Bail-In Power, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance: The End of Cheap Senior Unsecured Debt? A Structural Pricing Perspective

Abstract

Regulatory reforms are transforming bank funding and its seniority structures, with hard to gauge impact on funding costs. Basel III requires higher equity, while some bank resolution tools, such as depositor preference and bail-in power, can reduce the seniority ranking of senior unsecured debt. Moreover, tight market funding conditions during a crisis typically force banks to rely more on secured debt and repo from central banks, increasing asset encumbrance, which reduces the recovery rate for other debt. We use extensions of simple option price models for pricing various debts and find that asset encumbrance and the introduction of new bank resolution tools only increases senior unsecured debt yields modestly for existing banks under distressed market conditions in 2013. Moreover, if properly designed, bail-in debt could improve financial stability.