Attribution Of Intentions Research Articles

Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence

We consider a public goods game which incorporates guilt-aversion/surprise- seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Khalmetski et al., 2015). We implement the induced beliefs method (Ellingsen et al., 2010) and a within-subjects design using the strategy method. Previous studies mainly use dictator games - whose results may not be robust to adding strategic components. We …nd that guilt-aversion is far more important than surprise-seeking; and that the attribution of intentions behind guilt- aversion/surprise-seeking is important. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Suspicious Minds and Views of Fairness

Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? In a novel experimental design, participants were significantly more likely to attribute a no-redistribution vote to selfishness if they considered redistribution fair. I define this - attributing actions that do not adhere to one's own fairness view to selfishness- as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how suspicious attribution arises from two other mechanisms documented in the experiment: the participants underestimating the number of people with fairness views differing from their own and overestimating the selfishness of participants with other fairness views.

Neural correlates of intention attribution in communication: Communicative intentions and expressive means

Neural correlates of intention attribution in communication: Communicative intentions and expressive means

Different contexts change the impression of animacy.

The aim of this research was to explore the effect of different spatiotemporal contexts on the perceptual saliency of animacy, and the extent of the relationship between animacy and other related properties such as emotions and intentionality. Paired-comparisons and ratings were used to compare the impressions of animacy elicited by a small square moving on the screen, either alone or in the context of a second square. The context element was either static or moving showing an animate-like or a physical-like trajectory, and the target object moved either toward it or away from it. The movement of the target could also include animacy cues (caterpillar-like expanding/contracting phases). To determine the effect of different contexts on the emergence of emotions and intentions, we also recorded and analysed the phenomenological reports of participants. The results show that the context significantly influences the perception of animacy, which is stronger in dynamic contexts than in static ones, and also when the target is moving away from the context element than when it is approaching it. The free reports reveal different proportions in emotional or intentional attributions in the different conditions: in particular, the "moving away" condition is related to negative emotions, while the "approaching" condition evokes positive emotions. Overall, the results suggest that animacy is a graded concept that can be articulated in more general characteristics, like simple aliveness, and more specific ones, like intentions or emotions, and that the spatiotemporal contingencies of the context play a crucial role in making them evident.

Assessment of hostile and benign intent attributions in early childhood: Can we elicit meaningful information?

AbstractThroughout middle childhood and adolescence, hostile intent attributions fairly consistently predict levels of aggression. Across 28 published studies in early childhood, however, researchers have found less consistent relationships. We believe this may be due to a majority of these studies using an inappropriate methodological approach for early childhood, forced‐choice questioning. We tested the use of open‐ended vs. forced‐choice questions about intent in 118 Head Start preschool children. In response to a forced choice question, only about 30% of children attributed intent correctly to a video depicting clearly purposeful behavior. And across 18 video vignettes depicting ambiguous provocation, children's intent attribution scores based on a forced‐choice approach demonstrated neither reliability nor validity. Conversely, children's intent attribution scores in response to open‐ended questions demonstrated reliability, correspondence with other aspects of social information processing, and predictive validity in the form of relations to teacher reports of social competence and aggression. Researchers should refrain from utilizing forced‐choice approaches to intent attributions in early childhood unless also conducting intent understanding checks.

Public goods games and psychological utility: Theory and evidence

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Analyze This! Thematic Analysis: Hostility, Attribution of Intent, and Interpersonal Perception Bias.

Research suggests that aggressive individuals exhibit a strong tendency to attribute hostile intent to the behavior of others when confronted with an ambiguous social situation. The vignettes method has become a standard procedure to assess hostile attributions. Vignettes represent incomplete ambiguous social stories, in which the subjects experience a negative outcome and are asked to attribute intent to the provocateur's action. This article explores the ways in which subjects perceive ambiguous social situations and other people's intentions, their tendency to refer negative outcome to oneself, and the components defining hostility in the interpersonal relationships. The sample consisted of male adolescent violent offenders (N = 45) recruited from the Social Therapy Department of the German correctional facility for juvenile offenders in Berlin. All offenders were incarcerated for a violent or sexual crime and were currently undergoing individual and group psychotherapy. The five hypothetical vignettes used in this study were originally designed to assess hostile attributions in both institutional and noninstitutional social situations. Participants' responses were analyzed using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis revealed three key themes regarding the social perception-positive, negative, and neutral-and two themes regarding the components of hostility-provocateur-related personality features and relationship type. Although the vignettes were originally developed to detect hostility-prone perception bias, they seem to be able to reveal a wider set of different attributions of intent, both positive and negative. Thus, vignettes are not limited to assessment of hostility specifically. They much rather seem to be a measure which is sensitive to diverse attributions of intent in general. The diagnostic qualities of the vignettes, their area of application, limitations of the study, and future perspective are discussed.

The Effect of Germ Movement on the Construal of Mental States in Germs: The Moderating Role of Contamination Fear

In two studies, we examined a novel relationship between movement and anthropomorphism—the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman agents—in relation to germs. Furthermore, we examined whether individual differences in contamination fear and disgust proneness moderated the effect of movement on the tendency to anthropomorphize germs. Following an initial study that demonstrated associations between imagined germ movement, contamination fear, and the attribution of malevolent intentions to germs, we conducted a second study that experimentally manipulated germ movement with a brief film clip of magnified germs. The results of the second study showed that the experimental manipulation of germ movement increased attributions of malevolent intentions to germs and enhanced the tendencies of individuals with higher levels of contamination fear to attribute some general human characteristics to germs (i.e., intentions, feelings). These findings suggest that the attribution of malevolent intentions to germs may be a cognitive distortion that contributes to the maintenance of contamination fear, which may afford a novel treatment target. Perceived movement may serve as an antecedent to the attribution of malevolent intentions to germs and thus exacerbate the tendency to make these attributions.

Individual differences in the intentionality bias and its association with cognitive empathy

Previous research indicates that we tend to over-attribute intention when interpreting the actions of others. This ‘intentionality bias’ is explained by a dual-process model of intention attribution (Rosset, 2008). However, it is currently unclear whether individual differences exist in the intentionality bias, and specifically whether cognitive and/or affective empathy skills are associated with hyper-intentionality. In the current study, we adopted Rosset's (2008) ambiguous sentence paradigm to test whether individual differences in the intentionality bias are associated with self-reported perspective taking, online simulation, emotion contagion, proximal responsivity and peripheral responsivity. Regression analyses revealed that cognitive empathy, but not affective empathy, significantly predicted the proportion of intentional judgements when participants were asked to interpret ambiguous sentences that were prototypically accidental. Moreover, greater perspective taking skills predicted a higher proportion of intentional over accidental judgements of ambiguous actions. The implications of these findings for understanding prosocial behaviour and ‘shared intentionality’ among humans are discussed.

Robots As Intentional Agents: Using Neuroscientific Methods to Make Robots Appear More Social.

Robots are increasingly envisaged as our future cohabitants. However, while considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of their technological realization, the ability of robots to interact with humans in an intuitive and social way is still quite limited. An important challenge for social robotics is to determine how to design robots that can perceive the user’s needs, feelings, and intentions, and adapt to users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots were able to adequately demonstrate these skills, humans would eventually accept them as social companions. We argue that the best way to achieve this is using a systematic experimental approach based on behavioral and physiological neuroscience methods such as motion/eye-tracking, electroencephalography, or functional near-infrared spectroscopy embedded in interactive human–robot paradigms. This approach requires understanding how humans interact with each other, how they perform tasks together and how they develop feelings of social connection over time, and using these insights to formulate design principles that make social robots attuned to the workings of the human brain. In this review, we put forward the argument that the likelihood of artificial agents being perceived as social companions can be increased by designing them in a way that they are perceived as intentional agents that activate areas in the human brain involved in social-cognitive processing. We first review literature related to social-cognitive processes and mechanisms involved in human–human interactions, and highlight the importance of perceiving others as intentional agents to activate these social brain areas. We then discuss how attribution of intentionality can positively affect human–robot interaction by (a) fostering feelings of social connection, empathy and prosociality, and by (b) enhancing performance on joint human–robot tasks. Lastly, we describe circumstances under which attribution of intentionality to robot agents might be disadvantageous, and discuss challenges associated with designing social robots that are inspired by neuroscientific principles.

Children's hostile intent attributions and emotional distress: What do parents perceive?

Traditionally, assessments of social information processing and associated emotional distress have used children's self-reports. We posit that additional informants, such as parents, may help illuminate the association between these variables and aggression. Our sample was composed of 222 dual-parent families of fourth-grade children (103 boys; 119 girls). Children responded to instrumental and relational provocations and their parents read the same scenarios and responded the way they believed their child would. Peer nominations provided aggression scores. We explored how means differed by provocation type (relational vs. instrumental), informant (mother, father, and child), and gender of child. The results also suggest that parent perceptions may effectively predict children's participation in relational and physical aggression, above and beyond the child's self-reports.

PB 4 Neural correlates of intent attribution and laughter processing in children and adolescents

Introduction The attribution of intent during social interaction is a cornerstone of the social adjustment process ( Crick and Dodge, 1994 ). In particular, the tendency to attribute hostile intent has consistently been associated with and argued to play a role in the development and maintenance of aggressive behavior in childhood and adolescence ( Dodge, 2006 ). However, little is known about the neural correlates of hostile intent attributions ( Erdley et al., 2010 ). We used fMRI and behavioral measures to investigate intent attributions and attention biases for hostile social stimuli using social laughter processing in children and adolescents under consideration of gender and age effects. Methods 35 girls and 28 boys in three age groups (9–12, 13–15 and 16–18y; mean 15.3, SD 2.39) without current psychiatric diagnoses rated 1.5s audiovisual laugh sequences in a 3T MRI scanner. 20 friendly, 20 tickling and 20 taunting sequences ( Szameitat et al., 2009 ) were rated as friendly or taunting on a four-point scale. Rating, reaction time (RT) and attention bias (RT friendly – RT taunting laughter) differences were calculated with three 2 (gender) × 3 (age group) × 3 (laughter type) mixed model ANOVAs. Participants with excessive movement or spurious responding were removed from analysis. Neural responses were calculated in SPM8 in a whole brain analysis of the BOLD response to each laughter type and the correlations to hostile intent rating, physical aggression ( Buss and Perry, 1992 ) and callous unemotional traits ( Frick, 2003 ). Results A significant main effect of laughter type ( F = 100.62, p F = 2.829, p = .068) and the main effect of age on attention bias ( F = 2.634, p = .083) approached significance, with younger participants showing attention bias to taunting and older participants to friendly laughter. Callousness and physical aggression correlated with hostile ratings of friendly ( r = .288, p r = .315, p r = −.404, p A broad network showed increased BOLD response during laughter processing, including bilateral medial and superior temporal gyri (MTG, STG), inferior and medial frontal gyri (IFG, MFG), caudate nuclei and left superior parietal lobe (whole brain FWE p Conclusions The current study found an extended neural network involved in laughter processing in children and adolescents, similar to that found in adults ( Szameitat et al., 2010 ). In addition, attribution of hostile intent in laughter was found to associate with changes in BOLD signal strength across these processing areas. This association strength was modulated by youth’s aggressive behavior and callous personality traits.

Deep Brain Stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus does not negatively affect social cognitive abilities of patients with Parkinson\u2019s disease

Bilateral deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) is a treatment option for patients with advanced idiopathic PD successful at alleviating disabling motor symptoms. Nevertheless, the effects of STN-DBS on cognitive functions remain controversial and few studies have investigated modification of social cognitive abilities in patients with PD treated with STN-DBS. Here we expanded the typically-investigated spectrum of these abilities by simultaneously examining emotion recognition, and both affective and cognitive Theory of Mind (ToM). By means of a cross-sectional study, 20 patients with PD under dopaminergic replacement therapy, 18 patients with PD treated with STN-DBS, and 20 healthy controls performed the Ekman 60-Faces test, the full version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, and the Protocol for the Attribution of Communicative Intentions. There were no differences between the PD groups (treated and not treated with STN-DBS) on any of the social cognitive tests. Our results suggest that patients with PD who are treated with STN-DBS do not experience detrimental effects on their social cognitive abilities. The present study, the first one examining a wide spectrum of social cognitive abilities after DBS of the STN, suggests that this surgical procedure can be considered safe from this standpoint.

Theory of Mind: Towards an Evolutionary Theory

Theory of mind is an important mental faculty. However, despite almost half a century of research, we only have a limited understanding of its evolutionary past. The present article proposes a novel hypothesis on the origin of this unique human capacity. According to this hypothesis theory of mind descended from two, closely related, defensive reactions, namely tonic immobility and immobilization stress. Both reactions are conserved in many vertebrate species and are highly prevalent in immature individuals. They are produced by a combination of manual handling and restraint (common in many nursing activities) and implicated in the management of stressful encounters. Most importantly, they have been shown to facilitate eye-contact, gaze-following, and intentional attributions. These traits, and several others detailed in the text, make them prime candidates in the search for the origin of theory of mind. The article presents conceptual arguments and empirical facts in support of this hypothesis.

The relation between pathological narcissism and aggression in middle and high school students: A moderated mediation effect of hostile intent attribution through internalized shame

The relation between pathological narcissism and aggression in middle and high school students: A moderated mediation effect of hostile intent attribution through internalized shame

Paranoia and the social representation of others: a large-scale game theory approach

Current definitions of paranoia include two key components: unfounded ideas of harm and the idea that the harm is intended by others. However, attributions of harmful intent have been poorly studied and mainly using artificial scenarios rather than participation in genuine social interactions where genuine resources are at stake. Using a large non-clinical population (N = 3229) recruited online, we asked people to complete a measure of paranoid ideation before playing a modified Dictator Game, where the ‘dictator’ can allocate money to the partner (the ‘receiver’). Participants were allocated to the role of receiver or of an uninvolved observer; and evaluated to what extent they believed dictator decisions were motivated by (i) self-interest or (ii) harmful intent. All participants attributed more harmful intent to unfair as opposed to fair dictators. Paranoia had a positive effect on harmful intent attribution, for both fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia did not interact with attributions of self-interest. Importantly, highly paranoid participants attributed equally strong harmful intent to the dictator in the observer role as in the receiver role. This challenges the assumption that paranoia is mainly due to an exaggerated sense of personalised threat and suggests instead that paranoia involves a negative social representations of others.

Differential responses of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and right posterior superior temporal sulcus to spontaneous mentalizing.

Previous research suggests a role of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) in metacognitive representation of social information, while the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been linked to social perception. This study targeted these functional roles in the context of spontaneous mentalizing. An animated shapes task was presented to 46 subjects during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Stimuli consisted of video clips depicting animated shapes whose movement patterns prompt spontaneous mentalizing or simple intention attribution. Based on their differential response during spontaneous mentalizing, both regions were characterized with respect to their task-dependent connectivity profiles and their associations with autistic traits. Functional network analyses revealed highly localized coupling of the right pSTS with visual areas in the lateral occipital cortex, while the dmPFC showed extensive coupling with instances of large-scale control networks and temporal areas including the right pSTS. Autistic traits were related to mentalizing-specific activation of the dmPFC and to the strength of connectivity between the dmPFC and posterior temporal regions. These results are in good agreement with the hypothesized roles of the dmPFC and right pSTS for metacognitive representation and perception-based processing of social information, respectively, and further inform their implication in social behavior linked to autism. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3791-3803, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

A simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the Knobe effect without any vignette

In this paper we will propose a simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the moral asymmetry of intention attribution in general, which is just to ask the felicity judgments on the relevant sentences without any vignette at all. Through this approach we were in fact able to reproduce the (quasi-) Knobe effects in different languages (English and Japanese), with large effect sizes. We shall defend the significance of this simple approach by arguing that our approach and its results not only tell interesting facts about the concept of intentional action, but also show the existence of the linguistic default, which requires independent investigation. We will then argue that, despite the recent view on experimental philosophy by Knobe himself, there is a legitimate role of the empirical study of concepts in the investigations of cognitive processes in mainstream experimental philosophy, which suggests a broadly supplementary picture of experimental philosophy.

Comic Agonism in the 2016 Campaign: A Study of Iowa Caucus Rallies

In this study, we assess the extent to which attending a candidate rally was associated with distrust of democratic institutions, epistemic rigidity, attribution of malevolent intentions to the political outgroup, and acceptance of political violence. Surveys ( N = 251) were distributed at rallies the night before and day of the 2016 Iowa Caucuses. Results suggest that attendees of rallies for Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump were more likely to distrust democracy relative to attendees of a Hillary Clinton or Ted Cruz rally. Findings also suggest that mistrust of democracy was associated with greater attribution of malevolence and acceptance of political violence. Attending a Sanders or Trump rally was indirectly associated with attribution of malevolence and acceptance of political violence through democratic mistrust.

Do corporations have minds of their own?

Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in which the collectively accepted function is expressed in part through its occupier’s intentional expression of her agency in that role (where the occupier is part of the group whose collective acceptance underwrites her having the relevant function in social transactions). I identify institutions as systems of status roles and show how this is compatible with seeing the agency of institutions generally, even over time periods in which there is complete change in role occupiers, as a matter of the contributions only of individual agents. I explain how the reduction of the institution to its members is compatible with its potentially having had a completely different membership. I show in the case of the corporation in particular that, once we see its origins and function, the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading and are compatible with a deflationary account of corporate agency. I show in connection with this that the corporation is to be identified with its shareholders, and that where a corporation separates ownership and control, its managers and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders doing business under the corporate form. Finally, I canvass the legitimate ways of construing ordinary talk about corporate intention, belief, and so on, in light of this, none of which support the attribution of genuine agency or intentionality to any group per se associated with the corporation.