With this, existentialism takes on both the promise and the difficulties of the general strategy that has lately come to be called a “constitution/commitment argument.” According to such arguments, recently advanced by Korsgaard, Velleman, and others, our values find their deepest source in the constitution of our agency (or selfhood more generally). The general idea is that the very constitution of agency or selfhood ineluctably involves us in certain commitments, so that honoring those commitments and the values they erect can no longer be something up for meaningful doubt from the agent’s own standpoint. (The agent, after all, is already committed.) Sartre and Beauvoir are making a similar move: we are “condemned to be free” in that whatever shape our life takes will then count as one or another manifestation of our freedom, and this involves a commitment to freedom’s value since any effort to deny such a commitment would just amount to some (characteristically bad faith) expression of that same freedom. Any authentic project, therefore, must own up to the value of freedom, commitment to which is already baked into the cake. Such arguments have an undeniable attraction, despite being notoriously elusive and controversial. Space forbids any effort to pass judgment on the strategy here. I confine myself to the remark that, while Grene lacks some recently developed terminology (and the resulting more explicit argumentation), her essay nevertheless indicates both the basic idea and some of its difficulties. Indeed, the strategy’s combination of promise and elusiveness helps explain Grene’s ambivalent recognition that, while existentialist arguments about the value of freedom are so far unsatisfactory, still there is some deep intuitive appeal to their suggestion of an illuminating connection among authenticity, freedom, and the demand of respect for individual dignity (272).