Army Field Manual Research Articles

Torture, What is it Good For? Absolutely nothing! An Analysis of McCain and the Response to the Abuse at Abu Ghraib

This paper discusses Senator John McCain's statement on detainee amendments on the Army Field Manual (FM 34-52) and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees, and the many associated postmodern sea of circulating fictions regarding detainee abuse. We use the government's own reports as well as our experiences at the courts-martial of two of the seven bad apples to discuss the several circulating fictions, which include the following: that the abuse was confined to a few “rotten apples” at Abu Ghraib; that the “interrogation techniques” were normative; that abuse occurred and occurs as the outcome of interrogation; and that the problem of abuse can be fixed by referring to ambiguous normative standards which are already cited as the source of confusion that led to abuse. We outline the ambiguity of the Army FM 34-52 and show the implosion of meaning associated with and the juxtaposition of image versus reality when it comes to the actual reality of torture and its consequences. Additionally, we use Riesman and Veblen to discuss how this amendment is itself other-directed and conspicuous, as well as based on image, which we argue eventually leads to self-sabotage and the sabotage of American ideals. Finally, we critique the list of interrogation techniques used at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, and claim that this kind of system of torture, or what we call “must-torture logic”, will perpetuate the deviance of abuse at Abu Ghraib and other locations such as GITMO, Afghanistan, and other places in Iraq. [Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2008 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]

Touchstone Anthology of Contemporary Creative Nonfiction: Work from 1970 to the Present (review)

Reviewed by: Touchstone Anthology of Contemporary Creative Nonfiction: Work from 1970 to the Present Peter M. Ives (bio) Touchstone Anthology of Contemporary Creative Nonfiction: Work from 1970 to the Present. Edited by Lex WillifordMichael Martone. Touchstone, 2007. 552 pages, paper, $20.00. Whoopee—it’s an Anthology First, I hate the term “creative nonfiction.” It sounds like a genre with a serious chip on its shoulder, screaming out to anyone who will listen, “I used to be a contender.” How about noncreative nonfiction, or really creative or relatively creative or not-on-your-life-creative nonfiction? Let us just say “literary nonfiction” or “literary nonfictive prose” and proceed. Second, as a reader, I’m not crazy about anthologies. After all, who, besides a steamrolled student, goes out to buy an anthology? Here’s a combination of words you’ve never heard: “Hey, Honey, this Friday evening let’s go out, get a bite to eat, drop by Borders, and pick up an anthology.” Take it a step further: “Hey, Honey, let’s go out, get a bite to eat, drop by Borders, and pick up an anthology of creative nonfiction.” Typically, “Anthology” has a connotation of gossamer-thin pages filled with miniscule-font-sized sentences that run into adjacent zip codes and paragraphs that meander from Eastern to Pacific Standard Time; they weigh 50 percent more than the all the other contents in a book bag and induce not only a reluctance to read, but represent the best argument I can think of for Cliff Notes. However, as a teacher, I must admit that The Touchstone Anthology of Contemporary Literary Nonfiction . . . er, I mean . . . Creative Nonfiction, [End Page 156] edited by Lex Williford and Michael Martone, is about the best collection of essays and short memoir to be found between book covers. While students may still respond to anthologies as something akin to literary torture, at least they’ll sense that Williford and Martone are sticking to the more humane procedures outlined in the U.S. Army Field Manual. This is a book for educators, and Williford establishes in the foreword the principles by which he and Martone solicited from “teaching writers” (via a “sophisticated democratic online survey”) the titles of “the most compelling contemporary nonfiction they’ve taught in their creative writing workshops and their composition and literature classes.” Thus, in one fell swoop, the editors have produced an eclectic collection that not only captures literary nonfiction in all its variety, but succeeds in keeping teachers from those late night hours at the copying machine, surreptitiously violating copyright law. If an anthology is a bibliographic shopping mall, then the editors must make sure to provide for anchor stores, the literary flagship equivalents of Filene’s, Bloomingdales, Sears, Dillards, etc.—the big names that hypnotically drive the consumers through their entrances, allowing for serendipitous excursions to the smaller retailers symbiotically lining the corridors. Similarly, The Touchstone Anthology anchors its pages with our own literary flagships: Dillard, Lopate, Berry, McPhee, Lopez, Sedaris—to name just a few. And while I have read Annie Dillard’s “Living Like Weasels” so many times that I could perform it as a soliloquy at my son’s next birthday party, I also try to keep in mind my reaction when I first read it. The marvelous voice and images and narrative line. We anthologize and reread certain authors because of their greatness, their ability to beguile us with the virtuosity of their storytelling techniques. An anthology, I must grudgingly concede, is probably the best way to pass those first impressions on to a new audience. While many anthologies arrange the contents by subject or year or theme, the editors forthrightly chose to move alphabetically by author. A wise and fortuitous choice, given that the first essay, JoAnn Beard’s “The Fourth State of Matter,” demonstrates all at once the gorgeous possibilities of literary memoir. From the somnambulistic images of her opening sentence, “The collie wakes me up about three times a night, summoning me from a great distance as I row my boat through a dim, complicated dream,” to the dark foreshadowing of friends and colleagues “whose lives are ticking like alarm clocks ready to...

Why Contractor Fatalities Matter

The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000 threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream media reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however, understates the human cost of America's engagements in these regions by nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, are sustaining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses chronicled in The Washington Post's ongoing Faces of the Fallen series (1) fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 have been injured; more than 8,300 seriously. (2) Yet contractor fatalities (and injuries) remain generally outside the public's consciousness. (3) Given the extent of the military's reliance upon in the combat zones, a combined number of fatalities that exceeds 6,000 is a more accurate tally of the fallen. Apprising the American public of the human cost associated with military operations is critically important. This is especially true as the United States prepares for a post-election transition; transparency will inform discussions regarding the extent to which Americans are willing to outsource in fulfillment of the government's mandate, at home and abroad. Why Count Contractors? The total number of casualties is important, because the public and Congress not only care deeply about these fatalities, they routinely rely on body count as a measure of success or failure. President George W. Bush's 31 July 2008 statement highlighted the perceived importance of fatalities and the potential for obfuscation. The President trumpeted that [v]iolence is down to its lowest level since the spring of 2004, apparently relying solely upon military casualties as the significant measure of the violence. (4) Meanwhile, neither the American public nor Congress fully grasp the extent of the military's reliance upon in the combat zones. In 2006 and 2007 the contractor death rate climbed dramatically in Iraq. At least 301 civilian died in 2006. During 2007, some 353 died in Iraq, compared with 901 US military personnel. In other words, in 2007, accounted for more than one in four deaths associated with ongoing operations. In the second quarter of 2008, at least 61 additional contractor employees died in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Government Accountability Office recently reported that contractor deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of 2008 were a minimum of 455. (5) This result should not be surprising. Today, the heavily outsourced US military cannot effectively function or sustain itself without an enormous contractor presence. Particularly in Iraq, the US government employs--directly and through subcontracts--more than military. Most experts agree that are at least 190,000, and as many as 196,000, contractor personnel in Iraq, compared to fewer than 170,000 military personnel. In Iraq and Afghanistan, provide a variety of support, including food, transportation, postal, sanitation, housing, and morale, welfare, and recreation services. They also gather intelligence, maintain weapons, train troops, and handle interrogations. The Comptroller General observed that there are more private security in Iraq today than the total number of [of any type] (about 9,200) that were deployed to support military operations in the 1991 Gulf War. (6) Military doctrine increasingly reflects the nearly unlimited scope of contractor integration. In describing contractors as a force-multiplier, Army Field Manual 3-100. …

“You are in a place that is out of the world. . .”: Music in the Detention Camps of the “Global War on Terror”

Based on first-person accounts of interrogators and former detainees as well as unclassified military documents, this article outlines the variety of ways that “loud music” has been used in the detention camps of the United States‘ “global war on terror.” A survey of practices at Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan; Camp Nama (Baghdad), Iraq; Forward Operating Base Tiger (Al-Qaim), Iraq; Mosul Air Force Base, Iraq; Guantanamo, Cuba; Camp Cropper (Baghdad), Iraq; and at the “dark prisons” from 2002 to 2006 reveals that the use of “loud music” was a standard, openly acknowledged component of “harsh interrogation.” Such music was understood to be one medium of the approach known as “futility” in both the 1992 and the 2006 editions of the US Army's field manual for interrogation. The purpose of such “futility” techniques as “loud music” and “gender coercion” is to persuade a detainee that resistance to interrogation is futile, yet the military establishment itself teaches techniques by which “the music program” can be resisted. The article concludes with the first-person account of a young US citizen, working in Baghdad as a contractor, who endured military detention and “the music program” for ninety-seven days in mid-2006—a man who knew how to resist.

US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s Perspective

Until very recently, the four and half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than glimmer of hope, detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground. (1) Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and half years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 provides American participants with counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for similar operations well into the second decade of this century. The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons. (2) First, the writing team canvassed and included far wider range of opinion and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving the doctrine wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed. To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions. This article offers an assessment on the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and one view of how it has been applied to operations in the field. The hypothesis is that FM 3-24 conveys an effective military doctrine. Although its utility to the soldier and marine is evident from the reports emanating from Iraq, it is equally clear that FM 3-24 is not the final answer. What David Galula identifies as the 80 percent political action formula is beyond the scope of FM 3-24, but it still needs to be addressed. (3) The article provides brief but necessary reminder of doctrine's function and identifies six criteria for evaluating doctrine to be utilized in examining FM 3-24, testing its theoretical effectiveness. It then offers commentary on counterinsurgency practice in Iraq in the light of the new doctrine before returning to Galula's missing 80 percent. The hypothesis is supported by interviews with authors of the doctrine, service members serving and others who have served in Iraq, post-operational reports, and the ever-growing body of literature. Some careful consideration has also been given to opinion pieces and editorials published in various media. Writing COIN Doctrine Writing counterinsurgency doctrine today faces two major hurdles. First, things have changed markedly since the problem was last considered. John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen, and Steven Metz are three contemporary authors who have pointed out that warning signs related to this change have existed for some time. …

Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?

Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?

Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine

The Army's counter-insurgency doctrine is published in Part Ten of its Field Manual.1 It was last updated fully in July 2001. The pamphlet is the latest in a line of Army publications that have wre...

Organising for Nation Building

As countries and international institutions become increasingly involved in nation-building efforts, committing personnel and resources for prolonged periods of time, they often face major capabili...

America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 The December 2006 US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual No. 3-24 on counter-insurgency is available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf. 2 These data derive from a 2007 unclassified internal US government briefing memorandum made available to the author. 3 Iraqi support for attacks on US-led forces grew from 47% in January 2006 to 61% in September 2006. This 14-point change was due in large part to a 21-point increase among Shi'ites. ‘The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq’, World Public Opinion.Org , 27 September 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf. 4 Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States’, April 2006, available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/terrorism/keyjudgments_092606.pdf. 5 See, for example, the Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘U.S. Image Up slightly, But Still Negative’, 23 June 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247; and 'Arab Attitudes Toward Political and Social Issues, Foreign Policy and the Media (University of Maryland/Zogby International Poll), October 2005, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/pub/Arab%20Attitudes%20Towards%20Political%20and%20Social%20Issues,%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20the%20Media.htm. 6 When asked in an interview on CNN what affect a Senate resolution against the president's new ‘surge’ plan would have, Cheney answered: ‘It won't stop us’. Interview with Wolf Blitzer on ‘The Situation Room’, 24 January 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/24/cheney/index.html. In response to a question by Senator John McCain about the likely outcome in Iraq should the US announce it would withdraw within 4–6 months, General Petraeus warned of ‘greatly increased ethnic cleansing’, ‘the very real possibility of involvement of [other] countries’, as well as the possibility of an international terrorist organisation ‘getting a grip on some substantial piece of Iraq’. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination of Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, 23 January 2007. 7 Gates told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 January 2006 that ‘the timetable for the introduction of additional US forces will provide ample opportunity early on – and before many of the additional US troops arrive in Iraq – to evaluate the progress of this endeavour’. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Senate Armed Services Committee, Friday 12 January 2006, p. 5, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/January/Gates%2001-12-07.pdf. 8 ‘US facing defeat, says al-Qaeda’, BBC News, 9 September 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3642910.stm; ‘Al-Zawahiri: U.S. faltering in Afghanistan’, 9 September 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/09/09/zawahiri.tape/index.html. 9 Joseph Lieberman, ‘Why We Need More Troops in Iraq’, Washington Post, 29 December 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801055_pf.html. 10 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 260. 11 Stephen J. Hadley, ‘Baghdad is Key’, Washington Post, 29 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/28/AR2007012800922_pf.html. 12 Text of US Security Adviser's Iraq Memo, 29 November 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html?ex=1170651600&en=1f804dd505468937&ei=5070. 13 It would take almost the entire planned troop surge – 20,000 of the 21,500 soldiers – to begin to secure Iraq's borders, using the number of US Customs and Border Protection and National Guard personnel on the US–Mexico border as a guide. And even then, the level of security would be no better than that at the Mexico border. Even though the agents and soldiers on the US–Mexico border know the terrain well and many have a command of Spanish, they apprehend only about one-third of those who get across the border. It would take time for a US border force in Iraq to gain corresponding advantages. Calculations based on data provided by the CIA World Factbook . 14 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Report, 1 September–31 October 2006. 15 Based on FY2005. Congressional Research Services, ‘The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11’, 22 September 2006, p.16, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 16 Michael Abramowitz and Lori Montgomery, ‘Bush to Request Billions for Wars’, Washington Post, 3 February 2007. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSteven SimonSteven Simon is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This essay is adapted from Steven Simon, After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq , Council Special Report no. 23 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, February 2007), and is used with permission. A version was prepared for a Council on Foreign Relations/IISS Symposium on Iraq's Impact on the Future of US Foreign and Defence Policy, with generous support from Rita E. Hauser.

Beware of Boldness

At a counterterrorism conference in September 2004, then-Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers stated that key question senior officials needed to ask about their conduct of Global War on Terrorism was, Are we being as bold and innovative as we need to be? (1) Army Field Manual 7.0, Training Force, states that goals of operational deployments and major training opportunities are to enhance unit readiness and produce bold, innovative leaders. (2) These adjectives have now become accepted as key components of lexicon of defense transformation. But before words become etched in stone, Army and other services should seriously think about what these terms mean for leaders, and their historical role in American military experience. The colloquial caution, Be careful what you ask for, because you just might get it, is worth pondering. Words Matter As any serious student of military history knows, truly innovative ideas usually come from staffs and subordinates. Leaders, especially at higher levels, rarely need to be innovative themselves; instead, they must be prepared to recognize valuable contributions from others and incorporate them into practices of larger organization. Timothy Lupfer's seminal study on evolution of German tactical doctrine in World War I describes how senior German leaders incorporated best ideas from staff officers and junior leaders throughout army (and from French) to develop doctrines and practices for elastic defense-in-depth and new offensive tactics that provided basis for later blitzkrieg. (3) In contrast, American leaders in Vietnam often actively resisted initiatives for improvement proposed by subordinates. John Nagl's insightful study of counterinsurgency lessons from war in Southeast Asia concludes that the US Army generals who commanded MAAG-V [Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam] and MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] repeatedly rejected innovative suggestions for changes in American counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam. He concludes that these senior leaders were very capable professionals, but their experience and organizational culture limited their vision. Nagl contrasts that example with British Army in Malaya, which adapted much more readily to unfamiliar conditions and quickly embraced new ideas. (4) There are plenty of examples of American military leaders before Vietnam who appreciated contributions that innovative subordinates and staffs had to offer, especially in World War II. Army Air Forces Commanding General Henry Hap Arnold organized an advisory council of three to five young staff officers, the brightest I could get, and set them up in an office close to his. His instructions to them were straightforward: What I want you to do is sit down and think. Think of problems confronting us. Think of solutions to those problems. Bring in new ideas. If you bring in one idea every two or three days, I will be satisfied. (5) A well-known example of American wartime innovation is development and application of Rhinoceros or Rhino hedgerow buster. This was typical of process of decentralized adaptation that made American Army in Europe so successful in World War II. The brainstorm of Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in July 1944, device consisted of prongs fashioned from a German roadblock that allowed a Sherman tank to force its way through a hedgerow without having to expose its vulnerable underbelly. Fifth Corps commander Major General Leonard Gerow recognized Rhino's significant potential, and he invited General Omar Bradley to view a demonstration. The First Army commander was so impressed that he instructed his ordnance chief to comb England for arc welding equipment and to mass-produce devices from beach obstacles. …

Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign (review)

Reviewed by: Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign Harold M. Tanner Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign. By Gary J. Bjorge. Leavenworth Paper No. 22. Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. Maps. Figures. Tables. Glossary. Notes. Pp. viii, 253. Available at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/csi. Between 6 November 1948 and 10 January 1949, Chinese Communist forces eliminated five Nationalist Armies totaling nearly half a million men in a campaign that involved well over a million combatants across front lines of around two hundred kilometers. This action, the Huai Hai Campaign, put the Communists in control of China's strategic Central Plains. Combined with other operations, the result was to eliminate the forces of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) north of the Yangzi and to so deplete his troop strength, while simultaneously increasing Communist strength, that the way was paved for Mao Zedong's armies to cross the Yangzi and sweep the Nationalists from the mainland. Curiously, there has heretofore not been an English-language monograph on Huai Hai. Dr. Bjorge's concise and well-researched volume fills this gap in the literature. His goal is to study the Huai Hai Campaign "as an example of warfare at the operational level," focusing on "the planning and execution of large-scale operations by PLA commanders . . . to further validate the importance of operational art as a doctrinal concept . . . and also increase the reader's understanding of the professional knowledge and skill of the PLA officer corps" (p. 2). To illustrate his point, the author constructs an analytical framework drawn from two sources: U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations and Sunzi's The Art of War. He presents the planning and implementation of Huai Hai as a concrete illustration of the principles of operational art as seen in those two sources and uses concepts from both works, but particularly concepts such as "moving the enemy," "deception," and "subduing the enemy without battle" from Sunzi. This succeeds both because Sunzi was a significant influence on the thinking of Chinese Communist and Nationalist leaders and because the principles outlined by Sunzi have universal applicability and thus his work "has been integrated into U.S. Army doctrine" (p. 6). Dr. Bjorge begins with an introductory chapter on historical background and proceeds with chapters on Communist and Nationalist planning, the physical setting and comparison of forces, and the unfolding and significance of the campaign. The book includes fourteen maps on which the reader can [End Page 1305] easily locate places named in the text. The author has made good use of primary and secondary sources in Chinese to provide a detailed study of the Huai Hai Campaign as a concrete example of the operational art. But in doing so, has he changed or added to our understanding of the reasons for Nationalist defeat (or Communist victory)? Our general understanding is that, aside from political, economic, and social weaknesses, Jiang's defeat was the result of: (a) the poor quality of Nationalist commanders, including Jiang; (b) over-centralized command; (c) unclear command structure, with Jiang often issuing orders personally, from afar; (d) factionalism; and (e) superior organization, command structure, generalship and unity on the Communist side. Bjorge's work does not change this picture. Nonetheless, by looking at a significant campaign in detail, he gives us concrete examples of decision-making on both the Nationalist and Communist sides and the immediate (and for the Nationalists, disastrous) results of those decisions. In doing so, he puts flesh on the bones of the true, but highly generalized statements about the military conflict in the English-language historiography of the period, most of which treats military operations as peripheral to the political, social, and economic struggles between the Communists and Nationalists. As part of the growing English-language literature on Chinese military history, this book will be useful not only to students of the operational art, but also to specialists and graduate students of modern Chinese history. Harold M. Tanner University of North Texas Denton, Texas Copyright © 2004 Society for Military History

Modern War, Modern Law, and Army Doctrine: Are We in Step for the 21st Century?

Our first problem was with using suppressive fires against the air defense. According to standard Army procedure, we simply estimated where the enemy air defense might be, based on the terrain and the force's operating pattern. But the Defense Department's lawyers insisted that before we shoot at these locations, they had to be 'observed,' that is, not 'templated.' ... By the lawyers' definition, someone would have to view Serb air defenses through photography or TV within a few hours of the time the artillery was to be fired. This was a requirement derived from the NATO Rules of Engagement that had been approved for the operation, without regard to the kinds of needs we might have for the Apaches.... Before we could shoot our suppression, we would have to have visibility over what was there, updated to the last few hours.... The commander would either have to accept the risk from other untargeted [templated] locations, or call off the planned mission. Surely there had to be a better way. Never had we imposed such a standard on ourselves. There had to be a misunderstanding, I thought. (1) --General Wesley K. Clark, USA Ret., concerning legal constraints to suppressive fires in support of AH-64 operations in Kosovo To most of the US Army, the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has little bearing on their pursuits in the profession of arms. Images of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass murder, while terrible in their own context, are not the types of crimes to which the men and women of the US armed forces would potentially be a party. Thus, while the US government supports the work of the tribunal as a matter of policy, the findings of the court, beyond the occasional headline, are simply not of interest to US military professionals. That is a mistake. In fact, when examining current tactical and operational Army doctrine in light of the work of the ICTY, it becomes evident that in some areas, commanders may not have the doctrinal tools or appropriate training mechanisms available to steer clear of potential criminal culpability in future conflicts. Over the past several years, the Office of the Prosecutor has moved forward in exploring the legal basis of a criminal charge frequently referred to as unlawful attack. (2) These issues pertain to the legal review of the conduct of military operations that affect the surrounding civilian population (or associated nonmilitary objects). It examines the obligations of military commanders and other combatants under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols, and a broad body of international humanitarian law designed to safeguard civilians and other noncombatants. In select recent cases, these reviews have resulted in the indictment, apprehension, and conviction of operational commanders for violations of these conventions. It is still premature to postulate how these trials and judgments might affect future US Army tactical and operational commanders, particularly with respect to the conduct of ground operations. However, on the basis of information that is in the public domain, it is clear is that there are increasing expectations by the international community that military commanders be held to stricter standards of accountability with regard to making informed decisions on ground operations and target selection. As such, the jurisprudence coming out of the ICTY is likely to raise the bar for commanders to adequately justify the effects of military operations on the surrounding civilian populations and objects. These future effects will not be limited to only the traditional restrictions defined in US Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Laws of Land Warfare, but also will include more recent legal criteria pertaining to the issues of proportionality, dual-use infrastructure, terror, and even environmental damage. (3) In contrast, Army operational and tactical doctrine in the fields of reconnaissance, intelligence, and fire-support remain heavily biased toward the rapid, accurate, and overwhelming application of force or fires on the enemy target or objective, often coupled with the least possible risk to friendly troops and assets. …

Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force

of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power secondary efforts. Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. --US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 2001 Mass and economy of force are intimately related principles of war. This article explores the characteristics of this relationship and how new warfighting concepts and capabilities--in particular, network-centric warfare--are likely change that relationship and even the principles themselves. Economy of force has the distinction of being one of the most misunderstood and unappreciated principles of war. (1) The confusion as its meaning is no doubt because of the connotations of the word economy; in particular, most of us associate the idea of economy with reducing cost--that is, economizing. Hence, some believe that the principle encourages operational commanders use as little combat power as possible achieve the mission--that the commander should be frugal. However, as Bernard Brodie once observed, when originally propounded the concept meant to suggest husbandry or usage of military forces. (2) The commander was employ effectively all available combat power--massing forces achieve the primary objective while allocating minimum, but all necessary and essential, power secondary tasks. Hence, the true sense of the concept is well stated in the US Army's doctrinal Field Manual 3-0, Operations: of force is the reciprocal of mass. It requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas achieve superiority--overwhelming effects--in the decisive operation. Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes execute, all elements should have tasks perform. (3) Carl von Clausewitz was also adamant that all forces be used: If a segment of one's force is located where it is not sufficiently busy with the enemy, or if troops are on the march--that is, idle--while the enemy is fighting, then these forces are being managed uneconomically. In that sense they are being wasted, which is even worse than using them inappropriately. When the time for action comes, the first requirement is that all parts must act. (4) Shrewd and Judicious Effects Justification for employing all forces, and in a calculated or shrewd manner, arises from the numerous instances where commanders lost battles at least partly because they failed do so. For example, in the American Civil War, General Robert E. Lee's Confederate army defeated General Joseph Hooker's Federal force at Chancellorsville in 1863 despite Hooker's large numerical advantage--half the Northern troops never engaged. At sea, the World War II battle of Midway in 1942 is instructive. The Japanese theater commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commanded over 160 warships Admiral Chester Nimitz's 76; but some of them, including two light carriers, were thousands of miles away carrying out a needlessly elaborate distraction scheme. (5) Arguably, if Yamamoto had massed more assets and more logically arrayed his total force, the Japanese would have won, despite the American signals intelligence advantage and strokes of luck. (6) The straight fact is that massing forces is not always the best means effectively employ them. Properly conducted economy-of-force operations can be just as important, or more so. For instance, an operational commander could practice economy of force in order create opportunities. Traditionally, opportunities have been created by the and balanced dispersion of combat power; such dispersion can compel the enemy do the same, or at least adjust the disposition of his own forces. Ideally the enemy's response facilitates the execution of the commander's operational idea, making the main attack more effective by allowing a preponderance of combat power at the decisive time and place. …

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5: Fighting Future Wars

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5: Fighting Future Wars

ACCOMMODATING CHANGE: THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESS

AbstractOne of the goals of the original system engineering process defined in the Fort Belvoir Defense System Management College, System Engineering Management Guide and Army Field Manual 770–78 is to minimize changes during the system development process. With the rapid increase in the rate of technological change as well as the increase in the duration of major system development projects, this inability to accommodate change causes performance, cost and schedule problems. To address this need for change the author has developed a Dynamic System Engineering (DSE) Process that expands the bounds of the existing process to focus more attention on the front end of the system development process.

The use of hypertext and sensory-level supports for visual learning of aircraft names and shapes

Hypertexts have many novel and unexplored features for representing, linking, and exploring knowledge to make it more useful for learning. We contrasted traditional textbook presentation of information against a hypertext that implemented database retrieval of text and manipulation of colored, bitmapped displays. Hypertext enabled us to explore the role of sensory-level supports, such as apparent motion and colored overlays, as aids for visual cognition and concept formation. One visible difference between traditional text and hypertext was in the use of a rapid browsing strategy by the hypertext learners, compared with a methodical, extended side-by-side comparison by the book learners. The research also discovered that students better learned local neighborhoods of concepts, as opposed to widely dispersed concepts, in the hypertext environment. We selected visual aircraft recognition (VACR) as a topical area for the research because it is a very important problem in the Army, because traditional VACR training emphasizes both text and images, and because we had available to us a fine manual (Army Field Manual FM 44–30) full of black-and-white pictures and text that was artfully arranged on the page, as well as access to hundreds of color slides of airplanes. Our research found superior learning with the hypertext field manual, and we examined higher order learning strategies, such as depth-first versus breadth-first paths through the hierarchy of knowledge, and sensory-level supports for learning within these environments.

Accuracy of Pace Count as a Distance Estimation Procedure

The purpose of this study was to assess the accuracy of pace counting under varying conditions and to resolve discrepancies between U.S. Army Field Manual 21-26 (FM 21-26; Department of the Army, 1987) and pace-counting research conducted by Powers (1964). Two experiments were designed to measure accuracy of distance estimations from pace counting on-road and off-road under conditions of daylight and darkness. In both experiments, male soldiers enrolled in One Station Unit Training (OSUT) were trained to estimate distances based on pace counts performed on a flat road during daylight. In Experiment 1, the soldiers were tested on a flat road during both daylight and darkness; in Experiment 2, soldiers were tested off-road on hilly terrain during both daylight and darkness. The general finding in both experiments was that soldiers tended to underestimate distance during day- light and to overestimate distance during darkness. These errors became greater as the test conditions became less like the training condition. It was concluded that pace count should be adjusted, as indicated by FM 21-26, either by opportunities for more training time or by standard pace-count adjustment formulas. Also, because of inherent inaccuracies, pace count should be used as a backup and/or in conjunction with other land navigation techniques.

Plagues on our children. The threat of biological warfare.

Twenty-five years ago, at the beginning of World War II, chemical and biological weapons began to be developed in this country. At that time, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated: "Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind ... we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies." A few years later the United States became the first country to use nuclear weapons. More recently, we have been employing non-lethal gases (tear and nausea gases) against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The world's press has been terming the use of these gases a form of chemical warfare. As for biological warfare activities, the current published position of the United States on this matter is stated in Army Field Manual FM 27-10: "The United States is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases, of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare." Many military leaders believe that if non-lethal chemicals and diseases were employed as weapons there would be less killing and less destruction of homes and factories. It is not our purpose here to discuss whether these weapons are truly less humane than flame-throwers, napalm, and nuclear bombs. But once we have accepted the use of chemical and biological weapons, there is no guarantee that only non-lethal ones will be used. As Sidel and Goldwyn * pointed out recently, there has been little public discussion by the medical profession on the ethics or advisability of developing and using chemical and biological weapons. Yet we must remember that it is our medical and other scientists, both in civilian and in military positions, who are helping to perfect these weapons and also the defenses against them. To collaborate in or even simply to condone the imposition of disease on a population of civilians is certainly a contravention of Hippocrates' oath: "... I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-doing. Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course...." This issue is complex and uncomfortable, but each physician must evaluate his rights and duties—both as a citizen and as a doctor. The dilemma has perhaps been best expressed by Albert Einstein when he said: Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men. —ROBERT E. NOPAR, M.D.

The New U. S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare

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