Associative-propositional Evaluation Model Research Articles

First Thought, Best Thought: Positive Mood Maintains and Negative Mood Degrades Implicit-Explicit Attitude Correspondence

Two studies investigate the effect of mood on the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes toward African Americans (Experiment 1) and implicit and explicit academic attitudes (Experiment 2). Because explicit and implicit attitudes are more related when people validate their automatic attitudes as true (the associative-propositional evaluation model) and because people tend to validate their immediate reactions when they are in positive rather than negative moods (the affect-as-information model), the authors predicted a stronger implicit-explicit attitude correspondence among positive versus negative mood participants. As predicted, in both studies, participants exhibited a significant correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes when in positive moods but not when in negative moods.

Unraveling the Processes Underlying Evaluation: Attitudes from the Perspective of the Ape Model

The present article provides an analysis of the attitude construct from the perspective of the Associative–Propositional Evaluation Model (APE Model). It is argued that evaluative responses should be understood in terms of their underlying mental processes: associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation, independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. Associative processes are claimed to provide the basis for primitive affective reactions; propositional processes are assumed to form the basis for evaluative judgments. Implications of this conceptualization for a variety of questions are discussed, such as automatic features of attitudes, processes of attitude formation and change, attitude representation in memory, context–sensitivity and stability of attitudes, and the difference between personal and cultural evaluations.

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: Conceptual, empirical, and metatheoretical issues: Reply to Albarracín, Hart, and McCulloch (2006), Kruglanski and Dechesne (2006), and Petty and Briñol (2006).

Commentators on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen’s (2006) recently proposed associativepropositional evaluation (APE) model raised a number of interesting conceptual, empirical, and metatheoretical issues. The authors consider these issues and conclude that (a) the conceptual criticisms raised against the APE model are based on misinterpretations of its basic assumptions, (b) the empirical criticisms are unfounded, as they are inconsistent with the available evidence, and (c) the proposed alternative accounts appear to be less parsimonious and weaker in their predictive power than the APE model. Nevertheless, the commentators offered valuable suggestions for extensions of the APE model, which the authors discuss with respect to their implications for new directions in attitude research.

A metacognitive approach to "implicit" and "explicit" evaluations: Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006).

A metacognitive model (MCM) is presented to describe how automatic (implicit) and deliberative (explicit) measures of attitudes respond to change attempts. The model assumes that contemporary implicit measures tap quick evaluative associations, whereas explicit measures also consider the perceived validity of these associations (and other factors). Change in explicit measures is greater than implicit measures when new evaluative associations are formed and old associations are rejected. Implicit measure change is greater than explicit when newly formed evaluative associations are rejected. When implicit and explicit evaluations conflict, implicit ambivalence can occur. The authors relate the MCM to the associative-propositional evaluation model and explain how the MCM builds on the attitude strength assumptions of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion.

Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006).

The authors comment on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006) associative-propositional evaluation model of implicit and explicit attitudes by examining the claims that (a) truth value is attached to propositions but not to associations; (b) pattern activation is qualitatively different from syllogistic structure of arguments; and (c) Pavlovian conditioning may be propositional, whereas evaluative conditioning is not. They conclude that despite surface dissimilarities between implicit and explicit attitudes both may be mediated by the same underlying process.

Associating versus proposing or associating what we propose: Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006).

This commentary highlights the strengths of the associative-propositional evaluation model. It then describes problems in proposing a qualitative separation between propositional and associative processes. Propositional processes are instead described as associative. Propositions are ordered associations, whereas many other associations do not depend on the order of the involved elements. Implications of this alternative definition for the phenomenology of thought and for social psychology are discussed.