Army General Staff Research Articles

5 Lin Biao's Plots Against Other Senior Leaders

Abstract On August 25, 1966, there appeared a big-character poster titled "Bombard XX" at the Headquarters of the Army General Staff. Responding to [Mao's] command to "Bombard the Headquarters" [August 5, 1966, big-character poster—Ed.] everyone in a certain department at the Headquarters signed the [August 25] poster, but no one expected that the poster would soon be used to attack Marshal He Long.

The Civil War in the American West (review)

BOOK REVIEWS249 all relevant sites in the Fairfax-Warrenton-Front Royal-Leesburg quadrangle . Two additional tours cover outlying areas pertinent to Mosby's life and military operations, notably the Harpers Ferry area and central Virginia. Most of the sites are structures of one kind or another, but a significant number of skirmishes and burial places are included. Privately owned sites are identified as such in order to prevent possibly unpleasant confrontations with property owners. No effort is made in the book to analyze critically Mosby's campaigns and his significance or lack of same in the eastern theater. The work is simply a guidebook, and, although overly adulatory in places, it fulfills the requirements of the genre quite adequately. Those readers who want more details and a chronology of Mosby's activities will turn to the works of Virgil C. Jones and Jeffry Wert; those who want to ride where Mosby rode and stand where he stood will be thankful for the work of Evans and Moyers. They, like James I. Robertson, have produced a book that will provide pleasure to segments of the general reading public, who may then turn to more substantive treatments of the subject for further study. William Glenn Robertson U.S. Army Command and General Staff College The Civil War in the American West. By Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. Pp. xiv, 448. $27.50.) This book contains five vignettes on military movements in the transMississippi West during the Civil War: the battles of Glorieta Pass and Pea Ridge, General Nathaniel Banks's campaigns in Louisiana, and Indian warfare in Minnesota and on the High Plains. Mr. Josephy describes background events leading up to each movement and offers detailed descriptions of the military action. For example, his narrative of Glorieta Pass begins with a discussion about the repercussions of secession on army units in Texas and the Southwest and its impact on reducing United States military strength in the region. Similarly, his description of the Sand Creek Massacre includes an account of Caucasian-Indian difficulties on the plains as well as those leading to the massacre itself. Each section of the book contains a detailed map, which permits the reader to follow the account more easily. As one might expect, given Mr. Josephy's background, the book is well written and the narrative uncomplicated. Author of a number of books on Native Americans in the West, Mr. Josephy also served as an associate editor for Time and as editor of American Heritage before retiring. Josephy's study is the first major publication that describes military events in both western states and territories under one cover, and for that reason it is a worthwhile contribution to the literature of the Civil War. Roy Colton's Civil War in the Western Territories (1959) focuses 250CIVIL WAR HISTORY on the Southwest, and LeRoy Fisher's The Western Territories in the Civil War (1977) is a collection of graduate seminar papers that deal with territories only. Despite its contribution, Josephy's book is, in some respects, a disappointment . For one thing, it suffers from jumpy organization. Josephy intersperses military events that had some relationship to the Civil War with Indian troubles and warfare. Thus in the first section he describes the fighting at Glorieta Pass in New Mexico, and in the second he moves on to the Sioux outbreak in Minnesota. From there the narrative focuses on Banks's efforts in Louisiana before returning to the central plains for descriptions of the Sand Creek Massacre, the Battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas, and bushwhacking in Missouri and Kansas. In addition, Josephy does not follow a strict chronological order; nor does he define the West for his reader. While placing events in chronological order is not an essential requirement in writing history, it is somewhat disconcerting to read about the 1864 occurrence at Sand Creek before an account of the Battle of Pea Ridge, which occurred in 1862. And some readers might consider Banks's Port Hudson and Red River campaigns integral to the military movements along the entire Mississippi River rather than separate from them. Except for the fact that they took place on...

"Closing Ranks" and "Seeking Honors": W. E. B. Du Bois in World War I

In July 1918, at the height of American mobilization during World War I, W. E. B. Du Bois issued Close Ranks, one of the best-known and least-understood prescriptions in the history of civil rights protest. In the Crisis, the monthly journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), he called on African Americans to forget [their] special grievances and close ranks with white Americans and the Allies for the duration of the war. Close Ranks is commonly described as the most controversial editorial of Du Bois's long career. Not only was it accommodationist in tone; it was also published when he was seeking a commission as a captain in the Military Intelligence Branch (MIB), an antiradical agency of the United States Army General Staff. He applied to MIB at the suggestion of his friend, the white chairman of the NAACP, Joel E. Spingarn, who was then serving as an intelligence officer. Although Du Bois insisted that the editorial and the commission were unconnected, his motives became a matter of scorching debate among campaigners for equal rights, and they have puzzled historians and biographers ever since. The controversy damaged Du Bois's reputation as an unbending opponent of racial discrimination and deepened the divisions between various factions in the increasingly vigorous black political vanguard. Partly because of Close Ranks, Du Bois was to recall World War I with a mixture of shame and bitterness for the next forty years.1 The importance of the Close Ranks incident in the life of W. E. B. Du Bois is not in question; contemporaries and historians noted the mauling he received in the black press and his struggle to defend himself. But no attempt has been made to investigate fully his critics' most serious charge: that he wrote the editorial to strengthen his application for a commission. Historians have cited Close Ranks in three main ways. Most commonly, it is used to epitomize black patriotic senti-

Joseph Bradley. <italic>Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia</italic>. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 274. $27.50

Journal Article Joseph Bradley. Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 274. $27.50 Get access Bradley Joseph. Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 274. $27.50. Bruce W. Menning Bruce W. Menning U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 97, Issue 2, April 1992, Pages 584–585, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/97.2.584-a Published: 01 April 1992

<sc>benjamin franklin cooling</sc>. <italic>Jubal Early's Raid on Washington, 1864</italic>. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation. 1989. Pp. xiii, 344

Journal Article benjamin franklin cooling. Jubal Early's Raid on Washington, 1864. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation. 1989. Pp. xiii, 344 Get access Cooling Benjamin Franklin. Jubal Early's Raid on Washington, 1864. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation. 1989. Pp. xiii, 344. William Glenn Robertson William Glenn Robertson U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 96, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 264–265, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/96.1.264-a Published: 01 February 1991

Short Notices

Journal Article Short Notices Get access Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. Pp. 249. $28.45. ISBN 0-7735-0774-4. ROGER J. SPILLER ROGER J. SPILLER Combat Studies Institute US Army Command & General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Social History of Medicine, Volume 4, Issue 3, December 1991, Pages 558–559, https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/4.3.558 Published: 01 December 1991

Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War.

Journal Article Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War. By James A. Huston. (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1989. 492 pp. $65.00.) Get access William Glenn Robertson William Glenn Robertson United States Army Command and General Staff College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 77, Issue 3, December 1990, Pages 1092–1093, https://doi.org/10.2307/2079135 Published: 01 December 1990

James Lee Mcdonough and James Pickett Jones. <italic>War So Terrible: Sherman and Atlanta</italic>. New York: W. W. Norton. 1987. Pp. xx, 385. $19.95

James Lee Mcdonough and James Pickett Jones. War So Terrible: Sherman and Atlanta. New York: W. W. Norton. 1987. Pp. xx, 385. $19.95 Get access Mcdonough James Lee and Jones James Pickett. War So Terrible: Sherman and Atlanta. New York: W. W. Norton. 1987. Pp. xx, 385. $19.95. William Glenn Robertson William Glenn Robertson U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 94, Issue 3, June 1989, Pages 850–851, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/94.3.850-a Published: 01 June 1989

Gettysburg: The Second Day (review)

BOOK REVIEWS355 Pennsylvania to the Republican column because of the tariff campaign borders on common knowledge. Nevertheless, Huston constructs the account with great clarity, and he adds information about the precise timing and means for implementing the tariff issue. Further, the book has useful insights into the perceived tariff benefits for labor as well as business owners. Historiographically, Huston provides an excellent guide not only for the older dispute between Beardian Progressives and Revisionists, but also for the more current maze of republicanism, modernization , and even "Celtic fringe" theories of Civil War causation. Indeed, the last chapter qualifies as the best, most current Civil War historiographical essay available. John V. M ering University of Arizona Gettysburg: The Second Day. By Harry W. Pfanz. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. xxii, 601. $34.95.) In two ways, this book is reminiscent of Richard J. Sommers's Richmond Redeemed: The SiegeatPetersburg (1981). First, the title ofeach book is misleading. Sommers did not cover the entire siege, but only Grant's Fifth Offensive, which lasted less than a month. Similarly, Pfanz does not describe all the action on July 2 at Gettysburg, but concentrates exclusively on the Confederate attack against the Union left, thereby omitting the fighting on the Union right at Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Second, both authors demonstrate extraordinary knowledge about their subject. A friend of mine at the Army Command and General Staff College, Dr. Philip J. Brookes, has a knack for coining neologisms. One of his most recent is "overstanding," which goes beyond mere understanding . In regard to historians, it would connote an almost superhuman grasp of the details and issues surrounding an event. All historians overstand their subjects in the eyes of the lay public, but occasionally a historian achieves a degree of overstanding that truly impresses even experts in the field. Sommers did it, and so has Pfanz. Pfanz's overstanding of the Confederate attack and its repulse comes from a massiveresearch effort and an intensive study of the terrain. The 108 pages ofnotes and bibliography attest to his mastery for the relevant sources, and his career in the National Park Service—including ten years at Gettysburg—allowed him to examine the terrain in minute detail. In spite of Pfanz's magnificent scholarship, many questions about the battle at the tactical level remain unanswered. The book abounds with educated guesses, conjectures, and outright admissions that some things cannot be known. For instance, before maturing his plan for July 2, Lee sent three scouting parties to investigate the Union left. The area they 356CIVIL WAR HISTORY reconnoitered was a beehive of Union activity, yet the parties reported seeing only a few enemy cavalrymen. Not even Pfanz can explain how this happened. Still, despite such mysteries, the author's description ofthe fighting at the Devil's Den, Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and the slope of Cemetery Ridge is as complete as any historian could ever expect. It surpasses that of Edwin B. Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1968), which has long been the standard account. The latter devoted approximately 100 pages to these events; Pfanz exceeds this by 220 pages. Although quite detailed, the book is never tedious because of riveting anecdotes, sparkling writing style, and excellent analysis woven into the narrative. Pfanz offers astute interpretations concerning the leadership on both sides. He praises Meade for his "aggressive decision" (p. 54) to fight at Gettysburg even after part of his army had been defeated there on July 1, and for his generalship on July 2. Lee does not fare so well. He was overconfident, based his attack on faulty intelligence, and erred in not using Ewell's corps to strengthen the assaulting force. Hence, eleven Confederate brigades assailed twenty-two Union brigades. Longstreet said these eleven brigades did the finest three hours of fighting done by any troops anywhere—which may be true—but they should not have had to fight so well against such uneven odds. Moreover, in contrast to Meade's direct role in orchestrating the defense, Lee played an excessively passive role after giving the attack order. Both commanding generals...

CAMPAIGN PLANNING: GETTING IT STRAIGHT

Abstract : Incredibly, there exists today no properly sanctioned doctrine for campaign planning in either the joint or combined arenas. Further, within these two planning communities, there is no consensus on the terminology of planning discourse. In this article, our purpose is to get planners singing from the same sheet of music. With the recognition that something called a campaign plan is important, several questions come to mind. Exactly what are campaigns and campaign plans? What is contained in them? What is a campaign plan designed to do and how do you recognize one when you see it? While the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is developing doctrine concerning the Army role in campaign planning, the responsibility for promulgation of joint and combined doctrine for the strategic and operational levels of war resides within other domains. Until guidance concerning the process of campaign planning and who should write campaign plans is institutionalized in joint and combined doctrine, the issues will remain the object of debate and the source of much confusion. Our joint and combined staffs are manned by skilled planners who are fluent in the language of operational art. This reflects well upon the instruction at the various service schools and upon the officer corps. In the main, headquarters that should do campaign planning are working at it. Where exceptions are found, as in NATO, officers are responding to the guidance of the political leadership. The skills and knowledge necessary to fight successfully as a joint or combined team are extant; what is needed now is the authoritative guidance to unify the actions of our forces at the strategic and operational levels of war.

THE ARMY NURSE CORPS

1The ANC Historian at the US Army Center of Military History and is now a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 2Executive director, National Student Nurse Association, NY, holds the rank of Colonel in the US Army Nurse Corps Reserves

A set of organizational models

Human Resource ManagementVolume 19, Issue 2 p. 19-27 Article A set of organizational models George H. Rice Jr., George H. Rice Jr. A professor in the Management Department of the College of Business Administration, Texas A&M. He is the author, with Dean Bishoprick, of Conceptual Models of Organization (Appleton Century Crofts, 1971), and has consulted with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Civil Service Commission, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His research interests focus primarily on organization theory and behavior in organizations.Search for more papers by this author George H. Rice Jr., George H. Rice Jr. A professor in the Management Department of the College of Business Administration, Texas A&M. He is the author, with Dean Bishoprick, of Conceptual Models of Organization (Appleton Century Crofts, 1971), and has consulted with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Civil Service Commission, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His research interests focus primarily on organization theory and behavior in organizations.Search for more papers by this author First published: Summer 1980 https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.3930190205 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume19, Issue2Summer 1980Pages 19-27 RelatedInformation

AFRICAN MINERALS AND AMERICAN POLICY

Abstract : Major A. D. Ackels is presently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor's degree in History and Political Science from the University of Minnesota and a master's degree in Comparative Politics from Georgetown University. Major Ackels entered the Army in 1965 and has since served in a variety of command and staff positions, including overseas tours in Japan and Vietnam. In 1972, he joined the Foreign Area Officer program as a specialist in Sub~Saharan Africa. Since then he has served in Ethiopia and has travelled in 14 other African nations. Field research for this article was done in Addis Ababa, at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and in Washington, D.C., while Major Ackels was serving as an African Analyst in the Capabilities and Readiness Division of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command. In attempting to demonstrate the importance of Africa as a potential source of raw materials, this study focuses on eight metals: aluminum (bauxite), chromium, cobalt, copper, iron, manganese, platinum, and uranium. These minerals were selected because they are found in commercially exploitable quantities in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they have a variety of applications in American industry, because they represent metals for which there are at present no generally suitable substitutes, or because they represent important underused deposits of metals widely recognized to be essential to all industrialized nations.

The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order

IN INDONESIA's NEW ORDER, economists-technocrats, as non-party, professionally-trained experts, have replaced politicians in policy making posts, most visibly as members of a team of academics that moved into government posts laterally, from the University of Indonesia (U. of I.). In a bureaucratic state, these technocrats have functioned as policy innovators, as courtiers of foreign investment, and as relatively systematic administrators. They have provided a repressive military regime with a progressive civilian image and initiated their military patrons into the mysteries of their science. In this paper, the views on modernization that the economists bring to their important tasks and impart to the military and to the nation are presented. Prior to 1966 and their recruitment to high public positions, the team of professor-economists borrowed time from academic pursuits to serve on the Staff of the Army Command and General Staff School (SESKOAD) and of other military institutions in order to introduce their ideas to would-be military professionals of their new political generation. At SESKOAD, according to interviewers for a study in 1969-1970 by this writer, the youthful team successfully inserted its views on economic development into the curriculum, persuaded its peers in the military that national security depended on economic progress and helped write a new Army Doctrine reflecting its views.' In 1966, when General (President) Suharto and Sultan (Vice President) Hamengkubuwono suddenly replaced a regime headed by aging civilian populists contending with political and economic crises, they were personally untrained in the science of economics. Needing such knowledge, they enlisted the expertise of the academic team that had, for years, been developing its ideas and imparting them at key military institu-

Ewald Gerstmann andGerstmannite

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsErvan F. KushnerColonel Kushner is the author of two books, A Guide to Mineral Collecting at Franklin and Sterling Hill, N.J. and A Guide to Mineral Collecting at Ouray, Colorado. He is a graduate of Fordham College, Fordham Law School and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Wiley Sword. <italic>Shiloh: Bloody April</italic>. New York: William Morrow and Company. 1974. Pp. xx, 519. $15.00

Wiley Sword. Shiloh: Bloody April. New York: William Morrow and Company. 1974. Pp. xx, 519. $15.00 Get access Sword Wiley. Shiloh: Bloody April. New York: William Morrow and Company. 1974. Pp. xx, 519. $15.00. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 81, Issue 2, April 1976, Page 450, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/81.2.450 Published: 01 April 1976

Confederate Finance and Purchasing in Great Britain

Journal Article Confederate Finance and Purchasing in Great Britain. By Richard I. Lester. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975. xiii + 267 pp. Illustrations, tables, appendixes, notes, selected bibliography, and index. $15.00.) Get access Warren W. Hassler, Jr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 62, Issue 4, March 1976, Pages 1000–1001, https://doi.org/10.2307/1903894 Published: 01 March 1976

Comment on Hyperbole: Statement of the Drug Research Board

At the risk of being repetitious, we feel obliged to return to a theme explored repeatedly in past issues ofThe Journal. 1-4 This situation reminds me (R.H.M.) of an experience that occurred during my army years. I was attending the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. On the first day in our nervously chattering class of Military Map Reading, in strode an impressive full colonel: elegant, beribboned, and ramrod erect. He stared sternly at the large group. Then he spoke in measured words, Gentlemen, I am Colonel Jones, your instructor in map reading. I wish to state at the outset of this course, that at all times, I reserve the right to use the terms north and south interchangeably! This ice-breaking introduction is reminiscent of the ambiguous, mad-hatterish resolution of the Drug Research Board of the National Research Council (NB: the final paragraph): WHEREAS, The patient's

Manohar Malgonkar on His Novel The Princes: An Interview

Manohar Malgonkar visited Lock Haven State College, Lock Haven, Pa., during the Fall semester of 1972. During 28-30 September he gave two public lectures, conducted four college classes, taped one half-hour television interview, and another longer two-hour interview for a literary journal, and met with numerous students, faculty, and townspeople at an informal reception held in his honour. His novel The Devil's Wind had just been published. Perhaps what is most striking about Malgonkar's conversation is his command of the English language: his spoken sentences are as precise and rounded as those he writes. He talks quickly, confidently, eagerly yet unaffectedly - obviously enjoying it. His voice and manner are warm and gentle. No transcript taken from the tape could catch the subtleties of voice which gave life and point to many of his rewarks. Malgonkar is a trim and sprightly man who retains some of the brisk alertness of his military career. Born in Bombay on 12 July 1913, he served for a time in the infantry, in counter-intelligence, and on the Army's General Staff during World War II, rising to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. After graduatingfrom Bombay University with honours in English and Sanskrit, he became a professional big-game hunter, and used to arrange tiger shoots for the Indian Maharajahs. Soon he gave up killing wild animals for a living, to turn ardently anti-killing, and joined government service. He has since become a fierce wild-life conservationist. He stayed on in the Army for a while after the war and then turned to business and farming. He owned and operated manganese mines near his home town Jagalbet, India. He was also active in politics as a member of the Swatantra Party, and twice contested Indian parliamentary elections unsuccessfully. Malgonkar is the author of five English novels: Distant Drum (1960), Combat of Shadows (1962), The Princes (1963), A Bend in the Ganges (1964), and The Devil's Wind (1972). He is also a historian, having written three books of Indian history: Kanhoji Angrey (1959), Puars of Dewas Senior (1962), and Chhatrapatis of Kolhapur (1971). He has written several scripts for Indian movies. Mr Malgonkar has also written fifty short stories and over a hundred articles. He has visited the U.S.A. four times, in 1963, 1964, 1970, and 1972, when he lectured at many colleges and universities. At present he lives with bis family in Jagalbet, Belgaum district of India, and grows coconuts, oranges, and mangoes. The following is a partial transcript of an interview with Malgonkar during his visit to Lock Haven in 1972.

THE NAVAL ENGINEER AND SHIPBOARD MANPOWER UTILIZATION

Naval Engineers JournalVolume 86, Issue 1 p. 33-38 THE NAVAL ENGINEER AND SHIPBOARD MANPOWER UTILIZATION ARTIS I. PLATO, ARTIS I. PLATO The author graduated from the City College of New York in 1956, receiving his Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree. Following this, he started work at the New York Naval Shipyard in the Internal Combustion Engine and Cargo Elevator Section. During 1957 and 1958, he was called up for active duty with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and served in Europe with a Construction Engineer Battalion. After release from active duty, he returned to the shipyard until 1961 when he transferred to the Naval Supply Research and Development Facility, Bayonne, N.J. Initially, he was in charge of an Engineering Support Test Group and drafting services for the whole Facility. Later he became a project engineer in the Food Services Facilities Branch with duties that included planning and designing new afloat and ashore messing facilities for the Navy. In 1966 he transferred to NAVSEC as a project engineer in the Design Work Study Section, and in this capacity worked on selected projects and manning problems for new construction and also developed a computer program (Manpower Determination Model) that makes accurate crew predictions for feasibility studies. In 1969 he became Head of the NAVSEC Shipboard Manning/Design Work Study/Human Factors Engineering Section. He has been active in the U.S. Army Reserve since his release from active duty, his duties having included command of an Engineer Company and various staff positions and his present rank being that of Major. He is presently enrolled in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College non-resident course, and in 1972 attended American University from which he received his MS degree in Technology of Management.Search for more papers by this author ARTIS I. PLATO, ARTIS I. PLATO The author graduated from the City College of New York in 1956, receiving his Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree. Following this, he started work at the New York Naval Shipyard in the Internal Combustion Engine and Cargo Elevator Section. During 1957 and 1958, he was called up for active duty with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and served in Europe with a Construction Engineer Battalion. After release from active duty, he returned to the shipyard until 1961 when he transferred to the Naval Supply Research and Development Facility, Bayonne, N.J. Initially, he was in charge of an Engineering Support Test Group and drafting services for the whole Facility. Later he became a project engineer in the Food Services Facilities Branch with duties that included planning and designing new afloat and ashore messing facilities for the Navy. In 1966 he transferred to NAVSEC as a project engineer in the Design Work Study Section, and in this capacity worked on selected projects and manning problems for new construction and also developed a computer program (Manpower Determination Model) that makes accurate crew predictions for feasibility studies. In 1969 he became Head of the NAVSEC Shipboard Manning/Design Work Study/Human Factors Engineering Section. He has been active in the U.S. Army Reserve since his release from active duty, his duties having included command of an Engineer Company and various staff positions and his present rank being that of Major. He is presently enrolled in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College non-resident course, and in 1972 attended American University from which he received his MS degree in Technology of Management.Search for more papers by this author First published: February 1974 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-3584.1974.tb03565.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume86, Issue1February 1974Pages 33-38 RelatedInformation