Beware of Boldness

Abstract

At a counterterrorism conference in September 2004, then-Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers stated that key question senior officials needed to ask about their conduct of Global War on Terrorism was, Are we being as bold and innovative as we need to be? (1) Army Field Manual 7.0, Training Force, states that goals of operational deployments and major training opportunities are to enhance unit readiness and produce bold, innovative leaders. (2) These adjectives have now become accepted as key components of lexicon of defense transformation. But before words become etched in stone, Army and other services should seriously think about what these terms mean for leaders, and their historical role in American military experience. The colloquial caution, Be careful what you ask for, because you just might get it, is worth pondering. Words Matter As any serious student of military history knows, truly innovative ideas usually come from staffs and subordinates. Leaders, especially at higher levels, rarely need to be innovative themselves; instead, they must be prepared to recognize valuable contributions from others and incorporate them into practices of larger organization. Timothy Lupfer's seminal study on evolution of German tactical doctrine in World War I describes how senior German leaders incorporated best ideas from staff officers and junior leaders throughout army (and from French) to develop doctrines and practices for elastic defense-in-depth and new offensive tactics that provided basis for later blitzkrieg. (3) In contrast, American leaders in Vietnam often actively resisted initiatives for improvement proposed by subordinates. John Nagl's insightful study of counterinsurgency lessons from war in Southeast Asia concludes that the US Army generals who commanded MAAG-V [Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam] and MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] repeatedly rejected innovative suggestions for changes in American counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam. He concludes that these senior leaders were very capable professionals, but their experience and organizational culture limited their vision. Nagl contrasts that example with British Army in Malaya, which adapted much more readily to unfamiliar conditions and quickly embraced new ideas. (4) There are plenty of examples of American military leaders before Vietnam who appreciated contributions that innovative subordinates and staffs had to offer, especially in World War II. Army Air Forces Commanding General Henry Hap Arnold organized an advisory council of three to five young staff officers, the brightest I could get, and set them up in an office close to his. His instructions to them were straightforward: What I want you to do is sit down and think. Think of problems confronting us. Think of solutions to those problems. Bring in new ideas. If you bring in one idea every two or three days, I will be satisfied. (5) A well-known example of American wartime innovation is development and application of Rhinoceros or Rhino hedgerow buster. This was typical of process of decentralized adaptation that made American Army in Europe so successful in World War II. The brainstorm of Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in July 1944, device consisted of prongs fashioned from a German roadblock that allowed a Sherman tank to force its way through a hedgerow without having to expose its vulnerable underbelly. Fifth Corps commander Major General Leonard Gerow recognized Rhino's significant potential, and he invited General Omar Bradley to view a demonstration. The First Army commander was so impressed that he instructed his ordnance chief to comb England for arc welding equipment and to mass-produce devices from beach obstacles. …