Baldwin Hills Reservoir Research Articles

886332 Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir, 1963 — interpretation of step-by-step failure sequence : Leps, T M Engng GeolV24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P83–88. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures,Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

886332 Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir, 1963 — interpretation of step-by-step failure sequence : Leps, T M Engng GeolV24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P83–88. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures,Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

886279 Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in review : Scott, R F Engng Geol V24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P103–125. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures, Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

886279 Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in review : Scott, R F Engng Geol V24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P103–125. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures, Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

886331 Review of Baldwin Hills reservoir failure : Jansen, R B Engng GeolV24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P7–81. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures, Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

886331 Review of Baldwin Hills reservoir failure : Jansen, R B Engng GeolV24, N1–4, Dec 1987, P7–81. (Proc International Workshop on Dam Failures, Purdue University, Indiana, 6–8 August 1985)

Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in review

A very large amount of information on the Baldwin Hills Reservoir failure of December 1963, is available in the reports and papers which have been published. Except for survey data obtained in recent years, which might shed further light on the problem of ground deformation, little more is likely to turn up on the condition of the reservoir and dam. Here it will be assumed that the facts are known and available; the discussion will concentrate on their interpretation. This discussion is divided into two parts: (a) a review of some of the events prior to construction and statements made by various engineers regarding the design of the system; and (b) an evaluation of the interpretations offered. Although some of the background is given in the State of California report of 1964, it is believed that a more detailed description of some of the material is of interest in its reflection of the views of the site and design by the people most concerned. With the publication over the years of a number of papers with different explanations of the mechanics of ground deformation leading to the failure, it is an appropriate time to review the opinions offered.

Ground subsidence analysis prior to the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

Ground subsidence analysis prior to the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir, 1963—Interpretation of step-by-step failure sequence

Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir, 1963—Interpretation of step-by-step failure sequence

Comments on paper entitled: Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

Comments on paper entitled: Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

Lacustrine beach-bar reservoirs have become important exploration targets in the Bohai Bay Basin in China, especially in the Banqiao Sag within the Huanghua Depression, where some typical thick layer beach-bar reservoirs have been discovered recently. The average single-layer thickness of the beach-bar sand bodies in the second member of the Paleogene Shahejie Formation within the sag is greater than 10 m and the cumulative thickness of these sands reach up to 100 m. The second member of the Shahejie Formation in the Banqiao Sag consists of a third-order sequence of three systems tracts—a lowstand systems tract, a transgressive systems tract, and a highstand systems tract. Beach-bar sand bodies were deposited widely in the sag in the lowstand systems tract, but were less deposited in the other systems tracts. The sedimentary characteristics, distribution patterns, and formation mechanisms of the beach-bar sand bodies in the lowstand systems tract of the second member of the Shahejie Formation were systemically studied using cores, wireline logs and 3D seismic data. The beach-bar was divided into five sedimentary microfacies, namely, sandy bar centre, sandy bar flank, interbar deposit, coastal beach, and infralittoral beach. Based on the integrated analysis of the paleostructure and sedimentary environment, it was inferred that the thick layer beach-bars in this area resulted from the combination and joint control of the sediment source system, hydrodynamic environment, lake level variations, and contemporaneous fault activity. Firstly, the sands in the braided river delta of the Beidagang buried hill structural belt served as the provenance that provided the material basis for the beach-bars in the Banqiao Sag. Secondly, the wave effects in the gentle-slope belt controlled the scale and distribution of the beach bars. Under the control of waves, various sedimentary microfacies were regularly distributed. In particular, the continuous activity of the contemporaneous Dazhangtuo Fault contributed to the formation of the thick layer beach-bars in the Banqiao Sag. The contemporaneous fault controlled the allocation of the sediments, providing abundant sands in the downthrown side of the fault. In addition, there was a constant high-energy hydrodynamic environment near the fault plane, where the sand bodies experienced long-term reworking by waves and gradually formed beach-bars with large thickness. The activity of the contemporaneous fault increased the accommodation space in the lowstand systems tract of the second member of the Shahejie Formation, which resulted in continuous sand deposition and provided the necessary conditions for forming the thick layer beach-bars.

Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir—Invited discusser's responses to prepared questions

Failure of Baldwin Hills reservoir—Invited discusser's responses to prepared questions

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

I think it would be a good idea if I start by describing what my affiliation with Baldwin Hills was. The failure happened, as we know, in December 1963. Within a day or so after the failure the mayor of Los Angeles under (as you might understand) certain pressures formed what was called locally, a blue-ribbon committee. It consisted of several professors from different universities around the Los Angeles area and was chaired by a retired judge. It had a lawyer in the group, and representatives of different areas among the professors: the seismic, soil mechanics (me), and geology areas, and a professor who was in the petroleum area. We did a very cursory study of the failure, in a few weeks, because we had a deadline. The mayor had angry citizens' groups to address and had to ameliorate things by showing that he was doing something, so we had to prepare a report by something like February. This meant a rather brief study of everything. The report was fairly inclusive; I will refer to one or two things in it here that Mr. Jansen did not treat, but it had to be done under a deadline. That was the end of my immediate involvement except for getting the State Board of Inquiry report a few months later with the immensely thorough job that they did in digging trenches, and generally doing things to the reservoir that it had not experienced during the failure. There followed a long gap in which Don Hudson, a seismological person, and I at Cal Tech prepared a little paper pointing out what our view was at that time on the role of fault movements in the failure of the reservoir; it appeared a couple of years later. Nothing else happened for quite some time, until in 1969 I was approached by Stan Wilson who was working at that time with Professor Casagrande for Standard Oil Company as a result of the suit which had been brought against the combined oil companies by, I think, the insurance companies and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP). Immediately after the reservoir failed, of course, there were a great many claims for damages, and after a certain amount of nudging, the insurance companies paid off on these claims to the tune of something like $15,000,000. I was then employed by Mr. Wilson on behalf of that oil company group; my checks came from Standard Oil. So I want to make quite clear what my involvement was at that time. I was paid by Standard Oil. For the mayor's Board of Inquiry I was (somewhat resentfully) not paid by anybody, of course. That is part of being a good citizen.

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in retrospect—Prepared discussion

The Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in retrospect—Prepared discussion

A discussion of the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

A discussion of the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

A review of the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

A review of the Baldwin Hills reservoir failure

Geological causes of dam incidents

This General Report presents synoptic case histories of several dam failures or accidents where the mechanism for the incident was related to the geology. The failures of Teton Dam, Baldwin Hills Reservoir, and Malpasset Dam are attributed, respectively, to pervious rock, subsidence or pressurization of a fault, and reservoir induced pressure of abutment rock. The near catastrophe of San Fernando project was brought about by a seismic event. Vaiont Dam did not fail, but the structure lost the function of its reservoir when an enormous rock mass slid into the reservoir. Soluble rock in the foundation was the mechanism which caused a seepage problem at Wolf Creek Dam.

Closure to “Earth Movement at Baldwin Hills Reservoir”

Closure to “Earth Movement at Baldwin Hills Reservoir”

Earth Movement at Baldwin Hills Reservoir

THE FAILURE OF THE BALDWIN HILLS RESERVOIR IN LOS ANGELES IN DECEMBER, 1963, WAS CAUSED BY EARTH MOVEMENT MANIFESTED BY OFFSET AT A FAULT, PERMITTING RELEASE OF WATER INTO A HIGHLY ERODIBLE FOUNDATION. DISPLACEMENT AT THE RESERVOIR IS ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL LAND SUBSIDENCE IN THE VICINITY. THE FINDINGS OF AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PHENOMENA WHICH PRECIPITATED THE DISASTER ARE PRESENTED. SEVERAL POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE MOVEMENT ARE ANALYZED. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THIS FAILURE ARE OUTLINED. /ASCE/

Supervision of Safety of California Dams

This article describes several dam failures including the 1928 St. Francis Dam failure and the 1963 Baldwin Hills Reservoir failure in California and the 1963 Vaiont dam failure in Longarone, Italy, and discusses state supervision/jurisdiction of all nonfederal dams in California for safety.

Fault motions at the Baldwin Hills Reservoir site

Abstract A distinction is made between the damaging potential of rapid fault motions associated with earthquakes and those having a relatively slow creep type motion. Information is given on nonseismic movements that have been occurring on faults passing through the Baldwin Hills Reservoir during the past 10 years. The relationship between those faults and the Inglewood fault system is described, and correlations are presented with local elevation changes, horizontal ground movements, and seismic activity. Comparisons are made with similar slow fault motions occurring at other places in California, and attention is drawn to the potential damaging effects of such movements.