Right-wing Populist Research Articles

Cracking foundations, contested futures: Post-secondary education in Alberta at the end of the holocene

This article introduces the special issue of REPCS dedicated to the analysis of the restructuring of higher education in Alberta, Canada. It describes the acceleration of the processes of commodification of education and research and the corporatization of institutional governance under the government that took office in April 2019. The Alberta case is situated within the political economy of this petro-state, governed by a right-wing populist party, as well as in relation to the global trends in post-secondary education driven by neoliberal regimes. Further, the article highlights the cracks in the foundations of modern universities that have deeper historical origins than neoliberalism, and that are widening as the governance and raison d‘être of these institutions are challenged by global socio-ecological crises and Indigenous-led decolonization and climate justice movements. Drawing upon first-hand knowledge, as a participant in the struggles at the University of Alberta, as well as extensive research into the government’s restructuring agenda and the impacts on the post-secondary sector, the author outlines proposals for reform of the legislative framework governing the relationship between universities and the state, as well as the internal governance of the institution, and assesses the current terrain of agency for such transformation.

A manifesto against property

The term polycrisis, coined by Edgar Morin at the turn of the millennium (Morin and Kern 1999), has been picked up by a handful of commentators recently, and it was also recently the topic of a special issue of Anthropology Today (Henig and Knight 2023, see also Kalb 2023). Ranging from biodiversity loss and climate change to mounting inequalities both globally and domestically, a widespread sense of powerlessness spreads even in countries considered democratic, often feeding conspirators, ethnonationalists, right-wing populists and others who promise simple answers to complex questions.

The green, green grass of the nation. A new far-right ecology in Spain

The Spanish far-right party Vox has undergone, together with other similar forces in Europe, an “ecological turn”. To analyze this case, the article starts from the premise of the need to understand better the far-right parties’ discursive mechanisms and their engagement with environmental issues. Theoretically, we criticize the ideological and ontological approaches to the current wave of national populism; instead, we argue that the dominant form of authoritarian national populism is more usefully analyzed in terms of embodied narratives, metaphorical imagination, mythmaking, and affective intensification. Empirically, using discourse analysis (Laclau, 2005) and drawing on the affective turn in political ecology, first, we argue that Vox's eco-narrative is interpretable as a combination of national populism and biopolitical imaginary pitting a “culture of death” against the “culture of life”. Vox's key rhetorical mechanisms, we intimate, are hyperbolical metaphorization and rhetorical inversion, have an intensifying effect at two interconnected levels: fear and indignation concerning the degeneration of Spain, pride and hope regarding Vox's and its male hero's promise of salvation and the Reconquista of the Spanish way of life. Second, by looking into key policy areas (energy and water), we argue that Vox has systematically chosen the former in conflicts between capitalist interests and environmental issues.

BEYOND RELIGION

By equating the traditional mindset with traditional beliefs (in magic, ritual, superstitions, etc.), several studies have consistently shown that such beliefs significantly influence people's political behavior and preferences. While these studies have highlighted the political consequences of a traditional mindset in several countries from the Global South, they nevertheless have little to say as to whether holding superstitious beliefs (e.g., believing in fortune tellers, horoscopes, or lucky charms) has certain political implications for countries in the Global North. In this article, we explore whether the traditional mindset has political consequences even in an industrially advanced Germany. We present an analysis of data from the German General Social Survey (GESIS 2019) showing that superstitious voters have less trust in the political system, are more inclined to think that Hitler would be remembered as a good stateman if he had not perpetrated the Holocaust, that the Nazi regime also had a good side, and that the Jews are different and, in any case, have too much influence. Hence, dissemination of superstitious beliefs could make right‐wing populists more electorally appealing and successful than they once were. We believe our findings to be of some importance as they show that if the proliferation of superstitious beliefs continues unchecked, they may transform our political systems in ways that policy makers and democratic forces should strive to avoid.

THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF THE (NORTHERN) LEAGUE IN ITALY (2008-2018). IS THE ECONOMIC DECLINE OR THE IDENTITARIAN ISSUES THE MAIN REASON FOR IT?

This article aims to analyze the rise and electoral success of the (Northern) League in Italy, for the period 2008-2018. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the economic difficulties encountered by the electorate or other factors, such as political and cultural ones, have influenced the growth and electoral success of the League in Italy. By analyzing both demand and supply-side data, the analysis shows that the League has had better electoral results in the years after the crisis when the economy has been improving than in the years when there has been a major economic shock. Regarding survey data on the supporters of the League, the analysis shows that the economy is among the least influential factors for them to support a right-wing populist party. On the contrary, the analysis shows that the main triggers for radical right populist mobilization have more to do with group values, identity issues, ethnic and cultural affiliation, xenophobic sentiments, skepticism towards foreigners, multiculturalism, and forms of Euroscepticism.

Overlooked and Undeserving: Older People in Narratives of Return in Post-1989 East Germany

The German right-wing populist party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) opposes diverse family lifestyles by promoting the return to a family model of father, mother, and children. This “Narrative of Return” paves the way for the party’s anti-gender, anti-childlessness, and anti-immigration agendas. This article examines how narratives about families as promoted by the AfD reflect or address experiences of the post-socialist transformation in East Germany. It turns out that Narratives of Return (NoR) overlook the elderly as acting individuals and disregard the ways they engage with their families and how they continue to organize their lives autonomously in old age. NoR instead depict older people as an anonymous group of supposedly undeserving pensioners, who benefit from society and family without having any function in them. However, discourses on care for the family can be traced down to a micro-level that confirms how care for the family is, in fact, care for older people. The article presents two selected life stories of advanced-age East Germans to substantiate this claim. The life stories reveal that older people themselves believe in various notions of family, despite being served with NoR in the recent past. Experiences in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) even seem to prevent older people from again falling for totalizing schemes that order and prescribe uniform (family) experience. Consequently, it is not to be expected that NoR will succeed in closing discourses on care for the family easily.

Borderless fear?

Abstract Studies have highlighted differences between right-wing populism in Western and Central Eastern Europe but suggested that discourses have been converging since the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. This article examines this claim by focusing on right-wing populist frames and affective communication on migration in Austria and Slovenia. Taking a communication-centred approach, the study is based on a critical frame analysis of 70 speeches from far-right to centre-right parties in parliamentary debates on migration between 2015 and 2019. The results show that right-wing populist discourses in the two adjacent countries have aligned in appealing to affects, particularly to fear and in framing migration as a threat to security and culture. Despite differences in mobilizing affects, the findings indicate a mutual alignment of right-wing populism beyond borders, signalling a potential risk of a broader right-wing populist bloc unified by fear of migration.

Comprehensive security, disinformation, and COVID-19: An analysis of the impacts of mis- and disinformation and populist narratives during the pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated many fundamental and challenging implications regarding security, for both states and people. This article addresses the pandemic as a security threat, whereby societal and human dimensions of security are intertwined with the narrower (so-called traditional) state dimensions, culminating in comprehensive security. This article uses mixed methods, combining desk research and a selection of narratives or stories from several parts of the world that signify how the intersection of disinformation and populist discourses exacerbated the COVID-19 security challenges. These are analysed through an innovative comprehensive security analytical approach. Drawing on both security theory and policy, the article examines how the COVID-19 pandemic jeopardised security on multiple levels. First, the state's capacity to effectively act and deliver in the domestic sphere waned. Second, the social contract between the state and its citizens eroded as public trust dissipated. This article argues, however, that the most pervasive threat to security during the pandemic pertained to the exploitation of the information domain in relation to the state, society, and people. The article interrogates how mis- and disinformation about the pandemic compounded and exacerbated the security challenges it posed, often relying on existing narratives within right-wing populism movements to increase mistrust and discontent. These largely right-wing populist narratives contributed to broadening the gap between states and people, besides weakening public compliance with state health security measures. The nature of populism and the narratives of particularly right-wing populism contributed to increases in fragmentation, polarisation, and discrimination impacting societal trust. The article concludes with recommendations to mitigate the adverse impacts of mis- and disinformation, including reinvigorating the relationship between state institutions and the people to strengthen comprehensive security.

Authoritarian populism and response to COVID‐19: A comparative study of the United States, India, and Brazil

As the phenomenon of populism is in the preliminary stages of exploratory research, the present study involves an empirical investigation involving a case study of the United States, India, and Brazil to examine whether a correlation exists between populism and management of COVID‐19. The study adopts the ideational approach of populism as a set of ideas or discourse to review how core conceptual features of populism have impacted on management of COVID‐19. The study has two main objectives: (1) to examine whether populism in the United States, India, and Brazil has determined “a populist response” to the pandemic in dealing with the health crises and (2) to explore the management of COVID‐19 in the states led by right‐wing populism and the commonality of populist approaches adopted in handling the health crisis. Comparing the three states' statistical data of management models, the study has argued that common populist mechanisms such as distrust for experts, contempt for institutions, and suspicion of “others” have guided the US, India, and Brazilian leadership response to COVID‐19. It further argues that leadership in the United States, India, and Brazil has prevented effective management by politicizing the crisis, aggravating social polarization, and contradicting expert advice. Moreover, populist and nationalist orientation of the leadership has evaded responsibility in these states with the leadership blaming ethnicities for spreading the virus and by weakening societal solidarity.

Die Milieukoalition des Rechtspopulismus. Kombinationen politischer Einstellungen innerhalb des potenziellen Elektorats der AfD

ZusammenfassungObwohl in den letzten Jahren viel zu den Charakteristika des AfD-Elektorats geforscht wurde, gibt es bisher nur wenige Erkenntnisse darüber, inwiefern unterschiedliche soziale Gruppen und Milieus aus jeweils unterschiedlichen Motiven zur AfD neigen. Da es der AfD erfolgreich gelingt, sowohl Angehörige der Arbeiterklasse als auch Teile der Mittelklasse für sich zu mobilisieren, stellt sich die Frage, wie diese Koalition an AfD-Sympathisantinnen aus unterschiedlichen Klassenlagen zustande kommt und erklärt werden kann. In dem Beitrag wird mit Daten des ALLBUS 2018 untersucht, inwiefern sich die AfD-freundlichen Milieus innerhalb der Arbeiter- und der Mittelklasse in ihren Einstellungsprofilen zu vier politischen Konfliktdimensionen (Umverteilung, Migration, individuelle Freiheitsrechte und Leistungsethos) sowohl vom nicht-AfD-affinen Teil ihrer jeweiligen Klasse als auch voneinander unterscheiden. Anhand von Regressions- und Clusteranalysen kann gezeigt werden, dass der mit der AfD sympathisierende Teil der Arbeiterklasse ein national-solidarisches Weltbild aufweist und Gleichheitsansprüche einfordert, während in dem mit der AfD sympathisierenden Teil der Mittelklasse regressive Normalitätsvorstellungen vorherrschen und die AfD als Verteidigerin bestehender Hierarchien und Privilegien angesehen wird. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen wird abschließend diskutiert, wie es der AfD gelingt, durch eine Anrufung dieser Einstellungsmuster Milieus mit divergierenden ökonomischen Interessen für sich zu mobilisieren.

SAĞ POPÜLİZM VE SOL POPÜLİZM: TÜRK SİYASAL SİSTEMİNDE İTTİFAKLARIN ÇATIŞMASI

This study aims to investigate the effects of right and left-wing populism before the 2023 elections on the Turkish Political System. In this direction, the study argues that the People's Alliance, formed with the AKP-MHP alliance, has adopted right-wing populism and the Nation Alliance, which was established in partnership with four opposition parties (CHP-İYİP-SP-DP) and currently expanding to six opposition parties (CHP-İYİP-SP-DP-DEVA-GP), adopted left-wing populism. In line with the findings obtained in the study, it is argued that the 2019 elections are actually a “clash of alliances” and thus right-left populism. Accordingly, the study describes the 2019 elections as a "limited" success for left-wing populism. Considering that the alliances have increased their discourse and strategies in the last period, the article describes the 2023 elections as the “real clash of alliances”, and argues that the election result revealed that although a significant rise in left populism is observed, right-wing populism is dominant in Turkish politics. For now, right axis of populism is the winner in Turkish Political System.

When the Fourth Pillar Crumbles: Press Freedom in the Time of Right-Wing Nationalism

When the Fourth Pillar Crumbles: Press Freedom in the Time of Right-Wing Nationalism

Partisanship and perceptions of the consequences of welfare service privatization from left to right (-wing populism)

In view of increased support for a rightwing populist (RWP) party and marketization of the Swedish welfare state, here we study local politicians’ and voters’ perceptions of welfare service privatization. We specifically ask whether such perceptions form coherent attitudinal profiles, linked to partisanship and left-right ideology. Using survey data focusing on the views of local politicians and voters in Sweden, we analyze perceptions of potential consequences of privatization and apply cluster analysis to examine whether and how such perceptions are interlinked. The results show that two distinct and contrasting latent profiles can be identified based on the underlying pattern across eight indicators. A large majority displays these profiles, which are closely connected to partisanship and ideology. Moreover, an ambivalent profile is identified. Contrary to expectations, views expressed by RWP politicians and voters are mainly aligned with the coherent profile associated with social democrats but also to a lesser extent the ambivalent profile. Thus, there appears to be a duality in RWP politicians’ and voters’ perceptions of welfare service privatization, suggesting that the potential impact of increased support for an RWP party on the future development of welfare service delivery in Sweden is not clear-cut.

Business power, right-wing populism, and noisy politics: lessons from Brexit and Swiss referendums

This article contributes to debates on business power, noisy politics, and right-wing populism. The populist right weakens strategies of quiet politics, which many suggest has led to a steep decline of business power. I challenge this view and argue that a combination of innovative strategies and ample financial resources allow business associations to exercise power in this environment. Drawing on new empirical evidence, the article makes three central contributions. First, I suggest that the failure of Remain business advocacy in the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted from the constraints of administrative legislation (the PPERA), weaknesses in campaigning strategies, and the CBI leadership’s decision to not register as a campaign organization. Second, while my regression analysis provides some support for Culpepper’s quiet politics argument, the Swiss business federation Economiesuisse has won 90% of the referendum campaigns it has led, including many referendums with high issue salience against right-wing populists. Third, Economiesuisse shows that business strategies of ‘loud voice’ can be successful. With money and innovative public-facing campaigning strategies, business organizations can win in noisy environments and against right-wing populists.

The rise of right-wing populism and voting power distribution in German state parliaments

ABSTRACT Germany has seen the rise of right-wing populism, similar to various other European countries. A recent example is the emergence of the Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) party. Since 2015, the party has had much success in elections. Accordingly, in this article we analyse voting power distribution in German states before and after 2015. Within this analysis, we identify which parties gained and lost voting power. To calculate voting power distribution in parliaments, we use cooperative game theory. In particular, we apply the EC value considering that parties exclude coalitions with other parties. Of course, the methodology presented in this article should not be used for analysis alone but should complement existing analyses (from the fields of demoscopy and political science).

Populist party-producer group alliances and divergent developmentalist politics of minimum wages in Poland and Hungary

In the advanced peripheral economies of East-Central Europe, right-wing populist parties have increasingly politicized the dualism between larger, export-competitive foreign-owned enterprises and smaller, inward-oriented and less productive domestically owned firms. By focusing on the two most-similar cases of right-wing populist governments in the region—namely, Hungary and Poland, this paper documents a striking attempt by Poland’s Law and Justice party to use increases in the minimum wage and social security contributions as a developmentalist tool that should force domestically owned firms to achieve greater efficiency and technological upgrading. In sharp contrast, Hungary’s Fidesz party has systematically compensated minimum wage increases with cuts in employer social contributions and has refrained from assigning developmentalist aims to labor cost increases. Both parties have cultivated a cross-class electoral base and have faced electoral trade-offs in emphasizing minimum wage increases. Yet we argue—and show through a comparative historical analysis—that variation in their policy approaches stems from their distinct, electorally motivated, alliances with influential producer groups and the distinct policy quid pro quos they have struck with those groups, namely, organized labor for Law and Justice and organized business for Fidesz.

Bringing gender and religion in: Right-wing networks and “Populism and Civil Society”

In this contribution, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen’s Populism and Civil Society is confronted with current gender studies research on populism. This research mainly focuses on right-wing populism and highlights strong links between right-wing populists and the religious right, which are to a large degree organized by “anti-gender,” a stance both against social constructivist notions of gender and against basic gender rights, especially in the fields of reproduction and of LGBTIQ concerns. Against the backdrop of this literature, I argue that in Populism and Civil Society, right-wing populist anti-gender politics are not addressed in a way that takes account of their full complexity; and that these politics furthermore suggest to treat right-wing populism and left-wing populism as phenomena that do not only differ in content, but also in form.

Falling behind whom? Economic geographies of right-wing populism in Europe

ABSTRACT Existing studies suggest that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) appeal to people in communities that have fallen behind in material terms. However, it remains open which benchmark communities apply as they become politically discontented. We argue that the structure of territorial inequalities influences the benchmarks used by people in regions falling behind. Panel data regressions using subnational election results in EU states from 1990 to 2018 reveal a sharp contrast between the economic geographies of right-wing populism in core and peripheral EU member states. We find a strong association between falling behind the richest region of the country and RWPP support within core EU countries, while in peripheral EU states falling behind the EU core is associated with regional support for RWPPs. This suggests that RWPP voters in peripheral countries cue on how they are faring relative to the EU core, while RWPP supporters in core countries cue on how they are faring relative to dynamic regions of their own country. Our analysis also shows that increased manufacturing employment reinforces the effect of falling behind the richest region in core EU member states, while we find no strong evidence that regional economic stagnation is important to the electoral performance of RWPPs.

Staging the New City: Urban spectacles and the ecological origins of Nayib Bukele's authoritarian populism

AbstractThis paper analyzes the connections between real estate speculation and authoritarian populism in El Salvador. Focusing on president Nayib Bukele's term as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán (2012–2015), I examine the role speculative urbanism played in the crafting of his profile as a promising politician in the early years of his career. I trace how Bukele instrumentalized the ecosystem of Nuevo Cuscatlán's coffee forest as a means to fund a personalistic populist strategy whose main project called for the construction of a “New City.” This project involved the lifting of barriers to real estate investment to raise funds for social programs and municipal infrastructure. Its flipside was an aggressive process of deforestation and displacement of rural populations. Drawing on urban political ecology and critical agrarian studies, I argue that Bukele's New City project constituted a type of urban spectacle. This urban spectacle was rooted in two socio‐ecological dynamics: (1) The use of land as a revenue‐raising token of exchange; and (2) The fetishization of urban water infrastructure in the context of water scarcity. The paper concludes with various considerations about the destructive force of the link between authoritarian populism and urban extractivism in rural environments.

Multilingual Encounters beyond (Research) Collaboration: Public Anthropology and “Linguistic Others” in Post-2015 Germany

Abstract This paper reflects on anthropology’s public role in the aftermath of Germany’s so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015. Media and political discussions clearly showed that the dominant (German) culture/Kultur discourse had been primarily based on nineteenth-century evolutionist ideas, structural racism, and growing right-wing populism rather than on established anthropological insights into cultural identity, gender, religion, transnational realities, and political economy. Methodological anthropological tools (i.e., self-reflexivity, ethical considerations, positionality) were nearly non-existent in sociopolitical programs or strategies. We argue for an epistemological shift by referring to current challenges and limitations regarding collaborative research. We propose Encounter/Begegnung as an epistemological standpoint for public anthropology by going beyond research, enabling diverse engagement, knowledge production, and representation. Based on cumulative insights spanning six years of the interdisciplinary, multilingual (Arabic, Farsi, German, English) “Encounter/Begegnung” media project, we argue for shifting the focus from collaboration to encounters as a necessary impetus for public anthropology in post-2015 Germany.