Arms Control And Disarmament Agency Research Articles

Sidney David Drell

Sidney David Drell

Using Military Spending Data: The Complexity of Simple Inference

This study assesses the reliability of estimates of the direction of military spending growth obtained from two main sources - the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It examines the average directional agreement between early and late ACDA and SIPRI spending estimates for a full sample of countries and for seven different regions (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, South Asia, NATO Europe, and the Warsaw Pact). It shows that the direction of ACDA and SIPRI estimates diverge significantly over time and that the two data sources appear especially challenged when estimating the sign of smaller, and especially negative, growth-rate changes and of spending in regions (Africa and the Middle East) where growth-rates vary markedly. It further establishes that, when a single source publishes consistent directional estimates, these estimates can diverge considerably from those published by the other source. Based on the findings, this study proposes a set of simple validation procedures and tests their strengths and weaknesses on various sets of countries.

Consider the Source: Organizational Bias in Estimates of Foreign Military Spending

I seek to determine the degree and nature of bias in the military spending estimates of the two main sources of such data—the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I examine how ACDA and SIPRI revise their estimates of foreign military spending. I do so by evaluating ACDA and SIPRI growth rate estimates from successive statistical volumes for a full sample of countries and years as well as for seven identified regions (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, NATO Europe, and the Warsaw Pact), to determine whether, and by how much, early and late estimates of each organization depart from its own or the other's final estimates. The findings reveal that systematic (or patterned) error for some regions is high and that unpatterned error for some regions is extremely high. The latter finding is important because unpatterned error can become systematic with changes in sample size.

The arms trade in the 1990s: Changing patterns, rising dangers

Analysts of the conventional arms traffic have long understood that international trading patterns are closely related to developments in the world security environment, with changes in the global correlation of forces producing corresponding shifts in the worldwide flow of arms. It should not be surprising, then, to find that the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union have been accompanied by dramatic changes in the character and direction of the global arms traffic. Whereas arms once flowed in great plenty from the USSR to its allies in Eastern Europe and the developing world, today the outflow from the former Soviet Union (FSU) is significantly reduced. Other cold-war trade patterns have also been disrupted, producing a generalised decline in the dollar value of international arms transfers. At the same time, however, we have seen the emergence of new arms trade patterns that reflect the altered power relationships of the post-cold war era. As these new power relationships transform world politics in the years ahead, the arms traffic will continue its own evolution, resulting ultimately in a complete transformation of global trading patterns. To appreciate the extent of this transformation fully, it is first necessary to review the arms trade system of the cold-war era. For much of this period, from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the global arms traffic was largely governed by the competitive practices of Washington and Moscow. Eager to establish and maintain close military ties with the rising powers of the Third World, the two superpowers offered increasingly sophisticated arms to those regimes willing to align themselves with one or the other of the major blocs. As a result, arms supplied by the two superpowers (and by their close allies) constituted a large share of the global weapons flow: according to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), US and Soviet arms accounted for 65% of the total worldwide weapons traffic in 1972-88 (when measured in dollars), while those provided by all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries combined accounted for around 90% of the traffic during this period.' The Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow also governed the direction and composition of the arms flow during this period. In their pursuit of Third World allies, the superpowers concentrated their arms-supply activities in a number of major areas considered pivotal to the global correlation of forces-most notably the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. As a result, the

Military Expenditures, Health, and Education: Bedfellows or Antagonists in Third World Development?

Whether military expenditure, health, and education are strange bed-fellows, antagonists, or complementary to modernization, economic development and the physical quality of life are the major questions addressed in this paper. Fundamental military roles in underdeveloped countries are discussed; and empirical cross-national analyses of aggregate data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the World Bank, and world political and social indicators, are used to test competing hypotheses. Educational expenditures as related to human capital formation and the percentage of labor force in industry are found to be the best allies in predicting economic development. Other findings indicate that military expenditures are adversarial (or antagonistic) to health and the physical quality of life. The theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.

How Organizations Learn: U.S. Government Estimates of Foreign Military Spending

Theory: Organizational learning is conceived apart from inertia by drawing from the literature on organizations and cognitive psychology. Hypotheses: Organizational learning is predicted to be cumulative and specific (limited in space and time) rather than noncumulative or general (applied to diverse subjects and new tasks). It is also expected to reflect important subject and learner characteristics that are expressed in two competing models: the first assumes that subject difficulty impedes learning and the second assumes that apparent inhibitors actually facilitate learning. Methods: Correlations are examined among successive estimates of foreign military spending, for the same countries and years, published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Learning scores, for different nations, are regressed on potential learning inhibitors and facilitators that are linked to the two models. Results: Learning in ACDA is most convincingly shown to be specific (though cumulative and noncumulative). Learning appears to occur with moderate challenges and to be determined primarily by learner characteristics.

Arms control agency faces uncertain future

National security cognoscenti are busy sifting tea leaves trying to puzzle out the fate of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the new Administration. Of special concern to these policy gurus is the future of the semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's existence as a separate entity on the executive branch's organization chart is precarious. The agency has never functioned as intended since Congress created it in 1961. Its stock over the decades has ebbed and flowed, paralleling the prominence and clout of its director. And except for a few notable successes--the conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty being one--the agency's authority has plummeted in the past 14 years. Today, almost every interested party agrees that something has to be done, that the agency cannot continue as it now functions. Several recent studies have called for its rejuvenation. Still other studies have suggested that ACDA be dismantled, and those activities relevant to national security in a post-Cold War environment be shifted to and integrated into the State Department. Observers expect ACDA to evolve into an agency whose primary focus is on problems of proliferation. In a world in which tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, restraint on armsmore » transfers, and economic assistance conditional on a recipients's security behavior will be the norm for security and stability, a role for ACDA as the U.S.'s nonproliferation nanny is not a bad one.« less

Arms Control Fellowship

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has announced that it is accepting applications for visiting scholars under the William C. Foster Fellows Program for 1986–1987. This program is designed to give specialists in the physical sciences and other disciplines relevant to ACDA activities an opportunity to participate actively in the arms control and disarmament activities of this agency and to give ACDA the perspective and expertise that such people can offer.

Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study

Although the industrialized member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) remain by far the largest spenders on military-related activities, the share of the Third World in total defense expenditures has risen considerably over the last 2 decades. Particular countries have been raising their expenditures on defense at a rapid rate in recent years.' According to statistics produced by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), about 30% of the 90 Third World countries for which data were available spent more than 15% of their national budgets for defense in 1977 while approximately half spent over 10%.2 There are good reasons for suspecting that these figures understate the amount spent for security in some of these countries and that the burden of military-related expenditures in developing nations is even higher than these figures suggest. What is the impact of this burden on the development process? For the industrialized countries, it has been shown that high rates of economic growth, investment, and employment are inversely related to high levels of military expenditure.3 For the developing countries the evidence is less clear. Resources devoted to one form of expenditure, such as military, cannot be used in other sectors, such as for investment in productive undertakings or in social services. Nonetheless, the argument is often made that military expenditure may have some net positive developmental effects. The study generally cited as supporting this contention is that conducted by Emile Benoit for ACDA at the end of the 1960s.4 The original goal of the Benoit study was to determine what effect military expenditure has on the development process in Third World

Arms Control : the Soviet Approach and Its Implications

AbstractThe Soviet Union has no discrete arms control goals, although it does have a variety of diplomatic and military objectives which can be pursued via arms control negotiations. In the Soviet Union, there is no organization comparable to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which is charged with advancing the cause of arms control. Instead, there appears to be only a military bureaucracy and a foreign policy apparatus, whose purposes are reconciled at the highest levels of Soviet politics.1 Nor does the Soviet Union have an arms control theory compaiable to that of the United States. In the U.S., strategic thinking is concentrated at the level of generality where political purpose and military capabilities intersect. It is at this level that concepts of "stability," "esealation-dominance," and "action-reaction arms races" emerge. The intellectual underpinnings of Western arms control policy is provided primarily by the first and last of these. While there is a serious professional military literature in the Soviet press. focusing largely on operational-tactical questions, little is written at the level of generality where political ends and military power meet, and what is written is often propagandistic. This is an area preserved for the top Party leadership, which generally does not, and does not need to, share its reflections with the outside world. The absence of a serious arms control theory and the apparent absence of a bureaucratic framework designed to give arms control considerations an independent voice in the decision-making process are symptomatic of Soviet arms control policy-a policy which uses negotiations as a means of furthering Soviet power, both military and diplomatic.

Arms Transfer Data Sources

Different issues related to arms transfers demand differing arms transfer data. At the moment, there are two sources available that aggregate data on military expenditures: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The data given cover only part of the requirements for comprehensive arms trade data. SIPRI's definition is too limited to be of much value for serious research into the economic and social consequences of the arms build-up. ACDA, on the other hand, has a very serious coverage problem. Both sources are very confusing on pricing arms transfers. All in all, there is no good source on arms transfers on which detailed studies or judgments can be based.

Watchdog for nuclear development: Technology can help monitor civilian uses of nuclear energy while discouraging military applications

At a time when nuclear proliferation seems a growing threat to world peace, many countries are supporting technical efforts to monitor the constructive uses of nuclear, energy to help ensure that nuclear materials and technology are not diverted to weapons use. Recover (for REmote Continual VERification) is an experimental system designed to transmit data automatically from sensors at nuclear sites around the world to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. The system was developed under the auspices of the IAEA in a program initiated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

Worldwide Defense Expenditures

AbstractThe report that follows is taken from a research report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), “Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data, 1964,” January 1966. It presents the results of a project conducted by the Economics Bureau of the ACDA. The interpretations and conclusions expressed were working hypotheses of the authors intended for intra-agency use.The report is a pioneering effort by ACDA to show how much the nations of the world spend for defense, as compared with their overall economic resources—gross national product (GNP)—and the amounts devoted to such peaceful pursuits as education, public health, and foreign aid. As the Agency wishes to emphasize that the individual figures are in many cases extremely rough, a note on the statistics on page 48 describes some of the qualifications of the data. The ACDA plans to continue these annual compilations of world military expenditures.