Bail-in Debt Research Articles

Determinants of bail-in debt yields in the EU banking sector: a multi-country approach with idiosyncratic factors

Determinants of bail-in debt yields in the EU banking sector: a multi-country approach with idiosyncratic factors

Who Should Hold Bail-Inable Debt and How can Regulators Police Holding Restrictions Effectively?

Who Should Hold Bail-Inable Debt and How can Regulators Police Holding Restrictions Effectively?

Incentive Effects from Write-down CoCo Bonds: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract Departing from the principle of absolute priority, contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds are particularly exposed to bank losses despite not having ownership rights. In this article we show the link between adverse CoCo bond design and their yields, confirming the existence of market discipline in designated bail-in debt. Specifically, focusing on the write-down feature as a loss-absorption mechanism in CoCo debt, we find a yield premium on this feature relative to equity-conversion CoCo bonds as predicted by theoretical models. Moreover, and consistent with theories on moral hazard, we find this premium to be largest when existing incentives for opportunistic behaviour are largest, while the premium is non-existent if moral hazard is perceived to be small. Overall, our findings support the notion of market discipline through monitoring debt investors and have important implications for the optimal design of CoCos from a regulatory perspective.

COVID-19, Macroeconomic and Sustainability Shocks, Moral Hazard and Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises: Designing Appropriate Systems of Public Support

Banks have so far weathered well the financial turbulence caused by COVID-19 while at the same time being central in the economic and financial response. As the crisis moves from its initial phase as a short-term liquidity shock, the financial sector is facing increasing volumes of non-performing loans, raising the spectre of a banking solvency crisis. In economies already burdened with low-quality assets, the COVID-19 fallout is intensifying existing problems with legacy loans heightening the risk of a banking crisis. These issues are now being worsened by the impact of inflation and the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, addressing increasing volumes of bad loans, while supporting the proper functioning of the financial system, is a major challenge with systemic repercussions for a range of economies. This paper identifies a great paradox: since the bank rescues of the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis there has been a disproportionate focus on the liability side of bank balance sheets through resolution measures such as bail-in and the accumulation of bail-inable debt. Post-crisis bank resolution regimes have overlooked solutions lying within the asset side of bank balance sheets. This paper analyses historical evidence to argue that concentrating on a liability-focused approach to the exclusion of asset-side solutions is ill-conceived. An excessive accumulation of non-performing loans on the asset side of bank balance sheets inevitably renders resolution interventions on the liability/equity side ineffective or at the very least insufficient to maintain banking system viability and financial stability. Bank asset restructuring involving the use of asset management companies, asset protection schemes and even capital injections can play a critical role in achieving an expeditious restoration of banking systems’ health following a major macroeconomic, sustainability or financial crisis.

No-fault default, chapter 11 bankruptcy, and financial institutions

This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of a no-fault-default debt structure as an alternative to the typical bankruptcy process. We show that the deadweight costs of bankruptcy can be avoided or substantially reduced through no-fault-default debt, which permits a relatively seamless transfer of ownership from shareholders to bondholders in certain states of the world. We show that potential costs introduced by this scheme due to risk shifting can be attenuated via convertible debt, and we discuss the relationship of this to bail-in debt and contingent convertible (CoCo) debt for financial institutions. We then explore how, despite the advantages of no-fault-default debt, there may still be a functional role for the bankruptcy process to efficiently allow the renegotiation of labor contracts in certain cases. In sharp contrast to the human-capital-based theories of optimal capital structure in which the renegotiation of labor contract in bankruptcy is a cost associated with leverage, we show that it is a benefit. The normative implication of our analysis is that no-fault-default debt, when combined with specific features of the bankruptcy process, may reduce the deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy. We discuss how an orderly process for transfer of control and a predetermined admissibility of renegotiation of labor contracts can be a useful tool for resolving financial institution failure without harming financial stability.

No-fault Default, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, and Financial Institutions

This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of a no-fault-default debt structure as an alternative to the typical bankruptcy process. We show that the deadweight costs of bankruptcy can be avoided or substantially reduced through no-fault-default debt, which permits a relatively seamless transfer of ownership from shareholders to bondholders in certain states of the world. We show that potential costs introduced by this scheme due to risk shifting can be attenuated via convertible debt, and we discuss the relationship of this to bail-in debt and contingent convertible (CoCo) debt for financial institutions. We then explore how, despite the advantages of no-fault-default debt, there may still be a functional role for the bankruptcy process to efficiently allow the renegotiation of labor contracts in certain cases. In sharp contrast to the human-capital-based theories of optimal capital structure in which the renegotiation of labor contract in bankruptcy is a cost associated with leverage, we show that it is a benefit. The normative implication of our analysis is that no-fault-default debt, when combined with specific features of the bankruptcy process, may reduce the deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy. We discuss how an orderly process for transfer of control and a predetermined admissibility of renegotiation of labor contracts can be a useful tool for resolving financial institution failure without harming financial stability. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Fine-tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The Case for Remunerating Bankers through Bail-Inable Debt

This paper proposes a radical change in the current remuneration practices, including bail-inable debt within the variable component of remuneration packages. In supporting such claim, the paper sets the economic rationale for remuneration and explains the quintessential role of debt in banking. Against such theoretical framework, the incumbent EU regulation reveals to be severely flawed. Consequently, the paper shows why including bail-inable debt in remuneration packages provides incentives towards optimal risk-taking and develops a detailed policy proposal that focuses both on the content of the regulation and on the possible implementation strategies. Bank Governance, Remuneration, Capital Requirement Directive, Bank Resolution, Bail-inable debt, Stability, Resolvability, Managerial Incentives; Excessive Risktaking; Material Risk-Takers

Are bank capital requirements optimally set? Evidence from researchers’ views

We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.

Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views

We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.

Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views

We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.

Why MREL won’t help much: minimum requirements for bail-in capital as an insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework

The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remove the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) emanating from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficient minimum of high-quality, easy-to-bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. The main problem, echoing the general concerns scholars voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus fail to fully alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to correctly gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustments of MREL prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions, and the market discipline that follows from them may prove inadequate and the policy objectives of the regulatory intervention may be missed. The pending European legislation aims to implement the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by making very detailed and case-specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. Omitted from this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is barely conceivable that the pricing of MREL instruments reflects an accurate risk assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this paper looks in detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework. It concludes with policy recommendations based on the prior analysis.

Bail-Ins, Optimal Regulation, and Crisis Resolution

We provide a framework to study bail-in regimes for banks. In the presence of a monitoring problem, the optimal bank capital structure combines standard debt, which liquidates the bank and provides strong monitoring incentives, and bail-in debt, which recapitalizes the bank but provides weaker incentives. A bail-in regime, which increases use of bail-in debt, is the optimal regulatory policy when liquidation is socially costly due to fire sales or bailouts. Bail-ins fully replace bailouts. Bail-ins can generate self-fulfilling crises in long-term debt markets, leading to bank runs. Debt guarantees and an expanded notion of lender of last resort prevent these crises, and should complement bail-ins in the crisis resolution toolkit.

Raising bank loss absorption capacity through equity capital or bail-in debt

PurposeBased upon recent statements made by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a group of well-known professors coming from ten European countries, during the period 2012-2017, this paper aims to analyze from a European perspective the adequacy and credibility of the proposed framework.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is a summary and interpretation of statements from the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee.FindingsThe authors argue that the credibility of the bail-in mechanism is likely to be limited. Because of this, unexpected losses may not be absorbed by unsecured debt holders. Therefore, there is still a need for relatively high equity capital buffers.Originality/valueThe issue of how to raise loss absorption capacity for banks is prominent on the international policy agenda. International regulators are aiming for a combination of equity capital, typically raised by issuing shares, retaining profits and issuing contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds and bail-in debt where unsecured creditors such as holders of subordinated and common bonds are supposed to take losses in case of a bankruptcy or restructuring of a bank.

Convertible bonds and bank risk-taking

Abstract We study how contingent capital affects banks’ risk choices. When triggered in highly levered states, going-concern conversion reduces risk-taking incentives, unlike conversion at default by traditional bail-inable debt. Interestingly, contingent capital (CoCo) may be less risky than bail-inable debt as its lower priority is compensated by a lower induced risk. The main beneficial effect on risk incentives comes from reduced leverage upon conversion, while any equity dilution has the opposite effect. This is in contrast to traditional convertible debt, since CoCo bondholders have a short option position. As a result, principal write-down CoCo debt is most desirable for risk preventive purposes, although the effect may be tempered by a higher yield. The risk reduction effect of CoCo debt depends critically on the informativeness of the trigger. As it should ensure deleveraging in all states with high risk incentives, it is always inferior to pure equity.

MREL and TLAC: The Path from Bail-out to Bail-in for Banks' Creditors in the European Union

Abstract In the wake of the financial market crisis new rules on banking recovery and resolution of systemic banks have been enacted in order to facilitate the bail-in of banks' creditors. Banks will be required to maintain sufficient amounts of own funds and bail-inable debt called Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) or Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) respectively. Hence even more competing norms exist in parallel most of which aim to correct the results of banks' internal models which have often times underestimated risks. Because the multitude of new and existing rules overlap, reducing unnecessary complexity is needed and can be accomplished without changing capital and MREL requirements overall. A pro-forma analysis relating to a sample of 23 systemically important banks in the European Union support this view. Durch MREL und TLAC vom Bail-out zum Bail-in der Bankenglaubiger in der Europaischen Union Zusammenfassung Infolge der Finanzmarktkrise wurden Regeln zur San...

Why MREL Won't Help Much

The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remove the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) emanating from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficient minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. The main problem, echoing the general concerns scholars voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus fail to fully alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to correctly gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustments of MREL prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions, and the market discipline that follows from them may prove inadequate and so may. The pending European legislation aims to implement the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by making very detailed and case-specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. Omitted from this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is barely conceivable that the pricing of MREL instruments reflects an accurate risk assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this paper looks in detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework. It concludes with policy recommendations based on the prior analysis.

Equity Versus Bail-In Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective

We examine the optimal size and composition of banks’ total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). Optimal size is driven by the trade-off between providing liquidity services through deposits and minimizing deadweight default costs. Optimal composition (equity vs. bail-in debt) is driven by the relative importance of two incentive problems: risk shifting (mitigated by equity) and private benefit taking (mitigated by debt). Our quantitative results suggest that TLAC size in line with current regulation is appropriate. However, an important fraction of it should consist of bail-in debt because such buffer size makes the costs of risk-shifting relatively less important at the margin.

The Market-Implied Probability of European Government Intervention in Distressed Banks

New contract terms for credit default swaps (CDS) on banks were introduced in 2014 to cover losses from government intervention and related bail-in events. For many large European banks, CDS spreads are available under both the old and new contract terms; the difference (or basis) between the two spreads measures the market price of protection against losses from certain government actions to resolve distressed banks. We investigate cross-sectional and time series properties of this basis, relative to each bank’s CDS spread. We interpret a general decline in the relative basis as a market price-based signal that governments are less likely to bailout banks in distress, but that banks do not yet have sufficient bail-in debt to protect senior bond holders in case of a credit event.

Bail-In Power, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance: The End of Cheap Senior Unsecured Debt? A Structural Pricing Perspective

Regulatory reforms are transforming bank funding and its seniority structures, with hard to gauge impact on funding costs. Basel III requires higher equity, while some bank resolution tools, such as depositor preference and bail-in power, can reduce the seniority ranking of senior unsecured debt. Moreover, tight market funding conditions during a crisis typically force banks to rely more on secured debt and repo from central banks, increasing asset encumbrance, which reduces the recovery rate for other debt. We use extensions of simple option price models for pricing various debts and find that asset encumbrance and the introduction of new bank resolution tools only increases senior unsecured debt yields modestly for existing banks under distressed market conditions in 2013. Moreover, if properly designed, bail-in debt could improve financial stability.

SPOE Plus TLAC = More Bailouts for Wall Street

SPOE Plus TLAC = More Bailouts for Wall Street