Auction Participants Research Articles

TINGKAT KEPUASAN PESERTA LELANG TERHADAP PELAYANAN TEMPAT PELELANGAN IKAN (TPI) MORODEMAK

Objectives of this study were analyze fish auction participant satisfaction to auction services in TPI Morodemak, analyze attributes effect, services that fit to service quality measurement, and analyzed fish auction participants perception to performance and importance for fish auction house Morodemak services. Used descriptive method and purposive sampling with 49 respondents consists of commercial fishmongers, traditional fishmongers, purse seine owners, and boat lift net owners as fish auction participant. Satisfication measurement used Customer Satisfication Index (CSI), Importance and Performance Analysis (IPA) and gap analysis. Results from this study were value CSI 20% (0.2) indicate the auction participants dissatisfied with the services provided, IPA show there are four attributes should be develop, two elements have not been completed based on measurement requirements of service satisfaction, gap value average -0.05 means the auction participants were not satisfied with the performance of TPI services because the performance value was lower than the importance value.

Multiple‐Winner Award Rules in Online Procurement Auctions

This study investigates a novel mechanism—multiple‐winner award rules—that are widely used in e‐procurement auctions and crowdsourcing sites. In many e‐procurement auctions, the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) specifies three rules before the auction starts: (i) the size of the finalist set (from which the winner[s] will be chosen); (ii) the number of winners; and (iii) the allocation of the contract among the winners. We examine how these three rules affect auction performance using a dataset of online procurement auctions across a variety of product categories. We find that the multiple‐winner award rules significantly impact the suppliers’ participation decisions, which is an important factor in determining the economic performance of the auction (i.e., buyer's savings). Most interestingly, these three rules systematically induce opposite effects on auction participation for two types of suppliers: experienced and inexperienced bidders. For example, increasing the number of winners encourages experienced suppliers, but discourages inexperienced suppliers from participating in the auction. On the other hand, raising the disparity in the contract allocation among winning bidders (e.g., from 50/50 to 90/10 split) deters experienced suppliers, but motivates inexperienced suppliers to participate. These findings provide guidelines for industrial buyers and crowdsourcing hosts on how to effectively make use of multiple‐winner design levers to promote suppliers’ participation when designing procurement auctions and crowdsourcing contests.

Participation and welfare in auctions with default

In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through (i) the possibility of no trade and (ii) the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the model.

Does Marketing System Influence on Consumer Satisfaction?: Study of Marine Fish Marketing System at Fish Auction “PPN Muara Angke”, North Jakarta

Market performance in the form of marketing efficiency is the result of a good marketing system which then affects consumer satisfaction. This research was conducted to analyze: 1) satisfaction of marine fish consumers at fish auction PPN Muara Angke, 2) influence of market performance on consumer satisfaction, 3) differences in marketing efficiency between fishermen and traders, 4) differences in satisfaction of fishermen and merchant’s consumers. The research method used is a qualitative and quantitative descriptive research type. The population in this study are ship owners or fishermen, auction participants which include wholesalers, wholesalers, processors, and retail traders. Sample determination technique using purposive sampling and snowball sampling with a sample of 42 people. The analysis technique used is descriptive, simple linear regression, and one-way ANOVA real difference test. Based on the results of the study that marine fish consumer satisfaction in Muara Angke it can be said to be satisfied and market performance affects consumer satisfaction. The marketing efficiency of fishermen and traders is equally efficient but more efficient marketing of fishermen and the satisfaction of fishermen and traders are equally satisfying but more satisfied by fishermen consumers.

Online Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Service-Oriented Network Slicing

Future mobile communication networks (5G) are envisioned to support a wide range of use cases with diverse service requirements. Network slicing as a key architectural enabling technology for 5G can provide users with customized services and meet the requirement of economic efficiency, where resource allocation is of vital importance. In this paper, we propose an online auction-based resource allocation scheme for network slicing (ORANS) to meet the diverse service requirements and improve network economic efficiency. We first propose a bidding information construction method to provide customized bidding information for users based on service types. Next, we model the slicing resource allocation problem as an online winner determination problem, with aim to maximize the social welfare of auction participants. We then implement a resource allocation strategy and payment rule to accomplish the service-oriented optimal resource allocation. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed ORANS and the numerical results show that ORANS significantly outperforms the greedy algorithm and the primal-dual approximation algorithm in network economic efficiency while satisfying the diverse service requirements of users.

The Benefits of European Periodic Auctions beyond MiFID Dark Trading Caps

Initially designed as a better alternative than dark trading, the success of periodic auctions has spread across all European stocks. On capped stocks, the market share of periodic auctions rose from 1 to 4.5 percent between early March and September 2018. Nevertheless, on uncapped stocks, periodic auctions doubled in popularity from 0.75 to 1.5 percent over the same period. The random auction end time prevents adverse selection, as shown by the price reversion. In lit and dark trading, passive buy trades are followed by a strong drop in midpoint due to the aggressive sellers. In contrast, periodic auction trades show almost no sign of adverse selection. This feature derives from the random end time of the auction, which creates a level playing field for all market participants. Based on Kepler Cheuvreux trades, this study shows that periodic auction participation mitigates the market impact. In addition, using public market data, this study shows that, on average, trading intensity diminishes after a periodic auction trade while it increases after a dark trade. TOPICS:Exchanges/markets/clearinghouses, security analysis and valuation, developed markets, performance measurement

The Implementation of the Government Goods and Services Procurement Policy at the General Hospital of Sanggau Regency West Kalimantan Province

This study is associated with the implementation of the government goods and services procurement policy at the General Hospital of Sanggau Regency, West Kalimantan Province. In this case, the procurement refers to the procurement causing legal problems namely the procurement of surgical medical devices in fiscal year 2014. The theoretical structure of the research consists of the grand theory (government science), middle range theory (public policy theory), and applied theory (the implementation theory of Van Meter and Van Horn Public Policies). This study was employed qualitative research approach. In addition, the secondary data collection was carried out by using library research. Meanwhile, the primary data collection was conducted by applying interview techniques and observation that involved 10 research informants determined by purposive sampling technique. The results of this study were analyzed by the researcher by entailing six variables of Van Meter and Van Horn. The results of this study indicated that there was an alleged criminalization by Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (GISA) through the results of an audit on the procurement of surgical medical devices at the General Hospital of Sanggau regency in fiscal year 2014. Basically, the reason why the GISA stipulated the State losses is due to the emergence of an indication of a conspiracy among auction participants referring to the explanation of article 83, paragraph (1) the letter e on Presidential Regulation No. 70 Year 2012, without involving Procurement Service Unit (PSU) and/or the working groups of PSU, including the existence of contract value differences with the real value of provider purchases and VAT. The cause of the criminalization of the GISA audit results raising legal problems is presumably resulted from the fact that the audit carried out by GISA was not based on the GISA audit standards. Moreover it was not objective and unprofessional. The results demonstrated that the state losses determined by GISA were grounded on 1) the misinterpretation on the conspiracy indications in the explanation of article 83 paragraph (1), the letter e, Presidential Regulation No. 70 Year 2012 carried out by GISA; 2) incorrect assumptions which are not in accordance with the facts conveyed by GISA in the treatise of the audit results used as the basis for determining state losses; 3) GISA does not understand the mechanism and system for implementing procurement stipulated by the Government in which it should be carried out electronically/(e-procurement); 4) State Loss Calculation Method performed by GISA by finding out the difference between the value of the contract and the real value of the purchase of the provider based on the incorrect interpretation regarding the indications of conspiracy in the explanation of the article 83 paragraph (1) the letter e, Presidential Regulation No. 70 Year 2012. As a result, the State losses that GISA's stipulated become baseless; 5) The existence of the alleged GISA audit is carried out based on emotions, subjectivity, motives and certain interests. The researcher proposes several suggestions and the "SO&R by hari" model that can be analyzed by using 1 dimension/variable (variable policy standard, objective & resources) on new concepts obtained by the researcher regarding the Implementation of Government Goods and Services Procurement Policy, which is a simplification and refinement of the Van Meter and Van Horn theories on Public Policy Implementation, and a new framework which is specific and focused on the research related to government goods and services procurement.

CReam: A Smart Contract Enabled Collusion-Resistant e-Auction

Auction is an effective way to allocate goods or services to bidders who value them the most. The rapid growth of e-auctions facilitates online transactions but poses new and distinctive challenges. It is difficult to establish trust among sellers, buyers, and auctioneers without centralized auction websites or platforms (the auctioneer) which collect bids and derive the auction results. However, these third parties may be untrustworthy, and malicious sellers or buyers may refuse to deliver the goods or payment according to the protocol. Moreover, the open and anonymous online environment may stimulate auction participants to form collusion coalitions to rig the auction and reap unfair profit. Many auction designs have been proposed to address these concerns, but they fall short of simultaneously achieving decentralization (i.e., held without a trusted third utility), strong consensus (i.e., the establishment of trust), collusion resistance, and practical implementation. We present CReam , the first decentralized collusion-resistant e-auction system that is implemented with smart contract on the blockchain. With the carefully designed smart auction contract, mutually distrustful and rational sellers and buyers are stimulated to operate properly, hence transact safely without trusted third parties. The auction mechanism in the smart contract can effectively prevent bidder collusion and realize economic robustness, i.e., truthfulness. We implement a fully functional CReam on the Ethereum network. Extensive experimental results confirm that CReam can greatly reduce the probability of collusion and achieve an approximate optimal revenue at a low cost of contract execution.

Имитационное моделирование оптимальной цены предложения в контрактной системе государственных и муниципальных закупок

The work is aimed at solving the actual problem of estimating the optimal offer price with participation in tenders on electronic platforms. The proposed approach is based on the use of the Monte Carlo method for simulation in order not only to adequately assess the cost of the proposed project, but also to predict the demand for the project under different conditions, as well as to simulate the behavior and intentions of the auction participants. The constructed model allows us to study the pricing mechanism on electronic trading platforms. With the help of the presented simulation methods, the estimation of the optimal price of the contract proposal depending on the number of competitors and the contract value, as well as the intentions of the competitors’ participation in the auction, the simulation results are presented.

Bid-Fish: An android application for online fish auction based on case study from Muara Angke, Indonesia

In utilizing natural resources from the sea, the Indonesian government has obliged fishermen to distribute all the fish they catch at a fish auction institution that has been provided at each landing port, namely the Fish Auction Place or known as Tempat Pelelangan Ikan (TPI) in Bahasa. In this study, we made a sample case at the TPI Muara Angke, North Jakarta which has a function to improve the welfare of fishermen through an auction which is expected to achieve optimal prices. However, in practice, it turns out that there are often price discrepancies expected by fishermen because there are no bidders who bid for more of the fish they have made fishermen prefer to sell their fish catches into cold storage or even directly abroad due to a bad auction system. This is very detrimental to Indonesia because it has lost a lot of its national income. Therefore, it is necessary to digitize the embodied fish auction process in the form of an online mobile platform-based fish auction application to be able to introduce fish training more widely so that many auction participants want to bid higher fish auction prices without limited space and time for bidders participate in the auction so that the potential value obtained by fishermen can be greater and in accordance with the expectations of the fishermen. In this study, we built a mobile application for online fish auctions called “BidFish” which consists of two applications for admin (TPI) and users who have the auction feature (auction) in real time within the time specified by the admin who will automatically determines compiling a price quote from the highest price other than that there is a deposit storage feature (BidPay) which is a requirement for the user to be able to attend an auction. This application is built with the Android platform considering the level of Android smartphone usage is very large in Indonesia so it is expected to be a solution to the price mismatch problem that occurs in an auction by getting more bidders.

The Impact of QE on Liquidity: Evidence from the UK Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme

Quantitative easing (QE) has become a key component of the monetary policy toolkit since the global financial crisis. However substantial uncertainty remains about the impact of QE on market liquidity. Identifying the impact is particularly challenging due to the potential for reverse causality, because liquidity considerations might affect purchases. To address this challenge, we study the Bank of England’s Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS), in which the Bank of England purchased £10 billion of sterling corporate bonds via a series of auctions over 2016 and 2017. In particular, we use granular offer-level data from the CBPS auctions to construct proxy measures for the Bank of England’s demand for bonds and auction participants’ supply of bonds, allowing us to control for any reverse causality from liquidity to purchases. Across a wide range of transaction-based liquidity measures, we find that CBPS purchases improved the liquidity of purchased bonds.

Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default

Consumer protection may induce some socially undesirable outcomes in a competitive bidding environment. In an auction with costly participation, we show that the possibility of default may cause social welfare loss through two channels. One is the possibility of no trade when a default occurs, and the other is the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the default probability, the expected winning rent and social welfare.

Trust and experience in online auctions

ABSTRACTThis paper aims to shed light on the complexities and difficulties in predicting the effects of trust and the experience of online auction participants on bid levels in online auctions. To provide some insights into learning by bidders, a field study was conducted first, to examine auction and bidder characteristics from eBay auctions of rare coins. We proposed that such learning is partly because of institutional-based trust. Data were then gathered from 453 participants in an online experiment and survey, and a structural equation model was used to analyze the results. This paper reveals that experience has a nonmonotonic effect on the levels of online auction bids. Contrary to previous research on traditional auctions, as online auction bidders gain more experience, their level of institutional-based trust increases and leads to higher bid levels. Data also show that both a bidder’s selling and bidding experiences increase bid levels, with the selling experience having a somewhat stronger effect. This paper offers an in-depth study that examines the effects of experience and learning and bid levels in online auctions. We postulate this learning is because of institutional-based trust. Although personal trust in sellers has received a significant amount of research attention, this paper addresses an important gap in the literature by focusing on institutional-based trust.

Auction theory adaptations for real life applications

We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios.1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative.2. We formulate a positive symmetric discrete distribution, which is likely to be followed by the total number of auction participants, and incorporate this into auction theory results.3. We develop extensions when the valuations of the bidders are interdependent and incorporate all the results developed into a final combined realistic setting.4. Our methods can be a practical tool for bidders and auction sellers to maximize their profits. The models developed here could be potentially useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement of financial instruments and also non-financial commodities.All the propositions are new results and they refer to existing results which are stated as Lemmas.

How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders?

Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders’ valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders’ synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data.

An analysis of auction strategies in apartment sales

PurposeThis paper aims to empirically test the effect of list price and bidding strategies in ascending auctions of residential real estate.Design/methodology/approachThree regression models are estimated, using a unique data set from 629 condominium apartments in the inner-city of Stockholm, Sweden, sold between January 2010 and December 2011.FindingsThe results show that jump bidding has the predicted effect of reducing competition by scaring off bidders. However, a higher average bid increment leads to a higher selling price. Furthermore, results show that a fast auction in terms of average time between bids acts to increase the probability of so-called auction fever as both the number of bidders and the selling price are positively correlated with the speed of the auction. While the average behavior of all auction participants, in terms of jump bidding and time between bids, significantly affects auction outcomes, differences in strategies applied by winners and losers show mixed results. The results of this study with respect to sellers’ list price strategy show that underpricing is an ineffective strategy in terms of enticing more bidders to participate in the auction. Furthermore, underpricing is not sufficient to have a positive effect on the selling price.Originality/valueThis paper is one of the first papers to empirically analyze how different bidding strategies affect the outcome of residential real estate auctions in terms of competition and the final selling price.

Sistem Informasi Pelelangan Online Pada PT. Balai Lelang Bandung

PT.Balai Lelang Bandung is a company in Bandung which is located at Ruko Maple Kav. G, Jl. Gn. Batu No. 201, Sukaraja, Cicendo, Bandung - West Java, provides services such as pre-auction, auction, and post auction. The registration process of tender participants is quite convoluted and takes a lot of time in the registration process either in terms of the auction participants or the auctioneer itself. The auction process is very time-consuming bidders themselves, where in conducting the auction, participants are required to attend directly to the auction so many prospective bidders who discontinue their intention to follow the auction process. In this design approach method is prototypemethod, while system development method using Unified Modeling Language (UML). System design tool used to describe the system model such as usecase, scenario diagram, sequence diagram.
 Index Terms - Information System, Online Auctions, Prototype, UML

A comparative study of LSTM neural networks in forecasting day-ahead global horizontal irradiance with satellite data

Accurate forecasts of solar energy are important for photovoltaic (PV) based energy plants to facilitate an early participation in energy auction markets and efficient resource planning. The study concentrates on Long Short Term Memory (LSTM), a novel forecasting method from the family of deep neural networks, and compares its forecasting accuracy to alternative methods with a proven track record in solar energy forecasting. To provide a comprehensive and reliable assessment of LSTM, the study employs remote-sensing data for testing predictive accuracy at 21 locations, 16 of which are in mainland Europe and 5 in the US. To that end, a novel framework to conduct empirical forecasting comparisons is introduced, which includes the generation of virtual PV plants. The framework enables richer comparisons with higher coverage of geographical regions. Empirical results suggest that LSTM outperforms a large number of alternative methods with substantial margin and an average forecast skill of 52.2% over the persistence model. An implication for energy management practice is that LSTM is a promising technique, which deserves a place in forecasters’ toolbox. From an academic point of view, LSTM and the proposed framework for experimental design provide a valuable environment for future studies that assess new forecasting technology.

Petroleum geology of the 2018 offshore acreage release areas

A total of 21 areas were released in 2018 for offshore petroleum exploration. They are located in the Bonaparte, Browse, Northern Carnarvon, Bight, Otway and Gippsland basins. All release areas were supported by industry nominations, indicating that interest in exploring Australia’s offshore basins remains strong, despite the significant decrease in the number of exploration wells drilled in recent years. Sixteen areas are being released under the work program bidding system with two rounds, one closing on 18 October 2018 and the other on 21 March 2019. Five areas are being released for cash bidding and include the producible La Bella gas accumulation in the Otway Basin. Prequalification for participation in the cash-bid auction closes on 4 October 2018 with the auction scheduled for 7 February 2019. Geoscience Australia continues to support industry activities by acquiring, interpreting and integrating pre-competitive datasets that are made freely available as part of the agency’s regional petroleum geological studies. The regional evaluation of the petroleum systems in the Browse Basin has been completed and work continues on assessing the distribution of Early Triassic source rocks and related petroleum occurrences across the North West Shelf. A wealth of seismic and well data, submitted under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006, are made available through the National Offshore Petroleum Information Management System. Additional datasets are accessible through Geoscience Australia’s data repository.

Bidding for Bidders? How the Format for Soliciting Supplier Participation in NYOP Auctions Impacts Channel Profit

In a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction, consumers bid for a product or service. If a bid exceeds the concealed threshold price, the consumer receives the product at her bid price. This paper examines how to optimize the interactions between the NYOP retailer and service providers, while, at the same time, managing the bid acceptance rates in order to induce the desired consumer bidding behavior. Channel profit is impacted by how the retailer decides whether or not a given consumer bid will be accepted and, if so, which service provider is chosen to supply a unit of the product to the consumer. We devise a mechanism, the modified second-price auction, which maximizes channel profit. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.