Atlantic Cooperation Research Articles

The seeds of Marielle Franco: Afrodiasporic agency at the online-offline nexus

ABSTRACT Based on our fieldwork with Rio de Janeiro favela activists and social movements, this paper looks into how Black female activists, during the COVID-19 pandemic, engaged with multimodal resources and practical sociolinguistic imaginations that yielded forms of agency within an unequal social matrix. While engaging with a critique of the liberal model of agency as the triumph of individual autonomy, this paper ethnographically looks to modes of agency that unfold at the online-offline nexus as a capacity to act that emerges from pain and suffering, within limits of the language that wounds, and in the context of surviving capitalist inequities. This modality of agency becomes visible in the mourning movement for Marielle Franco, a Black favela councilwoman brutally murdered in 2018. Ethnographically, we discuss the Afrodiasporic agency of mourners as ‘watering Marielle’s seeds’, that is, as expanding Marielle’s sociolinguistic imaginations of language diversity, access to semiotic resources, and Black Atlantic cooperation.

Eyes on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. To What Extent was Germany Involved in the NATO Diplomacy Surrounding Finland and Sweden in the Early 1990s?

After the breakup of the Eastern Bloc, NATO started transforming from a military alliance of the West to a cooperative security organisation of Europe as a whole. When strengthening liaison with the former Warsaw Pact countries, an important German–American initiative was the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). From the perspective of Germany, the NACC widened the scope for the European security dimension, whose core element was the Western European Union (WEU). In Finland and Sweden, changes in security thinking resulted in adjustments in the policy of neutrality. The chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl was an active spokesperson for Finnish and Swedish memberships in the European Community (EC) and Nordic participation in the WEU, but for the first time, this article examines to what extent Germany was involved when Finland and Sweden started building their relations with the NACC.

Legal principles of international cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic alliance

The article analyzes the legal principles of Ukraine’s international cooperation with NATO and the European Union.The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 1993 «Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy» was one of the first documents that established the basic principles of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the Alliance. The defining feature of the foreign policy is the establishment of partnership relations with Western countries, mutually beneficial cooperation, participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the North Atlantic Assembly.The Partnership for Peace Framework Document stipulates that the signatory state will develop an individual partnership program. Participation in the Program involves cooperation with NATO in the military, military-techni-cal, military-political spheres, in the field of science, ecology, defense economy, etc.On 14 September 1995, the NATO-Ukraine North Atlantic Council approved an Individual Partnership Program, marking the beginning of an “expanded and deepened” relationship.The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and NATO on the estab-lishment of a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine with the aim of disseminating the informa-tion about NATO was of great importance.The decisive factor was the adoption the Charter on a Special Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, a basic political document, on July 9, 1997.The subsequent legal regulations laid the grounds for a stable relationship between Ukraine, NATO and European Union member states. These are, in particular: the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, “Military Doctrine of Ukraine”, Laws of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ukraine’s Refusal to Implement a Non-Aligned Policy”, “On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine on the Foreign Policy of Ukraine” and “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (on the strategic course of the state to gain full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)”.Thus, the political and legal measures to form the foundation for significant rapprochement with NATO and the European Union are implemented.

German–Norwegian relations in security and defence: What kind of partnership?

The article contributes to the debate on European defence cooperation and integration by analysing the German–Norwegian security and defence partnership. I define this partnership as being based upon mutual interests and values, and one in which the minor partner has important resources to contribute which accord with the larger partner’s interests and values. The article analyses this partnership within the framework of European integration and Atlantic cooperation, and in terms of how the discourse on strategic autonomy shapes the partnership. The article discusses two specific areas of cooperation, the High North and German–Norwegian collaboration on defence procurement. When analysing this relationship, I argue that Norway applies strategies such as acting as an external resource, adaptation and shielding to influence German policies vital to Norwegian security.

The Birth of French Neo-liberalism and International Order in the 1930s: Its search for European Integration and Atlantic Cooperation

The Birth of French Neo-liberalism and International Order in the 1930s: Its search for European Integration and Atlantic Cooperation

The Role of Great Britain in the Process of Formation of Relations EU–NATO: History and Modernity

The article presents the results of a study of the UK’s involvement in the European Union–NATO relations process during 1990–2010s in the context of establishment the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The methodology of the study was formed by a systematic approach, methods of historical analysis, historical-genetic, periodization, comparative-historical, etc. An interdisciplinary approach made it possible to use certain methods of other sciences, in particular, political science (institutional comparative analysis, event analysis), elements of political modeling and forecasting. It is stated that the British leadership has been in the position of preserving the integrity of the Atlantic co-operation system since the early 1990s. The UK’s position as a staunch supporter of Atlanticism has become one of the decisive and at the same time controversial factors in the creation of the EU Security and Defense Council. Until the second half of the 1990s, British governments opposed the EU’s provision of military and political resources and supported the WEU as a «European support» for NATO. The Blair government’s consent to the transfer of WEU functions to the European Union opened the way for establishing a direct relationship between the union and the Alliance. The signing of the Berlin Plus Agreement with the European Union in 2002–2003 was one of the main elements of NATO’s reform. The political and strategic crisis of NATO in the early 2000s reinforced the relevance of a purely European defense structure. However, the inability of the EU to deploy military resources, the resistance of the Atlanteans, led to a general failure of the autonomy of the CSDP. During the Cameron governments, London openly favored the formation of a NATO Response Force, rejecting the development of EU military resources. Although in the context of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, Europeans’ attention has shifted from the EU’s military capabilities to traditional Atlantic security structures, the strengthening of the Union’s military mechanisms following Britain’s exit has not been ruled out. The United Kingdom is directly involved in the strategic weakness of the EU as a subject of the European and world security system, in a NATO-dependent operational and resource plan. At the same time, Brexit can complicate the task of unifying security, weakening the difficult EU–NATO relationship. Key words: Great Britain; EU; NATO; Common Security and Defense Policy; USA.

Розвиток комунікативної культури співробітництва Україна-НАТО

The article deals with the peculiarities of the concepts "communicative culture" and "communicative instruction" perception in the diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization context. Ukraine's mission to NATO culture, it’s forms of cooperation are analyzed. Main events that contributed to the cooperation between modern Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization communicative culture development are outlined. "Communicative culture" is considered as a tool, as a set of best practices, the study subjects characteristic and as a subsequent communications trajectory to be reproduced. Among the publications related to diplomatic communication between Ukraine and NATO problems, there are narratives that consider this issue in the context of the "communicative guidance" term, which stands to denote the impact on a partner for one purpose or another: to persuade, to doubt, to force to do, etc; the state of the subject's propensity to make any communication. Ukraine-NATO communication practices confirm the correctness of the application of the concept of "communication culture". The Ukraine - NATO communicative culture formation begins with firmly commitment of sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine to democracy and the rule of law, which is the key to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO-Ukraine relations date back to the 1990s and have since become one of NATO's most important partnerships. Since 2014, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, cooperation in important areas has been intensified. The establishment of constructive communication began after the end of the Cold War, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace (1994). In response to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, NATO has stepped up its capacity-building and force-building support to Ukraine. NATO countries continue to condemn Russia's illegal Crimea annexation and its destabilizing and aggressive activities in eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea region. NATO has increased its presence in the Black Sea. Following the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, practical support is provided to Ukraine as part of the Comprehensive Assistance Package to Ukraine. In June 2017, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law restoring the country’s course towards NATO membership as a strategic goal of foreign and security policy.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2019 marks three anniversaries of great significance to the Republic of Slovenia, its citizens, its security and defence system, and the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The first anniversary commemorates 70 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the other two relate to the 15 years of Slovenia's membership of the European Union and NATO. Celebrating 70 years of NATO is of central importance because of the Alliance's symbolic meaning. Although it was officially established on 4 April 1949, it is true to say that North Atlantic cooperation is far older. It began during the mass immigration of members of numerous nations from the territories of today’s European Union and other parts of the world into North America. So far, several generations have been connected through family ties on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean; yet, these ties are not the only ones. These relationships overcame terrible ordeals in both World Wars, and resulted in cooperation, later officially named the Alliance, in the aftermath of World War II for one reason only – for it to never happen again. On the celebration of the 70th anniversary of NATO in Washington, D.C., the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that “[the Treaty's] reach is vast, and it has stood the test of time – because we have united around our core commitment to protect and defend one another”. In a wider sense, however, this long lasting Alliance is probably all about striving to safeguard, preserve and develop the Western European cultural, historical, political, sociological, security, defence, military (and so on) identity. Recently, the geopolitical aspect and the importance of the Alliance in relation to other emerging political actors, mainly from the East, have become increasingly important. Nevertheless, despite the major changes it has undergone in the past 70 years, the Alliance, having seemed obsolete to other security organizations, is now as vital as ever. The fact that the Republic of Slovenia has already been a member of the European Union and NATO for 15 years appears logical, particularly from the historical perspective. The territory of what is now Slovenia, where our ancestors have lived for centuries, was part of the Holy Roman Empire for over a thousand years, the Austrian Empire for 63 years, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire for 51 years. The 20th century saw several different organizational structures, with us as part of them, together with those countries which are now collectively referred to as the Western Balkans. However, the 21st century brought us membership of the European Union and NATO, i.e. a “place” where we can finally belong. On 23 March 2003, a referendum on Slovenia’s membership of the EU and NATO was held, asking the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia if they were in favour of joining the two organizations. Almost 90% of voters favoured Slovenia joining the EU, while 66% voted to join NATO. The current edition of Contemporary Military Challenges is dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Slovenia's membership of the Alliance. In 2009 and 2014, two special thematic issues were published, marking the 5th and 10th anniversaries respectively, highlighting the experience gained, and describing the best and also the less successful practices. We wanted to write them down, to remember them and leave them for generations yet to come. What is more, we wanted to share our experience with other countries aiming to join the Alliance. Our purpose here was to help those countries to not repeat our mistakes, and to assist them in avoiding mistakes altogether. For this issue, authors from other countries were invited to share their experiences and views of their countries’ and Slovenia’s membership of the Alliance. Special thanks go to David Humar and Primož Šavc for their invaluable assistance in creating the current edition.

Turning Foe to Friend? US Objectives in Including Russia in Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security Co-operation

ABSTRACTThis article scrutinises four moments in the post-Cold War era where the United States engaged to include Russia in Euro-Atlantic security forums: the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; Partnership for Peace; Permanent Joint Council; and the NATO-Russia Council. The overall puzzle is: why did consecutive US administrations aim to formalise co-operation between NATO and Russia? Current tensions highlight the issue's significance, yet in the literature, there is no study looking specifically at these episodes of US efforts to integrate Moscow. Building on a broad set of primary sources, this article determines what we can now know of US objectives concerning the role of Russia in Euro-Atlantic co-operation. It concludes that US objectives moved from seeking new and stable relations between former adversaries, to facilitating US objectives in the Euro-Atlantic context with NATO enlargement, to expressing more global interests in confronting emerging crises and challenges, amongst others in the war on terror. Co-operation was limited to where interests were overlapping. Russia would not be placed in a position to influence NATO as an alliance. US officials remained hopeful that co-operation with Russia was possible, and would benefit all. At the same time, decisions would serve US interests should relations sour.

Air ambulance and hospital services for critically ill and injured in Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands: how can we improve?

The Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA) is an intergovernmental organization under the auspices of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The NORA region comprises Greenland, Iceland, Faroe Islands and western coastal areas of Norway. Historical, cultural and institutional links bind these nations together in multiple ways, and regional co-operation has in recent years become a focus of interest. This commentary addresses air medical services (AMSs) and available advanced hospital services in the 3 smallest NORA countries challenged sparse populations, hereafter referred to as the region. It seems likely that strengthened regional co-operation can help these countries to address common challenges within health care by exchanging know-how and best practices, pooling resources and improving the efficiency of care delivery. The 4 largest hospitals in the region, Dronning Ingrids Hospital in Nuuk (Greenland), Landspítali in Reykjavík and Sjúkrahúsið á Akureyri, (both in Iceland) and Landssjúkrahúsið Tórshavn on the Faroe Islands, have therefore undertaken the project Network for patient transport in the North-West Atlantic (in Danish: Netværk for patienttransport i Vest-Norden). The goal of the project, and of this article, is to exchange information and provide an overview of current AMSs and access to acute hospital care for severely ill or injured patients in the 3 participating countries. Of equal importance is the intention to highlight the need for increased regional co-operation to optimize use of limited resources in the provision of health care services.

“All We Have Done, We Have Done for Freedom”: TheCreoleSlave-Ship Revolt (1841) and the Revolutionary Atlantic

AbstractThe revolt aboard the American slaving ship theCreole(1841) was an unprecedented success. A minority of the 135 captive African Americans aboard seized the vessel as it sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, to the New Orleans slave markets. They forced the crew to sail to the Bahamas, where they claimed their freedom. Building on previous studies of theCreole, this article argues that the revolt succeeded due to the circulation of radical struggle. Condensed in collective memory, political solidarity, and active protest and resistance, this circulation breached the boundaries between land and ocean, and gave shape to the revolutionary Atlantic. These mutineers achieved their ultimate aim of freedom due to their own prior experiences of resistance, their preparedness to risk death in violent insurrection, and because they sailed into a Bahamian context in which black Atlantic cooperation from below forced the British to serve the letter of their own law.

The Euro-Atlantic Brand

“Euro-Atlantic” as a political power brand name was employed possibly for the first time in a 1985 speech by Bettino Craxi, then president of the European Council, when he spoke about “Italy's Euro-Atlantic role.” Its political usage was codified in the label Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a group formed in 1997 and which now numbers fifty “partner” governments. EAPC is the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. (The NACC was created as an adjunct to NATO six years earlier in the first flush of post–Cold War Europe.) Among EAPC partners are not only eleven far-flung (and non-Atlantic-riparian) governments of the former Soviet Union—from Armenia to Uzbekistan—but also the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. Russia itself is listed among the partners, although its leaders remain highly suspicious of the NATO parent.

Across the Atlantic cooperation to address international challenges in eHealth and health IT: Managing toward a common goal

Purpose Countries on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean have invested in health information and communication technologies. Since eHealth challenges cross borders a European Union–United States of America conference on public policies relating to health IT and eHealth was held October 20–21, 2008 in Paris, France. Process The conference was organized around the four themes: (1) privacy and security, (2) health IT interoperability, (3) deployment and adoption of health IT, and (4) Public Private Collaborative Governance. The four key themes framed the discussion over the two days of plenary sessions and workshops. Results Key findings of the conference were organized along the four themes. (1) Privacy and security: Patients’ access to their own data and key elements of a patient identification management framework were discussed. (2) Health IT interoperability: Three significant and common interoperability challenges emerged: (a) the need to establish common or compatible standards and clear guidelines for their implementation, (b) the desirability for shared certification criteria and (c) the need for greater awareness of the importance of interoperability. (3) Deployment and adoption of health IT: Three major areas of need emerged: (a) a shared knowledge base and assessment framework, (b) public-private collaboration and (c) and effective organizational change strategies. (4) Public Private Collaborative Governance: Sharing and communication are central to success in this area. Nations can learn from one another about ways to develop harmonious, effective partnerships. Conclusions Three areas that were identified as highest priority for collaboration included: (1) health data security, (2) developing effective strategies to ensure healthcare professionals’ acceptance of health IT tools, and (3) interoperability.

Back to the Future?

This article evaluates different theoretical frameworks for understanding both the nature ofthe NATO alliance and the evolution of NATO- Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. It argues that the evolution of relations between the alliance and Moscow is best accounted for by the realist analytical perspective, while liberal and social-constructivist perspectives fail to capture the most important aspects of the alliance. Despite the establishment ofthe NATO-Russia Council in 2002, a balance-of-power logic, dictated by an international system that has remained to a large extent anarchical, continues to shape relations between the alliance and Moscow. The article proceeds in four sections. It begins with a short summary of NATO-Russia relations since the end ofthe Cold War. It then lays out the main theoretical frameworks that have been used to explain relations between the alliance and Moscow: liberal, social-constructivist, and realist ideas about - and prescriptions for - NATO-Russia relations. The next section applies all sets of perspectives to the record of key post-Cold War NATO -Russia relations. The article concludes with a section explaining why realism is the strongest explanatory paradigm.NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS DURING THE 1990SAlthough during the Cold War, and particularly in the period of detente, NATO had shown it could adapt to the evolution of east-west relations, the collapse of the USSR in December 199 1 marked the beginning of a new and uncertain phase in the alliance's history. Many scholars and decision-makers alike saw in the disappearance of the original catalyzing threat, which had led to west European calls for a US defence commitment to Europe in 1947, the risk that the alliance might soon become obsolete - unless its members were able to craft a new role for NATO. While the failed Soviet conservatives' coup in August 199 1 served as a warning that NATO's original purpose could not be completely disposed of, western leaders were swift to recognize the need for a rapid update in this institution's role. The declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance that was adopted by the North Atlantic Council in London in July 1990, while reaffirming the basic principles on which the alliance rested, also identified a first set of initiatives aimed at reforming NATO's role in post- Cold War Europe. At its Rome summit in November 1991, the alliance adopted a new strategic concept in which, alongside restating the defence dimension, prominence was also given to economic, social, and environmental issues. In addition, the new strategic concept envisioned a peacekeeping role for NATO outside the borders of its member countries. These changes reflected a consciousness that, unless the alliance was willing to reform, it risked drifting towards gradual irrelevance and marginalization.1The efforts to revitalize the alliance and assert its relevance in the postCold War international system also kicked offa new phase in relations with Moscow. After the end of the Cold War, Russian decision-makers expected NATO somehow to atrophy and championed the emergence of a new European security structure; at the same time, however, they did not reject the alliance's offer of cooperation and declared their identification and wish to align with the west. After the establishment in December 199 1 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to discuss issues of common concern between NATO and former Soviet bloc states, Moscow joined the newly launched Partnership for Peace program in June 1994. However, the Kremlin insisted that Russia would not let itself be treated as a country on a par with other nonmembers of the alliance, but required an arrangement that was qualitatively different from those offered to other former Soviet bloc states. Following the alliance's intervention in the Balkans and the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in November 1995, Russian troops participated in the implementation and stabilization forces that were deployed in BosniaHerzegovina with the aim of supervising the application of the agreement, and in May 1997 Russia entered the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council. …

In Defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad, NATO Nuclear Forces and Transatlantic Relations 1956–1963

In the history of NATO, lack of Atlantic communality is a recurring theme. Atlantic cohesion was constantly challenged. However, the discord among NATO members rarely threatened the very existence of the Alliance. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed such a rare occurrence. In Europe the question of nuclear sharing triggered the development of blue-prints for a step-by-step replacement of the Atlantic security co-operation by a European Security Community. These blueprints were discussed among the EEC member-states and within the forum of the WEU. This study analyses not only those concepts, but also the role of the SACEUR, General Norstad, in defending NATO from external threats and internal decay. By studying the leeway of the SACEUR, this study tries to establish whether the subsystem of the international system, formed by the nations of the North Atlantic area after the Second World War, should be characterised as a system of hegemonic stability or as a pluralistic security community. The article is based on recently declassified archival material from both sides of the Atlantic.

Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain

THE RECENT WAR in Iraq has triggered the most severe transatlantic tensions in a generation, dividing Europeans and Americans from each other and themselves. Pundits proclaim daily the imminent collapse of three vital pillars in the institutional architecture of world politics: NATO, the UN, and even the EU. And yet some form of trans atlantic cooperation clearly remains essential, given the vast mutual interests at stake. Where, then, should the Western alliance go now? The Iraq crisis offers two basic lessons. The first, for Europeans, is that American hawks were right. Unilateral intervention to coerce regime change can be a cost-effective way to deal with rogue states. In military matters, there is only one superpower-the United States-and it can go it alone if it has to. It is time to accept this fact and move on. The second lesson, for Americans, is that moderate skeptics on both sides of the Atlantic were also right. Winning a peace is much harder than winning a war. Intervention is cheap in the short run but expensive in the long run. And when it comes to the essential instruments for avoiding chaos or quagmire once the fighting stops-trade, aid, peace keeping, international monitoring, and multilateral legitimacy Europe remains indispensable. In this respect, the unipolar world turns out to be bipolar after all. Given these truths, it is now time to work out a new transatlantic bar gain, one that redirects complementary military and civilian instruments

Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: Disillusionment in the Caucasus and Central Asia

When the Soviet Union fell into shards, it was as if Western liberal democracy—at least on the level of words—suddenly vaulted far to the east, into the traditional heartland of “Oriental despotism.” Ten years later, all the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia now have parliaments, elected presidents, and (Turkmenistan excepted) multiple parties. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) extends across the steppes two-thirds of the way to the Yellow Sea, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council includes the homeland of Genghis Khan. When Western forms sprang eastwards, so did the hopes of Western democrats and the interest of Western businesses in the Caspian basin. Today, however, in response to the region’s authoritarianism, corruption, and limited oil, disillusionment has set in. It is an appropriate moment to take stock. A serious taxonomy of Caucasian and Central Asian regimes must separate out three political patterns. In the first, which predominates in most of the region, the ruler is a powerful president who typically was the Communist first secretary during Soviet days. There is no effective power sharing, whether with parliaments, local governments, or independent judiciaries. (Tajikistan is a special case. The Russian government forced its local allies into a fragile power-sharing agreement with Islamist guerrilla fighters.) Yet despite these elements of continuity, there are striking differences from Soviet times. First, the major role that the “center” in Moscow played in the government of the republics has disappeared. Because the center had directed most of the economy, the selection of officials, Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., is director of the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and research professor of international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. His most recent contribution to the Journal of Democracy was “Russia Under Putin: The Feudal Analogy” (July 2000).

NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement

When Bill Clinton became President of the United States in 1993, policymakers and analysts alike questioned NATO's importance and relevance in the post-Cold War world. [1] Without the agreed-upon threat of communism and the Soviet Union's presence, NATO was forced to reevaluate its role and mission in European security. Now, as the Clinton Administration comes to a close, NATO exists as the central pillar of European security and remains vital to the implementation of US foreign policy in the Balkans. Since 1993, much research has been devoted to NATO's evolution. Analysts have examined NATO's organizational adaptations to the post-Cold War world, [2] its bombing campaign and peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia, [3] and more recently the military activities and peace-enforcement operation in Kosovo. [4] In addition to these deployments and organizational changes, NATO's enlargement has been another defining moment for the alliance since the Cold War's end. At NATO's 1997 Madrid Summit, formal membership invitations were extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. After the invitations, NATO promised that its doors remained to new members in the future. This commitment was reiterated at NATO's Washington Summit in 1999, when the allies again pledged to revisit the issue of expansion at its next major summit in 2002. Since NATO's 1999 military campaign in Kosovo, expansion has fallen from NATO's agenda. However, in parts of Europe it remains an issue of critical importance. In the Baltic states, the newly created democracies in the Balkans, and in other states in the Mediterranean region, NATO membership is a central foreign policy objective of many governments. At Vilnius, Lithuania, in May 2000, nine applicant states issued a joint declaration to NATO that enlargement should occur soon and should include many new states. Thus, while in some respects NATO's enlargement has disappeared from the political agenda in the United States and among some allies, the push for expansion continues throughout much of Europe. This article turns to NATO's promised open door policy and examines the prospects for the next round of expansion and the political variables that will likely determine whether NATO proceeds with enlargement. While many diplomatic, military, and political issues will affect when and if NATO expands, judging from the events surrounding the Madrid Summit, NATO's great powers will be crucial in determining new membership. Thus, this article focuses on the United States' and other NATO member states' willingness to support expansion, as well as a new dynamic to the enlargement question--the Visegrad states' ability to adapt to NATO's military requirements. Most evidence suggests that enlargement will be a difficult decision for NATO due to vast differences among the allies over how expansion should proceed. This divisive environment does not bode well for the alliance as it assumes a larger role in European security and military affairs. Before examining these variables, let us first turn to the official policy and underlying political factors that were crucial to NATO's expansion in 1997, which have much bearing on the debates to come as 2002 nears. NATO Enlargement, 1997 The decision to expand NATO evolved over time and was principally orchestrated by the United States. As the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Soviet Union disbanded, NATO recognized its historic opportunity to forge new relationships with the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. At the Rome Summit in 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to serve as a policy forum for these states to develop a formal dialogue with the alliance. Although expansion was not on NATO's agenda at that time, the NACC represented NATO's first official outreach program to develop more formal relations with its former communist adversaries. …

THE INTERNET AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN

In previous articles I have commented on the new United Kingdom Data Protection Act 1998, on the protection and confidentiality of data on the Internet (particularly in relation to data flows to the United States) and on the possible control/censorship of online material. None of those articles more than touched on the more serious but connected issue of the way in which the law deals with children on the Internet and how information about children is handled or controlled. Clearly there are many aspects to this question and I shall endeavour to deal with some of them in this article. Although to Internet afficionados, it may be trite to remind readers that in legal terms the Internet is no different from any other medium, I think that it does no harm to remind oneself that, from a philosophical perspective, the way in which children’s rights are applied (or abused) on the Internet is no different from the way these same issues are dealt with in terrestrial law enforcement. See: http://news2.this.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid%5f2170007217770.stm for an example of cross Atlantic co-operation in this field. Certainly, the global and intrinsically secret nature of the Internet may afford opportunities of access to children by those persons wishing to do them harm — moral, emotional or physical. This article is not intended to be apologist for those people; there may be arguable reasons why adults of sound mind should be permitted (whether under the guise of the First Amendment or similar) to access material which some parts of society might consider not to its taste. Such arguments cannot exist in relation to children (or in relation to those of less than full mental capability).

The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997: blessings of liberty

List of Abbreviations Introduction Falling Satellites The Hand of Friendship The Coup against Gorbachev The North Atlantic Cooperation Council An Arms-Length Friendship? Peacekeeping Beyond Cooperation Associate Allies? Encounter in Warsaw and the Secret Letter A Concrete Perspective Partnership for Peace A Fresh Breeze from Evere The Allies Travem:unde The Brussels Summit Presentation Aftermath A Special Partnership Main Parameters Consultations as Appropriate How and Why Reassurance Puzzling Evidence A Process of Examination From Noordwijk to Brussels Cold Peace? The Enlargement Study Intensified Dialogue Warning Signs The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act Endgame Afoot One or More Enhanced Partnership The NATO-Russia Act Ukraine Affordable Stability? Closing Arguments From Paris to Madrid: The Defining Moment Conclusion and Recommendations Appendixes A: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, July 8, 1997 B: Chronology of Principal Events C: Fundamental Principles of NATO Enlargement D: Signatories to the Partnership for Peace E: Benefits of NATO Enlargement F: Focus of Pre-Accession Military Work Notes Selected Bibliography Index