Attack Helicopter Research Articles

Обеспечение конвенциональной безопасности в Европе: прошлое, настоящее, будущее

The article discusses the issues of control over the size and the use for military purposes of five categories of conventional offensive weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, 100 mm+ artillery, combat aircrafts and attack helicopters. These are subjects to the restrictions in Atlantic-Ural area in accordance with the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) which is the key, though not the only one to date, international regulatory and legal instrument in this field.

Military technologies of the world

From the introduction of gunpowder to the reigning era of nuclear weapons, military technological advances have been at the forefront of change. These changes in weaponry have influenced the outcome of many historical events and the downfall or success of major civilizations. All nations have sought to improve military technologies in the hope of gaining the upper hand in conflict. The developments in guns, cannon technology, warships, tanks, and airborne and space weapons, have been crucial in the ever-changing face of war. While it is inherent in human nature to seek better weapons for survival, the use of this weaponry will continue to make an impact on history. Through careful examination of the science and engineering of these weapons, persons can continue to venture into the field of military weaponry with an outlook towards the future. Through the many advancements made in military weaponry, our civilization is one that continues to change in the face of war. Technological advancements made in this area improve upon current war tactics and often are the basis behind military warfare. Technology has proven to transform history, lending itself to be one of the most powerful assets of the human race. Breakthroughs in military technology prove to be at the forefront of war and in many cases the result of war is directly connected through these advancements. In history, major civilizations have seen their rise or downfall through the elevation of weapon technology. Lee delves into the engineering and science behind major weapons such as: guns, cannons, fighter and stealth aircrafts, various types of missiles, attack helicopters, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, main battle tanks and future weapons. He comprises the knowledge behind the weapons along with an understanding of how the weapons are used and applied to modern warfare. By showing how weapons have changed military warfare, he explains the human nature to seek better weapons for survival, protection, and domination of resources.

Numerical Analysis on Starved Elastohydrodynamic Lubrication Characteristics of Spiral Bevel Gears

The spiral bevel gears of attack helicopter transmission systems are taken as an object in this paper. The numerical analysis model for starved elastohydrodynamic lubrication (SEHL) of spiral bevel gears is established on the basis of the analysis of load tooth contacts analysis and SEHL in elliptical contacts. The SEHL characteristics of spiral bevel gears are also analyzed. The results are as follows: during the course of a gear-tooth meshing cycle of the spiral bevel gear, the extremum of minimal film thickness and maximal film pressure occurs near midpoint of the path of contact, and leans to dedendum. The minimal value of the minimal film thickness is 0.39 um, and the maximal value of the maximal film pressure is 0.69 GPa. The value of minimal film thickness gradually increases with the increasing of meshing point velocity. When the velocity of meshing point exceeds 110 m/s, the increase became tardiness. As the load of meshing point increases, the value of minimal film thickness gently diminishes.

The Influence of Attack Helicopter Modernization on Pilot Decision Process

The Influence of Attack Helicopter Modernization on Pilot Decision Process

The AU Standby Force and the Challenge of Somalia

Let us recap. In December 2006, in response to what seemed like the imminent fall of the southern city of Baidoa to the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian troops launched an offensive into Somalia in support of the country’s beleaguered interim federal government. Apparently catching the UIC off-guard, Ethiopian soldiers – backed by tanks, artillery, attack helicopters and fi xed-wing ground attack aircraft – quickly drove the UIC forces out of Mogadishu and most of the territory it had previously occupied. The remnants of the UIC fl ed to a rugged, forested corner of southern Somalia on Kenya’s border.

Flexible Force Structure: A Flexibility Oriented Force Design and Development Process for Israel

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The theory is the essence of the author's unpublished PhD Thesis, ‘Recovery from Technological and Military Doctrinal- Surprise on the Battlefield by Applied Flexibility and Adaptability’, Bar-Ilan University, 2005. 2. Azriel Lorber, Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 37–46. 3. Ido Hecht, The ‘Operational Breakthrough’ in German Military Thought 1870–1945, Tel Aviv, 1999, pp. 120–121 (Hebrew). 4. Williamson Murray, Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences, in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge, 1996, p. 125. 5. Dani Asher, ‘From “Directive 41” to “Tachrir 41”, from Egyptian Doctrine—to War’, Ma'arachot, No. 332 (1993), p. 49. 6. Efraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective, Cambridge, MA, 1988; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ, 1976; Richards, J. Heuer, Jr., ‘Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counter-Deception’, in Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), Strategic Military Deception, New York, 1982, pp. 31–69. 7. John Ferris and Michael Handel, ‘Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command and Military Operations’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 48–50. 8. Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable, Brookings General Series, reprint 343, Washington, DC, 1978, p. 61. 9. Shimon Naveh, ‘The Cult of the Offensive Preemption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought’, in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security, London, 1996, 168–187. 10. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, New Jersey, 1997, p. 86. 11. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace, Tel Aviv, 2002, pp. 61–62 (Hebrew). 12. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939, Boulder, Colorado, 1999, p. 231. 13. David M. Glantz (ed.). The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22 June–August 1941, London, 1993, p. 340. 14. R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, Norman, OK, 1991, p. 158. 15. Stephen Bungay, Alamein, Tel Aviv, 2005, p. 4 (Hebrew); Michael I. Handel, ‘Technological Surprise in War’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2. No. 1 (1987), p. 4. 16. B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, London, 1953, pp. 31–33. 17. Alfred Price, Battle Over the Reich, London, 1973, p. 70; Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, New York, 1964, p. 493. 18. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, London, 1996, p. 238. 19. R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles, London, 1960, pp. 216–217. 20. Avi Kober, ‘Has Battlefield Decision Become Obsolete? The Commitment to the Achievement of Battlefield Decision Revisited’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22. No. 2. (2001), pp. 149–152. 21. Michael Handel, Clausewitz in the Age of Technology, Tel Aviv, 1988, p. 65 (Hebrew). 22. Ya'akov Zigdon, ‘Force Building in L.I.C’, in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shay (eds.), Low Intensity Conflict, Tel Aviv, 2004, p. 307. 23. Ltc. Ido, ‘Attack Helicopters in Iraq: Failure and Success’, Ma'arachot, No. 395 (2004), pp. 12–21. 24. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London, 1975, p. 370. 25. Giora Segal, ‘The Art of Tactical Fighting: Command in the Battlefield Chaos’, Ma'arachot, Vol. 398 (2005), pp. 8–21. 26. Ibid., p. 14. Segal claims that the employment of the Mission Oriented Command method by the IDF is a myth more than a reality, because it is not officially the doctrinal command method. 27. Agranat Commission Report, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 528–530, 1348–1349. 28. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p. xii. 29. Ibid., p. XII. 30. Naveh, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, pp. 168–187. 31. Ibid., p. 169. 32. Moshe Yaalon, Ma'arachot, No. 396 (2004), pp. 12–21 (Hebrew). 33. Shmuel (Samo) Nir, ‘The Nature of L.I.C’, in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shay (eds.), Low Intensity Conflict, Tel Aviv, 2004, pp. 24–25 (Hebrew). 34. Tomer Naveh, ‘How to Overcome Raphah Tunnels?’, Ma'arachot, No. 399 (2005), pp. 8–15. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMeir FinkelMeir Finkel, a Colonel in the Israel Defence Forces, has a Ph.D. in Evolutionary Biology and a Ph.D. in Politics.

Optimizing the Presentation of Uav Images in an Attack Helicopter Cockpit

Future Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) will collaborate more directly with military manned aircraft. TNO Defence, Security and Safety investigated how to present UAV sensor images in a fighter aircraft cockpit in order to maximize target identification and flying performance. Ten military pilots performed several Close Air Support missions in a helicopter simulator using four different display configurations. The orientation of the electronic map was either North-Up or Heading-Up. The UAV sensor image was either non-aligned (unadjusted image orientation: the image is presented as seen from the UAV viewpoint), or aligned with the orientation of the electronic map (adjusted image orientation, either resulting in a North-Up orientation or a Heading-Up orientation with respect to the helicopter, depending on the orientation of the electronic map). The pilots reported that they generally preferred the aligned UAV sensor image in combination with a Heading-Up map. This preference was reflected in their performance: targets were identified twice as fast, and the waypoint trajectory was flown more efficiently.

Dynamic and Aerodynamic Clearance of the Apache AH Mk1 Attack Helicopter for Embarked Operations

The introduction into service of the Westland manufactured Apache AH Mk1 has coincided with a thrust within the UK armed services for a greater emphasis on amphibious operations within the littoral environment. From this background has emerged a requirement for an embarked, attack helicopter capability, for which the Apache AH Mk1 has been earmarked. However, this helicopter being, by design, optimized for the battlefield environment, cannot be presumed to adapt to the naval environment without presenting certain challenges. This article describes how Westland Helicopters Ltd has sought to determine the feasibility of conducting embarked operations with Apache AH Mk1 by deriving limits to be respected during Ship Helicopter Operating Limits (SHOL) trials using a variety of analytical methods. Aspects of operation considered include aircraft lashing, landing, stability on deck with rotors running or stationary and when being towed, rotor engagement and disengagement, ground resonance, and main rotor spreading and folding. The article considers further aspects of importance to embarked operations and summarizes the trials process that results in an operational envelope for service use. It concludes that a practical operating envelope can be achieved, anticipates a successful outcome for the SHOL trials, and includes a projection for future activities to enhance the aircraft's maritime operational capabilities.

Freedom fighters and rebels: the rules of civil war

War is not as simple as it used to be. Wars (or armed conflicts, to use the modern term) between states are now infrequent and civil wars, which have always happened, attract more attention than previously. In the face of terror and localized violence to civilians on a large scale within a state the United Nations (UN), or even other states, may feel compelled to do something to prevent such actions in the future. This ‘something’ may involve the use of armed force to defeat or ‘bring to justice’ those considered responsible for the condemned acts. Frequently overlaid with such action is the desire of aid agencies to provide medical and other services to those affected by the conflict. In reality, terror on a large scale tests to the extreme the law's ability to prevent it. This paper is concerned with one aspect of the matter—namely, the activities of freedom fighters and rebels in civil wars and how international law (in the form of international humanitarian law) can be used to protect those who do not take part in the conflict. This is a widespread phenomenon which should not be overshadowed by the events of 11 September 2001. International humanitarian law (or the laws of war) has developed principally to control the treatment of the ‘victims’ of an international armed conflict, such as the wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their first Additional Protocol of 1977 are the main sources of this law. Members of the armed forces of a state are entitled to take part in the conflict, are styled as ‘lawful combatants’ and upon capture are to be treated as prisoners of war, entitled to the detailed regimen set out in the third Geneva Convention of 1949. The 1949 Geneva Conventions contain only one Article dealing with a non-international armed conflict (common Article 3) but Additional Protocol II of 1977 (much shorter than Protocol I) applies to conflicts between the armed forces of a state and ‘dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups, which under responsible command exercise such control over a part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this protocol’. The article does not apply to sporadic acts of violence, and a state may of course deny that what is happening is an armed conflict. As at 19 April 2001 there are 157 States party to this Protocol; all 189 members of the UN have signed up to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In this paper I concentrate on non-international armed conflicts, or civil wars, though the term can be ambiguous. There may be doubt whether the armed conflict is international or non-international: a state may disintegrate into separate states; there may be an attempt to take over the government of a state by ‘rebels’; ‘warlords’ may control part of the territory of the state rich in natural resources; ‘freedom fighters’ may seek independence for a part of the state comprised of a particular ethnic group. The intensity of the conflict may increase and decrease. The state concerned may be strong or weak. I shall refer to those who fight against the armed forces of the state as ‘rebels’. Government forces will usually have an advantage, in terms of military equipment and manpower, over the rebels. For instance, the rebels are unlikely to possess jet bombers or sophisticated attack helicopters. The rebels may therefore resort to more ‘basic’ activities that include terrorizing, killing or injuring those who are not taking an active part in the conflict. Moreover, rebels are unlikely to have any knowledge or training in the limits of action imposed by international humanitarian law (it has to be assumed that government forces will have had some basic training in this area of law and that the commanders will wish to maintain discipline amongst their troops). Overlaid with international humanitarian law is the law of the state concerned. Thus, rebels will often be seen by the government as ‘outlaws’ or ‘terrorists’. In such conflicts, unlike international armed conflicts, there is no notion of the ‘lawful combatant’ on the part of the rebels.

An Exploratory Investigation of Relationships between Situation Awareness and Performance in an Attack Helicopter Domain

As part of a research program studying display concepts to increase tactical situation awareness (SA) in the attack helicopter domain we investigated the relationship between SA and performance. In order to test this relationship empirically, we developed two measures of SA that could be assessed independently of performance, a detailed measure and a high-level measure. In three phases of a simulated attack helicopter mission the detailed measure, but not the high-level measure, was significantly correlated with a measure of performance. The results offer conditional empirical support for a relationship between SA and performance.

Representing and Visualizing a Dynamically Changing Tactical Situation

In a research project investigating information requirements for increasing SA in the attack helicopter domain, we examined issues concerned with the presentation of dynamically changing information about a tactical situation. We explored features including an underlying digital map, supplementary unit information, and dynamically updated information about enemy and friendly unit movements. We found that although continuous updating would most accurately represent the current tactical situation, periodic updates were more successful in making subjects aware of the changing enemy and friendly dispositions, thereby supporting higher levels of SA. We found that some features rated as highly useful were not actually invoked during the simulation, suggesting that subjective evaluations of utility of display features may be a misleading indicator of their actual usage.

Evaluating attack helicopters by AHP based on linguistic variable weight

In this paper, we propose a new method for evaluating weapon systems by analytical hierarchy process (AHP) based on linguistic variable weight. Many researchers used fuzzy arithmetic operations with weight and attribute of computing performance score to solve fuzzy MADM problems, such as S.M. Chen [Evaluating weapon systems using fuzzy arithmetic operations, Fuzzy sets and systems 77 (1996) 265–276]. Chen used a large number of fuzzy arithmetic operations, which not only causes information (data) loss or more fuzziness, but also adds to the difficulty and accuracy of decision-making. Therefore, we use linguistic variable weight method to solve the above problems, and to avoid the mistake of decision-making. Our method possesses intuition, in accord with human rethinking-model, and is close to humanized uncertainty of language expression. We use many experts' viewpoints to build the membership function in order to calculate the performance score, and identify expectation of the decision-maker to avoid the constraint of system alternatives and subjective judgements of the decision-maker. In this paper, we also use linguistic variable method to revise the method of C.H. Cheng [in: Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Defense Management, pp. 1113–1124] and R.R. Yager [Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 (1978) 87–95]. Firstly, we measure the importance of relative weight, and use it to determine the centralization or dilation power of linguistic hedge. When the power of linguistic hedge is determined, we can use it to calculate the results of decision-making. Finally, we construct a practical example for evaluating attack helicopters to illustrate our proposed method.

The Genetic Algorithm as an Automated Methodology for Helicopter Conceptual Design

The genetic algorithm (GA) is a search algorithm that mimics the patterns of natural selection and reproduction displayed by biological populations. The GA's operation as a non-calculus-based search and optimization method makes it a good candidate for use in conceptual design. This paper presents a discussion of the use of a GA as an automated approach to conceptual design of helicopters. To accomplish this task, a GA was combined with an industry-standard helicopter sizing code. This resulting genetic algorithm-based design code was then used to generate conceptual designs for the medium lift replacement helicopter and a hypothetical attack helicopter. Results of these design efforts are discussed, providing insight into the use of a GA to automate the conceptual design of helicopters.

Taking the Lead? Light Weapons and International Security

INTRODUCTION In recent years, the global proliferation of conventional weapons has earned a prominent, if not a central, place on the increasingly crowded post-Cold War international security agenda. But while public, academic, and governmental awareness of the problems associated with the proliferation of conventional weapons is growing, the diffusion of light weapons (a subset of conventional armaments) remains seriously under-examined. This is somewhat surprising given that ninety per cent of all deaths and injuries sustained in the course of intrastate conflicts since 1993 were the result of direct fire from light weapons.(f.1) For those interested in dealing with the weapons that kill people in armed conflict, it is also disturbing; for, as one recent study concludes, 'before efforts to limit light weapons are likely to be effective, the issue itself must receive significantly more national and international attention.'(f.2) Simply stated, unless and until the ubiquity, ready availability, and continuing proliferation of light weapons is recognized as a serious impediment to democratization, development, good governance, and peacebuilding, it is unlikely that serious steps will be taken to develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with them. The purpose of this article is threefold: to provide an overview of the causes and consequences of the ready availability and continuing proliferation of light weapons; to develop a framework for thinking about practical, realistic, and constructive measures to address the problem; and to identify ways in which Canada might take the lead in advancing this agenda. After a discussion of the nature of light weapons, the article develops four propositions: 1 the ready availability and continuing proliferation of light weapons pose serious challenges to development, democratization, good governance, and other aspects of 'sustainable human security'; 2 underpinning the diffusion of light weapons is a complex ecology of causation that includes the failure of states to provide adequate security against threats of organized or unstructured violence, the persistence of militarized cultural forms, the increased availability of light weapons on the international market, and the absence of any generally agreed international norm limiting the rights of states to acquire such weapons; 3 to be effective, political measures will have to address both the supply and demand sides of the light weapons equation; and 4 Canada can play an important, if modest, leadership role in mobilizing the international community to deal with the problems of light weapons. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Although there is no authoritative definition of light weapons, by convention they are understood to be armaments that are used in intercommunal and intrastate conflict and that fall below the threshold of major conventional weapons systems (that is, those weapons encompassed by the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles/launchers).(f.3) At one end of this spectrum are 'small arms' such as pistols, assault rifles, and light machine guns.(f.4) At the other end are crew-served armaments such as recoilless rifles, mortars, light artillery, and even some missile systems. Strictly speaking, the term includes landmines, though these are often treated as a separate category, especially in the context of international disarmament negotiations. Light weapons can be found at every point along the continuum of technological complexity. At one extreme, they can be highly sophisticated and embody increasingly advanced (and lethal) technologies. The most important technological developments include reductions in size and weight; improvements in target acquisition; increased rate of fire; 'improved ballistic and terminal effects of projectiles'; 'improvements in affordability, simplicity, and ruggedness'; and reduced maintenance requirements. …

Finite-difference time-domain analysis of HF antennas on helicopter airframes

In this paper, the finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) method with the Berenger perfectly matched layer (PML) absorbing boundary condition (ABC) is used to model the radiation characteristics of high frequency (HF) antennas operating in the 2-30 MHz range on a full-scale helicopter. The computed input impedance of both antennas is compared with actual measurements from an operational full-scale helicopter and also with measurements on a scale model NASA generic advanced attack helicopter (GAAH). To study the coupling effects of the helicopter fuselage on the antenna systems, the S-parameters are computed and compared with measurements on the NASA GAAH scale model. Finally, computed gain patterns are compared with actual in-flight measurements of the antenna systems on an operational full-scale helicopter.

British army aviation in the 1990s

The Army Air Corps has gone from strength to strength since its formation in 1957 with the increased need for and recognition of the roles of helicopter support by commanders on the ground. As technology has advanced, so has the ability of the helicopter to perform a under range of tasks and this has come to fruition with the new generation of Attack Helicopters. As Director Army Air Corps, General Lytle describes the technical and organisational advances of the last few years for Army Aviation and the central role of the Attack Helicopter for flexible operations of the future.

The defence environment and the helicopter industry

Fulfilling military needs at a time of changing priorities and strategies requires a close understanding by industry of those needs and the environment in which the military may be called upon to operate. The UK MoD and helicopter industry have, worked together to ensure a fleet of modern helicopters fully supported by a prime contactor are available for the many tasks our Services must undertake. In this view from industry, the authors discuss how developments in the world defence environment and the changes in retirements that entails has been interpreted and met by one company—West‐ land. They highlight, current deficiencies and requirements, including all‐weather performance, reliability, strategic reach, range and payload and survivability, and provide a bidder's view of the Attack Helicopter, concluding that industry is well placed to continue meeting the needs of the Services in the changing, marketplace as in the changing world.

Bombardment analysis method for assessing truss system combat survivability

The system combat surviv ability of structures is an essential issue of design analysis for many important structures such as the truss boom of an attack helicopter. Its system failure due to combat damage may cost much more than the repairable nonsystem failure. Nevertheless, before the difficult system survivability of twodimensional multiple-story and statically indeterminate truss structures can be assessed, the bombardment survivability of each truss component should be predicted somehow. In this article, the Poisson process is used to model the approaching situation of fragments from a high explosive warload detonated in the vicinity of the targeted area encompassing a truss structure. Then a judicious Lee-Buffon method is developed and merged with the Poisson's model to accommodate the bombardment analysis of truss components due to small incoming fragments in a decomposed and probabilistic sense. Moreover, the ingenious combinational pivotal decomposition method is employed to assess the truss system combat survivability systematically. With minor modification, this analysis scheme may also be applied for space station truss structures subject to micrometeoroid/debris impacts.

Introduction: Military Spending, the American Economy, and the End of the Cold War

Paul Kennedy's (1987) retrospective and prophetic volume, The Rise and Fall of the caused quite a stir when it suggested that military spending leads to the downfall of the very nations that use it most heavily to project their influence internationally. Drawing on examples of Ottoman Turkey, Hapsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, and nineteenth-century Britain, Kennedy theorized that Great Powers, or major players in the world system, invariably suffered from imperial overstretch, an excessive spending on troops, navies, and weapons systems that saps investment from the civilian sector and contributes to the gradual erosion of their economic competitiveness. Eventually, as first-rate powers became second, then third-rate, ones, declining tax revenues from increasingly inefficient economies hampered the ability to project military influence abroad. It takes little imagination to apply Kennedy's warning to the world's foremost Great Power today. The strength of the Pax Americana since World War II was largely a reflection of the ability of the United States simultaneously to support an enormous nuclear arsenal, a large, well-equipped army, a navy with fleets in every ocean, specialized military operations in troublesome Third World contexts, a ring of military bases around the so-called Communist block, and various alliances with its subordinate partners (e.g., NATO, SEATO, ANZUS). In the 1980s, the U.S. military machine grew mightily under the Reagan administration. In the 1980s, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, it was said, never met a weapons system he didn't like. And so were born the B-1 bomber, the B-2 Stealth bomber, the Star Wars spacebased defense system, the Trident submarine, the MX missile, the cruise missile, the neutron bomb, a 600-ship Navy, the Apache attack helicopter, the Tomahawk missile, the F-16 fighter, and many, many others (some of which got their start earlier during the Carter administration). There was, and is, of course, a substantial economic and political cost to these operations. Officially, the Pentagon today consumes roughly 30 percent of federal expenditures, or $300 billion annually. However, other military-related expenditures are throughout the federal budget. Research for nuclear weapons, for example, falls within the domain of the Department of Energy; veterans' payments are included within Health and Human Services; military foreign aid (which comprises the bulk of U.S. assistance extended overseas) is part of the State Department's budget; and significant shares of NASA's budget arc also dedicated to military purposes, such as spy satellites. If these hidden costs are included, the Pentagon's budget may rise to as high as 50 percent of federal government expenditures (Wirls 1992). The differences between military and civilian markets have been clarified in numerous works (e.g., Ettlinger 1992). The Pentagon is a monopsonist-a single buyer in a guaranteed market-largely unconcerned about price or profit. Ostensibly, the main criteria underlying decisions to purchase weapons include quality and acquisition times. The demand for military goods and services, therefore, is

Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security

The resumption of Sino-Russian military contact and subsequent military transactions since the beginning of the 1990s are the most significant and radical developments in the two countries' bilateral relationship. The speed, scope, and volume of military sales between Moscow and Beijing had not been anticipated by many observers. Since late 1990, Beijing and Moscow have completed major transactions in military equipment, such as the sale to China of 24 Su-27s, and more deals reportedly are being discussed. These include sale of an additional 48 Su-27s; joint production of MiG-31 interceptors, Tu-22 Backfire medium-range bombers, IL-76 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS), and attack helicopters; joint development of China's air-defense systems, the Yak-141 VSTOL naval fighter, T-72M2 main battle tanks (the latest version of the series), ground-air and ground-ground missiles, naval vessels including submarines and the 67,500-ton aircraft carrier Varyag, and nuclear and missile technology. If these deals, or even some of them, are finalized, the quality and quantity of the arms would constitute a real breakthrough. The potential is enormous for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to elevate significantly its defense and projection capabilities. These actual and possible Russian military sales have been the largest foreign arms delivery to the PRC since the Sino-Soviet honeymoon in the early 1950s. But the earlier military ties between Beijing and Moscow were basically in the historical context of the Cold War and the Korean War. The PRC's current serious effort to acquire Russian military equip-