The formulation of the 1955 Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation, which metamorphosed soon afterwards into the short-lived five-power Baghdad Pact, is nowadays usually seen as the direct result of the initiative taken by the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after the latter's historic trip across eleven Middle Eastern capitals in May 1953. This famous tour - the first-ever to the area by an American head of diplomacy - is now generally considered as a watershed in Middle East politics, burying plans for the long-cherished Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), designated to create a regional bulwark against any possible Soviet penetration, and replacing it with plans to set up the so-called 'Northern Tier' collective defence project, based on the voluntary participation of pro-Western Middle Eastern countries lying on the southern borders of the USSR. In light of the documentary evidence now available, however, this assertion can be held as true only in its broadest sense. Dulles was indeed convinced during the said tour that the continuing controversy between the British and Iranian governments over the fate of the recently nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the conflict between Egypt and Britain over British military presence in the Suez Canal base zone, and the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine clearly made MEDO a future rather than an immediate possibility. He also deduced that MEDO had not worked because of Western predominance. Instead, Dulles concluded that the prospect of an anti-Soviet collective defence alliance was more encouraging in Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria, where political leaders seemed to be more aware of the Communist threat. His new approach envisaged an association of local forces under an indigenous command. Outside powers could not present a blueprint and expect it to be accepted automatically. Their absence could even encourage other Middle Eastern countries to join. As the pact developed, however, Western advisers could become involved in the matters of planning and organization. The 'Northern Tier' scheme would, furthermore, separate the issues of regional defence from the intricacies of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics.' Dulles understood, however, that, ultimately, for a really viable defence concept to develop fully, the participation, or at least the co-operation, of most Arab states in