Autonomous Foreign Policy Research Articles

Iran’s Foreign Policy from Non-Alignment to ‘Look to the East’: Between Ideology and Pragmatism

In the wake of the 1979 Revolution, the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran aimed to chart an autonomous foreign policy distinct from the Cold War’s binary dynamics, proclaiming a stance of ‘neither East, nor West’. From the outset, this non-alignment aspiration exposed the many diverse interpretations of this political concept, which served to accentuate Iranian particularism and factionalism. Despite the Islamic Republic’s commitment to the principles of non-alignment over decades, shifts in the global landscape and domestic economic imperatives have gradually pushed Tehran toward more conciliatory approaches with nations beyond the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), leading it to increasingly align itself with ‘the East’, particularly Russia and China. Since the latter half of the 1980s, Tehran has actively sought to bolster its foreign relations with countries beyond the NAM, culminating in recent developments such as the 2015 multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and the forging of the respective 20-year cooperation pacts with Russia and China. This article explores the transformation of Iranian non-alignment, examining the various political and economic factors that have compelled the Islamic Republic to uphold its revolutionary ideology of self-determination and independence, while at the same time pursuing more pragmatic policies seemingly at odds with the principles of non-alignment.

From variation to convergence in turbulent times – foreign and security policy choices among the Nordics 2014–2023

ABSTRACT The Nordic states have long made distinct choices regarding foreign and security policy principles. However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a convergence of the Nordic countries’ general patterns of cooperation within their security policies. We argue that the challenging international context has led to heightened threat perceptions, triggering a reformulation of their foreign policy roles. Based on this assumption the article aims to analyse the convergence of the Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies by tracing changes in their foreign policy roles following Russia’s increasing aggressiveness. We trace the changes in the Nordic countries’ foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat perceptions and perceptions of reduced manoeuvrability in international affairs. Our empirical analysis sheds light on how all Nordic countries perceive an increasing threat to the multilateral rule-based order, which has consequences for the roles of these states, how the threat perceptions of the Nordic states have been on high alert since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and finally how this has significantly impacted the Nordic foreign policy elites’ perception of their countries’ ability to manoeuvre and conduct autonomous foreign policy, motivating radical changes in the roles.

Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Davranışının Neoklasik Realist Bir Açıklaması: Bülent Ecevit’in 1978-1979 ve 1999-2002 Hükümetlerinin Karşılaştırılması

This study examines and compares the foreign policy behavior of Türkiye under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit between 1978-1979 and 1999-2002 via utilization of neo-classical realist theory. The article argues that the permissive strategic environment in both periods, détente in the former and unipolar international system in the latter paved the way for Türkiye’s multi-dimensional foreign policy which put special emphasis on neighboring regions. The worldviews of Ecevit and his foreign ministers Gündüz Ökçün and İsmail Cem as well as the emergence of grave economic problems in the country also contributed to the consolidation of region-centric foreign policy streak in both periods. Yet, while the arrival of the Second Cold War in December 1979 following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan interrupted Türkiye’s multi-dimensional foreign policy stance for a while, the increasing trend towards multi-polarity starting from mid-2000s facilitated Türkiye’s pursuit of more autonomous foreign policy line.

EU Restrictive Measures and Third Countries’ Evidence

EU restrictive measures, often referred to as ‘sanctions’, have become an increasingly used instrument of EU autonomous foreign policy. For some restrictive measures, however, the EU cannot act alone. In order to adopt them, the Council must rely on information transmitted by third states’ authorities and decisions taken by them at domestic level. This has been the case, in particular, of EU restrictive measures adopted in connection with misappropriations of state funds. The Council’s use of such evidence has been somewhat controversial and has led to numerous legal debates before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). To what extent was the Council free to rely on the evidence provided by these third states’ authorities? How to ensure that the fundamental rights of the targeted persons and entities were complied with in the process? Faced with these questions in its particularly abundant case law, the CJEU has progressively raised the threshold of validity for these sanctions. It has done so up to a point at which, in the authors’ opinion, the sanctions can no longer reach such threshold in practice. This article addresses the evolutions and implications of the CJEU case law on a legal aspect that is of crucial importance for the EU’s sanctions practice. Restrictive measures – Third States evidence – Misappropriations of State funds – Terrorism – Judicial review – Fundamental Rights – Ukraine – Tunisia – Egypt

ПРІОРИТЕТИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ МЕКСИКИ НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ СТОЛІТТЯ: ОГЛЯД АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ AMLOЛОПЕСА ОБРАДОРА

The article attempts to analyze the priorities of Mexico’s foreign policy at the beginning of the XXI century with an emphasis on reviewing the foreign policy strategy of the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). The methodological basis of the study is a comparative analysis of Mexico’s foreign policy priorities. Currently, Mexico is the leading state in Latin America, which tries to implement an autonomous foreign policy, being involved in all international affairs. In the XXI century Mexico moved away from the policy of isolationism in accordance with the Estrada doctrine and began to be guided by the Castañeda doctrine  to conduct an active foreign policy both at the regional and global levels of the international system. Therefore, the following goals of Mexico’s foreign policy strategy can be defined: support of regional autonomy and a balanced policy in the international arena, issues of social and economic development of the state, relations with the U.S. Despite the ambitious goals of Mexican foreign policy, the state has a number of internal problems that undoubtedly affect its positioning in the world. It is worth noting that the administration of the previous President Peña Nieta emphasized the positioning of Mexico as an active player in the international arena. In turn, the López Obrador administration, being populist, puts domestic politics as the primary goal of its activities  following the principle “the best foreign policy is a good domestic policy”. Therefore, Mexican priorities under the AMLO administration are the development of trade and economic cooperation with Central American states, relations with the United States (in particular, within the framework of the USMCA and the reduction of migration flows), as well as non-interference in global issues of international politics. It should be noted that such non-interference is quite controversial on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian war  neutrality in condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the existing pro-Russian position of the leading political elites.

Increasing Realism in Turkish Foreign Policy during Post-Davutoğlu Era

This article compares Turkish foreign policy in the post-Davutoğlu era with the previous period and analyzes the changes and continuities in these two periods. In the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) period, the Davutoğlu era, Turkish foreign policy featured soft power and cooperation-based characteristics. While maintaining its proactive and multi-dimensional aspects, there were three crucial changes in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Davutoğlu era. First, the elimination of the Fetullah Terror Organization (FETÖ) network from the state institutions and organizations after the July 15 coup attempt contributed to the effective functioning of the state, more autonomous foreign policy, and successful military operations. Second, Türkiye adopted a new security concept aiming to eradicate the sources of terrorism both within and outside its borders and began to use more hard power. Third, Türkiye increased its capabilities in crisis management in its relations with great powers and managed its autonomous foreign policy. These three changes in the post-Davutoğlu era led to increasing realism, autonomous foreign policy, and the rise of deterrence and the sphere of regional influence.

The way out of a crisis? the role of cities in Europeanization: a study of Thessaloniki city diplomacy

ABSTRACT Even though many stakeholders generally acknowledge cities’ presence and growing importance in international relations, the impact of their autonomous foreign policy remains unclear. Despite prior observations of city diplomacy, knowledge of how intensively city diplomacy is interconnected with the foreign policy of central governments is vague. The article is therefore focused on the circumstances that push cities to undertake diplomatic action and the consequent implications for the Europeanization process of the region. The conclusions reveal that Thessaloniki city diplomacy leverages the Europeanization of the region and has the capacity to complement the Greek government’s foreign policy. The article also argues that the cross-border exposure of cities implies possibilities for further Europeanization of the region.

S400s, sanctions and defiance: explaining Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy and the US response

ABSTRACT The United States Congress enacted CAATSA in 2017 to impose various restrictions on traditional rivals of the United States, which, however, was also imposed on a long-term strategic ally, Turkey. How can the application of sanctions designated for strategic rivals and enemies on an ally be explained? This article incorporates the hierarchy theory with Kai He’s negative balancing strategy notion, which provides a solid theoretical explanation for patron states’ punitive measures against their allies. We argue that CAATSA is part of the United States’ current negative balancing strategy, which aims to undermine the power of rising challengers, Russia and China, by preventing (Western) secondary states, including Turkey, from getting (nuclear) weapons from these two countries. In this context, the US used CAATSA sanctions to punish Turkey’s non-compliant and autonomous foreign policy behaviour when Russia and China rivalled the US-led order.

Saudi-Qatar Diplomatic Rapprochement: A Perspective of Neoclassical Realism

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Qatar. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed had hoped that the blockade against Qatar would make Qatar no longer hold an independent and autonomous foreign policy and away from the influence of Iran and Turkey. However, the Saudi blockade against Qatar has not only failed to bring the latter to its knees but has allowed it to stand on its own feet and gradually reduced its dependence on imports. At the same time, Qatar has strengthened its ties with Iran and Turkey, bringing the two powers directly into the Gulf region and challenging Saudi Arabia’s hegemony in the Gulf. However, on 5 January 2021, Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar. Based on neoclassical realism, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar through both the international system and domestic factors, ultimately concluding that the reasons for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries are related to Turkish and Iranian forces, the attitude of the United States, as well as GCC unity, the change in the Crown Prince’s diplomatic philosophy, the preservation of Sunnis and the promotion of economic cooperation.

TURKEY – NATO'S AMBASSADOR IN NAGORNO KARABAKH?

It was in full swing of the 2020 newly-blown Nagorno Karabakh war when during an online press conference following the meetings of NATO Defense Ministers its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg openly denoted Turkey as the one expected to "use its considerable influence in the region to calm tensions". Amid Armenia's accusations of Ankara allegedly playing a negative role in the conflict, this was a living testament of Turkey being a "valued Ally" of NATO. Pushing a political solution to the conflict, in which NATO was though not part in and around, the Alliance apparently sought to "level the playing field" within the Minsk Process, whose activity was never effective. The peace efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia and two powerful NATO allies – France and the United States, proved to be obsolete and unhelpful in the long-standing territorial dispute between Yerevan and Baku. Somehow, inserting Turkey into this configuration of powers consequently managed to bring some stability to the region. This study aims at investigating how comes that Russia "sanctioned" having Turkey, another NATO member, as a "certified" player on the field and that Armenia-favoring France let engage the country which has even no diplomatic relations with Yerevan. It concludes consequently that self-positioning of Turkey as a non-conventional NATO ally pursuing an autonomous foreign and security policy has been a critical factor.

The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

<i>The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969</i>. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

Geoeconomia e desenvolvimento: o II PND como vetor estratégico da autonomia nacional

In this work we will present the Geisel government’s attempt to relaunch a broad development program with profound structural changes in the national economy, the Second National Development Plan (II PND). We hypothesize that the plan main goal was to better position the country in the competitive international geo-economic order. For that, two objectives are presented. The first is to analyze the “development” theme, which has been re-read and adapted since the Costa e Silva government, since the DSN (National Security Doctrine) needed to be updated to the world and national conjuncture of the 1970s. is to show that, in order to achieve the ambitious Plan, Geisel has adopted an autonomous foreign policy in order to represent national interests in accordance with development goals. Thus, the article is divided into two sections, in addition to an introduction and conclusion: in the first, we present the international context; in the second, we analyze the II PND in detail and its strategic developments.

The Geoeconomics of the Russian–Japanese Territorial Dispute

Russia’s effort to become a geoeconomic power in Asia alters the dynamics of the territorial dispute with Japan. Both Moscow and Tokyo aim to prevent Russia’s geoeconomic “pivot to Asia” becoming merely a pivot to China. Yet, a settlement is obstructed by the growing geoeconomic value of the Southern Kurils and Japan’s lack of an autonomous foreign policy.

A decade of opening. Turkey's new international role in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been central for the contemporary Turkish history due to the its novel domestic identity grounded on the moderate Islamism, and an assertive, autonomous foreign policy, beyond the Western axis. For more than a decade, Turkey developed an active agenda as an emerging middle power, thus opening new spaces and increasing its presence in global political economy forums such as G-20. Until recently, Ankara tried to generate a non-turbulent regional environment to boost its political, economic and cultural relations with the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. At the same time, Turkey started developing particular strategies for new regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. These spaces were chosen mainly to expand global influence and presence, and pursuit market diversification through the creation of official representations, high-rank visits, and commercial initiatives. This paper attempts to bring some arguments about the sources of Ankara’s diplomatic opening toward these regions in the age of the emerging middle powers, while, at the same time, comparing the similarities and differences of the opening’s process and outcomes in both regional spaces.

Neoliberal Crisis, Social Demands, and Foreign Policy in Kirchnerist Argentina*

Traditionally, Argentine foreign policy has been regarded as the domain of the executive, and a laudable expression of realism. Perspectives that include domestic variables as a source of foreign policy have only emerged relatively recently, and have only assumed importance in a redemocratised Argentina in the course of its recurrent economic and political crises in the late 20th and early 21st century. This dynamic was particularly marked during and after the crisis of 2001. As a result, Kirchnerist foreign policy was affected by a range of complex domestic factors. The aim of this article is to show how those factors drove the governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, without abandoning executive primacy, to prioritise a neodevelopmental economic model, and combine them with an autonomous foreign policy which they believed to be the only way to meet the social demands of those affected by the neoliberal crisis.

Managing the transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana: Turkey’s relations with Britain and the US in a turbulent era (1929–47)

ABSTRACTBy analyzing Turkey’s relations with Great Britain and the US in a period of drastic change (1929–47), this article argues that the origins of the shift in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana not only affected the perceptions and strategies of relevant powers, but also entailed a dynamic interactive process. It asserts that the transition featured aspects of significant change, as well as continuity for the region. It demonstrates that while attempting to bandwagon with the relatively stronger naval, military, and economic partner, Turkey also endeavored to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy at various stages of this transition.

The Mexican political fracture and the 1954 coup in Guatemala (The beginnings of the cold war in Latin America)

This article challenges two general assumptions that have guided the study of Mexican foreign policy in the last four decades. First, that from this policy emerges national consensus; and, secondly that between Mexico and the US there is a “special relation” thanks to which Mexico has been able to develop an autonomous foreign policy. The two assumptions are discussed in light of the impact on Mexican domestic politics of the 1954 USsponsored military coup against the government of government of Guatemala. In Mexico, the US intervention reopened a political fracture that had first appeared in the 1930’s, as a result of President Cardenas’radical policies that divided Mexican society. These divisions were barely dissimulated by the nationalist doctrine adopted by the government. The Guatemalan Crisis brought some of them into the open. The Mexican President, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’ priority was the preservation of political stability. He feared the US government might feel the need to intervene in Mexico to prevent a serious disruption of the status quo . Thus, Ruiz Cortines found himself in a delicate position in which he had to solve the conflicts derived from a divided elite and a fractured society, all this under the pressure of US’ expectations regarding a secure southern border.

Peru y España, politica exterior peruana 1968 - 1975

En el siglo XX la política exterior del Perú fue caracterizada por su Panamericanismo conservador que en el contexto de la Guerra Fría vinculó al Perú con EE UU. Perú tuvo una favorable política exterior hacia el gobierno conservador y autoritario de Franco en España (1939-1975). El gobierno de Velasco (1968-1975) cambió la tradicional política exterior desarrollando una política autónoma frente a EE UU, la que no afectó sino por el contrario incrementó las relaciones con España firmando el Perú una serie de convenios de cooperación técnica y cultural.

A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of Communist Romania between Subordination and Autonomy, 1948–1962

Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania was well-known during the Cold War as a non-conformist voice in the Communist bloc, especially because of his opposition to the Soviet Union and spectacular foreign policy initiatives. But was that line Ceauşescu's creation? This analysis examines the sources of Romania's dynamic and autonomous foreign policy in the Cold War and shows that the origins of this foreign policy can be traced back to Ceauşescu's predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The shock caused by de-Stalinisation and Nikita Khrushchev's reformist policies saw the Romanian party leadership limit its dependence on the Soviet Union, both politically and economically. Romania's foreign policy experienced a revival starting from the tumultuous moments when Gheorghiu-Dej listened to Khrushchev's Secret Report at the 20th Congress in February 1956. Fearing the loss of his position in power, Gheorghiu-Dej saw relations outside the Communist bloc as a source of stability.

Turkish Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the AKP Era

Since the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey has become the subject of increased attention from the US foreign policy community. Schools of thought range from those who argue that Turkey is “turning away from the West” to those who suggest that Turkey is pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy. One of the few things on which these schools of thought agree is that, if they are correct, we should be able to find these patterns in public opinion. Analyzing data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, we find some differences in attitudes based on political party affiliation, income and education, but the results generally refute the argument that Turks see a fundamental choice between East and West in their foreign policy or that supporters of the AKP have fundamentally different international outlooks. Taken together, these results have important implications for US policymakers.