Baghdad Pact Research Articles

Baghdad Pact

The sixth session of the Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, was held in Karachi January 26–28, 1959. In its communique issued following the meeting the Council reaffirmed the value of the pact for defensive military cooperation as well as economic and technical cooperation in raising living standards. The statement said that the greater part of the meeting had been devoted to a frank exchange of views on the international situation. The Council agreed that more use should be made of regular meetings of the Council of Deputies at the headquarters of the pact for the sake of political solidarity. The offer of the United Kingdom government to equip a new nuclear center for training in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was welcomed by the Council; it was decided that the center should be located in Teheran. As pointed out by one source, no reference was made in the communique either to the situation in Iraq or to Iraq's association with the pact.

Statement of the Baghdad Pact Nations

Essay| October 01 1958 Statement of the Baghdad Pact Nations Current History (1958) 35 (206): 244–245. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1958.35.206.244 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Statement of the Baghdad Pact Nations. Current History 1 October 1958; 35 (206): 244–245. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1958.35.206.244 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1958 by The Regents of the University of California1958 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre

Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre

Baghdad Pact

The fourth session of the Council of the Baghdad Pact was held in Ankara, Turkey, January 27–30, 1958, under the chairmanship of Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, and was attended by delegations from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, as well as by an observer delegation from the United States. It was reported that at the opening meeting the delegates from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan stressed the need for more economic aid to the pact area, while the United Kingdom and United States speakers expressed the belief that member nations should concentrate on completing economic projects already under way. Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, in his opening address pointed out that Congress had authorized the President to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations in the Middle East, including the Baghdad Pact nations, that requested assistance against armed aggression by any communist-controlled country. On the second day of the session the Council approved reports of the military, liaison, and countersubversion committees. The report of the military committee recommended a longterm defense building project, which would include a communications system from west Turkey to Pakistan with trunk and lateral highways, harbor and storage facilities at seaports on the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea, and civil airports that could be readily converted for military use. In the meeting on January 29 Mr. Dulles announced that, subject to funds being made available by Congress, $10 million would be provided by the United States for the improvement of telephone and radiotelephone links between the capitals of Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, in addition to $8 million already provided for surveys being carried out.

Baghdad Pact

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered “just as good” as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.

Current Russian Designs in Europe and the Middle East

Soviet foreign policy since the war has remained true to its objective of world dominance. The means used have progressed from nonaggression pacts, scrapped when they were no longer useful, to offers of "peaceful coexistence," accompanied by offers of economic aid to underdeveloped countries and designed to draw such countries out of the Free World's orbit. The grim events in Hungary and the Middle East are a part of the Kremlin's plan of world domina tion. The threat can only be averted by a firm policy of collective security, il lustrated by NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact.—Ed.

The Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre

The Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre

United States Statement on Baghdad Pact

United States Statement on Baghdad Pact

Baghdad Pact

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its annual meeting in Karachi from June 3 through 6, 1957. Representatives were present from the five member countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom—and the United States was represented by an observer delegation. The Council had been scheduled to meet months earlier, but Iraq originally refused to meet with the United Kingdom. At the opening session, presided over by Mr. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri es Said, was reported to have spoken forcefully about the dangers implicit in the problems of Israel, Algeria, Kashmir and Cyprus. Mr. Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, was reported to have followed Mr. Nuri es Said's remarks with a speech in which he announced his government's offer of a contribution of £500,000 a year in cash and in kind for building up the minimum military infra-structure in member countries. The speeches of other delegates were reported to be noteworthy for their frank recognition of past weaknesses in the Baghdad Pact organization and the need to give it new effectiveness. In the course of the first session the United States formally accepted an invitation to join the Pact's Military Committee; and a United States military delegation headed by General Nathan F. Twining started participating in a separate concurrent meeting of the Military Committee. The United States thus became a member of the Pact's three main committees, but had still not become a formal member of the Pact.

Baghdad Pact

The chiefs of state of members of the Baghdad Pact, except the United Kingdom, met November 5–8, 1956, in Teheran. Their statement issued after the meeting condemned “Israeli aggression”, called for immediate withdrawal of Israel troops from Egypt and release of Egyptian prisoners taken by Israel, and requested the United Kingdom and France to stop hostilities, withdraw their forces from Egypt, and respect Egypt's sovereignty, integrity, and independence. The statement welcomed the General Assembly resolution contemplating the establishment of an international police force. The Suez dispute, it said, should be settled through negotiations with Egypt, under the auspices of the UN, “which should, inter alia, insure free passage through the canal with full respect for Egyptian sovereignty”. It added that those present had emphasized the necessity of solving the Arab-Israel dispute and considered the UN 1947 resolution an appropriate basis for negotiating a settlement.

Baghdad Pact

Council The Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second session in Teheran from April 16 to 19, 1956. The United States observer delegation was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson; the choice of Mr. Henderson, was reported to emphasize the importance attached by the United States to the pact, and to have been a direct response to diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom. During the session, the question of United States participation in the pact through economic aid to the members was reported as a major focus of interest, and on April 18 the United States was reported to have become a full member of the Pact's Economic Committee, having agreed to contribute in technical advice and personnel and possibly in new equipment. Mr. Henderson was reported to have told the Council that the United States was prepared to discuss supplementing its programs of bilateral aid to member countries with a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the pact, thus meeting, according to the press, one of the major requests of the member countries. The delegates were reported to have reached unanimous agreement on a plan for combined efforts to combat subversion in member countries, as put forward by the Liaison Committee and the Counter-Subversion Committee; the crux of the plan was reported to be an agreement to form an international security organization to pool the information and resources of member countries, including combined police resources. The recommendations of the Economic Committee and of the Secretary-General for a permanent secretariat were also reported to have been unanimously approved.

French-Tunisian Agreement

Review| July 01 1956 French-Tunisian Agreement Baghdad Pact Council Baghdad Pact Council Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1956) 31 (179): 52. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1956.31.179.52 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Baghdad Pact Council; French-Tunisian Agreement. Current History 1 July 1956; 31 (179): 52. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1956.31.179.52 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1956 by The Regents of the University of California1956 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Statement of the Baghdad Pact Council

The Statement of the Baghdad Pact Council

Baghdad Pact

On September 23, 1955, Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance formed on February 24 by Iraqand Turkey, and adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5 (Baghdad Pact). On October 11, the government of Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Pact; following parliamentary approval of the decision, Iran formallyadhered on November 3. Both before and after Iran's formal adherence to the Pact, the Soviet Union, according to press reports, protested strongly. In a note of October 12, the Soviet government declared that the accession of Iran was incompatible with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the near and middle east, and contradicted certain treaty obligations of Iran with respect to the Soviet Union. In a subsequent note, the Soviet Union repeated its protest, alleging that Iran's adherence to the Pact “inflicted serious damage” to relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, and that Iran would have to bear the full consequencesof joining. In a reply to the earlier Soviet note, Iran had declared that its object in adhering to the Pactwas the consolidation of peace and security in the middle east; the Pact was for defensive purposes, and Iran'sadherence should not mar Iranian-Soviet friendly relations, nor did it conflict with the terms of existing agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, both the United States and United Kingdom had formally welcomed Iran's decision.