Assumption Of Rational Expectations Research Articles

Fiscal stimulus with imperfect expectations: Spending vs. tax policy

This paper addresses the question: how sensitive is the power of fiscal policy at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) to the assumption of rational expectations? We do so through the lens of a standard New Keynesian model in which people are dynamic level-k thinkers. Our analysis weakens the case for using government spending to stabilize the economy when the ZLB binds. The less sophisticated people are, the smaller the government-spending multiplier is. Our analysis strengthens the case for using tax policy to stabilize output when the ZLB is binding. The power of tax policy to stabilize the economy during the ZLB period is essentially undiminished when agents do not have rational expectations. Our results are robust to whether or not Ricardian equivalence holds. Finally, we show that the way in which tax policy is communicated is critical to its effectiveness.

Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs

Econometric models of strategic interactions among people or firms have received a great deal of attention in the literature. Less attention has been paid to the role of the underlying assumptions about the way agents form beliefs about other agents. We focus on a single large Bayesian game with idiosyncratic strategic neighborhoods and develop an approach of empirical modeling that relaxes the assumption of rational expectations and allows the players to form beliefs differently. By drawing on the main intuition of Kalai (2004), we introduce the notion of hindsight regret, which measures each player’s ex-post value of other players’ type information, and obtain the belief-free bound for the hindsight regret. Using this bound, we derive testable implications and develop a bootstrap inference procedure for the structural parameters. Our inference method is uniformly valid regardless of the size of strategic neighborhoods and tends to exhibit high power when the neighborhoods are large. We demonstrate the finite sample performance of the method through Monte Carlo simulations.

An assessment on rational expectations and perception engineering in the cyber-capitalist age

In recent years, studies in economics have revealed that analyses in psychology, sociology, religion, and ethics have begun to describe trends in the markets, household preferences, entrepreneurships, and investor decisions. These studies are referred to be results of the critical dynamics put forward by the "Rational Expectations Theory." Although conditional rationality is widely assumed in economic analysis, the assumptions of rational expectations as a unique approach allow for new perspectives of bias on the perception engineering which is being realised through social media for both political or economic operations. Percepion engineering has become easy and widespread in this new age of cyber-capitalism in which artificilal intelligence (AI) based Management Information Systems (MIS) and IoT tend to dominate pervasively for economic, political or religious reasons. This study asserts that investment decisions, political tendencies and economic preferences may not be rational due to exposure to perception engineering through innovative technology of algorithms and social media. Therefore, in today's cyber-capitalist ecosystems, the generation of manipulated social consent has been incredibly enhanced by hacking, collecting, accumulating, changing, controlling, and disseminating information for propaganda and marketing purposes over social media. In this multidiscipinary study, perception engineering that has become a part of artificial intelligence-assisted social engineering processes, is concluded to be the key spoiler of rational expectations of economic agents. In this context, possible measures are developed and suggested.

Risk-Taking and Asymmetric Learning in Boom and Bust Markets

Abstract An increasing number of studies depart from the rational expectations assumption to reconcile survey expectations with asset prices. While surveys are helpful to establish a link between subjective beliefs and investment decisions, precise inference about how investors depart from rational expectations can be challenging without relying on strong assumptions. In this article, we provide direct experimental evidence of how systematic distortions in investors’ expectations affect their risk-taking across market cycles. As mechanism, we identify an asymmetry in how individuals update their expectations across boom and bust markets. The documented mechanism is consistent with survey data and provides important implications for recently proposed asset pricing models.

The Drifting Influence of Hall's Random-Walk Hypothesis on Consumption Modeling

Abstract Hall's 1978 article titled “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle–Permanent Income Hypothesis” was meant to revolutionize consumption modeling. It indeed delivered, but not by becoming the dominant modeling strategy, but by unleashing a complex process of interaction between researchers in consumption and interconnected fields that transformed Hall's original object, from a local theory of consumption into a growing research area spanning the fields of consumption, finance, monetary policy and econometric modeling, and becoming, at the turn of the century, a building block of the DSGE modeling framework. Researchers reacting to innovative work produced new models that acted modified the context of research inducing a feedback system responsible for a connected set of innovations in the fields mentioned above. Along that process the practice of consumption modeling drifted away from Hall's original proposal, suggesting the necessity of a more nuanced view of the notion of influence in contemporary macroeconomics. In this particular case, we found that drifting occurred within the bounds set by the Euler equation and the assumptions of intertemporal optimization and rational expectations.

Overreaction and Diagnostic Expectations in Macroeconomics

We present the case for the centrality of overreaction in expectations for addressing important challenges in finance and macroeconomics. First, non-rational expectations by market participants can be measured and modeled in ways that address some of the key challenges posed by the rational expectations revolution, most importantly the idea that economic agents are forward-looking. Second, belief overreaction can account for many long-standing empirical puzzles in macro and finance, which emphasize the extreme volatility and boom-bust dynamics of key time series, such as stock prices, credit, and investment. Third, overreaction relies on psychology and is disciplined by survey data on expectations. This suggests that relaxing the assumption of rational expectations is a promising strategy, helps theory and evidence go together, and promises a unified view of a great deal of data.

Theories of Learning and Economic Policy

L’hypothèse de référence, celle des anticipations rationnelles, suppose, d’une part, un degré irréaliste de rationalité des agents économiques, et d’autre part élude la question de savoir comment les agents parviennent à se coordonner sur une position d’équilibre. Cet article examine comment les théories de l’apprentissage, et plus particulièrement de l’apprentissage adaptatif, traitent ces questions et peuvent conduire à des conclusions en termes de politique économique distinctes de celles obtenues avec anticipations rationnelles. Des exemples sont discutés, ils incluent la politique monétaire au sein de modèles de la nouvelle économie keynésienne, la vision néo-Fisherienne de la politique économique, les objectifs d’inflation, les modèles d’hyperinflation et les politiques macroéconomiques visant à éviter la stagnation au taux plancher zéro.

Long-run expectations of households

The rational expectations assumption, e.g. in life-cycle models and portfolio-choice models, prescribes that all actions are in line with a well-structured and unbiased system of expectations. In reality, justification and identification of expectations are nontrivial, and we lack empirical evidence especially for the long run. This paper starts to fill this gap and elicits short-run and long-run expectations of a sample of households that is designed to be representative of the universe of German households. We focus on expectations about three highly welfare-relevant markets: the stock market, the labor market, and the housing market. We show that linear extrapolations of short-run expectations can approximate long-run expectations in the labor market, but not in financial or housing markets. In the latter two markets, long-run expectations of households are severely below linear price growth and far below historical values. This extreme pessimism does not extend to the labor market, where expectations are fairly close to historical values. We also document substantial heterogeneity of expectations by socio-economic and personal characteristics, e.g., females are more pessimistic than males about outcomes in all markets.

International business cycles: Information matters

We propose a mechanism that explains standard stylized facts in both international macroeconomics and international finance. To do so, we develop a New Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions à la Bernanke et al. (1999), in which we depart from the full-information rational expectations (FIRE) assumption. The key ingredient is home information bias (HIB) in expectations. While the FIRE model predicts high consumption co-movements, no departure from uncovered interest parity (UIP) and procyclical trade balance, assuming HIB makes the model consistent with the data by producing low consumption correlation, solving the quantity puzzle, generating endogenous departures from the UIP and matching a countercyclical trade balance. The mechanism is empirically validated and shown to be robust to the extent of frictions in the economy.

Narrative expectations in financial forecasting

AbstractHow do people form expectations about the future? We use amateur and expert investors' expectations about financial asset prices to study this question. Three experiments contrast the rational expectations assumption from neoclassical economics (investors forecast according to neoclassical financial theory) against two psychological theories of expectation formation—behaviorally informed expectations (investors understand empirical market anomalies and expect these anomalies to occur) and narrative expectations (investors use narrative thinking to predict future prices). Whereas neoclassical financial theory maintains that past public information cannot be used to predict future prices, participants used company performance information revealed before a base price quotation to project future price trends after that quotation (Experiment 1), contradicting rational expectations. Importantly, these projections were stronger when information concerned predictions about a company's future performance rather than actual data about its past performance, suggesting that people not only rely on financially irrelevant (but narratively relevant) information for making predictions but erroneously impose temporal order on that information. These biased predictions had downstream consequences for asset allocation choices (Experiment 2), and these choices were driven in part by affective reactions to the company performance news (Experiment 3). There were some mild effects of expertise, but overall the effects of narrative appear to be consistent across all levels of expertise studied, including professional financial analysts. We conclude by discussing the prospects for a narrative theory of choice that provide new microfoundational insights about economic behavior.

Managing Macroeconomic Neoliberalism: Capital and the Resilience of the Rational Expectations Assumption since the Great Recession

ABSTRACT There is little systematic work on how much the core of mainstream macroeconomics has changed since the crisis of 2008 and even less on what explains patterns of stability and change. This paper addresses this gap by first, mapping out debates over the core assumption of rational expectations in high-prestige academic publications and the research of central banks of systemic importance and second, deploying a sociological perspective to assess the various forms of capital deployed by orthodox defenders, radical challengers and constructive critics of this assumption. The paper finds that although the core of modern macro has seen a more robust radical challenge than one might have expect, the defense of rational expectations remained quantitatively dominant and substantively elastic. While radical challengers had access to significant material resources and symbolic capital, orthodox players control the institutions of the economics profession via editorial boards and refereeing for the top journals. As such, the orthodox exercise a strong gatekeeping function that allows some pluralism yet also goes some way toward explaining their continued intellectual dominance.

An Economy of Neural Networks: Learning from Heterogeneous Experiences

This paper proposes a new way to model behavioral agents in dynamic macro-financial environments. Agents are described as neural networks and learn policies from idiosyncratic past experiences. I investigate the feedback between irrationality and past outcomes in an economy with heterogeneous shocks similar to Aiyagari (1994). In the model, the rational expectations assumption is seriously violated because learning of a decision rule for savings is unstable. Agents who fall into learning traps save either excessively or save nothing, which provides a candidate explanation for several empirical puzzles about wealth distribution. Neural network agents have a higher average MPC and exhibit excess sensitivity of consumption. Learning can negatively affect intergenerational mobility.

Fiscal Policy at the Zero Lower Bound Without Rational Expectations

We address the question of how sensitive is the power of fiscal policy in the ZLB to the assumption of rational expectations. We do so through the lens of a standard NK model in which people are level-k thinkers. Our analysis weakens the case for using government spending to stabilize the economy when the ZLB binds. The less sophis- ticated people are, the smaller is the size of the government-spending multiplier. Our analysis strengthens the case for using tax policy to stabilize output when the ZLB is binding. The power of tax policy to stabilize the economy during the ZLB period is essentially undiminished when agents do not have rational expectations. Finally, we show that the way in which tax policy is communicated is critical to its effectiveness.

Why Are Rational Expectations Violated in Social Interactions?

Individuals often interact with each other through observation --- they observe the choices of other people who possess private information. In such social interactions, it is typically assumed that decision makers have rational expectations, therefore they can infer what other decision makers know via observation of their choices. In this study, I assess the validity of the rational expectations assumption in a social interaction experiment. I use a simple and transparent experimental setting to show that decision makers often fail to exhibit rational expectations in social interactions and this behavior is independent of commonly documented errors in statistical reasoning: subjects exhibit a higher level of irrationality in the presence than in the absence of social interaction, even when they receive informationally equivalent signals across the two conditions. A series of treatments aimed at identifying mechanisms suggests that the behavior of other people are often ambiguous to a decision maker who observes their choices. So, the decision maker behaves as if she has limited ability to infer the relationship between what other people choose and what they know.

Perceived uncertainty shocks, excess optimism-pessimism, and learning in the business cycle

What are the effects of beliefs, sentiment, and uncertainty, over the business cycle? To answer this question, we develop a behavioral New Keynesian macroeconomic model, in which we relax the assumption of rational expectations. Agents are, instead, boundedly rational: they have a finite-planning horizon, and they learn about the economy over time. Moreover, we allow agents to have a potentially asymmetric loss function in forecasting, which creates a direct channel for expected variances to affect the economy. In forming expectations, agents may be subject to shifts in optimism and pessimism (sentiment) and their beliefs may be influenced by their perceptions about future uncertainty. We estimate the behavioral model using Bayesian methods and exploit a large number of subjective expectation series (both point and density forecasts) at different horizons from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. We find that sentiment shocks are the key source of business cycle fluctuations. Shifts in perceived uncertainty can also affect real activity and inflation through a confidence channel, as they play an important role in belief formation. Overall, the results shed light on the importance of behavioral forces over the business cycles, and on the contribution and interaction of first-moment - sentiment - shocks versus second-moment - perceived uncertainty - shocks.

Expectations, Coordination Failures and Macro Crises

AbstractDeep recessions and disruptions in credit markets have caused social concern and motivated research for a long time. They still challenge macroeconomic analysis. We map some observable features of a set of such episodes, trying to find common elements of the whole family of events. The different macroeconomic experiences show a high degree of heterogeneity. Given that, what emerges as a central element of crises is their character as a life-changing episode for the people concerned, which remains in their memory and triggers a search for lessons, as they frustrate past expectations and force widespread reevaluations of wealth and income prospects. Critical periods involve dynamics at different time scales, as economic changes with lasting implications take place in an environment of dramatic day-to-day variability. Crises tend to be associated with breaks in the growth trends of the economies in question, in a way that may surprise not only agents inclined to eccentric behavior, but also those who held beliefs based on prevalent economic analysis. Macroeconomic disturbances of this sort raise strong questions about the pertinence, and the logic, of usual rational expectations assumptions and modeling practices. These issues are briefly discussed in an opening section.

Learning and the Effectiveness of Central Bank Forward Guidance

AbstractThis paper examines the link between expectations formation and the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance. A standard New Keynesian model is extended to include forward guidance shocks in the monetary policy rule. Agents form expectations about future macro‐economic variables via either the standard rational expectations hypothesis or an adaptive learning model. The results show that the assumption of rational expectations overstates the effects of forward guidance relative to adaptive learning during an economic crisis. Thus, if monetary policy is based on a model with rational expectations, the results of forward guidance could be potentially misleading.

Computing semiparametric efficiency bounds in discrete choice models with strategic-interactions and rational expectations

This paper computes semiparametric efficiency bounds for finite-dimensional parameters in discrete choice models with nonparametric regressors in the form of conditional expectations. These can include expectations about exogenous events as well as expectations about the choices of other agents. Thus, the models studied here include incomplete-information games, social-interactions models as well as single-agent discrete choice models with uncertainty as special cases. Our bounds rely on the assumption of rational expectations and on regularity conditions of equilibrium beliefs. The paper focuses on binary-choice models but the derivation of the bounds illustrates how our approach can be extended to multinomial choice cases. Explicit efficiency bound expressions for the models examined here had not been derived before. Furthermore, since we also characterize the efficient influence functions, our results can also potentially be used to construct semiparametrically efficient estimators for these models.

Perceived Uncertainty Shocks, Excess Optimism-Pessimism, and Learning in the Business Cycle

What are the effects of beliefs, sentiment, and uncertainty, over the business cycle? To answer this question, we develop a behavioral New Keynesian macroeconomic model, in which we relax the assumption of rational expectations. Agents are, instead, boundedly rational: they have a finite-planning horizon, and they learn about the economy over time. Moreover, we allow agents to have a potentially asymmetric loss function in forecasting, which creates a direct channel for expected variances to affect the economy. In forming expectations, agents may be subject to shifts in optimism and pessimism (sentiment) and their beliefs may be influenced by their perceptions about future uncertainty. We estimate the behavioral model using Bayesian methods and exploit a large number of subjective expectation series (both point and density forecasts) at different horizons from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. We find that sentiment shocks are the key source of business cycle fluctuations. Shifts in perceived uncertainty can also affect real activity and inflation through a confidence channel, as they play an important role in belief formation. Overall, the results shed light on the importance of behavioral forces over the business cycles, and on the contribution and interaction of first-moment - sentiment - shocks versus second-moment - perceived uncertainty - shocks.

Restrictions on Asset-Price Movements Under Rational Expectations: Theory and Evidence

How restrictive is the assumption of rational expectations in asset markets? We provide two contributions to address this question. First, we derive restrictions on the admissible variation in asset prices in a general class of rational-expectations equilibria. The challenge in this task is that asset prices reflect both beliefs and preferences. We gain traction by considering market-implied, or risk-neutral, probabilities of future outcomes, and we provide a mapping between the variation in these probabilities and the minimum curvature of utility — or, more generally, the slope of the stochastic discount factor — required to rationalize the marginal investor’s beliefs. Second, we implement these bounds empirically using S&P 500 index options. We find that very high utility curvature is required to rationalize the behavior of risk-neutral beliefs, and in some cases, no stochastic discount factor in the class we consider is capable of rationalizing these beliefs. This provides evidence of overreaction to new information relative to the rational benchmark. We show further that this overreaction is strongest for beliefs over prices at distant horizons, and that our findings cannot be explained by factors specific to the option market.