Allocation Suboptimal?

<p><big>Bank capital requirements would entail large social costs if they made resource allocation suboptimal and banking services costly by unduly limiting the banks’ ability to lend. This paper considers three main factors that may make capital requirements relevant, namely, deposit insurance subsidies, stock valuation errors, and tax shields derived from debt financing. The theoretical model analyzes the combined effects of the three factors on the banks’ incentives to make fairly priced loans, which should also be socially optimal loans. A key finding is that the long-term cost of capital requirements is likely to be very small when deposit insurance is underpriced. Increased funding costs resulting from higher capital requirements are absorbed by shareholders of banks, rather than passed on to borrowers. Under some reasonable assumptions, higher capital requirements improve resource allocation by countervailing distortionary effects of deposit insurance subsidies. Short-term adjustment costs can still be large, but it should be relatively easy to mitigate the short-term effects.</big></p>

Banking's Climate Conundrum

Over the past decade, a consensus has emerged among academics and policy makers that climate change could threaten the stability of banks, insurers, and the broader financial system. In response, regulators from around the world have begun implementing policies to mitigate emerging climate risks in the financial sector. The United States, however, lags significantly behind other countries in addressing such risks. This article argues that the United States' sluggishness in responding to climate‐related financial risk is problematic because the U.S. banking system is uniquely susceptible to climate change. The United States' vulnerability stems, in part, from a little‐known statutory provision that prohibits U.S. regulators from relying on external credit ratings in bank capital requirements. Because of this deviation from internationally accepted capital standards, when a credit rating agency downgrades a “dirty” company, U.S. banks that lend to that company need not compensate by maintaining a bigger capital cushion. Over time, this dynamic will likely incentivize “dirty” companies to borrow more from U.S. banks, intensifying the U.S. banking system's exposure to climate risks. This article contends that the United States must overcome this unusual weakness by taking bold steps to safeguard the domestic financial system from the climate crisis.

Max headroom: Discretionary capital buffers and bank risk

This paper examines the association between discretionary capital buffers, capital requirements, and risk for the 99 largest European banks from 2013 to 2020. Discretionary buffers are banks’ own buffers, or headroom: the difference between reported and required capital. Against the backdrop of steadily increasing capital requirements over the sample period, I exploit unique and detailed Pillar 2 data that banks disclose since the release of a 2015 European Banking Authority opinion. I show that less headroom is associated with increased bank risk, even for well-capitalized banks. An additional examination of banks’ responses to the 2016 and 2018 EBA stress tests reveals that banks supervised by the ECB struggled to improve headroom. Overall, I document limitations of the effectiveness of bank capital requirements.

Bank capital requirement shocks: A narrative perspective

We provide new estimates of the impact of shocks to bank capital requirements on lending supply and macroeconomic activity based on a Bayesian VAR estimated on Italian data and identified combining sign and narrative restrictions. Narrative restrictions are based on the EBA 2011 Stress Test (ST) and the ECB 2014 Comprehensive Assessment (CA) and are corroborated by evidence from the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey. IRFs show that shocks to required capital persistently reduce R.W.A. and loan supply and lead to a temporary decline in GDP. Based on historical decomposition, the ST and the CA increased banks’ Tier 1 ratio by 40 bps and determined a contraction in loan supply and GDP after two years of up to 1.5% and 0.5%, respectively. Results are robust to using alternative narrative restrictions and hold also when controlling for market pressure during the sovereign debt crisis and for global shocks to bank capitalization.

Liquidity and bank capital structure

Bank capital requirements reduce the probability of bank failure and help mitigate taxpayers’ sharing in the losses that result from bank failures. Under Basel III, direct capital requirements are supplemented with liquidity requirements. Our results suggest that liquidity provisions of banks are connected to bank capital and that changes in liquidity indirectly affect the capital structure of financial institutions. Liquidity appears to be another instrument for adjusting bank capital structure beyond just capital requirements. Consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2005), we find that liquidity and capital should be considered jointly for promoting financial stability.

Capital requirements and banks’ behavior: Evidence from bank stress tests

This paper examines the impact of higher regulatory capital on banks’ behavior using stress tests as a quasi-natural experiment. I employ an exogenous source of variation in bank capital requirements based on the U.S. Federal Reserve’s selection rule. I find that banks meet higher capital ratios through issuing equity that expands their assets and reduces debts. The capital requirements transmit to the real economy through the bank lending channel. Stress-tested banks increase lending while reducing credit supply to small and riskier borrowers. Dependent firms on borrowing from stress-tested banks reduce assets and investments extensively in response to the credit loss.

House price, credit supply, and government policy in China

Abstract. House prices in China have risen rapidly since 2000, accompanied by rapid credit expansion and falling interest rates on loans. This paper compares the stabilization effects and welfare implications of five policies on China's housing and credit markets. Three policies directly target the housing and credit markets: bank capital requirements, loan‐to‐value regulation and a property tax rule. Two broader policies are also considered: the reduction of capital controls and of the nominal exchange rate peg. To quantify the analysis, three prominent features of the Chinese economy—a monopolistically competitive banking sector that is subject to direct government control, a nominal exchange rate peg and capital controls—are built into a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. Results show that relaxing capital controls is the most effective policy for stabilizing the credit market and the overall economy, while improving welfare. The second most effective approach is bank capital requirements, followed by a property tax rule. In contrast, loan‐to‐value regulation and a relaxation of the nominal exchange rate peg result in welfare losses to the economy.

UK Government controls and loan-to-deposit ratio

PurposeThis paper aims to present an analysis of the UK bank loans and deposits in tandem, linking the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio to macroprudential policy and funding restrictions. LTD ratio is used by micro and macroprudential authorities to address both structural (long-term) and cyclical (short-term) liquidity risks. It is an outcome of several political and economic factors and should be evaluated against this background.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use trend analysis and panel regression to investigate LTD ratio of Major British Banking Groups from 1945 to 2012 in the midst of changing the UK Government policies.FindingsThe results show that wholesale funding, government intervention and repression were the major forces behind LTD trends.Originality/valueThe authors recommend the use of LTD as a complement to other liquidity ratios in micro and macro-prudential regulation, particularly in the context of current reforms to banking capital requirements.

Welfare implications of bank capital requirements under dynamic default decisions

I study capital requirements and their welfare implications in a dynamic general equilibrium model of banking. The model is characterized by two features. First, banks choose entry and exit, which allows the number of banks change endogenously. Second, since equity issuance is costly, banks precautionarily hold capital buffers against future liquidity shocks. I find that the optimal capital requirement that maximizes social welfare is larger than 3.5%, and the value sensitively depends on the size of utility households derive from deposit holdings. In a special case without any utility from deposit holdings, I obtain welfare implications that are consistent with Corbae and D’Erasmo (2021a).

International bank credit, nonbank lenders, and access to external financing

AbstractUsing a cross‐country firm‐bank dataset, we examine how an unexpected increase in bank capital requirements by the European Banking Authority affects firms' financial choices. We find that the regulatory shock implies a reduction in the supply of bank credit, with US firms affected the most. Yet, US firms can tap into the public bond markets and secure credit lines from nonbank financial institutions. This has implications for their capital structure and their real outcomes. These results suggest that diversified domestic loan markets, in which banks and nonbank financial institutions lend to corporations, can help overcome reductions in cross‐border bank funding.

Assessing the economy-wide impacts of strengthened bank capital requirements in Indonesia using a financial computable general equilibrium model

ABSTRACT After the 2008 global financial crisis, authorities across the globe stressed the importance of equity capital to absorb losses. While many countries have raised bank capital adequacy requirements (CARs), the comprehensive impact assessment of this policy for emerging economies remains largely unexplored. We use a financial computable general equilibrium (FCGE) model of Indonesia called AMELIA-F to investigate the economy-wide impact of a 100 basis points increase in the CAR of Indonesian banks. Bank balance sheets contract as they move away from holding riskier assets, aiding macroeconomic stability. However, both non-housing and housing investment contract as banks pass on higher funding costs, driving long-run real GDP below baseline. As we discuss, debt-to-equity ratios for these sectors, and the economy-wide private debt to income ratio all fall, thus aiding long-run macroeconomic stability.

Private Equity and Bank Capital Requirements: Evidence from European Firms

AbstractUsing firm‐level data from 16 euro‐area countries over 2008–2014, we investigate how the performance of bank‐affiliated private equity‐backed companies evolves after the European Banking Authority increased capital requirements for their parent banks. We find that portfolio companies connected to exposed banks reduce their level of investment and experience weaker asset growth, employment growth and profitability following the capital exercise. We further show that the effect is stronger for companies likely to face financial constraints. Finally, the findings indicate that the negative effect of the capital exercise is muted when the private equity sponsor is more experienced.

Return on investment on artificial intelligence: The case of bank capital requirement

Taking advantage of granular data we measure the change in bank capital requirement resulting from the implementation of AI techniques to predict corporate defaults. For each of the largest banks operating in France we build by an algorithm pseudo-internal models of credit risk management for a range of methodologies extensively used in AI (random forest, gradient boosting, ridge regression, neural network). We compare these models to the traditional model usually in place that basically relies on a combination of logistic regression and expert judgement. The comparison is made along two sets of criterias capturing: the ability to pass compliance tests used by the regulators during on-site missions of model validation (i), and the induced changes in capital requirement (ii). The different models show noticeable differences in their ability to pass the regulatory tests and to lead to a reduction in capital requirement. While displaying a similar ability than the traditional model to pass compliance tests, neural networks provide the strongest incentive for banks to apply AI models for their internal model of credit risk of corporate businesses as they lead in some cases to sizeable reduction in capital requirement.

When Basel-inspired capital regulations are insufficient: Evidence from Zambia’s use of absolute minimum bank capital requirements

When Basel-inspired capital regulations are insufficient: Evidence from Zambia’s use of absolute minimum bank capital requirements

Agent-based modeling for benchmarking banking regulation regimes: Application for the CBDC

COVID-19 pandemic challenges the sustainability of the modern financial system. International central bankers claim that banks are solid. They have accumulated significant capital buffers. Those buffers should be further more augmented by 2027 in line with Basel III reforms. However, disregarding such a consecutive rise in the banking capital adequacy requirements, the US financial authorities undertook an unprecedented step. First time in the country history they lowered the reserve requirement to zero at the end of March 2020. Friedrich von Hayek demonstrated the fragility of the modern fractional reserve banking systems. Together with Ludwig von Mises (von Mises, 1978) he was thus able to predict the Great Depression of 1929 and explain its mechanics much in advance. Thus, we wish to utilize the agent-based modeling technique to extend von Hayek’s rationale to the previously unstudied interaction of capital adequacy and reserve requirement regulation. We find that the full reserve requirement regime even without capital adequacy regulation provides more stable financial environment than the existing one. Rise in capital adequacy adds to modern banking sustainability, but it still preserves the system remarkably fragile compared to the full reserve requirement. We also prove that capital adequacy regulation is redundant when the latter environment is in place. We discuss our findings application to the potential Central Bank Digital Currencies regulation.

The Effects of Banking Competition on Growth and Financial Stability: Evidence from the National Banking Era

How does banking competition affect credit provision and growth? How does it affect financial stability? In order to identify the causal effects of banking competition, we exploit a discontinuity in bank capital requirements during the 19th century National Banking Era. We show that banks operating in markets with lower entry barriers extend more credit. The resulting local credit boom, in turn, is associated with an expansion in real economic activity. However, banks in markets with lower entry barriers also take more risk and are also more likely to default. Thus, we provide causal evidence that banking competition can cause both growth and financial instability.

Climate Risk with Particular Emphasis on the Relationship with Credit-Risk Assessment: What We Learn from Poland

This research seeks to identify non-financial enterprises exposed to the climate risk relating to transition risks and at the same time use of bank loans, as well as to conduct stress tests to take account of the financial risk related to climate change. The workflow through which to determine the ability of the banking sector to assess the potential impact of climate risk entails parts based around economic sector and company level. The procedure based on the sectoral level identifies vulnerable economic sectors (in the Sectoral Module), while the procedure based on company level (the Company Module) refers to scenarios presented in stress tests to estimate the probability of default under stressful conditions related to the introduction of a direct carbon tax. The introduction of the average direct carbon tax (EUR 75/tCO2) in fact results in increased expenditure and reduced sales revenues among enterprises from sectors with a high CO2 impact, with the result being a decrease in the profitability of enterprises, along with a simultaneously higher level of debt; an increase in the probability of default (PD) from 3.6%, at the end of 2020 in the baseline macroeconomic scenario, to between 6.31% and 10.12%; and increased commercial bank capital requirements. Financial institutions should thus use PD under stressful conditions relating to climate risk as suggestions to downgrade under the expert module.

Bank solvency: The role of credit and liquidity risks, regulatory capital and economic stability

Banking stability is essential to any economy due to its many functions, including intermediation, payment facilitation, and credit creation. Thus, the stability of the banking industry is one of the critical ingredients in economic growth. This paper analyzes how bank capital requirements, credit, and liquidity impact bank solvency using ten major banks that control 90% of the market share in the UK in 2009–2018. The GMM model indicates a strong association between credit and liquidity risks. That is, when banks finance a risky or distressed project, this will lead to an increase in non-performing loans (NPL), which reduces bank liquidity. Poor liquidity profile of the bank may restrict it from providing financial intermediation role. In addition, the findings indicate that efficiency, asset quality, and economic growth have a significant positive effect on the solvency of banks. The results also show that the regulatory capital (tier1) has a positive significant influence on solvency of the banks. Further, the results indicate that during the economic boom, banks tend to increase their regulatory capital. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that during the “good time”, banks can accumulate enough capital that is genuinely capable of absorbing negative shock. Also, it is important for banks to ensure that they are efficient but also have robust credit appraisal system to reduce NPL. This paper also demonstrates the implication of increased capital requirements. That is, increased capital requirements ensure not only banks are liquid but also solvent which enables them to provide financial intermediation.

Risky Mortgages and Macroprudential Policy: A Calibrated DSGE Model for Lithuania

Following the financial crisis of 2009 there was an emergence of macroprudential policy tools, as well as a need to model the macroeconomy and the financial sector in a coherent framework. This paper develops and calibrates a small open economy DSGE model for Lithuania to shed some light on the interactions between the macroeconomy and the banking sector, regulated by macroprudential policy. The model features housing market, and endogenous credit risk a la de Walque et al. (2010), whereby the household can default on mortgage repayments, what leads to housing collateral seizure. Foreign-owned banks, that are subject to risk-sensitive macroprudential capital requirements, take into account not only the mortgage default rate but also the cap on loan to value (LTV) ratio when making lending decisions. Using this mechanism, we show that while a more stringent LTV constraint reduced credit demand, it can also lead to an expansion in credit supply via lower credit risk. Therefore, a tightening of LTV requirement should result in only a slight reduction in mortgage lending, coupled with lower interest rate margins. The article compares the impact of the tightening of three macroprudential tools, namely, bank capital requirements, mortgage risk weights and LTV limit. We find that broad-based capital requirements, such as the counter-cyclical capital buffer, are less efficient in leaning against the housing credit cycle, because of a relatively large cost incurred on the firm sector.

The Effect of Earnings Management and Signaling on Loss Loan Provision: The Role of Bank Capitalization

Objective - Loan loss provision is an accrual for the banking industry, and therefore has a significant effect on bank accounting earnings and capital requirements. Previous studies showed inconsistent results for the relationship between earnings management, signaling, and loan loss provision. The difference in the results is thought to be caused by bank capitalization. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the role of bank capitalization on the effect of earnings management and signaling on loan loss provision. Methodology – The sample consists of 86 conventional banks in Indonesia for the period of 2015-2019. Furthermore, this study used panel data analysis of multiple regression. Findings – The results showed earnings management has no effect on loan loss provision. In contrast, signaling has a positive and significant effect. Although bank capitalization is not proven to weaken the effect of earnings management on loan loss provision, it strengthens the positive effect of signaling on loan loss provision. Novelty – This study proves that bank capitalization has an important role in moderating signaling impact on loan loss provision but not for the effect of earnings management. This is due to the potential for earnings management in banks is relatively low because banks are highly regulated entities and with regulated governance mechanisms limit the managers' discretionary accounting decisions. Type of Paper - Empirical Keywords: Bank Capitalization, Earnings Management, Signaling JEL Classification: G23, G32. URI: http://gatrenterprise.com/GATRJournals/JFBR/vol6.1_1.html DOI: https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2021.6.1(1) Pages 43 – 50