Flexible Force Structure: A Flexibility Oriented Force Design and Development Process for Israel

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The theory is the essence of the author's unpublished PhD Thesis, ‘Recovery from Technological and Military Doctrinal- Surprise on the Battlefield by Applied Flexibility and Adaptability’, Bar-Ilan University, 2005. 2. Azriel Lorber, Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 37–46. 3. Ido Hecht, The ‘Operational Breakthrough’ in German Military Thought 1870–1945, Tel Aviv, 1999, pp. 120–121 (Hebrew). 4. Williamson Murray, Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences, in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge, 1996, p. 125. 5. Dani Asher, ‘From “Directive 41” to “Tachrir 41”, from Egyptian Doctrine—to War’, Ma'arachot, No. 332 (1993), p. 49. 6. Efraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective, Cambridge, MA, 1988; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ, 1976; Richards, J. Heuer, Jr., ‘Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counter-Deception’, in Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), Strategic Military Deception, New York, 1982, pp. 31–69. 7. John Ferris and Michael Handel, ‘Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command and Military Operations’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 48–50. 8. Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable, Brookings General Series, reprint 343, Washington, DC, 1978, p. 61. 9. Shimon Naveh, ‘The Cult of the Offensive Preemption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought’, in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security, London, 1996, 168–187. 10. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, New Jersey, 1997, p. 86. 11. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace, Tel Aviv, 2002, pp. 61–62 (Hebrew). 12. Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939, Boulder, Colorado, 1999, p. 231. 13. David M. Glantz (ed.). The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22 June–August 1941, London, 1993, p. 340. 14. R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, Norman, OK, 1991, p. 158. 15. Stephen Bungay, Alamein, Tel Aviv, 2005, p. 4 (Hebrew); Michael I. Handel, ‘Technological Surprise in War’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2. No. 1 (1987), p. 4. 16. B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, London, 1953, pp. 31–33. 17. Alfred Price, Battle Over the Reich, London, 1973, p. 70; Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, New York, 1964, p. 493. 18. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, London, 1996, p. 238. 19. R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles, London, 1960, pp. 216–217. 20. Avi Kober, ‘Has Battlefield Decision Become Obsolete? The Commitment to the Achievement of Battlefield Decision Revisited’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22. No. 2. (2001), pp. 149–152. 21. Michael Handel, Clausewitz in the Age of Technology, Tel Aviv, 1988, p. 65 (Hebrew). 22. Ya'akov Zigdon, ‘Force Building in L.I.C’, in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shay (eds.), Low Intensity Conflict, Tel Aviv, 2004, p. 307. 23. Ltc. Ido, ‘Attack Helicopters in Iraq: Failure and Success’, Ma'arachot, No. 395 (2004), pp. 12–21. 24. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London, 1975, p. 370. 25. Giora Segal, ‘The Art of Tactical Fighting: Command in the Battlefield Chaos’, Ma'arachot, Vol. 398 (2005), pp. 8–21. 26. Ibid., p. 14. Segal claims that the employment of the Mission Oriented Command method by the IDF is a myth more than a reality, because it is not officially the doctrinal command method. 27. Agranat Commission Report, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 528–530, 1348–1349. 28. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p. xii. 29. Ibid., p. XII. 30. Naveh, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, pp. 168–187. 31. Ibid., p. 169. 32. Moshe Yaalon, Ma'arachot, No. 396 (2004), pp. 12–21 (Hebrew). 33. Shmuel (Samo) Nir, ‘The Nature of L.I.C’, in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shay (eds.), Low Intensity Conflict, Tel Aviv, 2004, pp. 24–25 (Hebrew). 34. Tomer Naveh, ‘How to Overcome Raphah Tunnels?’, Ma'arachot, No. 399 (2005), pp. 8–15. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMeir FinkelMeir Finkel, a Colonel in the Israel Defence Forces, has a Ph.D. in Evolutionary Biology and a Ph.D. in Politics.