Arms Sales Research Articles

The French armament firms and the Spanish market, 1948–75

This article examines the evolution of French–Spanish military relations during the major part of General Franco's government in Spain. Special attention is given to the sales of arms and licences for manufacturing them in Spain. During the Cold War, Spain was part of the western bloc, led by the US. Nevertheless, the country's military equipment was not only supplied by US armament firms, but also by French ones, proving the limits to Americanisation in this sector. After several decades of contacts and negotiations between (mainly state-owned) French and Spanish companies, the most important results appeared at the beginning of the 1970s, being consolidated and extended during the democratic period.

NATO-Russia: Is the ‘Russian Question' European?

The proliferation of theaters (in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Far East, the Middle East and the Arctic) and cross-cutting issues (proliferation, disarmament, energy, arms sales) demonstrate the overall importance of the NATO/Russia relationship.

Judicial Review by EU and Domestic Courts of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Regime: Counterterrorism, Due Process, and the Search for the Golden Mean

SUMMARY This paper explores the extent to which sanctions, including asset-freezing and travel bans, imposed by the UN Security Council in its fight against terrorism on persons and entities allegedly associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban, have been amenable to judicial review by EU and domestic courts, and the impact of such litigation on the implementation and development of the existing Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime. I analyze the practice of EU and domestic courts, with special focus on the English courts, in reviewing the sanctions imposed by states and the European Union against Al Qaeda and the Taliban pursuant to Security Council resolutions. I also examine the response of the executive bodies responsible for implementing sanctions, such as the European Commission and Her Majesty's Treasury, to legal challenges brought by the affected individuals. Courts have generally been inclined to uphold domestic or EU acts implementing Security Council resolutions, on the basis that they draw their legitimacy from these resolutions. However, EU and English courts have recently acknowledged the inadequacies of the sanctions regime as implemented by the European Union and domestically, particularly the lack of adequate procedures whereby a person may challenge the freezing of their assets. In practice, if a domestic or EU court finds that the implementing act infringes fundamental rights, the court may quash it and order the relevant authorities to modify the implementation of the sanctions regime to remedy the infringements. These modifications could, in principle, clash with the conditions set forth by the Security Council. The rulings of EU and domestic courts may therefore compel states to violate their international obligations under Security Council resolutions and the UN Charter. However, rather than allowing noncompliance with the relevant resolutions, the Security Council should consider introducing needed improvements to bring the sanctions regime into compliance with fundamental rights, thereby avoiding an undermining of its authority and the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. In sum, this paper shows that legal actions before EU and domestic courts have triggered re-evaluation and encouraged the introduction of some important improvements to the sanctions regime and/or its implementation. INTRODUCTION In the wake of the terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam in 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 (1999), imposing financial sanctions and an air embargo against the Taliban. A sanctions committee, comprising all fifteen members of the Security Council, was established to oversee the implementation of these measures. In subsequent resolutions, which defined terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as constituting one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, the Security Council modified and strengthened the sanctions regime. The sanctions, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as preventive measures in the fight against terrorism, now apply to designated individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or the Taliban wherever located. States are required to implement three sanctions measures with regard to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban, namely to freeze their funds and other financial assets; prevent their entry into or transit through states' territories; and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, and transfer of arms and military equipment to any individuals and entities associated with them. The sanctions committee maintains a regularly updated consolidated list of individuals and entities identified or associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, or the Taliban. States may ask the sanctions committee to add names to the consolidated list. Designated individuals and entities are entitled to submit a request for delisting through the state of their residence or citizenship or through a focal point, which is now replaced by an ombudsperson. …

The organized hypocrisy of ethical foreign policy: Human rights, democracy and Western arms sales

Over the past two decades, Western political leaders have scripted a more ethical foreign policy, wherein far greater weight is given to protecting the rights and freedoms of extra-territorial citizens. Using the example of arms exports to developing countries, the present paper exposes the organized hypocrisy underlying countries’ self-declared ethical turn. We show that the major Western arms supplying states – France, Germany, the UK and the US – have generally not exercised export controls so as to discriminate against human rights abusing or autocratic countries during the post-Cold War period. Rather, we uncover ongoing territorial egoism, in that arms have been exported to countries which serve supplying states’ domestic economic and security interests.

The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: Towards a Renewed Rivalry?

While Russia during the Yeltsin period was largely relegated to a spectator role in the Mediterranean, under Vladimir Putin it has emerged as an increasingly significant player in the region. In particular in the energy and military sectors, Russia has shown a renewed interest in the Mediterranean and also stepped up its efforts to establish closer relationships with the countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea. This in turn has been of considerable concern to Western, and in particular European, countries, which at least to some extent have seen Russia's growing activism in the Mediterranean as a challenge to their interests. As a result, there now appears to be a renewed rivalry between Western countries and Russia in the region – rivalry predominantly over oil and gas supplies, as well as military cooperation, in particular arms sales, with the countries south of the Mediterranean. This renewed, but transformed, geopolitical contest between East and West seems to have been, at least to some extent, an empowering development for the countries along the southern rim of the Mediterranean, enhancing their leverage both vis-à-vis Western countries and Russia.

Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.

Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration

Greatest ex-president or foreign policy failure? Kaufman offers a fresh, comprehensive look at the Carter years.During the past decade, the literature on the Carter administration's foreign policy has grown rapidly, due largely to both the release of new materials at the presidential library and the attention Jimmy Carter has received since leaving the White House. While previous monographs have focused on specific foreign policy issues, Scott Kaufman breaks away from the mold and offers this up-to-date, comprehensive look at Carter's aggregate foreign policy record. Although many Americans regard Jimmy Carter as the nation's greatest ex-president, Kaufman argues that the diplomatic performance of the thirty-ninth president was mediocre, primarily because of Carter's own doing.Carter, who entered office at a time of transition, was determined to shift the direction of U.S. foreign policy in a way that would downplay conflict between the superpowers; to give more emphasis to North-South issues; and generally to make the world a better place by curbing repression, reducing arms sales, halting nuclear proliferation, ending political and military conflicts abroad, and strengthening the world economy. But, as crises developed abroad, the president gradually assumed a diplomatic stance similar to that of his predecessors, and ultimately his foreign policy boiled down to containing the Soviet threat.Kaufman admits that Carter, like all presidents, faced limitations in what he wanted to achieve, including lawmakers or foreign officials who did not see eye-to-eye with him. Despite difficulties, the president did have some success: he achieved ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, normalized relations with China, convinced Israel and Egypt to sign the Camp David accords and a peace agreement, and made human rights a permanent component of U.S. diplomacy. Nonetheless, Kaufman concludes that Carter's style of leadership caused his failures to far outnumber his successes: Carter viewed himself as a political outsider, attempted to achieve too much at once, failed to prioritize initiatives or to understand the complexities involved in achieving them, poorly handled intra-administration disputes, and failed to give the nation a vision of the state in which he wanted to leave the country by the end of his administration.

The Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran's Relations with Russia and the Saudi Dimension

Russia's Middle East policy faces a dilemma. On the one hand, Moscow maintains close, although frequently terse, ties with Iran, playing an important role in Iran's nuclear program and even using its position in the United Nations to shield Iran from harsh sanctions. In return, Moscow profits from the sales of arms and nuclear expertise, participates in Iran's energy sector, and may establish valuable cooperation on gas exports, both being obvious suppliers to the lucrative Western European market. On the other hand, Russia is also seeking to strengthen ties with Iran's neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, many of whom see Tehran as the major threat to any nonproliferation regime in the region and recognize that Russian cooperation has increased the likelihood that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. The impact on Russia's relationship with Saudi Arabia may be especially important to planners in Moscow. Saudi Arabia appears to be an increasingly willing client for Russian arms (and possibly also nuclear expertise), and Russia may value close relations with the next biggest oil exporter in the world. In the present study, we examine Russia's recent relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia and assess Russia's strategic position regarding the two countries. At the current time, Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the primary source of technical cooperation with Tehran on the nuclear issue, is at the center of developments in the Middle East. How Moscow assesses its position in the Middle East, and whether it ultimately wishes to prioritize Riyadh or Tehran, could be central to the future stability of the region.

Review: The Vital Triangle

THE VITAL TRIANGLE China, the United States, and the Middle East Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver Washington, DC: Center for Strategie and International Studies, 2006. 152pp. US$16.95 PaPer (ISBN 978-0-89206-529-5)Though America is the superpower patron in the Middle East, China has been playing an increasingly visible role in the region. America, China, and the Middle Eastern states all share various relations and commercial ties, from security guarantees to textiles to weapons. However, energy security is increasingly becoming a top priority for and Beijing. America and China are the world's first and second largest energy consumers respectively and their demands for energy are expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future. Since both countries' domestic supplies are insufficient to satisfy their growing demands, they are driven to seek external sources of energy. However, external supplies of energy are finite; the acquisition of an energy source by one state will necessarily come at the expense of the other state. This energy security competition has the potential to become a source of conflict. Disagreements over military invasion, nuclear proliferation, and arms sales exacerbate an environment that is already potentially explosive. It is in this context that authors Jon B. Alterman and John W Garver have written The Vital Triangle.The central argument of the book is that relations between any two sides of the America- China- Middle East triangle can affect the other side. This, in turn, can affect the triangle as a whole. China's aim in the Middle East is to develop relations with all states, whether friendly or unfriendly to the US. However, it must do so without aggravating S ino- American relations.China's ties with Middle Eastern states hostile to America have potentially serious implications for regional security in particular and the ChinaUS relationship in general. However, because Beijing views good relations with as essential to its continued growth, it must play a by [attempting] to expand multidimensional cooperation with Middle Eastern countries while maintaining good relations with Washington (n). For instance, in 1997, China announced a major contract with Iraq to develop its second largest oil field for the next 22 years once UN sanctions ended. The authors describe the delicate way in which Beijing procured Iraqi oil without aggravating S ino- American relations. Despite the spectre of a US-led invasion of Iraq and potential voiding of China's energy contracts, Beijing played this balancing act again. As the authors note, China explicitly and repeatedly expressed disapproval of U.S. war plans, but China's statements of opposition during Security Council were less sharp, far less verbose, and less frequent and came later in the debates (29). (How the authors were able to measure the sharpness and verbosity of statements of opposition is unclear.)Perhaps the most significant relationship China has established is with Iran. The authors provide a thorough overview of the energy contracts, arms sales, and missile and nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Tehran. America views these dealings as particularly troublesome because they undermine its counterproliferation efforts, sanctions, and overall efforts to isolate the regime. And yet, even here China plays its balancing act. With regards to Iran's nuclear program, the authors discuss how, despite initial reluctance, Beijing has supported sanctions against Iran. …

The Uncertain Future: Sino-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century

Two countries top almost everyone's list of nations that are most important to the United States. One has been a rapidly ascendant power for more than twenty years. The other has only recently begun to recover from the collapse of its empire. One is important because of its size and fast-growing economic and military power. The other's importance is based on its impressive nuclear arsenal, huge petroleum assets, and strategic location. These countries are China and Russia.The United States pursues its relationship with both countries in a bilateral fashion. However, the status of Russia and China's relationship with one another has the ability to dramatically impact the United States' relations with both countries. For example, the Nixon-era cooperation between China and the United States occurred in part because of China's fear of war with the much stronger Soviet Union. By the late 1990s, improved Sino-Russian relations led to a common diplomatic front against a variety of U.S. interests.An Uneasy AllianceA few years later, Russia's move toward the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was, to some degree, encouraged by Russia's interest in hedging its bets should relations with China sour. By 2007, however, the United States' preemptive war in Iraq and American support of the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine deeply alarmed Russia's national security establishment, which fears further American political or military action in the former Soviet republics-territories in which Russia wishes to be the dominant foreign power. Russia has sought to counteract this trend by drawing closer to China to offset U.S. unpredictability and meddling in former Soviet territory, which many Russians view as their backyard.1 Nevertheless, however bold the Sino-Russian pronouncements on the need for a multipolar world may be, the countries' interaction in other areas reflects caution, if not deep-seated distrust. This wariness will continue to mitigate the intensity of Russia's cooperation with China in opposition to U.S. interests.In formulating U.S. policy toward both countries, it is indispensable to know how the Sino-Russian relationship will evolve-and why.Over the last decade, cooperation between Russia and China has increased dramatically. It now includes military sales, joint military research and development, common diplomatic positions (e.g., Chechnya, Taiwan, U.S. missile defense), nonmilitary trade, and the settlement of border issues. To a large extent, this cooperation was formally codified in the July 16, 2001, Russia-China Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.2As in previous treaties, (e.g., the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, and the 1860 Treaty of Beijing), this agreement between China and Russia was driven primarily by a mutual need for:(1) Peace on the border. As long as a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan remains a possibility, China does not want to commit the resources necessary to protect its 3,645 km (2,264 mile) border with Russia. For Russia, after the Soviet Union's collapse, Moscow had neither the money nor the desire to station large numbers of troops along its border with China; and(2) Increased trade. In the 1990s, Russia was the only country willing and able to supply China with the sophisticated military equipment and technology it coveted. Additionally, China's shortages of lumber, various ores, and petroleum products were filled through Russian production. This was fully compatible with cash-starved Russia's need to keep key industries, such as aircrafts and lumber, viable through the sale of resources and arms to China.These reasons do not completely explain the rationale for the treaty, however. According to Alexander Yakovlev, a China expert from the Russian Academy of Sciences: Diplomats know any such treaty is always signed with a clear understanding about who is the real adversary. …

Arms Sales and Parliamentary Accountability: The Role of the Quadripartite Committee

Britain is one of the top conventional arms transferors globally, and it appears to be devoted to ensure transparency and accountability in such exports. The Scott Report of 1996, an enquiry into weapon supplies to Iraq and Iran in the early 1980s, came up with various criticisms and recommendations, most importantly the need for greater transparency and parliamentary accountability on arms sales. This article enquires into the role of parliament in scrutinising the government and ensuring accountability in arms trading, with emphasis on the role of the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls, the progress made since the Inquiry in this area and the strengths and challenges of the UK practices on the issue.

Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?

The current conflict in Somalia has proven to be long and devastating to its people where thousands were killed, raped, robbed and made refugees or internally displaced. Despite its deadly impact, the conflict has defied all expectations both theoretical and practical. However, there are several studies that attempt to explain the conflict and its causes. These causes include the role of cultural diversity in both bringing and maintaining the conflict in Somalia and Africa in general. This article argues that despite the existence of many studies that emphasise this relationship, they remain empirically inconclusive. The Somali society consists of many communities that differ linguistically and socio-economically. Despite their differences, the conflict in Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa in general stems primarily from inequality worsened by economic decline plus the easy availability of weapons that resulted from the massive sale of arms by members of the armed forces. The article concludes with several suggestions for bringing about resolution to this prolonged conflict in Somalia. One of the main suggestions would be an attempt to attract the vast wealth and brain power of the Diaspora communities.African Journal on Conflict Resolution Vol. 7 (2) 2007: pp. 93-134

Evil Empires: Blood Meridian , War in El Salvador, and the Burdens of Omniscience

In the months following the death of former President Ronald Reagan in June 2004, a seemingly endless succession of pundits, politicians, and historians enjoined their audiences to remember a number of things about his two terms in the Chief Executive's office. Heading many lists of things to remember were his reinvigoration of a U.S. conservative movement that had been in various states of dolor and disarray since the defeat of the Goldwater ticket in 1964; his management of the closing years of the Cold War and his demand, delivered by the Brandenburg Gate on a summer day in 1987, that Mikhail Gorbachev tear down this [Berlin] wall; and most of all his famously effective blend of personable, folksy charm and morally absolutist rhetoric. But what few of the speakers seemed interested in having their audiences recall was Reagan's remarkable capacity to forget. Probably the most notorious example of his forgetfulness came to the public's attention in 1987, following the release of the Tower Commission's report on the Iran-Contra affair. The report confirmed the story that had been circulating through the national press for months: that a team of U.S. military intelligence officers operating under the aegis of the National Security Council had orchestrated illegal sales of arms to Iranian terrorists and then funneled the profits from those sales to anti-Sandinista forces fighting an insurgent campaign in Nicaragua. Frances FitzGerald writes that Reagan, the [Tower] commissioners reported, had initially told them that he authorized the first shipment of arms to Iran, but in a second interview, after a conversation with [White House Chief of Staff] Donald Regan, he told them he had not. Later he wrote them that his recollection had been influenced by that of others, and that, try as he might, he could not recall 'anything whatsoever' about the event (413-414). Reagan's own diaries from 1985 and 1986 suggest that he knew a good deal more about the affair than he was willing or able to recall just a year later (FitzGerald 386-387). In FitzGerald's analysis of Secretary of State George Shultz's recollection of Iran-Contra, Shultz presents a kind of backhanded defense of his former boss: Meeting with the President on November 14 [1986], Shultz found the President adamant that what was done had been right.... Shultz then realized that reason would not prevail: Reagan truly did not believe that what had happened had in fact happened. 'I had seen him like this before on other issues,' Shultz tells us in his memoir. 'He would go over the of an event, past or present, in his mind, and once that script was mastered, that was the truth--no fact, no argument, no plea for reconsideration, could change his mind' (382-383). Whatever the condition of Reagan's state of mind, it is likely that he very much wanted to forget--and not just about the Iran-Contra debacle, but about the whole range of U.S. foreign policy failures in Central America. By the late 1980s, America's involvement in various armed conflicts in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador had produced few (if any) tangible successes; rather, especially in El Salvador, the United States' considerable investments of economic aid, military training, and equipment had yielded little more than escalating civilian body counts and accusations of the military's participation in counterinsurgency operations that had gone horribly awry. If the rendition of 1980s history presented by the aforementioned pundits, politicians, and public intellectuals represents anything like a consensus, Reagan's desire to claim forgetfulness is very similar to a subsequent willed blankness in the nation's collective memory. It seems that no one wants to remember what life was like in El Salvador in the early and mid-1980s. In this essay, I seek to redress that blankness through investigation of an unlikely--but I believe a crucial--source: Cormac McCarthy's novel Blood Meridian, or, The Evening Redness in the West (1985). …

Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms Price Asset Transfers in Related Party Transactions

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavorable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms' length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.

The Iraq War and Iranian Power

By deposing Saddam Hussein, the United States radically altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Since the early 1940s, power had been dispersed among Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United States...

Why journals can live without impact factor and cluster bombs

How would you feel if the Royal Society of Medicine promoted the sale of cigarettes? What about if the president and trustees decided to hold a seminar sponsored by poppy farmers? Or the chief executive decided to close the academic department and replace it with a department of human trafficking? What would you do with your membership? Would you be proud of your involvement with a scientific society? Would you be happy to contribute to meetings and conferences in the knowledge that you were furthering your career in a respected organization, even though it was making a healthy profit by unhealthy means? Just in case you were beginning to wonder if I was building up to a climactic announcement, you can relax. As far as I understand it, the RSM is flourishing by entirely reputable means. But can we say that about all publishers? Some of the larger ones have been criticized for years for behaving like parasites, sucking every last drop of effort from authors, reviewers and editors, simply to boost their operating income and please their shareholders. Now Reed Elsevier—considered by many in the world of publishing to be the biggest, baddest wolf of them all—finds itself under attack for promoting arms sales. Richard Smith identifies the cynical contradiction at the heart of this approach: ‘Surely the company's business mission would be impossibly confused: would the company be in the business of killing people or keeping them alive?’ (pp. 114-115) Scientific publishing is a major part of Reed Elsevier's armoury, responsible for just under half a billion pounds of its profits. It publishes some of the world's best journals, including The Lancet, which has established itself as the world's premier journal for global health as well as being the weekly medical journal most feared for its piercing critique. Indeed, The Lancet's editors famously rebuked Reed Elsevier for its support of an exhibition for the arms trade. Last month, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust—a displeased shareholder—sold its shares in the publishing giant over the same malign entanglement. Now Smith calls for authors, reviewers and readers of The Lancet and other Reed Elsevier journals to orchestrate a campaign. ‘This is where Reed Elsevier is vulnerable,’ he urges. ‘Were those researchers to go elsewhere, the company would promptly pull out of arms exhibitions.’ One strong motivation to publish in The Lancet is its high impact factor (24 and rising)—that is, if you care for impact factor. Mabel Chew and colleagues studied impact factors in seven general medical journals over an 11-year period, and interviewed ten journal editors (pp. 142-150). They confirmed what we know: that impact factors have been rising over the last decade. They also confirmed what we suspected: that deliberate editorial practices and manipulation were a factor in this rise. Despite their successful manipulation of impact factor, journal editors were dissatisfied with it as a measure, leading the authors to conclude that their study adds weight to the need for complementary measures. The problem is that the hypocrisy of publishers is mirrored by the hypocrisy of editors. They might be dissatisfied, but too many of my illustrious colleagues are hell-bent on doing whatever their conscience allows in pursuit of a higher impact factor and a stronger marketing message. I have an alternative: forget this impact factor obsession and try one of Nick Black's walks through London's medical history. This month, he takes you to the lost hospitals of St Luke's, home to seven of the leading hospitals of the 19th century (pp. 125-129). Or you could walk to the Strand offices of Reed Elsevier and throw some rotten eggs and ethical indignation in support of The Lancet. It is a journal whose history, standing, and integrity matter far more than its impact factor ever could.

Why journals can live without impact factor and cluster bombs

How would you feel if the Royal Society of Medicine promoted the sale of cigarettes? What about if the president and trustees decided to hold a seminar sponsored by poppy farmers? Or the chief executive decided to close the academic department and replace it with a department of human trafficking? What would you do with your membership? Would you be proud of your involvement with a scientific society? Would you be happy to contribute to meetings and conferences in the knowledge that you were furthering your career in a respected organization, even though it was making a healthy profit by unhealthy means? Just in case you were beginning to wonder if I was building up to a climactic announcement, you can relax. As far as I understand it, the RSM is flourishing by entirely reputable means. But can we say that about all publishers? Some of the larger ones have been criticized for years for behaving like parasites, sucking every last drop of effort from authors, reviewers and editors, simply to boost their operating income and please their shareholders. Now Reed Elsevier—considered by many in the world of publishing to be the biggest, baddest wolf of them all—finds itself under attack for promoting arms sales. Richard Smith identifies the cynical contradiction at the heart of this approach: ‘Surely the company's business mission would be impossibly confused: would the company be in the business of killing people or keeping them alive?’ (pp. 114-115) Scientific publishing is a major part of Reed Elsevier's armoury, responsible for just under half a billion pounds of its profits. It publishes some of the world's best journals, including The Lancet, which has established itself as the world's premier journal for global health as well as being the weekly medical journal most feared for its piercing critique. Indeed, The Lancet's editors famously rebuked Reed Elsevier for its support of an exhibition for the arms trade. Last month, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust—a displeased shareholder—sold its shares in the publishing giant over the same malign entanglement. Now Smith calls for authors, reviewers and readers of The Lancet and other Reed Elsevier journals to orchestrate a campaign. ‘This is where Reed Elsevier is vulnerable,’ he urges. ‘Were those researchers to go elsewhere, the company would promptly pull out of arms exhibitions.’ One strong motivation to publish in The Lancet is its high impact factor (24 and rising)—that is, if you care for impact factor. Mabel Chew and colleagues studied impact factors in seven general medical journals over an 11-year period, and interviewed ten journal editors (pp. 142-150). They confirmed what we know: that impact factors have been rising over the last decade. They also confirmed what we suspected: that deliberate editorial practices and manipulation were a factor in this rise. Despite their successful manipulation of impact factor, journal editors were dissatisfied with it as a measure, leading the authors to conclude that their study adds weight to the need for complementary measures. The problem is that the hypocrisy of publishers is mirrored by the hypocrisy of editors. They might be dissatisfied, but too many of my illustrious colleagues are hell-bent on doing whatever their conscience allows in pursuit of a higher impact factor and a stronger marketing message. I have an alternative: forget this impact factor obsession and try one of Nick Black's walks through London's medical history. This month, he takes you to the lost hospitals of St Luke's, home to seven of the leading hospitals of the 19th century (pp. 125-129). Or you could walk to the Strand offices of Reed Elsevier and throw some rotten eggs and ethical indignation in support of The Lancet. It is a journal whose history, standing, and integrity matter far more than its impact factor ever could.

Remaking the Mainstream: The Case for Activist IR Scholarship

What should international relations (IR) academics do in relation to activism, both in principle and in relation to Britain foreign policy? In this article I argue that, while British IR academics do a significant amount of valuable theoretical and empirical research, we produce very little primarily empirical work which documents the record of the British state in creating human misery abroad – be it hunger and illness through comprehensive economic sanctions or repression using British taxpayer-subsidised arms sales. I use ‘British’ in this article as shorthand for ‘British-based’, and I use ‘British state’ as shorthand for the highly networked but heterogeneous political and corporate elite which holds concentrations of power and money in Britain and beyond. In addition, British IR academics engage in very little research exposing the deceptions and self-deceptions deployed by the British state to deny its responsibility for that human misery, and directed towards contributing to education and activism which challenges the right of the British political-corporate elite to act in these ways. The important work of exposing and challenging these oppressive aspects of British foreign policy has been carried out very predominantly by non-academics, principally journalist John Pilger, independent author Mark Curtis, and political satirist and campaigner Mark Thomas.1 Using my own past record of neglect of these issues as an illustration, I argue that most IR academics tend not even to be aware of making a choice in failing to carry out such vitally necessary work. In such cases, we have what physicist Jeff Schmidt called in his brilliant book of the same name ‘disciplined minds’, that is, minds which operate within elite-serving ideological bounds, doing innocuous, weakly challenging or directly elite-serving work.2

The Bureaucratic Politics of US Arms Sales to Taiwan

What influence do bureaucratic factors actually have on US arms sales to Taiwan? This is the core question that this essay addresses. The essay intends to analyze the processes of policy formulation behind US arms sales to Taiwan from bureaucratic decision-making perspective, using case studies that indicate the extent of bureaucratic models. It ultimately investigates and assesses the effectiveness of bureaucratic models in explaining US policy toward China. US arms sales to Taiwan is at the core of the US–Taiwan relationship; it is an indication of how the US regards Taiwan as a political entity and, as such, is a source of China–US friction and conflict. US military exports to Taiwan form the basis of research of many academic works on China–US relations and US policy toward China. Within the relevant American academic circles, US military exports to Taiwan is a focus of research on US policy toward China and US–China relations. Two such studies are particularly noteworthy in the context of this essay. The first focuses on the heightened tension in China–US relations during the early 1980s resulting from the Reagan Administration's intention to sell FX fighters. In his study, Doak A. Barnett analyzes the issue and its ramifications, particularly the influence that selling the FX fighters would have on US–China relations.1 As Barnett's book was published prior to the Reagan Administration's decision not to sell the FX fighters to Taiwan, one that was cut from the same cloth as Barnett's recommendations, many surmised that the Administration accepted Barnett's proposals. Another study by Dennis Hickey takes as its starting point US–Taiwan military and security relations, of which US military exports to Taiwan constitute an important aspect. After the establishment of China–US relations, Hickey conducted a deep and systematic research into US arms sales to Taiwan, particularly after the 17 August Communiqué of 1982, and uncovered certain details regarding the selling of F-16s to Taiwan by the George H. Bush Administration in 1992.2 The historical description and analysis approach of both Barnett and Hickey to their research is echoed among other works on US policy toward China and Sino–US relations, in which the relationship between Taiwan arms sales and the politics of decision-making models is not actually discussed. In recent years, advances have been made insofar as using different policy-making models to analyze particular periods and the important incidents in China–US relations,3 but no specialized research targeting systemic considerations has yet appeared on US weapons sales to Taiwan, and neither has any attempt been made to utilize the issue of US military exports to Taiwan in research examining the effectiveness of foreign policy decision-making models.

Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance

With new worldwide threats, post-Iraq war tensions, and the United Nations under siege, democracies should take the lead in forming a new coalition united behind a common global security agenda?as hinted by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal lenges and Change (HLP) in its December 2004 report.1 The vital ques tion after President George W. Bush's reelection is whether there will be more of the same from Washington, or whether unilateralism will make room for collective responses to the challenges of the twenty-first century. The relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) will be decisive in any global arrangement. Iraq, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and world poverty loom large, and ongo ing trans-Atlantic differences will not go away. Washington's policies have raised hackles in Europe over, inter alia, the Kyoto protocol on cli mate change; the landmine treaty; the approach to child-soldiers; the HIV/AIDS epidemic; the death penalty; biological weapons; global efforts to curb illicit sales of small arms and light weapons; the Compre hensive Test Ban Treaty; the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Amer ica's miserly percentage of overseas development assistance (ODA); and the International Criminal Court (ICC). As if these were not enough, U.S. attitudes toward the nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea, steel exports, farm and airline subsidies, alleged tax evasion, new definitions of torture and enemy combatants, and the new national security doctrine of preemptive strikes have also raised alarm. If we fast reverse, the June 2001 communiqu? from the EU-U.S. summit in G?teborg, Sweden, seems like ancient history: